

## Defeat in the Chūn/Chyōu

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**Abstract.** We here consider how victory and defeat are treated in the Chūn/Chyōu. We find that the Lǚ court of Spring and Autumn times viewed military operations not in a chivalric or moralizing way, like characters in Dzwǒ Jwàn 左傳 (DJ) *narratives* of Spring and Autumn events, but in a cold-eyed military advantage way.

**Victory.** In the 500 CC entries for military operations, “victory” (shǜng 勝) never occurs. Of the ruler prowess culture which is conspicuous in the Near East,<sup>1</sup> or the warrior’s honor/reward ethos which is reflected in many Jōu bronze inscriptions, there is no trace. That culture surely obtained among the *warriors* of Spring and Autumn, but the court viewpoint reflected in the CC evidently differs.

**Defeat.** The basic verb is bài 敗, which appears 16x in the CC; an alternate term, bài-jī 敗績, also occurs 16x. The element jī 績, which never occurs separately in CC, can mean “spin” (Shī 133B3 不績其麻 “not spinning her hemp”) or more generally “accomplishment” (Shī 244E2 維禹之績 “it was the work of Yǔ”). How one gets from this to the *negative* accomplishment of bài-jī is a puzzle. A possible clue is the DJ 8/8:2 phrase gūng-jī 功績 “[then he will achieve] a *meritorious* result,” leaving it open for jī to be qualified in the opposite sense, as “[incur] a 敗績 *disgraceful* result.” The next question is, What is the meaning of bài-jī, as distinct from bài, in the CC?

**Shame.** All defeats are shameful for a warrior. Perhaps (as Legge’s “disgracefully defeated” suggests) the defeats labeled bài-jī were *especially* shameful. We note in support that some bài-jī occur in the home territory of the defeated force, where a win would be expected. But others do not, and since most bài-jī defeats do not involve Lǚ, it would have had no role in punishing the leaders; information about humiliation *as such* would thus have had no operative value for the Lǚ court. The *term* may have arisen among warriors, but that is not its *content* in the CC.

**Individuals** were undoubtedly rewarded for merit, but no such reward is recorded in the CC, which does show that those guilty of military failure were punished. The year 0632 began with a Jīn invasion of Wèi (5/28:1). Mǎi, an uncle of Syī-gūng, had been remiss in protecting Wèi from invasion (戍衛不卒戍), and Lǚ, that is, Syī-gūng, put him to death (刺之; 5/28:2). A force under a Chǔ officer (楚人) had gone to the relief of Wèi (5/28:3), but was defeated by Jīn and its allies (bài-jī; 5/28:5); Chǔ later killed its high officer Dǔ-chǔn (殺其大夫得臣; 5/28:6).

<sup>1</sup>For the notably unreticent victory monuments of Near Eastern rulers, see for example Drews **Bronze Age** 49-50 (Egypt) or Liverani **Deeds** (Mesopotamia).

**Protocol.** With two exceptions,<sup>2</sup> the subject of *bài-jī* is the defeated *host* (*shī* 師), not its *leader*, which in the CC is a ruler or a deputized kinsman or noble. This reluctance to impute defeat to the ruler applies not only to Lǚ, but also to Chí, Sùng, Wèi, Yēn, Chín, Jìn, Jǐng, and Chǔ. It presumably reflects a CC convention of respect for rulers *as such*.<sup>3</sup> This may explain why the *bài-jī* statements are always in the passive voice, but it does not help us with the difference between *bài-jī* and *bài*.

**Severity.** Another possibility is that *bài-jī* defeats are more severe than *bài* defeats. DJ 3/11:1 explains: 敵未陳曰敗某師，皆陳曰戰，大崩曰敗績 “when the enemy is not drawn up in order it says ‘defeated the X host,’ when both are in order it is a battle (*jàn*); a great collapse is called *bài-jī*.” Legge may be influenced by this note in sometimes translating *bài-jī* as “suffered a great defeat.” Some *bài-jī* are followed by a long period where that state undertakes no new military actions.<sup>4</sup> But others are not; some states indeed are militarily active *in the same year* as their *bài-jī* defeat.<sup>5</sup>

**Disorder.** The disorder motif in the DJ definition is echoed by a Tán Gūng (Lǐ Jì) gloss to *bài-jī*: 驚賁失列 “were startled into flight, and lost cohesion.” But a fleeing army can recover its morale if it can regroup, or if it is rallied by its leader. What possible use could information about a *temporary* rout have had at the court of Lǚ?

