

The COST of NOT BEING CHRISTIAN:
HINDUS, SIKHS and MUSLIMS in BRITAIN and CANADA

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In recent years, students of the economic attainment of immigrants have become increasingly interested in cross-national comparisons (Model, et al. 1999; Reitz et al. 1999). Rather than examining different groups within a single host society, they contrast similar groups in two or more societies. This new emphasis reflects both an increase in the number of immigrant destinations and an increase in the data available on immigrants within those destinations. To date, the most popular research strategy has been the US-Canada comparison, with the occasional addition of Australia (Borjas 1988; Baker and Benjamin 1997; Card and Freeman 1993; Chiswick 1992; Reitz 1998). The present inquiry takes cross-national comparison in a new direction. We ask: what is the "cost" of being a non-Christian immigrant in a Christian nation (Siegel 1965). More specifically, is the "cost" or penalty of being Hindu, Sikh or Muslim greater in Canada or in England?

A comparison of non-Christian trajectories in the old world versus the new is certainly timely. For many years, Islamophobia or, as Halliday (1999) puts it "anti-Muslimism" was known to be strong in Europe. But scholars are now uncovering the phenomenon in North America as well (Eck 2000). The events of September 11th doubtless exacerbate this response. Sikhs too have occasionally been in the limelight, especially in the 1980s, when Sikh terrorists mounted an unsuccessful attempt to create an independent Punjab state.

Research on the economic consequences of membership in a non-Christian religion has been hampered by the dearth of data about religion. As a result, many scholars use birth place as a proxy, a strategy that renders impossible a decision as to whether or not religion makes an independent contribution to ethnic attainment. The present study utilizes the 1991 Canadian census and the 1994 Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, both of which contain a religion question. Limiting our inquiry to males, we compare foreign born Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims to native born Christian whites on labor force participation, unemployment status, occupational status and earnings in Canada and Britain. A later section of the paper takes a look at the effects of religion separately within each country. Our main conclusion is that cross-national differences are few, but most groups experience at least one shortfall in each country.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

To develop our hypotheses regarding which nation, Canada or Britain, offers foreign born non-Christians the more favorable environment, we draw upon a typology that Alejandro Portes and his colleagues developed with a cross-national perspective in mind, though it has not yet been used to inform comparative research (Portes and Manning 1986, Portes and Borocz 1989, Portes and Rumbaut 1996, 2001). The typology identifies three "contexts of reception" as critical for the economic incorporation of immigrants: government policy, labor market conditions and ethnic community characteristics. However, our focus motivates us to draw selectively from the typology as well as to add to it. For instance, under the rubric of government policy we emphasize official responses to discrimination, in contrast to Portes and Rumbaut (1996), who stress immigration law. Another difference is that we consider several variables under the rubric of labor market policy, whereas Portes and Rumbaut consider only one. Our extension includes indicators relevant to immigrant labor markets and indicators relevant to general labor markets. Finally, our evaluation of the effects of ethnic community characteristics follows Portes and Rumbaut quite closely.

We begin, like Portes and Rumbaut (1996), with government policy. But, the policy we consider central in deciding whether Canada or Britain offers non-Christian immigrants the more cordial

reception is not immigration law, as Portes and Rumbaut would have it, but discrimination law. Both the United Kingdom and Canada offer comprehensive civil legislation that includes mechanisms of redress. Yet, we hypothesize that the Canadian system is the more effective, for four reasons. First, the Canadian law has a less stringent standard of evidence than the British law. Second, the Canadian law permits similar complaints filed by more than one individual to be dealt with together, while under British law each case is considered on its own merits. Third, the Canadian government underwrites the cost of pursuing a complaint; in Britain, financial aid is means tested and not always available even then. Fourth, the Canadian code explicitly forbids discrimination on the grounds of religion; the British does not. For present purposes, this provision is central. To be sure, there are shortcomings in both nations' regulations. A common complaint is inadequate resources for pursuing complaints. Still, compared to Britain, Canada has the stronger policy (de Beijl 1995)

The second context of reception Portes and Rumbaut (1996) identify is labor market conditions. Under this rubric, their key variable is labor market discrimination, a factor we consider along with demographic and economic indicators. Portes and Rumbaut start by observing that "...widespread discrimination may hold that certain groups should be confined to low-wage menial labor...or it can hold that they are simply too incompetent to be employable at all" (1996:85). In other words, gatekeepers do not devalue all outsiders equally; they construct a hierarchy of preference, ranking applicants from some backgrounds more favorably than others.

In the present instance, we are less interested in ethnic than religious discrimination. One of the few Canadian studies to take up this question is a survey of attitudes toward immigrant groups, some of which were described wholly in religious terms. In their 1991 survey, the Angus Reid group asked a sample of over 3000 Canadians to assess "How comfortable would you feel being around..." members of several immigrant groups. On a scale where 100 would be perfectly comfortable, here are some of the more intriguing scores: British 90.7; Italian 88.1; French 86.5; Jews 86; Chinese 84; West Indian Blacks 79.7; Arabs 74.9; Moslems 73.6; Indo Pakistanis 72 and Sikhs 68.8. Most relevant for present purposes, the disparity between Moslem and Sikh is statistically significant ($t=6.7444$, $p<.0000$).¹ Unfortunately, the researchers neglected to inquire about Hindus.

British data on this topic are also sparse; the data used in the present study, the Fourth National Study of Ethnic Minorities, offer some insights. Members of its white subsample were asked, successively, whether or not they were prejudiced against Asians, Muslims, Caribbeans and Chinese. Twenty-six percent of whites acknowledged being prejudiced against Asians, 25% against Muslims, 20% against Caribbeans and 8% against Chinese. This survey also asked all participants, minority or not, the open ended question "Of all the racial, ethnic and religious groups in Britain, against which do you think there is the most prejudice?" The answer varied with the ethnicity/religion of respondents. Among whites, 32.6% said "Asians", 10.6% "Muslims", 11.7% "Pakistanis" and 10.4% "Caribbeans". Less than one percent of whites selected "Sikhs" as experiencing the most prejudice, an assessment echoed by Sikhs. Taken together, these results suggest that, to the extent that the British take account of religion, Muslims are the group most likely to encounter stigma. Evidently, the distinction between Hindus and Sikhs is of less significance in Britain than Canada.

One reason for the difference may be that Britain was the setting for the infamous "Rushdie affair" in which the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death threat against India-born British Muslim writer Salman Rushdie. To be sure, Sikhs have also been the recipients of unfavorable publicity, especially in the 1980s, when Sikh separatism on the subcontinent turned violent (Tatla 1993). Yet, perhaps it was

not this publicity that triggered the strong anti-Sikh sentiment recorded in the Canadian survey, but rather a struggle over the right of male Sikh adolescents to carry kirpahs (a dagger that carries ritual significance) in school. This was a debate that polarized the Peel School Board in suburban Toronto around the time of the survey described above (Hudson 1991, Lakey 1991).

