Christopher Meacham

Chris Meacham received his BA in physics and philosophy from Reed College, and his PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University. Professor Meacham spent a year as a Bersoff Fellow at NYU before joining the department at UMass in 2007.

Professor Meacham's work is primarily in Formal Epistemology (especially Bayesianism), Decision Theory and the Philosophy of Physics, though he also has interests in Metaphysics and Ethics. Particular topics of research include decision theoretic paradoxes, self-locating beliefs, the relationship between rational belief and chance, and statistical mechanical probabilities.

Electronic versions of his papers can be found in his personal website.

• "No Work For a Theory of Universals," with Maya Eddon, forthcoming in A Companion to David Lewis, ed. Schaffer and Loewer.
• "The Meta-Reversibility Objection," forthcoming in Time's Arrow and the Probability Structure of the World, ed. Loewer, Weslake and Winsberg.
• "Impermissive Bayesianism," forthcoming in Erkenntnis.
• "Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem," forthcoming in Asymmetries in Time and Chance, ed. Handfield and Wilson.
• "Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations," Philosophical Studies, 158 (2012): 257-287.
• "Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory," with Jonathan Weisberg, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89 (2011): 641-663.
• "Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary" (Part I: The Indifference Approach, Part II: The Regularity Approach), Philosophy Compass, 5 (2010): 1116-1126, 1127-1136.
• "Binding and Its Consequences," Philosophical Studies, 149 (2010): 49-71.
• "Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Uniqueness and Self-Locating Belief," in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 3, (2010): 86-125.
• "Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61 (2010): 407-431.
• "Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Beliefs," Philosophical Studies 138 (2008): 245-269.
• "Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance," Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 281-307.
• "Clark and Shackel on the Two-Envelope Paradox," with Jonathan Weisberg, Mind 112 (2003): 685-689.