

University of Massachusetts, Amherst
RFB# AA08-RH-2800
Addendum 1

Below is an addition to the request for bid# AA08-RH-2800 – Book Composition Services for the University of Massachusetts Press. Bid Opening Date: June 10, 2008 @ 1:00 p.m.

University of Massachusetts Press –

SAMPLE PAGE SPECIFICATIONS (Sample setting copy on following pages)

TrimSize 6 x 9 inches

Margins: Gutter = 4.5 picas; Head = 4 picas to baseline of Running Head

Type Page (including Running Head) = 26 x 44 picas

Lines per full text page = 39 (run long for bad breaks)

Lines on Chapter Opening page = varies

Chapters: Start New Page

Left Running Head = Chapter Number (spelled out including word “chapter”

Right Running Head = Chapter Title

Figures: use Lining Figs

Paragraph Indent = 1 Em

Space Breaks = 1 line space

Main Text <txt>: 9.5/13 Trump Medieval, justified

Extracts <ext>: 8.5/11 Trump Medieval, justified, indented 1 Em Left&Right, half line#
Above/Below extract block

Chapter Number <cn>: 11.5 Unifers 47 Light Condensed, CAPS, letter spaced (InDesign letter
space track 200 or equivalent), centered, base aligning with 3rd line of text page, 26 pts base/base
with CT below

Chapter Title <ct>: 18/21 Trump Medieval, C/lc, centered, 22 pts base/base with Epigraph below.

Chapter Epigraph <cep>: 8.7/12 Unifers 47 Light Cond., justified, indented 2 picas Left&Right
Epigraph Source <epso>: 7.5/12 Trump Medieval, centered, Caps/sm.caps, letterspaced (InDesign
letter space track 50 or equivalent), minimum 4 lines# below Epigraph Source to Text

Chapter Opening Style: Flush Left with first three words set in Initial cap & small caps,
letterspaced (InDesign letter space track 50 or equivalent).

Subheads:

A-Level Heads <h1>: 11/13 Unifers 47 Light Cond, C/lc, center, 20 pts extra# above, 6 pts extra#
below

<cn>Chapter 2

<ct>The Doctrinal Development of the American Military Profession

<cep>I see many soldiers: would that I saw many warriors! “Uniform” one calls what they wear: would that what it conceals were not uniform!

<eps>Friedrich Nietzsche

<txt>The future author of a book that would serve as scripture for the conservative political realists of late twentieth-century American military and diplomatic officialdom, Carl von Clausewitz, was serving as a staff officer in the rear guard of the Prussian forces seeking to cut off the French forces trying to reinforce Napoleon at Waterloo. A few miles away, the future author of General Order No. 100, Francis Lieber, a Prussian enlisted soldier, lay wounded and near death. Many of the philosophic inclinations of Clausewitz were the reverse of Lieber’s. In fact, the two men’s contrasting views of the nature of war would mark a key point of divergence between informal and formal norms in the American military profession. It is ironic that the two key individuals associated with such disparate martial legacies at one point shared the same uniform and participated in the same campaign.

Clausewitz is only known to history because the French Revolutionary army followed the common customs and usages of war at the time in granting him quarter and providing him medical care after he fell wounded in an earlier battle in 1806.ⁱ Following his recovery and parole, Clausewitz joined Field Marshals August Wilhelm Gneisenau and Gelhard Johann von Scharnhorst in modernizing and reforming the defeated and antiquated Prussian army. Being the most politically conservative and antirevolutionary of the Prussian military reformers, Clausewitz discarded his uniform and donned a Russian one in 1812 rather than fight for Napoleon, not returning to Prussian service until his sovereign had discovered the error of his ways by turning on the French Emperor after his defeat in Russia. After his retirement, Clausewitz put down his military insights and observations in a book that would end up being one of the most selectively read texts in history. The significance of its belated adoption by conservative American military theorists can only be compared to the reception in the English-speaking world of the King James Bible in the sixteenth century.

In 1832, Clausewitz died in the midst of a major revision of his seminal On War, completing only its first chapter.ⁱⁱ Although the author died in relative obscurity, the sponsorship

of Clausewitz's ideas by Field Marshals Helmuth von Moltke and Colmar von der Goltz in the late nineteenth century, as they undertook to prepare the new nation of Germany for total war, turned Clausewitz into a military icon. Clausewitz's influence in Europe rose steadily until this ideal of total war was experienced first-hand by Europeans during the First World War.ⁱⁱⁱ