To sum up, the surveys cited here indicate that the hierarchy of religious discrimination is different in the two countries. Yet, to understand the implications of this hierarchy, it is also useful to consider the demographic composition of the labor force, especially group size. Calculations based on the 1991 Canadian census show that in Toronto, for instance, 1.0% of the male labor force is Sikh, 2.7% is Hindu, and 2.7% Muslim. Analogous data for London are not available, but our tabulations based on the ethnic question in the 1991 UK census show Indians make up about 5% of London's male labor force; Pakistanis and Bangladeshis together comprise another 1.5%. These figures create queues consonant with the expectation that Sikhs fare better in Britain than Canada and Muslims better in Canada than Britain. But, because both minorities are small, it is unlikely that the economic effect of the cross-national differences in their standing is large.

We turn now to a labor market condition that affects all workers, but which, we believe, has special potential to produce cross-national differences in the well-being of non-Christian immigrants: unemployment rates. Over the time period we examine, Canadians faced an unemployment rate of 9.4%; the British rate was 11.3%. These values imply that Canadian employers had less discretion in hiring or promotion than their British counterparts did. This difference is potentially important because, when labor markets are tight, employers are freer to indulge in discriminatory behavior than when labor markets are slack (Hodge 1973). High unemployment rates, in turn, depress labor market participation. This phenomenon, called the “discouraged worker effect”, occurs because job searches are costly. When individuals believe their chances of success are small, their propensity to search declines. Thus, the cross-national difference in unemployment rates suggests minorities in Canada will have both higher labor force participation and lower unemployment than their British counterparts.

A similar structural effect impacts occupational and earnings attainment: the more unequal the occupational structure or the earnings distribution, the greater the potential disadvantage for subordinate groups; the less unequal the structure, the smaller the gap between subordinate and superordinate (Reitz 1998, Blau and Kahn 2000). Unfortunately, comparable data on the occupational structures of Canada and Britain are hard to come by because each country's official statistics define occupations differently. We draw on Esping-Andersen, et al.'s (1993) cross-national comparison of occupational polarization under Fordist and post-Fordist regimes in 1981. They define occupational polarization as the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers within each regime. Using their figures and collapsing Fordist and post-Fordist regimes, we conclude that Canada has the more equitable occupational structure. The ratio there is 2.09; in the UK it is 2.30.

Turning finally to cross-national differences in earnings inequality, we draw on Katz's (1998), measure: the log of the ratio of wages earned by men in the lowest decile to wages earned by men in the highest decile. In both 1989 and 1994, these ratios were higher in Canada than the UK; in other words, Britain has the more equitable earnings distribution.

To recapitulate, the effect of labor market structure is not identical across outcomes. The earnings distribution is more favorable in Britain than Canada; the occupational structure and the unemployment rate are more favorable in Canada than Britain. Since the latter also affects labor force participation, on three of the four job outcomes, the structural variables favor Canada.

The third and final "context of reception" that Portes and Rumbaut identify is ethnic communities, in particular whether they exist at all, and if so, whether "...they are composed primarily of manual workers or contain a significant professional or business element." (1996:87) The occupational standing of group members is important both because immigrants encounter discrimination and because they tend to rely on one another to find employment. Thus Portes expects that newcomers with no compatriots to help them find work will be disadvantaged. Similarly, those joining compatriots who are mostly manual workers are likely to be incorporated into the labor market as manual workers, irrespective of their job qualifications. Newcomers joining communities with a significant professional component are likely to be introduced to jobs in professional services, though which occupations they access will also depend on their credentials. Finally, newcomers entering ethnic communities containing a significant business element are likely to be incorporated as ethnic economy employees. Since the job outcomes of self-employed ethnics and their co-ethnic employees do not depend on the practices of native white employers, ethnic economies are particularly valuable when the dominant economy is weak and/or discrimination is strong.

Attention to the history of the South Asian religious communities in Canada and Britain indeed uncovers some differences. Historically, the first to arrive in Canada in perceptible numbers were Sikhs, recruited at the turn of the last century to replace the newly outlawed Chinese and Japanese. Settling primarily in British Columbia, the overwhelmingly male Sikh population worked primarily in the lumber industry. Between 1908 and 1967, a variety of penalties and quotas restricted immigration from Asia. In 1967, the introduction of the point system nominally ended discrimination on the basis of national origin. Gupta explains, "With this new emphasis, the immigration of professional South Asians to Canada increased, changing the size and character of the entire community" (1994:62). Yet, once underway, this "new" wave of immigrants doubtless stimulated the relocation of relatives, since the Canadian immigration system allocates at least some points on the basis of kinship (Reitz 1998). Moreover, in the mid 1970s, Canada accepted modest numbers of South Asian refugees from Africa, who doubtless derived some benefit from the presence of their compatriots from the subcontinent. In short, in Canada, connections between the pioneering generation and late twentieth century migrants is relatively weak, but those arriving in the last 20 years have joined a well established community.

In England too Sikhs were the first settlers from the subcontinent. Initiating settlement in the post World War I era, these pioneers were mainly craftsmen, most of whom became peddlers. However, England's post World War II labor shortage eventually drew most of them into durable manufacturing. According to Hiro, "This wage-earning community was later to prove to be the nucleus around which Indian immigration to Britain grew" because, as economic and political conditions in India worsened, those with relatives or close friends in England were the most likely to emigrate (1971:121). At first, the new states of India and Pakistan limited passport holders to the more educated and affluent. In 1960, however, the Supreme Court of India struck down this law. In response, the Indian government moved from a de jure to a de facto means of emigration control. It restricted access to foreign currency, a policy that reinforced the advantage of those with contacts in Britain. Yet, as some of the barriers to exit declined, new barriers to entry appeared.. Britain passed its first immigration control act in 1962. To be sure, in the 1970s, the door opened briefly to admit African refugees of Indian descent, but with this exception, the only applicants able to immigrate from the subcontinent in recent years have been those with close relatives in Britain.

To evaluate the impact of these disparate migration histories on immigrant incorporation

requires attending to the interaction between the job locations of earlier waves and the skills of later waves. In the British case, earlier waves held manual jobs; this meant that later arrivals, even if skilled, were likely to follow their compatriots into the factory. And indeed, empirical research suggests this was so. More recently, recession has closed many Midlands factories, and Britain's South Asian population has turned increasingly to self-employment (Ballard 1994). As in most countries, ethnic small business relies heavily on the labor power of kin. In the Canadian case, earlier waves held non manual jobs; this meant well qualified later arrivals could expect to work as professionals, the less qualified could expect to secure support jobs. Taken together, these considerations suggest later arrivals to Canada have had channels to slightly better jobs than later arrivals to England.

This concludes our discussion of the many variables we associate with Portes and Rumbaut's three "contexts of reception". Now we use this material to predict which country will offer non-Christian immigrants the more salutary environment. With respect to the policy context, the discussion indicates that the Canadian government is more strongly committed to the protection of non-Christian immigrants than the British. Similarly, newcomers settling in Canada, most of whom arrived after the mid-sixties, probably entered more resourceful religious communities than newcomers settling in Britain more than a decade earlier. However, the labor market context contains a few variables that work to the British advantage. Probably, the most significant of these is the lower earnings inequality in the UK. Other things equal, stigmatized groups earn more in host societies where earnings inequality is low than where it is high. Because we believe that structural factors are among the more powerful determinants of economic attainment, we expect that the British advantage on this variable will overpower the more numerous variables on which Canada holds the edge. Thus, on earnings we associate a better outcome with Britain.

