Speaker Series: David Christensen (Brown) "Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue?"

Abstract: “Modest” accounts of rational belief hold that one should lose confidence in one’s beliefs when one gets evidence that one’s thinking on the relevant matter is likely to be defective. Conciliationism about disagreement is one such account. Some have objected that modest accounts self-undermine: for example, if a conciliationist encounters expert disagreement about conciliationism, their own view tells them that it’s irrational for them to be confident in it! To thoroughly believe as conciliationism deems rational thus requires believing in a certain way, and also believing that so believing is irrational. Beliefs like this manifest what’s often called epistemic akrasia. Many reject the possibility that epistemic akrasia can be rational. Others have defended it, by arguing that in certain cases, an akratic agent can see her own beliefs as more accurate than rational alternatives would be. This paper argues that akrasia can be rational, but that defending rational akrasia based on an agent’s views about accuracy cannot succeed in general. Fortunately, however, the defense is not necessary.

David Christensen is a professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He specializes in epistemology,