In July 1815, the Parisian banker Jacques Fournel wrote to his friend Pierre Vitet in Rouen about the first three days of the second allied occupation of France, which he described as:

less courteous than last year…. The outskirts of Paris are destroyed…. Our friend R’s [probably Fournel’s partner Vital Roux] house was sacked, all the mirrors, doors, windows and woodwork smashed and 250 horses are roaming around the garden. [R]’s sister took refuge in the church along with a few other inhabitants of the area. Even the temple of God was not respected and she was forced to hide for three days in the bell tower. The sacred vessels, statues of saints and the virgin, all became victims of an enraged soldiery. This was a particularly ironic scene considering that the troops had been sent to place a very Christian king back on his throne. Peasant houses were not saved any more than the bourgeois ones. … Who could ever repair such disasters and erase the memories that they will leave behind?

1. Our thanks to Rafe Blaufarb and Katherine Aaslestad for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this introduction.

Denise Davidson, Christine Haynes, and Jennifer Heuer

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Until the twentieth century’s calamitous events, few moments of history have been as eventful and consequential—but also neglected in military history—as 1814 and 1815. Between the Battle of Leipzig in October of 1813 and the Battle of Waterloo in June of 1815, a coalition of powers undertook a series of military campaigns on the European continent and around the globe to put an end to Napoleon’s Empire—not just once, but twice.

In November 1813, while British and Peninsular forces under the command of the Duke of Wellington began to invade France from the southwest, the coalition agreed at Frankfurt to form three armies under the command of the Austrian General Prince Karl Phillip von Schwarzenberg to invade from the northeast: Schwarzenberg’s own Army of Bohemia; the Army of Silesia led by the Prussian General Gebhardt Leberecht von Blücher; and the Army of the North, led by the Swedish Crown Prince Bernadotte. In late December, 200,000 Allied soldiers crossed the Upper Rhine to invade French-controlled Switzerland, Franche-Comté, and Alsace. On New Year’s Day 1814, another 75,000 crossed the Middle Rhine, marching through Lorraine to the fortress of Metz. Despite some last-minute victories by Napoleon’s army and continued differences among the coalition leaders, within three months the Allies had marched to Paris, forcing the capital to capitulate and the emperor to abdicate. On May 30, 1814, the Allied powers signed the First Treaty of Paris. Although France escaped serious punishment for its role in these wars, it was reduced to its borders of 1792. Starting in November, the great powers of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna, where over the next nine months they re-configured territories and governments across the continent. Meanwhile, following a summer of war between Sweden and Norway, peace was also concluded in Scandinavia, with Norway passing from Denmark to Sweden. The War of 1812 still raged between Great Britain and the new United States, culminating in the burning of the White House. Despite the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent between these two powers on Christmas Eve 1814, the war continued into the new year, with the Battle of New Orleans allowing the Americans to claim victory, before this treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 16, 1815.

Ten days later, Napoleon escaped from his imposed exile on the island of Elba, landed on the coast of France, marched to Paris, and re-took power for what would ultimately be labeled the “One Hundred Days.” By May, Austria had defeated the Kingdom of Naples, under the rogue leadership of Napoleon’s brother-in-law Joachim Murat. On June 18, 1815, Napoleon met his final defeat at the hands of the British and Prussians on the field of Waterloo. This battle brought a definitive end to Napoleon’s rule; by late summer, the former Emperor was headed for exile on the remote isle of Saint Helena, where he remained until his death in 1821.

3. The composition of the troops at Waterloo was far more nationally diverse than these labels suggest; up to one half of the British camp, for example, may have been Dutch.

Waterloo did not, however, mark a neat conclusion to the Napoleonic Wars. For some Europeans, war essentially ended months before this battle, as armies were chased from their territory. For others, including those soldiers who were re-mobilized in 1815 and took months (or years) to return home as well as those Frenchmen and women who endured invasion and occupation, it persisted well beyond the defeat of the Imperial Guard on the field outside of Brussels. In analyzing the “end” of war, we must also remember how slowly and irregularly news of such events spread across Europe and, especially, the Atlantic world. Word of Wellington’s victory took a day to reach England and France; it took several days to reach Russia or Spain, and a week or more to arrive in the Americas. On a local, everyday level, war did not “end” at the same time.