A second variable on which Britain emerges the more attractive is tolerance for Sikhs. However, we choose to under-emphasize this finding, for two reasons. The first is the difficulty an outsider has in distinguishing a Sikh from a Hindu or from a Jain, for that matter. To be sure, some Sikhs wear turbans and carry daggers, but, in the West, such persons are rare. Thus, those Canadian employers with a "taste" for discrimination against Sikhs will have difficulty indulging it. Second, in the absence of longitudinal data on Canadian attitudes, we cannot rule out the possibility that the low ranking of Sikhs was simply a reflection of intergroup tensions in suburban Toronto in 1991. Labor market disadvantage is rarely the outcome of brief antagonisms.

These considerations translate into the following hypotheses: **ceteris paribus, on labor force participation, unemployment and occupational status, the "cost" of being Sikh, Hindu or Muslim will be lower in Canada than in Britain; on earnings, however, the "cost" will be lower in Britain.**

Unfortunately, meeting the "ceteris paribus" condition is difficult because of a multitude of confounding factors. Below, we identify and discuss the most salient of these, all of which originate in sending countries. Like their counterparts operating in receiving countries, these sending-country traits can be classified under three causal rubrics: ethno-religious traditions (culture), family resources, and the selectivity of migration.

We define ethno-religious tradition as similar values, attitudes and behaviors of individuals of a given ethno-religious heritage, regardless of socio-economic status (Light 1984; DiMaggio 1994). As a first approximation at controlling for ethno-religious heritage, we compare groups that are religiously similar but have settled in different destinations (Reitz 199?). To take into account the potential effects

of national origin, we control for birth place.. Unfortunately, most non-Christians in Britain are South Asian but non-Christians in Canada come from a wide range of countries. This is an especially nettlesome problem in the case of Muslims because South Asia is one of many regions where Islam holds sway. Yet another problem is that culture interacts with context. For example, discrimination tends to exacerbate religious zeal. Thus, at least one analysis of Muslims in Britain argues that fundamentalism has gained adherents in response to British intolerance of Islam (Gardner and Shukur 1994). This insight implies that, if prejudice is greater in the UK than Canada, controlling for a Muslim affiliation in Britain has a different meaning than controlling for a Muslim affiliation in Canada.

Yet, the religious effects that we seek to control are those that affect economic behavior. Only if some intra-religious differences in religious practices produce variations in people's motivation to work or to maximize earnings are they relevant to the present undertaking. The first scholar to raise these issues was Max Weber. His analysis of the religions of India showed that some Hindu castes were more successful capitalist competitors than others (Weber 1958). Today, some scholars challenge the accuracy of Weber's sources, others the logic of his argument (Huff and Schluchter 1999). Nevertheless, caste is associated with occupation. Some castes are entrepreneurial, others specialize in a craft or a profession. Islam too incorporates a variety of economic adaptations. Ismaili Muslims are known for their exceptional ability to raise capital for business enterprise, other Muslim denominations are handicapped in this regard (Nanji 1983, Rafiq 1992). These considerations imply that we should control for self-employment and occupation whenever possible. Still, statistical controls are only partial remedies; moreover, self-employment and occupation are inappropriate in models of labor force participation and unemployment. To be sure, omitted variables always plague statistical analysis; the best we can do is remain mindful of them.

The same problem arises with respect to "family resources". Our definition of "family resources" parallels Nee and Sanders' (2001) description of immigrant families as purveyors of "social, financial and cultural-human capital" with one exception: we classify cultural capital as a cultural rather than a family resource. Family resources include social capital (links to the resources of others), human capital (knowledge and skills) and financial capital (wealth). Since our data include no measures of family background, our main control for these resources is education. But the educational advantage of Canadian South Asians relative to British South Asians, as well as the greater skill barriers associated with admission to Canada suggests that non-Christian Canadians have the relatively more prosperous family origins. Again, this would be a cross-national difference that we cannot adequately control.

The final, origin-based source of variation in immigrant attainment is the selectivity of migration. By this term we mean the unobserved traits that distinguish migrants from non-migrants. Selectivity can be positive or negative; that is, movers may be more or less talented, more or less diligent than stayers. Debates regarding the determinants of selectivity have been shrill. Traditional demographic theory holds that economically motivated movers are positively selected; on the other hand, persons fleeing natural disaster or persecution "...may not be selected at all" (Lee 1966:56). Recent scholarship suggests that sojourners, tied migrants (those who move to join family members) and undocumented migrants are also less positively selected than economic migrants (Chiswick 1999, Duleep and Regets 1999) According to economist George Borjas (1994), the positively selected also include people persecuted because they are members of a professional or entrepreneurial class and people settling in nations where earnings inequality is high, relative to the countries from which they emigrated.

These considerations are complex, but we conjecture that they are unlikely to translate into

large differences between Canada and England. In the main, non-Christian immigrants, especially the males, are economic migrants. Both countries house some African Indian refugees, most of whom, before migration, were entrepreneurs. The proportion of undocumented non-Christians is likely to be small, but perhaps larger in Canada--where large scale immigration has been underway for nearly four decades--than in England, where entry for non-EU nationals is difficult. At the same time, the proportion of sojourners--or persons expecting to return home--is likely somewhat greater in England, where many South Asians settled "temporarily". Pakistanis and Bangladeshis especially have clung to this "myth of return", but few do so before retirement; others arrange for their bodies to be shipped home for burial (Anwar 1979; Gardner and Shukur 1994). To sum up, countercurrents run in both directions, but we believe that the great majority of both countries' immigrants are positively selected, economically motivated movers.

Assessing these considerations together, we suspect that the factor most likely to contaminate our cross-national comparison is variation in social class background. The bulk of migrants from South Asia to Canada probably have more advantageous social origins than their British counterparts. Controlling for education diminishes but does not eliminate the problem, as scholarship on status attainment has long shown. We know of no way to redress this imbalance save to attend to it when interpreting our results.

DATA and METHODS

For Canada, the data come from the 1991 Public Use Microdata File of Individuals (PUMFI), a three percent sample drawn from the Canadian census of that year and, for Britain, from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (NSEM). The NSEM, which covers England and Wales, was undertaken by the Policy Studies Institute in 1994. It is less representative than a census based sample because it does not cover the entire population and because it has a lower response rate than censuses do. Of those successfully contacted, 79% of minority households and 71% of households headed by British whites participated in the NSEM (Smith and Prior 1996). Moreover, since the absolute size of the NSEM sample, 7,949 individuals is much smaller than the PUMFI sample (809,654 individuals), many ethnic minorities are simply too few in the NSEM to support reliable estimates.

For this reason, the non-Christians that receive primary attention on the British side of the analysis are Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims born either on the Indian subcontinent or Africa. Moreover, nearly all of the Africa born in the NSEM are twice migrant--that is, their roots lie in the subcontinent. In Canada, on the other hand, the Africa born include substantial numbers of Maghrebis (North Africans) and sub-Saharan Blacks, along with persons whose origins lie on the subcontinent. The Canadian data include a number of other categories that contain enough persons to support analysis, though the codes used to identify these groups are disappointingly broad. In terms of religion, there are sufficient Jews and Buddhists; in terms of birthplace, in addition to European countries, the data distinguish the Middle East, South Asia, Hong Kong, the PRC, the Philippines, Vietnam, Other Asia, Africa, Latin America and a residual Other category. Finally, the Canadian data contain an ethnicity question. Although it is coded very crudely and some of its categories overlap with birthplace-- it permits the analyst to distinguish "Arabs" from "South Asians" and "West Asians" - a distinction relevant to our analysis of the Africa born. Unfortunately, the ethnicity question assigns some sub-Saharan blacks to a "Black/Caribbean" ethnic code and others to a residual "Other single origins" code; hence, we cannot unambiguously identify sub-Saharan Blacks among the Africa born.