A way out of this definitional impasse is to notice the distribution of *bài* and *bài-jī*. The simplest statement is that *bài-jī* only occurs in a military encounter which is called a *jàn* 戰 “battle.”<sup>6</sup> Then the actual information conveyed by *bài-jī* is not that a *bài* defeat was particularly severe, or that it resulted in loss of cohesion, but simply that it occurred in the course of a “battle.” It would follow that mere “*bài*” defeats occurred in encounters that did *not* qualify as “battles.” So we may next ask: What is a battle?

**Hypothesis.** We note that many participants in *bài* encounters are non-Sinitic states or nonstate peoples like the Dí, who did not possess the Sinitic art of chariot fighting, or may sometimes have fought differently. Between Sinitic states, CC information sometimes implies a non-formal encounter: a skirmish or surprise attack. Here the DJ definition is suggestive. We propose this hypothesis: in a *jàn* encounter, two chariot forces are drawn up and engage, and valor, not preparedness, determines the result. The result may be inconclusive (as in 8 *jàn* entries). But *if it is* conclusive, shame attaches to the loser, as it would not if the loser had merely been taken unprepared.<sup>7</sup> Defeats in less formal, non-*jàn*, contexts are not entered in the CC as *bài-jī*, but as *bài*.

<sup>2</sup>An officer of Wèi in 3/28:1 (0668) and the ruler of Chǔ in 8/16:6 (0575). The first of these is the first time that a defeated host was led by someone other than a ruler; this presented the CC scribe with a new situation. The Gūngyáng and Gǔlyáng commentaries labor over the second instance; they suggest that the reason is that the Chǔ ruler was personally wounded.

<sup>3</sup>For the ruler’s feelings as part of the court ethos reflected in CC, see Brooks **Distancing**.

<sup>4</sup>A famous instance is the battle of Chǐng-pú, for which see Brooks **Numbers**.

<sup>5</sup>See CC 2/13:1, 3/9:5, 6/6:2, 7/2:1, 8/2:2, and 8/16:2.

<sup>6</sup>The only *bài-jī* that is *not* the outcome of a *jàn* is the Jōu King’s defeat by the Máu Rúng in 8/1:6 (0590). The CC regularly shows deference to the Jōu King, and thus is unlikely to have used *bài-jī* here in an openly derogatory sense; see further n22 below.

<sup>7</sup>Note the implications of “en garde.” A stab in the back is not a duelist’s victory.

We now check this hypothesis against the relevant CC data. These comprise the 23 *jàn* (including 15 *bài-jī* defeats), the one *bài-jī* *not* resulting from a *jàn*, plus 16 *bài*, for a total of 40 items. We note that these entries comprise only 8% of CC military events. Spring and Autumn forces largely avoided the set-piece battle, and preferred the unopposed raid or the incidental skirmish: actions perhaps conferring no great military glory upon the *leaders*, but achieving results that were of interest to the *state*.

### The CC “*Jàn*” Battles

**2/10:4** (0702). Inconclusive. In summer 0714, Lǚ walled Láng 郎 (116°47' E, 35°1' N), near a bend in the Sè River. This gave Lǚ a protected outpost near to Sùng and to Tsáu 曹. Tsáu was also of interest to Wèi. In autumn the Lǚ ruler went to meet the ruler of Wèi, who did not appear; some difficulty between Lǚ and Wèi had passed beyond diplomatic resolution. At the end of 0702, Wèi with Chí and Jǜng fought a **battle** with Lǚ at Láng. Their purpose was thwarted, since Lǚ maintained its position at Láng.<sup>8</sup> In the following month, the allies covenanted at Wù-tsáu 惡曹, probably near Tsáu, and probably to discuss action against Lǚ, but no such action occurred.

**2/12:9** (0700). Inconclusive. After 0702, the Prince of Lǚ had often met with the Lord of Sùng; they covenanted in the 7th month of 0700. But further meetings followed in the 8th and 11th months, and shortly after the last of them, Lǚ covenanted with Jǜng. In the 12th month, Lǚ and Jǜng invaded Sùng, and a **battle** was fought near the Sùng capital, without any mentioned outcome, and with no described sequelae.

**2/13:1** (0699). Conclusive. In the 2nd month of 0699, larger forces (Lǚ, Jì 紀, and Jǜng vs Chí, Sùng, Wèi, and Yēn) renewed the fight; in that **battle**, Wèi and its allies were **defeated (bài-jī)**. In effect, the indecisive battle of 0700 was taken up with new allies in 0699 and fought to a finish. The issue seems to have been an increased Lǚ presence in the Sùng and Wèi sphere of interest.<sup>9</sup> Neither state could put together a combination that would force Lǚ to retreat from its advanced position at Láng.