Long after the Battle of Waterloo, societies across Europe struggled to cope with problems engendered by the “end” of these wars, including the return of soldiers and officers displaced or imprisoned far from home; the demobilization of hundreds of thousands of troops; the re-integration of these men into civilian life; the financial recovery from war debts; and the re-conversion of industry to peacetime goods. For a sense of the scale of these challenges, in 1815, Great Britain alone faced the release of 100,000 foreign prisoners of war; a public debt of 848 million pounds; and the demobilization of over 250,000 British soldiers—and the transfer of tens of thousands more. In France, thousands of prisoners of war crossed borders in both directions: between early 1814 and early 1815, over 16,000 French troops who had been captured abroad returned home via Strasbourg; in the last ten days of May 1814 alone, 15,000 Spanish and Portuguese prisoners returned to their countries of origin through a prisoner depot in Bayonne; and between January and May of the same year, no fewer than 66,000 soldiers and 5,500 officers of foreign origin left via the cities of Poitiers, Niort, La Rochelle, and Nantes. Following the Restoration, the French army continued to employ 240,000 men (many at half-pay), but many were demobilized, the infamous licenciés, and untold tens of thousands more were still imprisoned, displaced, or settling elsewhere on the European continent and around the Atlantic world. Almost every other state in Europe faced similar challenges, if on a slightly smaller scale, for years after the “end” of the wars.

In the immediate wake of Waterloo, France was invaded and occupied by over a million troops from Spain, Piedmont, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Denmark, initially covering more than two-thirds of

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5. Thanks to Christopher Tozzi for these figures, which are based on documents held at the Service Historique de la Défense [SHD] (Vincennes): Yj 16 and Yj 18.

French territory. According to the terms of the more punitive Second Treaty of Paris of November 20, 1815, 150,000 of these troops were to remain in the area around eighteen fortress towns along the northeastern frontier, under the command of the victor of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington. The French were to bear the expense of this occupation, until they had indemnified the Allies for the damages caused by the return of Napoleon, to the tune of another 700 million francs. Originally planned for five years, the occupation ultimately lasted for three. It had heavy consequences for the French, especially in the occupied regions. Designed by the Allies to ensure political stability in France and hence international peace in Europe, the occupation of 1815–1818 constituted a new approach to the enduring challenge of how to exit from war.7

Yet, even after the Second Treaty of Paris brought peace to the Continent, conflict continued—or began—to rage elsewhere in the world. While the Napoleonic wars have often been seen as a European story (with the exception of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt), their repercussions were global, affecting northern Africa, where the U.S. as well as Europe combated the so-called Barbary pirates; the Caribbean, where news of changes in government and territory was slow to arrive from Europe and abolitionism combined with the Haitian Revolution to destabilize colonial regimes; and Latin America, where independence movements were beginning to challenge the Spanish and Portuguese rulers, with help from demobilized men and weapons from the European theater.8 Long after the Battle of Waterloo, governments, armies, and civilians across the Atlantic world struggled with the consequences of over two decades of military conflict.

In short, peace did not come easily in 1814 and 1815, when many of the challenges of terminating war in the modern age emerged. These included reincorporating millions of demilitarized soldiers, living under foreign military occupation, shifting borders and populations, re-building governments and economies, and re-defining gender roles. These difficulties were amplified by revolutionary political movements such as nationalism, republicanism, and abolitionism, which remained part of the mix even as conservatives in Vienna worked to control or mitigate those forces for change. Yet, aside from the rich diplomatic history of this period, little historical work has addressed the complexities of “ending” war in 1814 and 1815.


Until recently, military historians have devoted little attention to the final years of the Napoleonic Wars (aside from Waterloo). Specialists of the period have tended to focus on earlier campaigns in Italy, Prussia, Austria, Spain, and, especially, Russia in 1812. More than the Great War, World War II, or even the U.S. Civil War, this field has been dominated by traditional narratives of generals and battles. Since the nineteenth century, scholarly as well as popular work on the Napoleonic period has taken a top-down approach to the history of war. The historiographical revolution of the last half-century has barely affected the study of this important moment of transition. Instead, books on the officers and campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars roll off the press, supported by a number of organizations devoted to Napoleon, including the Institut Napoléon, the Fondation Napoléon, and the International Napoleonic Society. Based on an analysis of the corpus in Google Books via N-gram, the highest spike in works on the Napoleonic Wars in English in the last two centuries has come since 2000. A quick search of history books on the subject, again in English, on Amazon generates over 800 titles; many of these concern the Battle of Waterloo. The more scholarly Historical Abstracts yields only 50 books, but 425 articles, on the Napoleonic Wars since the beginning of this century. Some authors have focused on military organization, strategy, or tactics. Others have emphasized the role of international diplomacy or government finance in both the


fighting and the resolution of the Napoleonic Wars. This scholarship provides a global overview of these conflicts, but important questions about the experiences of combatants during and, especially, after these wars have only begun to be explored. We know even less about civilian experiences.