In order to render the two data sets as comparable as possible, we deal with these many discrepancies by creating five religious categories--Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and "Others"--and four birthplace categories -- South Asia, Africa, Britain/Canada, and "Other". In our multivariate analyses, we omit Christians and Britain/Canada, a strategy that allows us to measure the difference between being a member of a minority religion or nationality relative to being a native born Christian. In order to assure that this contrast is limited to white people, we delete from our analysis all native born Christians of non-European origin.

There are a few other limitations and changes in the Canadian data that deserve mention. First, with respect to the PUMFI, in order to keep the analysis of manageable size, native born European-origin whites were sampled at 2%. All other groups were retained in their entirety. Second, for reasons of confidentiality, the codes for cases coming from the Atlantic Provinces and the Territories do not distinguish among non-Christian religions. Residents of these regions were therefore excluded from the study.

Having described our sample, we turn next to our dependent and independent variables, some of which are also problematic. Four dependent variables are used in this research: labor force participation, unemployment, occupational status and the log of weekly earnings. Labor force participation is coded one if the individual is in the labor force--employed or unemployed, zero otherwise; unemployment is coded one if the individual is unemployed, zero if employed. Non-labor force participants are missing on this variable. For occupational status, we rely on Treiman's International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI). Although a translation scheme is available for assigning an occupational status to each of the 333 occupational categories in the NSEM, no such scheme is available for the PUMFI. Equally problematic, the PUMFI divides occupation into only 14 categories. Thus, we had to devise a method for assigning each of these 14 categories a status score. Following Ganzeboom et al.'s (1992) observation that "the costs of being crude" are severe only when the number of occupations falls below six, we computed weighted average ISEIs for each of the 14 Canadian occupations. Calculating these averages required three pieces of information: the detailed occupational codes associated with each of the 14 categories (Statistics Canada 1994), the title of and number of persons in each detailed occupational code (Statistics Canada 1995), and the ISEI score for each occupational title (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). To facilitate the mapping process, we used Ganzeboom and Treiman's "numerical dominance rule". That is, when a detailed Canadian occupational code contained titles associated with more than one ISEI, the Canadian occupation was assigned the ISEI of its largest title. After each of the 14 occupations had been assigned all its component ISEIs, we weighted the ISEIs by the number of their incumbents. Each individual then was assigned an ISEI equal to the weighted average associated with his PUMF's occupation.

Finally, with respect to earnings, there is a paucity of cases in the NSEM. Only 79% of employed sample members reported their earnings. As a result, only 94 Sikhs, the smallest religious group, appear in the earnings analysis. Nothing can be done about this shortfall save to acknowledge it when interpreting the results. A similar, less worrisome difficulty plagues the cross-national strategy, namely that the number of cases missing on the dependent variables is not the same in Canada and Britain. Consider, for instance, unemployment; 13.3 % of the British sample and 11.4% of the Canadian are sample missing on this outcome; i.e. they are not in the labor force. Neo-classical economists believe that jobless individuals are disproportionately the less qualified and the less diligent. If this is so, then the men appearing on the British side of a British-Canadian comparison involving labor

force participants will constitute a more positively selected sample than those appearing on the Canadian side. This disparity, in turn, might lead to an overestimate of the attainment of British workers relative to Canadian. Economists have developed several techniques to correct for this "sample selection bias". When estimating unemployment, occupational status and earnings, we estimate a preliminary equation that distinguishes missing from non-missing cases on these three dependent variables. This equation allows us to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, a variable that "controls" for the effects of selection bias. Interestingly, the Mills ratio is significant in the unemployment and earnings models but not in the occupational status models. This is probably because we ignore labor force status when analyzing occupational status; that is, any worker who reports an occupation is included in our efforts to predict occupational status, whether or not he is currently working.

The independent variables include human capital measures, indicators of family responsibilities, descriptions of regional characteristics, dummies for birth place and dummies for religion. Details about their construction appear in Appendix A. Information regarding which independent variables predict which dependent variables, as well as regarding which independent variables produce which inverse Mills ratios appears in Appendix B.

Both in order to simplify the analysis and because female labor force participation is relatively low among foreign born Muslims, the analysis is limited to males. Those Muslim immigrant women who report employment are a highly select group--an issue that deserves detailed analysis in its own right. Because of the shortage of cases in the NSEM, all men age 21 to 64 (rather than the more customary 25 to 64) are included. The analytic strategy is simple. For each dependent variable, a regression for Canada and a regression for England is estimated. The coefficients of the dummies for the religion variables in the two nations are then compared.

Because labor force participation and unemployment are dichotomous, we use logistic regression to estimate these models. This means that cross-national comparisons must be done cautiously; the coefficients generated by separate logistic regression models may be confounded by residual variation. Thus, we use Allison's (1999) method for testing whether or not an adjustment for residual variation is appropriate, and when it is, we test for coefficient differences using his interactive approach rather than the standard Wald chi square test. On the other hand, we use ordinary least squares regression in our occupational status and earnings models; thus a simple t-test can be used to test for cross-national differences between coefficients.

RESULTS

Table 1 conveys all the information available in our microdata about the ascriptive characteristics of the three religious minorities. Looking at the total cases within countries, Muslims are the most numerous, followed by Hindus and Sikhs. But Canada and Britain do not draw their Muslims from the same places. In Canada, about a third come from the Middle East, a third from Africa and only a fifth from South Asia. In England, nearly 95% come from South Asia. Moreover, South Asian birthplace does not have the same meaning in England and Canada. Consulting publications based on the 1991 Canada census, we found that 75.9% of Canada's South Asians are born in India (vs. 41.0% in our British data), 11.0% are born in Pakistan (vs. 38.2% in our British data) and 1.9% in Bangladesh (vs. 20.8% in our British data) (Statistics Canada 1992). Similarly, substantial proportions of Canadian Muslims speak Arabic or identify as Arabs, essentially no British Muslims do. These disparities mean that controlling for region of birth will attenuate but not eliminate the effects of place of birth on labor

market outcomes

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The cross-national differences among Hindus and Sikhs are less striking though observable. The main one is that England houses a higher proportion of both groups from Africa and that Canada houses a higher proportion of Hindus from the Caribbean. Sikhs do not report Caribbean origins in either destination. Finally, the response to the, admittedly limited language choices show four out of five Canadian Sikhs speaking Punjabi, but only half of their counterparts in Britain select this as their primary language. The differences in nation of previous residence are not great enough to account fully for this difference; perhaps variations in the language questions contribute.²

