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Now that we have explored the multiple negotiations surrounding the creation and implementation of Bolsa Familia, one task—maybe the most important one—remains: assessing the efficiency of the program. The matter seems rather trivial and uncomplicated when compared against technical measurements of poverty. Nevertheless, the full complexity of the issue comes to light when we address the question of whether this kind of program can solve poverty around the globe. In other words, whether Bolsa Familia is something other capitalist developmental states with high poverty rates should emulate. This exploration will lead us into different theoretical frameworks underlying the origins and causes of contemporary poverty.

Technically speaking, poverty in Brazil diminished in a dramatic fashion since the inception of Bolsa Familia. As Figure 2 shows, the percent of people living below US $2 a day dropped from 21.74% in 2003 to 9.87% in 2009, and those living below US $1 a day dropped from 10.45% to 3.8% (World Bank 2011, 813-814). It is estimated that approximately 35 percent of this drop was attributable to Bolsa Familia (Hall 2008, 811). Quite conclusively, Bolsa Familia brought a marked improvement in the material livelihoods of millions of Brazilians. This was ultimately reflected in the elections of 2006, when Lula was rewarded with the votes he needed to attain reelection. In fact, there is a general consensus in the literature that the success of Bolsa Familia played a pivotal role on this matter (Hall 2008, 812; Hunter and Power 2007). Studies have actually shown that in 2006, 22 out of 26 states displayed an inverse proportionality between the votes obtained by Lula and the level of socioeconomic development at the municipal level. In other words, the poorer the municipality, the more votes Lula captured (Zucco 2008, 33).

The newly formed relationship between the poorest in Brazil and Lula prompted critics to argue that Bolsa Familia creates greater dependence of the poor on government hand-outs. While the political implications that Bolsa Familia had on Brazilian politics is palpably real, the argument that this creates a relationship of dependence that fosters laziness and idleness lacks empirical support. Contrary to these accusations, a study conducted by the International Poverty Centre concluded that Bolsa Familia was not detrimental to labour force participation among program beneficiaries (Soares, Ribas, and Osório 2007). Other studies have shown that 75 percent of Bolsa Familia recipients are actually employed, which represents an almost identical proportion to that of the wider population (Hall 2008, 815).

The fact that most beneficiaries use Bolsa Familia as a supplementary income to their jobs is a consequence of Brazil choosing to use the World Bank’s arbitrary benchmark to measure poverty.27 Even with Bolsa Familia benefits, the income of recipient families remains well below the minimum wage (Marques and Mendes 2007, 27). While immediate starvation and death is staved off, Bolsa Familia does not provide much more. Thus, the argument that such a meager income creates idleness can only be the product of the imagination of subjects who are completely out of touch with the lives of the poor.

More astute critics of Bolsa Familia, on the other hand, point out the fact that Bolsa Familia, as a policy that intends to lift people out of poverty, is a failed enterprise because it does nothing to create employment opportunities (Hall 2008; Hall 2006). Furthermore, they argue that “Bolsa Familia cannot . . . deliver a sustained improvement in health and education outcomes and a reduction of inequality in the long run” (Sánchez-Ancochea and Mattei 2011, 313). Lastly, they point out that the expansion on Bolsa Familia has been accompanied by a drop of investment on other social services.

. . . expansion in noncontributory benefits in Brazil through . . . welfare programmes has been accompanied by a significant drop in longer-term social investment . . . between 2002 and 2004, federal spending on basic sanitation and housing fell in real terms by 46 per cent. Over the same period at state level, investment in education saw a reduction of 12 per cent, housing by 14 per cent and basic sanitation by 18 per cent. Very similar results were recorded for social investments by municipal governments in terms both of overall as well as per capita spending . . . [in conclusion] there has been no coordinated effort at federal or sub-national levels to provide essential public services indispensable for the reduction of inequalities in lifestyle and improvements in welfare alongside improvements in individual and family income and consumption (Lavinas 2006, 7).

It is clear that these critics move beyond the narrow definition of poverty as a quantitative average that disregards quality of life, employment opportunities,28 etc. If we accept these rather reasonable re-framings of what poverty is, then the accomplishments of Bolsa Familia are much less impressive in light of the massive resources and exceptional circumstances that made the program possible.


27 As a reminder, Bolsa Familia’s cut off line was R$50 (Us$26.62) and R$100 (Us$53.23) in 2004, and R$70 (Us$37.26) and R$140 (Us$74.52) by 2011. If these monthly incomes are divided by 30, they reflect the two categories (Us$1.25 and Us$2 a day) the World Bank has to measure poverty almost exactly.

28 UNDP’s Human Development Index is an example of this. The HDI indicates that Brazil advanced to 0.718 in 2011, compared to 0.600 in 1990. This reflects a life expectancy of 73.5 years; 7.2 years of schooling on average (for those 25 years old); 13.8 years of schooling expected for that younger; and annual per capita income of $10,162. However, the HDI does not indicate the quality of education, or whether the education is conducive to employment. It merely measures the years children and young adults remain in schools. Similarly, quality of life is measured in per capita income, and disregards important aspects such as access to water and sanitation, level of ecological and social vulnerability, etc. Most importantly, the measurements are taken as averages, blurring the huge issues of inequality