In the wake of John Keegan's seminal 1976 study, *The Face of Battle*, military historians of the Napoleonic Wars began to consider the experiences of ordinary soldiers, including veterans. Employing local archival sources as well as letters, journals, and memoirs, pioneering scholars such as Jean Vidalenc, Isser Woloch, Alan Forrest, and Natalie Petiteau have recovered the experiences and memories of French and, to a lesser extent, foreign combatants who served with the French in the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Following in their footsteps, others such as Rafe Blaufarb, Stéphane Calvet, Kevin Linch, and Catriona Kennedy have focused on the range of motivations, emotions, practices, and trajectories among soldiers as well as officers during and after these wars. They have demonstrated that, for many of these men, loyalty to regiment trumped loyalty to Emperor or nation; that, in the absence of official recognition of their service, re-integration into civil society depended on networks of alliances on the local level; and that, with the exception of a small minority, veterans were not likely to become Bonapartist agitators. Such research challenges both nineteenth-century perceptions and subsequent tendencies to associate former soldiers with nationalism and political dissent.


More recently, the field has joined the professional trend toward a broader examination of “war and society,” including what by the twentieth century came to be called the “home front.” Building on pioneering work by Raoul Girardet on the “military idea” in contemporary France as well as Geoffrey Best on “war and society” in revolutionary-era Europe, scholars have begun to analyze what they now often term the “military culture” of this period. Emphasizing the ways in which propaganda and culture shaped and were in turn shaped by the revolutionary and imperial wars, Jean-Paul Bertaud, David Hopkin, and others have shown how military values permeated many—though certainly not all—areas of social life.15 Perceptions of military values proved particularly important in shaping relations between France and its archrival Great Britain. Inspired by Linda Colley’s Britons, several studies have explored the role of war and military service in British national-identity formation.16 Following the pioneering work of George Mosse, historians have examined the significance of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in the development of national identity. This is especially the case for the German lands, where the myth of the “Befreiungskrieg” or “War of Liberation” has recently come under scrutiny.17
The most provocative contribution to the history of the “culture of war” in this period is arguably David A. Bell’s The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, which traces the development of the modern separation between—but also permeation of—military and civilian culture and between war and peace, from the Enlightenment through the revolutionary and imperial wars. In their militarism, he insists, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars foreshadowed the “total” wars of the twentieth century. Although this claim has been challenged by some historians who insist upon the difference in scale and technology of the twentieth-century wars, Bell’s book has renewed interest in the military history of this period.18

At the same time, there has been a wave of works on the role of gender in military culture, as well as on the memory of war, many in the cutting-edge Palgrave series “War, Culture, and Society, 1750-1850,” edited by Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest, and Karen Hagemann. In addition to illuminating the experiences of women (including camp followers) during wartime, some of these works have shown how femininity and masculinity were re-shaped by war throughout the Atlantic world. Others have focused on how the Napoleonic Wars were memorialized in memoirs, histories, songs, images, and public buildings—if not yet in war “monuments,” per se—well into the nineteenth century.19


As exciting and important as they are, these new directions in the military history of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars have not fully analyzed the aftermath of these wars, in other words how civilians as well as soldiers moved from war to peace, across the European continent and beyond. Traditionally, narratives of these wars have concluded with the Battle of Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna, but the conflicts that had involved most of Europe and much of the Atlantic world did not neatly end with Waterloo. In the immediate wake of this battle, France was invaded and then occupied for three years. Over the longer term, all of the countries involved in these conflicts faced numerous challenges, not unlike those of the “postwar” periods of the twentieth century, including military demobilization, economic dislocation, and political reform. In comparison to later “postwar” eras, however, the period around 1814 and 1815 has not been examined through the lens of the “aftermath” of war. In the last few years, some preliminary research on the process of demobilization has emerged. In addition, a few studies have examined the end of the Napoleonic Empire, including the occupations of France in 1814 and 1815, but most are fairly focused case studies of particular national contingents or local populations.