Table 2 presents descriptive information by religion on the four dependent variables in the two countries. A good way to see how the structure of the British and Canadian labor markets differs is to compare the experiences of native born white Christians, the overwhelming majority in the two countries. The best structural indicators available in the data are the rate of unemployment and the dispersion in occupational status and in earnings. All three operate as expected. Unemployment is lower in Canada than England (7.96% vs 8.63%), the standard deviation of ISEI is lower in Canada (12.9) than in England (14.9), while the standard deviation in weekly earnings is greater in Canada (825) than in England (408). To be sure, a portion of these differences reflects coding decisions--for instance, the Canadian census offers only 14 occupations; the NESM top codes earnings at 789 pounds a week. Nevertheless, these indicators mesh so well with theoretical expectations it is unlikely that they reflect only the idiosyncracies of measurement.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

With respect to the dependent variables themselves, the cross-national differences are small. Hence, even though our multi-variate analysis compares the gap between minority and whites in Canada with the gap between minority and whites in Britain, our descriptive analysis simply compares minority well-being in Canada with minority well-being in Britain. This undertaking indicates that, on most labor market outcomes, Hindus in Britain fare better than Hindus in Canada, while Muslims in Britain fare worse than Muslims in Canada. The most striking disparity concerns Muslim unemployment rates; these are 15.0 % in Canada and 38.3% in Britain. The Sikh comparison yields mixed results: labor force participation, unemployment and earnings are more favorable in Canada, occupational status is more favorable in Britain. This last finding surprised us. Given Canada's immigration policy, we assumed a goodly proportion of its South Asians would be upper white collar workers. Returning to the data, we found that slightly over a third of Sikhs in both countries work in manufacturing. In Canada, however, Sikhs are also over-represented in agriculture and in transport, while in England their largest concentration, after manufacturing, is retail trade. Doubtless historical differences in the characteristics of the sending communities lie behind these variations.

Table 3, which describes the major independent variables, offers some explanation for the cross-national differences on the dependent variables in the previous table. As might be expected, given their respective immigration histories, those in Canada are younger, have fewer post migration years, poorer English, and smaller percents married. In other words, the religious minorities in England incur a smaller deficit, relative to native born Christians, on all the human capital variables except education, on which immigrants in Canada have a decided edge. Looking within religious communities, education again deserves attention. In England, only 3.8% of Muslims have any higher education; the comparable figure for Canada's Muslims is 28.5%. Indeed, Canada's least educated religious minority

is Sikhs, not Muslims. Sikhs also have the poorest English ability in Canada, while Muslims fit that description in England. These facts are consonant with our observation that Canada's Sikhs have relatively poor labor market outcomes. Another way the groups differ cross nationally is in their propensity for self employment. Though all groups report higher self-employment in England than in Canada, within England, the religious group with the highest rate is Sikhs (29.1%); within Canada, it is Muslims (17.2%). This pattern suggests that both the characteristics of the migrating group and the policies in the host society affect rates of entrepreneurship. The final variable in the table, percent metro residence, shows that England's religious minorities are all less urbanized than Canada's, though in both societies, immigrants are far more urbanized than natives.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The results of our multi-variate cross-national comparison of the "cost" of being non-Christian appear in Table 4. Shaded rows indicate statistically significant cross-national differences. They are relatively few. On labor force participation, Muslims in Canada have a lower rate than their British counterparts; on unemployment, both Hindus and Sikhs have a higher rate in Canada, while Muslims have a lower rate.³ On occupational status and earnings attainment, the effects of membership in a non-Christian religion do not differ cross-nationally. Although not shown in the table, we also compared the effects of region of birth (e.g. South Asia and Africa) on attainment in the two countries. No significant differences emerged on any of the four outcomes.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The labor force participation results are surprising. After all, our models control for the structural factor most likely to depress labor force participation, the regional employment rate. In addition, Muslims in Britain are far more likely to be unemployed than Muslims in Canada. These two facts imply that the most likely result of the cross-national comparison is lower labor force participation among British than among Canadian Muslims. Yet, Table 4 conveys precisely the opposite trend.

Of course, labor market variables are not the only determinants of labor force participation. Supply-side factors represent another source of variation. One potentially relevant supply side factor is denomination; as pointed out earlier, there are significant variations in beliefs and practices within faiths. Yet, we know of no theory that posits differences in Muslims' propensity to work by denomination. A more plausible supply side factor is the selectivity of migration. We anticipated that most migrants in both countries were economically motivated settlers. However, this assumption might require amendment, especially if a higher proportion of Canada's than England's Muslims are refugees. Not only do theorists consider refugees less positively selected than economically motivated movers, but refugees are eligible for benefits that most other migrants cannot receive. Although detailed figures of refugees by religion, ethnicity or nationality are rare, Canada appears to accept more refugees than Britain (Employment and Immigration Canada 1991, NIDI 1994). To be consonant with our results, a refugee-based explanation must show that the key cross-national difference is religion not national origin.

To test these ideas, we constructed interaction terms in the Canadian data between being Muslim and reporting Arab, South Asian, West Asian or Black/Caribbean "ethnicity". When added to the regression, two of these were significant: West Asian Muslims were less likely to be in the labor force and Black/Caribbean Muslims were more likely. According to the PUMFI documentation, West Asian ethnicity includes Afghans, Armenians, Iranians, Israelis, Kurds and Turks; Black/Caribbean includes Caribbean backgrounds as well as Ghanians, African Blacks and Blacks, but not Ethiopians or

Somalis--the two major sources of African refugees. While these regional categories seem arbitrary, they do suggest that West Asian Muslims are an important source of the difference in labor force participation in the two countries, an interpretation we verified by re-estimating the cross-national comparison without West Asians. Still, we cannot be sure that a disproportion of refugees is the reason for the low labor force participation of Canada's West Asian Muslims. At this point, we can only say that this group is less likely to participate.

Turning next to unemployment, keep in mind that the estimates exclude non-labor force participants but include a selection bias term. Therefore, the possibility that Muslim labor force participants are more favorably selected in Canada than in Britain cannot explain the lower unemployment rate of Muslims in Canada. More compatible with our methodology is the interpretation that Canada's lower unemployment rate is a determinant of the Canadian Muslim advantage. At the same time, Canada's lower unemployment rate does not seem to have helped Canada's Hindus and Sikhs; they fare better in Britain.

How to understand this apparently contradictory pattern? At least two other variables help resolve the paradox: each group's position in the labor queue and its self-employment rate. Because the self-employed create their own jobs, self employed members of stigmatized groups can mitigate the potentially deadly combination of high regional unemployment rates and a low position in the labor queue. And, indeed, Table 2 reported cross-national differences in self-employment rates among religious minorities consonant with this interpretation. The Canadian-British difference is smallest among Muslims (4.8%), and substantially greater among Sikhs (16.8%) and Hindus (17.8%). This means that regional unemployment rates and discriminatory employers are less consequential for Sikhs and Hindus in Britain--where nearly 30% are self-employed--than in Canada where around 10% are self-employed.

Furthermore, the survey research described earlier suggests that white employers rank Sikhs at the bottom of the labor queue in Canada but not in Britain. We initially dismissed this finding, perhaps prematurely. One reason for our hesitation was the suspicion that Canadian employers cannot distinguish Sikhs from Hindus or Jains. An admittedly flawed way of examining this assumption is to compare the magnitude of the Canadian religion coefficients. This exercise reveals that the Sikh and Hindu unemployment coefficients are not statistically different from one another ($\chi^2 = 1.46$, $p = .226$), Sikh and Muslim unemployment coefficients are not statistically different from one another ($\chi^2 = 0.64$, $p = 0.424$). Thus, to the extent that the religion coefficients convey employer attitudes--an admitted simplification--the position of Sikhs in the Canadian labor queue is about the same as the position of other non-Christians.