**2/17:3** (0695). Inconclusive. In the 1st month, Lǚ had made a covenant with Chí and Jì 紀 at Hwáng 黃, a place nearer to Chí and Jì than to Lǚ; Lǚ was thus probably the constrained party. In the 2nd month, Lǚ covenanted with small nearby Jū 郟, perhaps as a counter to the Chí covenant. In the 5th month, Lǚ fought a **battle** with Chí in Lǚ; the Chí incursion was probably a reprisal for the Jū covenant. In the 8th month, with forces from Sùng and Wèi, Lǚ made an unopposed incursion into Jū, presumably in repudiation of its covenant with Jū. In the 1st month of 0694, the Prince of Lǚ covenanted with Chí, and later went to Chí with his wife, a member of the Chí ruling house. The Chí/Lǚ battle seems to have been a demonstration. Though militarily a standoff, it had made its point: Lǚ renounced Jū, and instead adhered to Chí.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup>DJ says that the quarrel arose over Lǚ's distribution of rations, and was settled by Lǚ appealing to the order established by Jōu, a typical piece of ritualistic/ceremonial imagining.

<sup>9</sup>DJ, Gūngyáng, and Gǔlyáng differ among themselves as to why this battle was fought.

<sup>10</sup>DJ here imagines a Lǚ/Chí border dispute for which there is no support in CC. One point of interest in this sequence is that it shows that a weak state (Lǚ) could be forced to renounce a covenant (here, one previously made with Jū) by a strong state (Chí).

**3/9:5** (0685). Conclusive. Lǚ had made cause with a Chí faction in spring. That summer, Lǚ invaded Chí, explicitly in support of Prince Jyòu 紂 as a candidate to succeed the deceased Chí Syāng-gūng. In the 8th month, Lǚ fought a **battle** with a Chí force and was **defeated** (bài-jī). The long time spent by Lǚ in Chí presumably allowed a superior force to be assembled against it. Next month, in a separate action, Chí captured and killed Prince Jyòu. This Lǚ attempt at internal interference, which is understandable in view of previous Chí behavior toward Lǚ, led to a long period of enmity between Lǚ and the successful Chí candidate, the famous Chí Hwán-gūng.

**3/28:1** (0666). Conclusive. In the summer of 0667, Lǚ had covenanted with Chí, Sùng, Chǔ, and Jǐng, though not with Wèi, in the interest of common security against the pressure of Chǔ.<sup>11</sup> At the end of 0667, the Prince of Lǚ had met with the Lord of Chí in Chǔng-pú, in the territory of Wèi; again, Wèi was not present. In the 3rd month of 0666, a Chí officer led a force, invaded Wèi, and fought a **battle** with a Wèi force, which was **defeated** (bài-jī).<sup>12</sup> The attack probably had the prior consent of Lǚ.

**5/15:12** (0645). Defeat implied. Chín and Jìn **battled** at Hán, and Chín captured the Lord of Jìn, implying a damaging defeat. The general term bài-jī seems to be replaced in this entry by specifics which sufficiently indicate who had lost.<sup>13</sup>

**5/18:3** (0642). Conclusive. Chí Hwán-gūng died at the end of 0643. In the next month, a joint force from Sùng, Tsáu, Wèi, and Jū attacked Chí, hoping to influence the resulting succession dispute. That summer, a Lǚ force went to relieve Chí, with no stated result but perhaps reducing the number of intruders in Chí. In the 5th month, the Sùng contingent of the previous joint force (still in Chí territory after four months) fought a pitched **battle** with a Chí force and was **defeated** (bài-jī); the Dí people also came to the aid of Chí. Time had apparently redressed the disparity of numbers, and mitigated the previous confusion. In the 8th month, Chí Hwán-gūng was finally buried. As in 3/9:5, we see the neighbor states attempting to intervene in Chí politics at a time of presumptive Chí military weakness (in theory, only the ruler could lead the forces of the state; with the succession disputed, the forces might accordingly be hampered).