These exceptions aside, to the extent that this period has been addressed at all in the historiography—and for at least a half-century it has in fact been out of academic fashion—it has been through the lens of politics, as a “Restoration”
with a capital R, and not of the military, as a postwar “reconstruction.” Since the nineteenth century, most histories of the period from 1814 to about 1820 have discussed war as a backdrop to the high politics of the international Concert of Europe and domestic counter-revolutionary reaction. They sometimes mention key events such as the invasion of France and occupation of Paris in 1814, the Battle of Waterloo, the second invasion and occupation following this battle, and the liberation of French territory in 1818; but both diplomatic histories and national surveys have generally ignored the question of how these events shaped political (or cultural) life in this period.\(^\text{21}\) Even the most innovative work on Restoration political culture has largely neglected the links between this culture and the “exit” from war.\(^\text{22}\) A few interesting exceptions have appeared, including the works of John Bew and Will Hay on the intersection between war and politics in Great Britain in the 1810s, and some are beginning to question the very concept of


“Restoration” for the decades following 1815. On the whole, however, this period has remained the domain of political historians.

In short, the period following 1814/1815 is overdue for reconsideration by military historians. A quintessential case of the challenges of war termination, it deserves to be analyzed as a period of “post,” or more precisely “aftermath,” of war. For such an analysis, excellent models exist among the many innovative works on the aftermaths of the “total” wars of the twentieth century—for example, by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Antoine Prost, Annette Becker, Bruno Cabanes, John Horne, and Jay Winter, for the Great War; and by Guillaume Piketty, John Dower, and Norman Naimark, for the Second World War. Together, these works have brought to the forefront of military history the problems of what the French term “sorties de guerre,” or exits from war, including military demobilization, political as well as economic reconstruction, psychological trauma, and memory and commemoration.


24. On the concept of “aftermath” of war, see Matthew Stibbe and Ingrid Sharpe, eds., Aftermaths of War: Women’s Movements and Female Activists, 1918–1923 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). See also the work of Susan Grayzel, including Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and her more recent involvement with AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Council) Network Grant on “Women’s Organisations and Female Activists in the Aftermath of War: International Perspectives, 1918–1923.”

Inspired by such analyses, some scholars interested in the period 1814/1815 are beginning to take the study of the “end” of the Napoleonic Wars in some exciting new directions. Here we highlight several emerging topics and approaches as well as possibilities for further research. New themes include the difficulties of integrating demobilized soldiers back into civilian life, nostalgia for war, and questions of postwar national and political identities. Methodologically, these new studies incorporate approaches from Atlantic or transnational history, cultural history and gender history, the history of everyday life, and the history of emotions.

One promising approach considers the international dimensions not just of peacemaking but also of the repercussions of war, and the insights that apparently peripheral locations can give for understanding these dynamics. This may seem a given—by their very nature, war and peace involved multiple powers. For example, Brian Vick’s new study of the Congress of Vienna is an illuminating reconsideration of the intricacies of international negotiations in 1815. Other scholars have highlighted the importance of civil society, public opinion, and political culture in the Congress.26 However, there is still a tendency to frame this history, particularly in its postwar form, in national terms, in part because nineteenth- and twentieth-century European states celebrated resistance to Napoleon as a key stage of national development. Following new analysis of the Napoleonic Empire as an international phenomenon, scholars are beginning to examine the cross-national effects of the fall of the Empire.27 Contributors to this issue show that even in what is arguably the most “national” and central case—France—we need to think about limits to the nation and national history. Looking at postwar dynamics elsewhere similarly reveals both the power and the limitation of national frameworks. For the German lands, Katherine Aaslestad and Leighton James have illuminated the impact of the wars and their aftermath on Central European society as a whole, suggesting that focusing on Prussia as a proxy for the experience or identity of Germans gives only a partial story.28 Morten Ottosen has explored the dynamics that led to the dissolution of the 434-


27. Philip Dwyer and Alan Forrest, eds., Napoleon and the Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and Michael Broers and Peter Hicks, eds., The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

28. Katherine Aaslestad, Place and Politics, and “Identifying a Post-War Period in the German Confederation: The Hanseatic Cities, 1813-1830,” in Decades of Reconstruction: Postwar Societies from the 18th to the 20th Centuries, ed. Ute Planert and Jim Retallack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), and Leighton James, Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
year union between Denmark and Norway, and the growth of Danish and Norwegian nationalism. Others have argued that hostilities in Spain and Italy should no longer be seen as national uprisings.