To sum up, Hindus and Sikhs suffer more unemployment in Canada than Britain because they are less often self-employed and more often discriminated against in the former country.

The causal nexus in the Muslim case is somewhat different. Because the cross-national variations in self-employment rates are small, cross-national variations in regional unemployment rates are more important. In addition, studies suggest that "anti-Muslimism" is stronger in Britain than Canada. Taken together, these considerations translate into a Muslim unemployment rate that is four times higher in Britain than Canada.

Finally, the absence of significant cross-national differences on occupational status and earnings implies that neither cross-national differences in labor market structure nor in group standing are strong enough to translate into cross-national disparities by religion. Additional analysis (not shown) suggests

these differences generate variations in human capital returns, but the net effects of religion do not vary between the two countries.⁴ In other words, from the standpoint of religion, the consequences of settling in Canada or England operate primarily in terms of securing employment; for those with jobs, the effects of living in one country versus the other are statistically indistinguishable.

Before closing, it is appropriate to devote some attention to the "cost" of being non-Christian within each country. Table 4 offers some information on this point, but the models described there are restricted to variables that appear in both data sets. Moving away from cross-national comparison allows us to include all theoretically relevant variables. Of course, we remain constrained by the available measures; thus, in the Canadian data we cannot disaggregate South Asia or Africa into its components. Our main refinement is to add four dummies for ethnic group membership, again highly aggregated. They are Black/Caribbean, Arab, South Asian and West Asian. Though some of these ethnicities are highly correlated with birth place, they are only moderately correlated with religion.⁵

Table 5 conveys the resulting coefficients. In terms of significance, the pattern is nearly the same as in Table 4. Only one of the religion coefficients has changed: Muslims have significantly lower occupational status than native born Christians in the more elaborate model ($b=-0.8724^*$) but not in the simpler model ($b=0.6228$). Table 5 also contains some non-Christian groups too few to support study in the British data; namely Buddhists, Jews and persons checking "No Religion".⁶

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Using the figures in Table 5 as indicators of the relative economic well-being of Canada's religious minorities suggests that Muslims are the most handicapped, with Sikhs not far behind. The two groups experience about the same level of unemployment, Sikhs incur the higher occupational status penalty, Muslims the higher earnings penalty. Indeed, Sikhs earn significantly more than native white Christians with similar characteristics. To further explore the reason for this result, we re-estimated the earnings equation without controlling for occupational status. With this variable deleted, Sikhs no longer register a net earnings advantage; the effects of membership in the other religious groups, however, remain the same. In other words, Sikhs take up occupations for which they are overqualified, but within those occupations they earn somewhat more than similarly qualified native white Christians.

Turning to the remaining minority religions, we find that all four labor market outcomes of Hindus and Buddhists are the same as native white Christians; Jews have slightly higher occupational status and earnings--a finding reported before--and men with "no religion" appear both less likely to work and more likely to be unemployed. This last result suggests that the irreligious have greater employment problems than the religious, but because the category excludes "atheists", "agnostics", etc., further research is needed before this interpretation should be accepted.

Our last step is to estimate elaborated models for Britain. The data permit an extension of geography--hence, instead of five regions, we use seven and we disaggregate South Asia into India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In addition, we created five ethnic dummies: black, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Other. Again, these are highly correlated with birthplace but only moderately with religion.⁷ We aggregated the smaller religious groups into an "Other" category; those not supplying a religion are among the "missing" on this variable and we exclude them from the analysis.

Table 6 conveys the resulting coefficients for religious group membership. Significant findings differ from those generated by the simpler model in two ways: relative to native born Christians, Muslims are more likely to be in the labor force (1.1293^*) and Hindus suffer an occupational status

deficit (-4.4251*). Additional analysis did not reveal the reason for the latter change. The stronger Hindu penalty is not due to the addition of the Indian ethnicity variable; if it is excluded from the equation, the Hindu coefficient is only slightly smaller (-3.9100*). This finding means that, were better data available, Hindus might hold higher occupations in Canada than Britain; but this interpretation is speculative.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Using the figures in Table 6 as indicators of the relative economic well-being of Britain's religious minorities suggests the differences among them are small. Relative to native white Christians, Muslims are more often unemployed; Hindus and Sikhs hold lower occupations. Because access to jobs is a basic human need in industrial societies, some observers may feel unemployment vulnerability is the more pernicious handicap. From this perspective, Britain's Muslims are more disadvantaged than other non-Christians. Another study based on these same data concluded that Muslims were highly vulnerable to unemployment but detected a lower rate for Indian than Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims (Brown 2000). This analysis also differed from ours in finding that Sikhs were significantly more likely to be jobless than Hindus. Differences in sample and method probably explain the discrepancies; Brown's sample was restricted to non-whites but included both sexes and both foreign and native born South Asians

DISCUSSION

One way of summarizing our cross-national results is to weigh each labor market outcome equally and ask: which nation extracts the lowest "cost" for being non-Christian. Of the four statistically significant outcomes, three favor England; one favors Canada. Substantively, one of the more interesting effects favoring England is the lower labor force participation of Muslims in Canada--this is probably a correlate of Canada's more tolerant refugee policy. Equally intriguing is the higher joblessness of Sikhs in Canada, probably a result of Sikhs' political visibility around the time of the 1991 Census of Canada. The higher joblessness of Hindus in Canada is less consequential because, in neither nation is the coefficient significantly different from zero. Finally, Muslim unemployment is higher in England.

To us, the most appropriate interpretation of these findings is that, for non-Christian immigrants in general, neither nation extracts a substantially greater "cost" than the other. This is a surprise. We had hypothesized that, with the exception of earnings, Canada would prove the more rewarding host society. Several political, economic and historical conditions prompted this conclusion; for instance, Canada's more stringent anti-discrimination law, its lower unemployment rate, its more modest occupational disparities; the higher proportion of professionals among its South Asians. Indeed, we worried that our inability to control for the potentially more affluent family backgrounds of Canada's South Asians would bias the results in Canada's favor.

As already pointed out, one mechanism that seems to have undercut these Canadian advantages is discrimination against Sikhs. We too quickly discounted the intolerance toward Sikhs that Canadians reported to Angus Reid. This would not have surprised experts on the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, which has long detected a relationship between political events and public perceptions of immigrants and minorities (Schaefer 1998). Were Angus Reid to survey Canadians in the immediate post September 11 era, Muslims would doubtless emerge the most stigmatized non-Christian religious minority.

Still, Sikh disadvantage represents but one departure from our expectations. The overall pattern of our results-- no significant differences by religion for occupation and earnings; no significant differences by region of birth on any of the four outcomes-- implies that our theory was misspecified. In explaining these disparities, we turn to the work of Jeffrey Reitz (1988a,b).