**5/22:3** (0638). Inconclusive. In autumn 0639, the rulers of Sùng, Chǔ, Chǔ, Tsài, Jǐng, and several other states (but not including Lǚ) had met to make a covenant. At the meeting, the others had seized the ruler of Sùng and forthwith invaded Sùng. That winter, pursuing a parallel interest of its own, Lǚ invaded small nearby Jū, without any stated result. At the same time, an envoy from Chǔ came to present to Lǚ some of the spoils of the Sùng invasion; Lǚ at this time was sympathetic to Chǔ's attempt to expand its influence into the north. In the 12th month, the Prince of Lǚ met with Chǔ and its allies. At that meeting, the ruler of Sùng was released from captivity, perhaps at the suggestion of Lǚ. In the 3rd month of 0638, Lǚ again invaded Jū, and this time took its territory Syw-jyè 須句. In summer, the rulers of Sùng, Wèi, Syw 許, and Tǐng had attacked Jǐng.

<sup>11</sup>This is the meaning of the special term 同盟; see Brooks **League**.

<sup>12</sup>DJ describes a Chí force led by the Lord of Chí; this conflicts with the CC record.

<sup>13</sup>On this blank canvas, DJ spins a tremendous tale of depravity and aggrieved loyalty.

Not taking part in these events, but perhaps profiting from the distraction of many nearby states, Lǚ in the 8th month moved into Jū territory. This time a Jū force opposed Lǚ, and a **battle** was fought in Shv̄ng-syng 升陞, near Jū. No details are given, but later CC entries do not suggest success.<sup>14</sup> It seems that a Lǚ attempt to take territory from Jū was met by a force sufficient to thwart it: a successful blocking action. No very large force can have been fielded by Jū, and probably the Lǚ invading force was also modest. This would then qualify as a “battle” not by its size, but because *this* time the Jū force was drawn up and ready to resist.

**5/22:4** (0638). Conclusive. As the conclusion of the series of events affecting Sùng, in the 11th month Sùng fought a **battle** with Chǔ and was **defeated (bài-jī)**.<sup>15</sup> Sùng being thus weakened, Chí invaded Sùng in spring 0637, and besieged Mín 緡.

**5/28:5** (0632). Conclusive. Chí had twice invaded Lǚ territory in 0634. In response, a Wèi force had entered Chí. A Lǚ envoy had gone to Chǔ to ask military assistance. That winter, Chǔ invaded Sùng and besieged Mín, the city Chí had attacked in 0637. Evidently with the aid of that force, Lǚ invaded Chí and took Gǔ 穀. In the winter of 0633, a joint force from Chǔ, Chv̄n, Tsài, Jv̄ng, and Syw̄ 許 besieged Sùng. Lǚ had met with the besieging forces in the 12th month, when they made a covenant in Sùng. Now come the tremendous events of 0632. In spring, Jìn invaded Tsáu and Wèi. Mǎi, a son of Lǚ Jwāng-gung and an uncle of Syī-gung, had been remiss in protecting Wèi from invasion; Lǚ put him to death. A Chǔ force had gone to the relief of Wèi. In the 3rd month, Jìn invaded Tsáu, seized its ruler, and handed him over to Sùng. Then in the 4th month, with contingents from Chí, Sùng, and Chín, Jìn fought a **battle** with Chǔ at Chv̄ng-pú; Chǔ was **defeated (bài-jī)**; Chǔ killed its high officer Dv̄-chv̄n, who had led the defeated Chǔ force. His error, like that of Lǚ in 0685, was seemingly to remain so long in enemy territory that a superior force could be assembled to oppose him. The Chǔ defeat was a rout. It so weakened Chǔ that for eight years Chǔ made no further military effort, and then only to attack Jyāng 江, a small and nearby state.<sup>16</sup>

**6/2:1** (0625). Unknown. In the second month, Jìn and Chín **battled** in Pv̄ng-yá; Chín was **defeated (bài-jī)**. There is no other CC information that would permit us to form a more precise impression of this encounter. See next.

**6/7:6** (0620). Unknown. A **battle** was fought between Chín and Jìn. No outcome is stated by the CC. As with other matters relating to Chín, the most distant of the states mentioned in CC, the Lǚ chronicler in this case may have lacked information.

**6/12:7** (0615). Unknown. Another **battle** of unspecified outcome between Chín and Jìn. A few months earlier, Chín had sent a friendly mission to Lǚ, probably to dissuade it from giving assistance to Jìn, as Lǚ would do on a later occasion (8/12:1f).

<sup>14</sup>DJ invents a bài-jī defeat for Lǚ, and then invents a cautionary tale of neglected advice to explain the defeat. Listening to advice, according to DJ, is the fundamental virtue of a ruler.