Looking at the wider Atlantic world makes it clear that the reverberations of the Napoleonic Wars lasted long after formal peace treaties, and that demobilization had repercussions that extended far beyond the return of soldiers to their home soil. A number of scholars have begun to position Atlantic World conflicts, including the War of 1812 as well as naval and land battles in the Caribbean and Latin America, in the context of the termination and aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Perhaps most cogently, Rafe Blaufarb has argued that demobilization after the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 released dramatic military resources, both human and material, for potential service in Spanish American conflicts. These resources permitted insurgents, who seemed on the verge of defeat in 1815, to unleash a powerful comeback only two years later.
The end of war also had significant consequences for slavery and colonialism. Britain abolished the slave trade in its empire in 1807 and arranged several treaties on the matter in subsequent years, but regulation accelerated with peacemaking. With the Treaty of Paris in 1814, France agreed to end the slave trade within five years; Napoleon abolished the trade on February 8, 1815, during the Hundred Days; and the Congress of Vienna generalized the principle, on March 29, 1815. Although slave traders continued to circumvent the bans and operated in substantial numbers, historians have found that these restrictions represented real change. Most notably, Ian Clark contends that international declarations against the trade created a new normative framework that could effectively shame those who flouted its provisions.32 At the same time, the political and geographic complexities of the Caribbean complicate any analysis either of national identity or abolitionism and anti-colonialism in the early nineteenth century. The Haitian Revolution and its aftermath shaped many of the dynamics in the era, but the end of the Napoleonic Empire also loomed large. This was particularly true for colonies like Guadeloupe and Martinique, which changed hands. As Rebecca Hartkopf-Schloss’s work shows for Martinique, which had been under British control from 1809 and was transferred back to French control in December 1814, the Treaty of Paris influenced ideas about national identity and the future of the plantation system.33 The turmoil of the Hundred Days and the Second Restoration again called into question notions of political legitimacy, the rights of free people of color, and control of the plantation system.

If large-scale geopolitical analysis sheds new light onto the lasting repercussions of the wars, more locally-focused studies offer different insights into the experiences of living through mass demobilization, abrupt political change, and the restructuring of economic, social, and cultural life in the wake of war. Here the methodology of the “history of everyday life” has utility, although not all historians engaged in related approaches adopt the label.34 The extent and complexity of postwar repercussions become more visible when we look at “everyday” interactions.35 These can include interactions between military men and civilians, ranging from the small-scale skirmishes between occupying soldiers


35. On “everyday” economic experiences, including smuggling, trade, and networks, see Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor, eds., Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System: Local, Regional, and European Experiences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
and local villagers in France to the experiences of prisoners of war who straggled home or, conversely, established lives where they had been forced to settle. They also include exchanges between individuals and the state—such as the flood of refugees seeking assistance in Germanic cities devastated by war and repeated occupations, deserters trying to regularize their status, veterans seeking pensions, civilians demanding indemnities for war damages, or spouses and siblings hoping to discover the fates of missing men.

Such interactions reveal unexpected economic and social dimensions, from the individual—such as the shifting business of a furniture-maker away from wooden legs to cabinets and chairs as wars ended—to the collective, such as the role of women's groups in providing charitable support for the victims of war long after the formal cessation of hostilities. They also reveal hidden consequences of war for family life. One of the most striking cases may be that of couples who undertook paper marriages so that a man might be counted as a head of household and thus improve his chances of avoiding conscription. These couples then found themselves bound together when the Bourbon government outlawed divorce in 1816. Examining such experiences drives home the extent to which the end of war was not simply a question of a treaty or a regime change. Nor were the lived repercussions of war limited to veterans; negotiating the aftermath of war could be a long process for men and women, combatants and civilians. At the same time, these investigations can reveal aspects of the “inertia of the everyday,” practices and assumptions that continued despite dramatic political change.

The history of emotion also promises new insights into the transition from war to peace. Attracting the attention of historians of various periods and places, the field has proven especially influential among historians of the French Revolution.