In his comparisons of Canada and Britain as immigrant receiving societies, Reitz argues that Canada appears the more welcoming but that appearances are deceiving. By appearances he means that, in Canada, racist discourse is muted and overt racial conflict is rare; whereas in Britain, public figures are willing to assail foreigners and race riots appear endemic. Yet, when comparing levels of racial discrimination rather than levels of rhetoric or conflict, Reitz finds little difference between the two countries. For instance, field studies show about the same proportion of non-whites experience hiring discrimination in Britain as in Canada. Indices of segregation in housing are likewise quite similar. Reitz maintains that one reason the differences between the two countries are more apparent than real is that the goal of immigration has been very different in the two societies. "For Britain, non-white immigration occurred in the context of the obligations of a declining imperial power to former colonial territories. For Canada, non-white immigration was a trend within the context of a long-term program of national development." (1988a:117). Another cross-national difference that attenuates inter-group conflict in Canada is that its newcomers are relatively skilled. Perceptible inflows of unskilled workers tend to trigger discontent in most societies.

Reitz's perspective suggests we re-evaluate some of the variables we found supportive of Canadian advantage. For instance, although Canada has the more effective anti-discrimination law, Reitz believes that the practical effects of the difference are modest. In both countries, complaints must be initiated by individuals, not governments; in both countries, the goal of the legislation is conciliation not coercion. Other assessments suggest that the crucial legislative distinction is whether or not discrimination is a civil offense, as it is in both Canada and Britain, or a criminal offense, as it is in France. Civil offenses are considered more congenial to the filing of suits and the securing of redress than are criminal offenses (Banton 1994).

A second variable deserving of scrutiny is the ethnic community context. Following Portes and Rumbaut (1996), we concluded that recent arrivals to Canada would benefit from the high proportion of their co-religionists in the professions, whereas, in Britain, most later arrivals were handicapped in finding good jobs because most of their compatriots were factory workers. Recall, however, that by the late seventies, political and economic events in Britain brought the closing of many factories. Moreover, by the eighties, the Thatcher government launched several initiatives to support small businesses. These structural changes, combined with cultural traditions of entrepreneurship, enhanced the ability of British ethnic and religious communities to absorb labor. Canada too has seen its manufacturing decline and its services increase. But its South Asians have been less entrepreneurial than Britain's. This may reflect differences in the two host countries' approach to small business or differences in the castes and denominations of the South Asians settling in the two countries. An additional factor is that Canada's South Asian small business sector faces more competition from other entrepreneurial groups, for example Chinese and Vietnamese, than do Britain's South Asians. This re-evaluation suggests that substantial resources inhere in both nations' ethno-religious communities.

Nevertheless, we are unwilling to abandon the idea that general labor market indicators, such as unemployment rates, occupational structure and earnings distributions are relevant to cross-national comparisons of minority attainment. Regional unemployment rates did contribute substantively to our

understanding of cross-national differences in unemployment; occupational and earnings differences did not operate as predicted. At least in part, the failure was due to our methodology, which was limited to a comparison of dummy variables for religion. As suggested by footnote four, since the effects of occupational and earnings distributions are mediated through human capital, a better way to measure these effects is to compare returns to human capital within groups between countries. This could be done by estimating separate equations by country and group or by adding interactions between human capital and group membership in each country. Either way, these represent potential next steps in cross-national research on immigrant incorporation, whether that research focuses on the "cost" of national origin or of religion.

In closing, a comment on the value of Portes and Rumbaut's typology of immigrant incorporation as a tool for cross-national comparison. The typology directs attention to three contexts: governments, labor markets and ethnic communities. We concur that these are the appropriate contexts to highlight; yet, the typology emphasizes only one variable within each. While this formulation may be adequate for explaining between group variance within one nation, it is not adequate for explaining within group variance in two or more nations. In this study, the labor market context proved the rubric of expansion. However, depending on the research question, the government context and/or the ethnic community context might also profit from expansion. For instance, citizenship rules might prove a useful addition to the government context; sex ratios might prove a useful addition to the ethnic community context. Clearly, cross-national research on immigrant attainment is on the rise; scholars are increasingly in need of theoretical guidance. The Portes and Rumbaut typology has much to offer in this regard; with additional refinement, it can offer even more.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Calculations by the authors, who thank Richard Wanner for furnishing us with these data.

² For this datum, we relied on the NSEM question: "Apart from English, what language do you regularly speak in, or do others speak to you in, in Britain?" In the PUMFI, we used the mother tongue variable, which "refers to the first language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual at the time of the census" (Statistics Canada 1994).

³ Tests for residual variation indicated that an adjustment was appropriate in the unemployment regression. In order to enhance comparability across models, Table 4 contains the coefficients generated by standard techniques; however, Allison's (1999) interactive method was used to test for cross-national differences in the effects of religion on unemployment (Results available on request.)

⁴ For example, equivalent English language skills yield higher earnings in Canada than England.

⁵ The highest religion-ethnicity correlation for Canada is $r = .263$ ($p < .001$) for Muslims and Arabs.

⁶ The "no religion" category contains respondents who indicated they had "no religion" but excludes those who wrote in responses like "agnostic", "free thinker", etc.. These, along with "Jain" and other minor religious groups were coded as "other" (Statistics Canada 1994).

⁷ The highest religion-ethnicity correlation for Britain is $r = .278$ ($p < .001$) for Hindus and Indians.

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TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS of FOREIGN BORN HINDU, SIKH and MUSLIM MEN, AGED 21-64,
RESIDING IN CANADA AND GREAT BRITAIN (percentages)

Characteristic and Country of Residence	Hindu	Sikh	Muslim
BIRTH PLACE			
Canada			
Middle East/West Asia	0.3	0	32.9
South Asia	57.7	95.1	20.3
Africa	6.8	1.4	36.3
Caribbean/Latin America	25.4	0	7.1
Total Cases	1290	1182	2063
England			
India	48.9	83.3	9.7
Pakistan	0	1.8	54.6
Bangladesh	0.6	0	29.6
Africa	46.5	13.2	5.4
West Indies	0.6	0	0.3
Total Cases	327	227	766
LANGUAGE			
Canada			
Arabic	0	0	14.6
Punjabi	6.4	81.7	1.4
England			
Punjabi	11.3	54.2	23.9

Gujarati	39.8	3.5	5.0
Hindi	33.0	22.9	8.1
Urdu	7.0	12.8	31.6
Bengali	1.2	0	10.2
Syllethi	0.6	0	12.0
ETHNICITY			
Canada			
Arab	0	0	24.4
West Asian	0.2	0	17.2
South Asian	79.2	94.8	38.2
Black or Caribbean	8.6	0.1	6.2
England			
Indian	98.5	99.6	10.4
Pakistani	0	0	57.6
Bangladeshi	0.3	0	29.6
Black Caribbean	0.31	0	0.13

TABLE 2

MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS on DEPENDENT VARIABLES
 MEN 21-64, RESIDING IN CANADA and ENGLAND, by NATIVITY and RELIGION¹

	FB Hindus	FB Sikhs	FB Muslims	NB White Christians
% in LABOR FORCE				
Canada	91.5	91.5	86.6	88.3
England	88.9	84.5	86.1	87.8
% UNEMPLOYED				
Canada	13.0	15.2	15.0	7.98
England	8.94	19.4	38.3	8.63
MEAN ISEI				
Canada	43.9 (13.7)	36.3 (11.7)	44.7 (12.9)	43.0 (12.9)
England	45.9 (16.0)	40.3 (13.8)	38.2 (12.8)	43.3 (14.9)
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS ²				

Canada	677.34 (572)	652.50 (783)	661.89 (872)	755.92 (825)
England	747.43 (488)	558.03 (318)	514.85 (372)	765.78 (408)

¹Data for Britain are weighted.