<sup>15</sup>DJ again explains this defeat as the Sùng ruler’s failure to listen to advice. As always, DJ is unaware of the grand strategical aspect of the text on which it is commenting.

<sup>16</sup>See Brooks **Numbers**. This famous battle may have led commentators to regard *all* bài-jī as routs or disabling defeats; other CC entries show the reality to be more nuanced. It is here that DJ sees an idealized “hegemon” system as being inaugurated; compare Brooks **Hegemon**.

**7/2:1** (0607). Conclusive. In spring, forces of Sùng and Jvng met in **battle**; Sùng was **defeated (bài-jī)** and Hwà Ywǎn, the Sùng leader, was taken prisoner.<sup>17</sup> A Chín force invaded Jìn, and that summer joined with Sùng, Wèi, and Chyn to invade Jvng, perhaps to gain the release of Hwà Ywǎn. Here, in contrast to 5/15:12 above, we have *both* a statement of defeat *and* information about the capture of the defeated leader.

**7/12:3** (0597). Conclusive. In spring, Chǔ besieged Jvng; in the 6th month, a relieving Jìn force **battled** with Chǔ, and was **defeated (bài-jī)**,<sup>18</sup> creating a sufficient power vacuum that Chǔ in the 12th month extinguished Syāu 蕭, near to Sùng.

**8/1:6** (0590). Anomalous. In autumn, the Royal host (王師) was **defeated (bài-jī)** by the Máu-rúng 敗績于茅戎. These Rúng presumably fought in a non-Sinitic way, hence the absence of **jàn**. It remains to ask why the defeat is stated with the passive *bài-jī* rather than the active *bài*. Perhaps the latter option would make the Royal force the object of the verb,<sup>19</sup> and the subject position in the sentence may have been thought by the respectful scribe to be the less undignified of the choices available to him.<sup>20</sup>

**8/2:2** (0589). Conclusive. In the summer of 0590, Lǚ had covenanted with Jìn. In spring 0589, Chí invaded Lǚ's northern border. As though in retaliation, that summer Wèi fought a **battle** with Chí in Chí territory; Wèi was **defeated (bài-jī)**. See next.

**8/2:3** (0589). Conclusive. Later that summer, several kinsmen of the Lǚ ruler led a force, and with forces from Jìn, Wèi, and Tsáu **battled** Chí, again in Chí territory; this time Chí was **defeated (bài-jī)**. That autumn, Lǚ took lands near the Wvñ River, which ran between Chí and Lǚ. Jìn at this period was the policeman of the north; its policy was to coordinate northern forces against incursions from Chǔ, and to keep the northern states themselves in balance, lest any become strong enough to challenge Jìn. Jìn is here maintaining a balance of power between strong Chí and weaker Lǚ.

**8/16:6** (0575). Conclusive. In the 6th month, Jìn sought military aid from Lǚ; none was sent. Without help from Lǚ, Jìn **battled** a Jvng and Chǔ allied force at Yēn-líng, and the joint force was **defeated (bài-jī)**.<sup>21</sup> Chǔ later killed its high officer, Prince Tsṽ, presumably for his responsibility for the Chǔ defeat (compare 5/28:5). The Lǚ Prince later sought to join the peace negotiations between Jìn, Wèi, Sùng, and Chǔ, but was refused admittance. Lǚ sought to redeem itself by joining Jìn, Chí, and Jū in attacking Chǔ's ally Jvng. A shakeup in Lǚ followed, some of the Prince's kinsmen being seized by Jìn or fleeing to Chí. In the 12th month, Lǚ covenanted with Jìn. On his return from the covenant, the Lǚ Prince executed his half-brother Yěn.

<sup>17</sup>DJ explains the defeat as due to wrangling and betrayal among the Sùng leaders; that is, to propriety violation. Propriety, whether in the abstract or as embodied in the advice of wise ministers, is ultimately the DJ's one mode of historical explanation.

<sup>18</sup>DJ explains this defeat by saying that Jìn had ignored wise advice: a warning that Chǔ was practicing virtuous government and was thus invulnerable: This kind of populist wishful thinking was also indulged by Mencius, whose career coincided with the late layer of the DJ.

<sup>19</sup>Compare n9 above.

<sup>20</sup>This is the only *bài-jī* entry in which the *agent* of the passive voice is expressed.

<sup>21</sup>Reversing its earlier analysis, DJ explains the defeat of Chǔ by its violation of every canon of populist government. Theory is triumphant, if behavior is perhaps a little inconsistent.