36. The maker of wooden legs became a symbol for selfishness during the wars. For a quintessential example, see the caricature, “Le désespoir du tourneur en jambes de bois,” http://www.histoire-empire.org/docs/caricatures/desespoir.htm. On women's groups, see Aaselstad, “Identifying a Postwar Period.”


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To a lesser extent, historians of Restoration France and the Netherlands have also begun to look at the role of emotions in the political legitimation of post-Napoleonic regimes. At the same time, the question of how emotions have been created, controlled, and represented in conjunction with war and its aftermath has generated a substantial, but largely separate, body of scholarship. Like much of the work on the aftermath of war, it has focused largely on the twentieth century, but there has also been a growing interest in the early modern period.

The history of emotion suggests several avenues for understanding the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars that intersect with related work on demobilization, commemoration and memory, constructions of masculinity and femininity, and state legitimacy. Historians have explored the sense of anomie and nostalgia wrought first by revolution and then by war. The practice of battlefield tourism provides another way of thinking about emotion and the aftermath of war. This was especially the case with Waterloo, which drew flocks of tourists in the weeks and months after the battle. Commemorations of Waterloo varied across nations and would change meanings over the course of the nineteenth century. Visits to battlefields could evoke strong emotions—including admiration or respect, but also sorrow, horror, and titillation—among veterans and civilians. Governments and patriotic groups sometimes deliberately cultivated such reactions.


Other emotions were concealed or suppressed, particularly mourning the dead, as confirming the fates of the missing often proved impossible. While this difficulty presented a challenge throughout the wars, it took on a new urgency in peacetime, when men and women hoped to receive news of absent loved ones—and were often disappointed. The relative absence of rituals, monuments, or representations marking public grief compounded these uncertainties. This was most striking in France, where, as Natalie Petiteau has observed, the Bourbon Restoration organized public ceremonies for those deemed victims of the French Revolution, but not for the war dead.44 In England, official acknowledgement of the war tended to focus on the heroism of elites, rather than the sacrifices of the lower classes.45 The question of individual and collective mourning in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars—crucial after World War I—has received little attention from scholars.46 Further investigation may reveal more about the ways individuals and communities, as well as states, coped with losses, and how governments made use of other kinds of emotionally charged images to deflect problematic or dangerous emotions, including those of grief and suffering.

Inspired by the boon of studies on the remembrance and commemoration of the world wars of the twentieth century, historians of this earlier period are also now investigating the ways in which conflicts waged during the Napoleonic Empire were remembered by contemporary and subsequent generations. Much of this work has focused on the official and cultural memory of individual battles, particularly Leipzig and Waterloo. Other scholarship, inspired by theoretical studies such as Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s *Culture of Defeat*, has sought traces of the memory of Napoleonic warfare in popular culture—including oral traditions—through the nineteenth century. Together, these works illuminate the role of memory—or lack thereof—of the first “total” war in the formation of family, community, and national identity decades after its conclusion.47

45. Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary Wars*.
46. Calvet touches on veterans’ visits to cemeteries, particularly later in the nineteenth century, in *Les officiers charentais*.
As the above examples suggest, the history of emotion has often been connected to that of gender. While there is a growing literature on gender relations during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, including on the relationship between military service and citizenship, the literature on the immediate post-revolutionary and postwar moments is less developed. Several historians have begun to offer interesting angles.48 Considering the gendered aspects of war termination illuminates both changing understandings of masculinity and femininity and the dynamics of creating a postwar society. Two decades of more or less constant warfare interacted with other changes—including revolution and industrialization—to shape men and women's experiences and perceptions of appropriate gender roles. At the same time, various parties mobilized ideas about gender roles to negotiate the transition to postwar societies.

This process appears most clearly with regard to masculinity. The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars marked a turning point in creating and promoting new models of masculinity, sometimes labeled martial masculinity or virility.49 These models drew on an array of older ideas of military heroism, but were reshaped by the experiences of revolution and political transformation. Conscription, mass mobilization, and prolonged warfare also meant that ideals of martial masculinity affected many men who might not otherwise have defined themselves as warriors. Examining the aftermath of war presents both the limits of martial masculinity and its long-term reverberations. One of the immediate challenges facing postwar governments was the absorption of returned soldiers into civilian life, which in some cases entailed significant reworking of models of masculinity. Stephan Dudink has found that in the Netherlands, the icon of an arms-carrying hero, ready to sacrifice all for liberty, was quickly replaced by that of a sedate, industrious, domestic father.50 French royalists regarded Napoleonic veterans with suspicion, often refusing or limiting economic support and subjecting veterans to strict policing measures, but postwar governments also mobilized different visions of masculinity—from recognition of