²Earnings for Britain are adjusted to 1991 Canadian dollars.

TABLE 3

MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS on INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
 MEN 21-64, RESIDING IN CANADA and ENGLAND, by NATIVITY and RELIGION

Variable/Nation	FB Hindus	FB Sikhs	FB Muslims	NB Christians
AGE				
Canada	38.4 (11.0)	37.0 (11.4)	37.5 (10.7)	39.1 (12.1)
England	40.0 (8.5)	41.2 (9.3)	39.1 (10.7)	41.3 (10.9)
YEARS since MIGRATION				
Canada	10.8 (8.0)	11.8 (7.7)	10.0 (7.8)	na
England	20.6 (7.5)	23.3 (8.2)	20.8 (9.3)	na
% HIGHER EDUCATION				
Canada	28.8	19.3	28.5	12.9
England	13.8	9.3	3.8	11.3
ENGLISH ABILITY				
Canada	2.7 (1.0)	2.1 (0.6)	2.5 (0.9)	na
England	3.6 (0.7)	3.3 (0.8)	3.0 (0.9)	na
% MARRIED-SPOUSE PRESENT				

Canada	74.0	79.2	67.2	58.6
England	91.4	91.7	88.4	69.5
% SELF EMPLOYED				
Canada	9.9	12.3	17.2	12.6
England	27.7	29.1	22.0	21.5
% RESIDE in METROPOLITAN AREA				
Canada	95.6	85.2	96.1	57.1
England	70.6	75.1	76.0	28.5

TABLE 4
NET EFFECTS OF BIRTH PLACE AND RELIGION ON THREE LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES IN CANADA AND ENGLAND

DV / Nation/ Religion	Canadian Coefficient	English Coefficient	$\hat{\tau}$ parameter ^a
Labor Force Participation			
South Asia	-0.8532***	-1.0153	0.215
Africa	-1.0435***	-1.2654	0.304
Hindu	0.0498	0.5209	-0.925
Sikh	0.1357	-0.1185	0.442
Muslim	-0.3829***	0.8318	-2.291*
Unemployment			
South Asia	1.5903***	-0.3015	0.34
Africa	1.4629***	-0.7473	1.00
Hindu	0.1691	0.1403	8.60**
Sikh	0.3311*	0.1782	5.10*
Muslim	0.4457***	1.7401***	-7.56**
Occupational Status			
South Asia	-0.5048	0.2993	-0.341

Africa	-0.8953	3.1338	-0.923
Hindu	0.0581	-1.6361	1.030
Sikh	-4.8869***	-4.3425**	-0.313
Muslim	-0.6228	-2.6629	1.158
Log of Weekly Earnings			
South Asia	-0.5466***	-0.8054***	1.671
Africa	-0.5235***	-0.7468***	1.542
Hindu	-0.0403	0.0779	-1.402
Sikh	0.0842*	-0.0446	1.242
Muslim	-0.0741**	-0.0455	-0.316

^aIn models of unemployment, the ^a parameter is chi square; in all other models, it is the t statistic.

TABLE 5

NET EFFECTS OF RELIGION ON FOUR LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES OF CANADIAN MEN, 1991

RELIGION	LABOR FORCE	UNEMP- LOYMEN T	OCC STATUS	Ln WEEK EARNIN G S
Hindu	-0.0638	0.1792	0.4613	-0.0255
Sikh	0.0786	0.2811*	-5.3057***	0.1024*
Muslim	-0.3300**	0.3168**	-0.8724*	-0.0658*
Buddhist	-0.1678	0.2554	-0.4551	-0.0155
Jewish	-0.0341	-0.1666	1.6763*	0.1696**
Other	0.0085	0.0070	-1.2762	-0.0197
No Religion	-0.1932**	0.2270**	0.2233	-0.0359
R ² (adj. or pseudo)	0.1325	0.0640	0.3779	0.1704
N of Cases	22,820	20,282	19,572	18,058

TABLE 6

NET EFFECTS OF RELIGION ON FOUR LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES OF BRITISH MEN, 1994

RELIGION	LABOR FORCE	UNEMP- LOYMEN T	OCC STATUS	Ln WEEK EARNING S
Hindu	0.2541	0.5154	-4.4251*	0.0140
Sikh	-0.4151	0.6985	-7.5250***	-0.2220
Muslim	1.1293*	1.6234**	-1.9809	-0.0184
Other	0.1718	0.7293**	-0.3558	-0.0578
R ² (adj. or pseudo)	0.2627	0.2430	0.3612	0.4051
N of Cases	1740	1504	2121	1240

APPENDIX A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION	RANGE
Age	Raw value	21 - 64
Age Squared	Square of age	441 - 4096
Education	Less than high school	omitted category
	HS Diploma	0 - 1
	Some College	0 - 1
	Baccalaureate	0 - 1
	Advanced Degree	0 - 1
Post Migration Ed	School in Canada or Britain	0 - 1
Yrs Since Migration	Years since arrived or midpoint of interval	0 - 55
Years Squared	Square of years	0 - 3025
English Skills	no English - English only	1 - 4
Marital Status	Married, spouse present	1 - 0
Cohabiting	Partner present	1 - 0
Resides in Metro Area	Yes / No	1 - 0
Region of Residence	Canada 5 provinces	1 - 0
	Britain 9 regions	
Unemployment Rate	% unemployed in region	6.8 - 12.4
Net Weekly Household Income (Canadian dollars)	Total wkly household income minus individual's wkly earnings	\$ -1934 - \$4327
No. of Persons in Hshld	Total persons in household	1 - 13
Self-employed	Yes / No	1 - 0
Occupational Status	ISEI	16 - 85
Full Time Worker	Yes / No	1 - 0

Place of Birth	Canada 11 regions Britain 6 regions	1 - 0
Ethnicity	Canada 5 groups Britain 7 groups	1 - 0
Religion	Canada 8 faiths Britain 5 faiths	1 - 0

APPENDIX B

Independent Variables by Dependent Variable¹

In Labor Force or Not²

Age, age squared education, post migration schooling, years since arrival, square of years, English skills, marital status, cohabits, resides in metro area, unemployment rate, net household income, household size, place of birth, religion

Unemployed or Not

Age, age squared education, post migration schooling, years since arrival, square of years, English skills, marital status, cohabits, resides in metro area, region of residence, place of birth, religion, inverse Mills ratio

ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index of Occupation)

Age, age squared, education, post-migration schooling, years since arrival, square of years, English skills, self-employed, marital status, cohabits, resides in metro area, region of residence, place of birth, religion, inverse Mills ratio

Ln Weekly Earnings

Age, age squared, education, post-migration schooling, years since arrival, square of years, English skills, self-employed, ISEI, fulltime, marital status, cohabits, resides in metro area, region of residence, place of birth, religion, inverse Mills ratio

¹Cross-national models contain five regions, four birth places and four religions. Within nation models contain the maximum number of regions, birth places, religions and ethnicities for each nation.

²This specification was also used to predict 'missing or not' on unemployment, occupational status and earnings. The results of these models provide the basis for calculating the inverse Mills ratios for the associated dependent variable.