We here get a glimpse of factions in a small state, favoring one or another larger power. The larger powers were evidently well informed about these polarities.

**10/17:6** (0525). Unknown. A Chǔ force **did battle** with Wú at Cháng-àn 長岸. This is far into Chǔ territory, and that penetration alone counts as a considerable Wú achievement. Distance may have been a factor in the lack of further CC information. Later CC entries implicitly credit Chǔ with a successful blocking action.

**11/4:14** (0506). Conclusive. In the 3rd month, Jìn, Sùng, Tsài, Wèi, Chǔn, Jǐng, Chí, and several smaller states had met and then invaded Chǔ. In the 4th month, the ruler of Tsài had extinguished Shǔn 沈, taken its ruler back with him, and killed him. In the 5th month, the previous allies had made a covenant. Not deterred, Chǔ besieged Tsài in the 7th month. Wú, already a major enemy of Chǔ, joined Tsài in a **battle** with Chǔ, and Chǔ was **defeated (bài-jī)**. Rather than face the inevitable, Náng Wǎ of Chǔ fled to Jǐng. Wú evidently continued to press the defeated Chǔ forces, and presently entered Yǐng, the capital of Chǔ. *By this additional information*, not by the term *bài-jī* (compare 7/12:3), we may infer that the defeat of Chǔ was a serious one.

**12/2:5** (0490). Conclusive. In summer, Jàu Yāng led a Jìn force in **battle** with Jǐng; the Jǐng force was **defeated (bài-jī)**. There is no other CC information that would permit us to form a more precise impression of this encounter.

**12/11:3** (0484). Conclusive. In spring, Gwó Shū had led a Chí force and invaded Lǔ. In the 5th month, in retaliation, Lǔ and Wú joined in invading Chí. Gwó Shū, again commanding the Chí force, sought to attack the invaders separately, and fought a **battle** with Wú; he was **defeated (bài-jī)** and captured. Again we have both the fact of the defeat and the fact of the capture (see 7/2:1). There was a meeting between Lǔ and Wú in the following autumn, 0483, but nothing came of it (compare 2/10:4).

The **battles** above surveyed, whether or not with a stated **bài-jī** outcome, are final in the sense that whatever might have been the original goal, neither force undertakes further action immediately *after* the battle (the only exception is 2/17:3, which was probably fought to make a statement rather than to secure a victory in the usual sense). For both leaders, the opposing force was, *or had become*, the “objective point.”<sup>22</sup>

How were these encounters viewed by the respective courts? Was the Jū force in 5/22:3 told to smash the Lǔ army and faulted for its failure? Was it told to hold the position and praised for its success? We suggest the latter. In May 1942, a Japanese naval force moved to attack Port Moresby in New Guinea; an Australian/American force opposed. The latter lost the more valuable shipping; both withdrew afterward. Was Japan the victor because its losses were less? Was the battle drawn because neither side remained in possession of the field? Informed opinion sees a strategic victory for the allied opposing force, because Japan’s invasion attempt was thwarted.

The CC in 5/22:3, and in several other instances seemingly of the same type, does not say “successful blocking action.” Perhaps it had no terms with which to do so, and relied on its informed readership, the Prince and court of Lǔ, to supply that inference.

<sup>22</sup>Thus was Lee deflected from his nimble Pennsylvania raid into a losing set-piece battle with Meade at Gettysburg. Battle can redefine a campaign which had been otherwise conceived.

## Non-Jàn Military Encounters

We next survey the other group of military encounters which are identified by CC as ending in **defeat** (bài) for one side or the other, to see if our suggestion of jàn as a formal, prepared battle will hold for these events as well.

**1/10:3** (0713). Incident of invasion. In the 1st month, the Lǚ Prince had made an agreement with the rulers of Chí and Jǜng at Jūng-chyōu 中丘. That summer, Hwèi (a brother of the Lǚ Prince; back in 0719 he had led a Lǚ force which together with Sùng, Chǔn, and Tsài forces had invaded Jǜng) led a force which with Chí and Jǜng forces invaded Sùng. No outcome is specified. In the 6th month, some weeks later, the Lǚ Prince, apparently in charge of a Lǚ force acting on its own, **defeated** a Sùng force at Gwān 菅, and quickly went on to take (chyǔ 取) Gàu 郟 and then Fáng 防. These places are not far inside Sùng, in the area for which the town of Láng 郎, which had been fortified in the previous year (2/10:4, above) was the strongpoint. One imagines that the Lǚ force brushed aside a scratch Sùng blocking attempt,<sup>23</sup> and proceeded, unopposed, to take several Sùng towns. Sùng was not much weakened: that autumn, a presumably organized joint force from Sùng and Wèi entered Jǜng, and with a force from Tsài, attacked Dài. The ruler of Jǜng attacked the allies and took Dài. None of this shows the organized Sùng force as very effective; one also gets the impression that the Lǚ ruler was a better commander than his brother. But this is not the point at issue.