50. Dudink, “After the Republic.”
past glory to appeals to familial duty and the civic importance of agricultural labor—in an effort to reintegrate veterans into domestic life. Notions of martial masculinity were further challenged by the physical state of returned veterans. Wounded men had returned home throughout the wars, but mass demobilization brought home many more crippled, mutilated, or weakened men. The sight of injured soldiers could inspire admiration and respect—sentiments wartime regimes had tried to cultivate—but also pity, disgust, and ridicule.

The aftermath of war also affected women’s experiences. Violence against women was common not only during battle, but also in subsequent occupation. Rape was part of the experience of war, especially in areas where troops were given free rein. Leighton James has examined the violence that often followed assaults on fortified communities in German Central Europe, including sexual violence against women. Similar behavior took place during the invasions of France in 1814 and 1815, and during the subsequent occupation. In her research on the “occupation of guarantee,” Christine Haynes has found that countless acts of sexual violence were committed by all contingents of Allied troops against French women and girls during the three years of occupation.

Such attacks could have symbolic significance that went beyond individual brutality. When Bonapartist newspapers described atrocities that the Cossacks and other foreign soldiers committed against French women, for example, they sought to use these accounts of violence against girls and the elderly to stir up resistance to the invasion of French territory. Jacques Hantraye has argued that rape was a means for the occupiers to demonstrate power over the territory and people of France and was understood as a violation of the French nation. Yet these sexual assaults garnered little attention, especially compared to similar cases in the twentieth century, when real or threatened violence to women and children was invoked to galvanize national sentiment against enemies, or to recount stories of national suffering and grievance. At this stage, it is unclear whether the relative absence of this theme is due to different contemporary understandings of violence against women, or to lines of historiographical investigation, or both.

52. Haynes, “The Allied Occupation of France,” in War, Demobilization and Memory.
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Revisiting the aftermath of war with the goal of understanding ideas and practices of women’s citizenship is also a promising avenue for research. Not surprisingly, much work on gender and citizenship has focused on the drama of the French Revolution. In contrast, the legal constraints of the Napoleonic Code, social reactions, and the violence of the wars combine to make the early nineteenth century seem a deeply conservative one for women’s rights. In some cases in the German lands, however, women’s associations served not only as patriotic organizations, but also assisted in provisioning war refugees, invalid soldiers, veterans, and their families, and continued to take on such roles long after 1815. Katherine Aaslestad has suggested that in cities like Hamburg, which maintained distinctive urban traditions, such groups may lead us to rethink gendered claims to citizenship and their relationships to war. Here too more research elsewhere may offer new perspectives. Much remains to be done to grasp fully the complexities of 1814-1815.

The essays published here exemplify some of the best new work regarding the challenges of terminating war in 1814 and 1815. For the 2014 meeting of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850, which took place in Oxford, Mississippi, we organized four sessions on re-thinking 1814-1815. Of the twelve papers presented at the conference, we selected for inclusion here those that most explicitly addressed military issues. Employing a range of approaches, including medical, gender, transnational and micro history, the authors utilize very different types of sources, including correspondence, pamphlets, military archives, pension petitions, legal records, and diplomatic papers. Each gives a new perspective on the complexities that accompanied post-Napoleonic transitions, outside of as well as inside France.

Together, the articles in this issue make clear the value of revisiting the processes involved in ending the Napoleonic wars and embracing peace. These transformations required much more than diplomats sitting around a table in Vienna drawing lines on the map and assigning “legitimate rulers” to their thrones. Ordinary soldiers and civilians faced the transition to peace with a variety of emotions, from resignation to hope, from nostalgia to satisfaction. Particular places and people suffered more than others, as suggested by the articles by Hantraye and Tozzi, while doctors, administrators, and families all worked to cope with these returning veterans. Like the better known and better-studied examples of twentieth-century postwar transitions, the post-Napoleonic peace merits this attention as we move beyond traditional military and diplomatic history and incorporate the findings of social history, cultural history, intellectual history, and the history of the everyday. As after 1918 and 1945, veterans and civilians in the post-Napoleonic era had to negotiate complicated and difficult transitions, struggles that these articles attempt to uncover and explicate.

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