In this first non-jàn encounter, it is conspicuous that the invading force defeated an enemy and then continued with what was evidently its intended goal. The aim of the campaign was not *to bring on a battle* with Sùng, but *to take two towns* from Sùng.

**3/10:1** (0684). Resisted incursion. In spring the Lǚ Prince **defeated** a Chí force at an uncertain location in Lǚ, presumably resisting an incursion.<sup>24</sup> Next month, the Lǚ Prince made an incursion into Sùng. A month later, Sùng relocated a town which may have been too far from the Sùng capital to be defended successfully against Lǚ.

**3/10:4** (0684). Resisted incursion. In the 6th month, forces of Chí and Sùng camped at Láng; and the Lǚ Prince **defeated** the Sùng force at Shǜng-chyōu 乘丘, north of Láng. Lǚ seems to have attacked the Sùng contingent separately, weakening the joint force and eliminating the threat to Láng; it was this maneuver which Gwó Shū tried and failed to execute in 12/11:3. If the attack was a surprise one,<sup>25</sup> then the lack of jàn need not puzzle us: there was no “battle,” rather, a less formal encounter.

**3/10:5** (0684). Successful incursion. In the 9th month, Jīng 荆 (later “Chǔ 楚”) **defeated** the Tsài host at Syīn 莘 and carried off the Lord of Tsài. We may suppose that here Chǔ overcame (bài) any Tsài resistance,<sup>26</sup> and went on with its decapitation strike against Tsài.

<sup>23</sup>DJ here agrees in imagining a Lǚ attack on an unprepared Sùng force.

<sup>24</sup>DJ here tells the famous story of Tsáu Gwèi, a commoner who on being assured of the Lǚ Prince’s assiduousness in meting out justice, symbolically joins him in his chariot and guides him to victory over Chí. This is merely more DJ populism, a special version of DJ moralism.

<sup>25</sup>To its credit (and following its own theory), DJ also visualizes the encounter this way.

<sup>26</sup>DJ complicates this scenario with a propriety-violation subplot of insult and revenge.

**3/11:2** (0683). Unknown. In the 5th month, the Lǚ Prince **defeated** a Sùng host at Jìn 鄩, probably in territory recently disputed between Sùng and Lǚ, and near Láng.<sup>27</sup>

**5/1:8** (0659). Unknown. In the 8th month, Lǚ had covenanted with Chí, Sùng, Jǐng, Tsáu, and Jū. In the 9th month, Lǚ alone **defeated** a Jū host at Yěn 偃.

**5/1:9** (0659). Failed blocking action. In the 10th month, the Lǚ Prince's kinsman Yǒu 友 led the Lǚ host, **defeated** a Jyǚ 莒 host at Lì 郚, and went on to capture 獲 Jyǚ's Ná 挈. This is reminiscent of Lǚ Yǐn-gūng's exploit in Sùng (1/10:3), where a minor encounter on the way did not deflect the invader from his purpose.

**5/15:11** (0645). Successful incursion. In spring, a Chǔ force attacked Syw 徐. In the 3rd month, a Lǚ contingent with forces from Chí, Sùng, Wèi, Jǐng, Syw 許, and Tsáu went to relieve Syw. Actions later that year are recorded for Chí, Sùng, and Tsáu; that winter, Sùng attacked its previous ally Tsáu; that month a Chǔ force **defeated** Syw 徐 at Lóu-lín 婁林. The allies having dispersed, that second Chǔ effort succeeded. Note that the defeated Syw force is not called a “host” 師, the standard Sinitic term; indeed, no Syw 師 host is ever mentioned in the CC. In 10/4:2 (0538) Syw met with others, most of non-Sinitic origin, among them a non-Sinitic and *non-state* people, the Yí 夷 tribes of the Hwái River area. A “non-Sinitic” explanation suffices.

**5/33:3** (0627). Uncertain. At the end of 0628, the legendary Wǎn-gūng of Jìn had died. In the 1st month of 0627, a Chín force entered Jìn at Hwá. Chí sent an inquiry to Lǚ, and in the 4th month, aided not by Lǚ but by the Jyāng Rúng 姜戎, **defeated** Chín at Syáu 穀, on the Chín/Jìn border. The Chín force had presumably gone further into Jìn meanwhile, and was here in retreat from Chí and its allies; a rear attack is possible. So too, given Chí's Rúng allies, is a non-Sinitic mode of warfare.

**5/33:8** (0627). Uncertain. In summer, a body of Dí invaded Chí, and evidently also Jìn. CC later tells us that Jìn **defeated** the Dí at Jī 箕, in Jìn territory. The Jìn leader is not said to be in charge of a 師 host, and may have been fighting in a way adapted to the warfare practiced by the Dí. Details of this and other bà are not now knowable, but the prominence of non-Sinitic states and peoples in the bà list is very suggestive.

**6/11:6** (0616). Uncertain. In the autumn of 0616, the Dí had made an incursion into Chí. In the 10th month, Shúsūn Dý-chvń **defeated** the Dí at Syén 鹹, apparently a place within Lǚ, which we must assume had also been attacked. See preceding.

**8/12:3** (0579). Uncertain. In the autumn of 0579, a Jìn leader **defeated** the Dí at Jyāu-gāng 交剛, probably in Jìn territory. See preceding.

**10/1:6** (0541). Uncertain. In the 6th month, Sywń Wú 荀吳 of Jìn led a host and **defeated** the Dí at Dà-lǚ 大鹵, in Jìn territory. Except for the “host,” see preceding.

**10/5:6** (0537). Uncertain. Shú Gūng led the Lǚ host and **defeated** a Jyǚ host at Fvń-chywán 蚡泉 in Lǚ. We suggest that the Jyǚ force was not prepared for the Lǚ force, so that a set-piece battle, with both sides *ready* for battle, did not occur.

<sup>27</sup>Thus Shwō-wń. It is here that DJ (3/11:1) defines CC military terms, and gives a “disorganization” meaning to bà-jī (大崩曰敗績). This does not apply in all cases, though we find the DJ definition of battle as a two-sided formal encounter (皆陳曰戰) to be correct.

**10/23:7** (0519). Uncertain. In the 7th month, early autumn, Wú **defeated** the hosts of Dùn, Hú, Shǎn, Tsài, Chǎn, and Syǎ 許 at Jí-fǔ. Hú and Shǎn were extinguished, and Syà Nyè of Chǎn was captured. This implies a rout for the opposing forces. Non-Sinitic Wú made its first CC appearance by attacking Tán in spring 0584; it here continues to expand into the territory adjacent to it. The rout, and the capture of an opposing leader, remind us of similar jàn outcomes (5/15:12, 7/2:1); it is thus not for lack of severity or finality that this encounter is not called a jàn. A non-Sinitic way of war remains a plausible explanation. Slightly earlier, in 10/17:6, Wú had apparently been fighting in Sinitic style, and we must thus posit Wu's capacity to fight either way.

**11/14:4** (0496). Uncertain. In the 5th month, the state of Yǎwǎ 於越 **defeated** Wú at Dzwēi-lǐ 檣李. Both states belonged to the non-Sinitic coastal culture; neither entered the conflict as a 師 “host.” The fighting must have been on a large scale, but it may have been conducted in non-Sinitic style. So may all but two of the last nine events on the bà list. That frequent possibility becomes our explanation for those failures of the CC to call the event a **jàn** battle.

### Conclusion

We submit that our hypothesis is confirmed. There are two reasons why a military encounter is not called **jàn** in the CC. Either it was of Sinitic type but not formal, or it was of non-Sinitic type altogether. The *term* bà-jī may preserve the warrior's shame at being bested in a contest of valor, a contest which was culturally familiar and thus evoked his code of valor. So “disgracefully defeated” is a valid *translation* of the term, but that is not any longer what the CC scribes sought to convey by *using* the term. In the CC, bà-jī is simply the standard term for defeat in a formal jàn battle. It tells us nothing specific about shame, severity, or disorganization following from the battle. Any such information must be gleaned from other CC entries.

CC warfare, as viewed from the top (and what the CC gives us is precisely the view from the top), did not seek occasions for the display of valor. On the contrary, it seems to have sought to avoid such occasions, and to achieve its ends as far as possible by unopposed military force. To the Spring and Autumn ruler, victory in a set-piece jàn battle may well have been second best to securing, without battle, the state's objective: new territory gained by easy conquest, policy change induced by cheap intimidation, or successful interference in the succession crisis of some neighboring state.

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