Aside from the many questionable historical processes for which he has been either blamed or credited, it is fairly incontrovertible that Clausewitz understood the nature of war as intrinsically violent, political, unpredictable, and resistant to positivistic scientific systematization. For someone with no formal university training, the philosophical influences on Clausewitz were considerable. His posited dichotomy between absolute war and actual war places him in the idealist tradition of Immanuel Kant, and his reification of the nation-state reflects the influence of Georg Friedrich Hegel.^{iv} Insofar as he considered some societies more naturally virtuous than others, Clausewitz was completely Aristotelian in his views on ethical or humanitarian conduct in warfare. For Clausewitz, normative patterns of humanitarian conduct in war were societal rather than professional. In On War, Clausewitz wrote that "if wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationship to one another"; and that "to introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity."^v Unlike Lieber and Augustine, Clausewitz separates justice and morality from warfare. Like Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolò Machiavelli before him, his writings are addressed to those working on behalf of a self-interested nation-state in a zero-sum competition, where adjustments in the balance of power at the expense of other nation-states occur with no other justification than that of raison d'état.^{vi}

<h1>Clausewitz contra Lieber

<txt>Clausewitz, however, who was not translated into English until 1873, did not become a formal influence over American military thinking until the advent of the cold war, and specifically the so-called Clausewitzian renaissance after the American military defeat in Vietnam. It is historically problematic, therefore, to apply this "neo-Clausewitzian" weltanschauung, identified with so many contemporary military analysts and political pundits, to the development of American military professionalism in the late nineteenth century. Theorists who belong to this neo-Clausewitzian consensus include Samuel P. Huntington, Henry A. Kissinger, and Harry G. Summers Jr.^{vii} Since Clausewitz was one of the major reformers of the Prussian military, a short examination of his actual writings is warranted in connection with the

general influence that Prussian military reform exerted on the development of American military doctrine.^{viii}

Unlike Lieber, Clausewitz wrote a code for statesmen or heads of states, not only for soldiers, using his direct experience of war to integrate his personal life experiences with selected historical references. Also unlike Lieber, Clausewitz and his Napoleonic contemporaries were fixated on conventional warfare between large regular military formations. On the other hand, the genesis of Lieber's code, like most doctrinal developments, was an effort to address contemporary doctrinal deficiencies. Lieber was specifically tasked with addressing those aspects of war—such as constabulary functions and the handling of irregular forces—that historically have constituted the U.S. Army's most prevalent activity, even while such activities are traditionally minimized or avoided by American military professionals.

The strongest similarity between Lieber's and Clausewitz's view on war is the supremacy of political over purely military ends. In his most famous dictum, Clausewitz wrote that “war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.”^{ix}

In General Order No. 100, Lieber appears to have paraphrased Clausewitz: “war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain the great ends of state.”^x Recognition of this congruity between Lieber and Clausewitz does not, however, extend to the self-proclaimed American heirs of Clausewitz. In fact, the particular form of neo-Clausewitzianism that eventually took hold in America ended up turning Clausewitz on his head, by advocating a de facto political deference to military ends above policy goals. The American version of Clausewitz contradicts not only Clausewitz but also the tradition of both General Order No. 100 and the political allegiance mandated in the soldiers' and officers' commissioning oaths as derived from the Civil War. This reversal of the Prussian's position is, for the purposes of this study, one of the primary points of departure between true, classical Clausewitzianism and neo-Clausewitzianism.

<h1>Constitutional Allegiance and the U.S. Military Profession

<txt>Between the Civil War and World War II, the process of the development of military doctrine was formalized with the introduction of a standard publication system. The period was characterized by contested visions of military professionalism. Those favoring a domestic, democratic conception of military professionalism gradually supplanted those that drew on a functionally aristocratic model of an officer corps associated with Prussia and Germany.

Most discussions of the development of the military profession have centered on a presumed “civil-military gap” in values, attitudes, and worldviews that have developed between the military and civil society, and particularly on the political and societal consequences resulting from such a gap. The point of departure for any new military doctrine is the precedent that it replaces or modifies. The subject of the present analysis is the changes and consistencies in the development of American military doctrine in the context of preexisting doctrine, specifically the evolution of formal doctrine from the promulgation of General Order No. 100 during the American Civil War to the present.

The development of doctrine provides a historical record of the intellectual foundation of the military profession in the United States. Although certainly affected by external forces and political expediency, military doctrine is an internal system of normative values.

The doctrinal significance of General Order No. 100 and the just war precepts contained within it cannot be separated from the constitutional conflict that was contemporaneous with its publication. The American Civil War was a referendum for and by the American military profession on the meaning of allegiance. From 1790 to 1861, the oaths that officers took upon accepting military commissions did not consistently mention the Constitution. This changed as the result of the American Civil War, ending with a decision in favor of those holding primary loyalty to the federal government and its Constitution as opposed to those holding primary loyalty to state governments and their constitutions. This was subsequently formalized by legislation. In 1862, the Radical Republicans controlling the U.S. Congress mandated that an officer’s political allegiance to the Constitution was to be unqualified and specified by law. From 1862 onward, the words of the presidential oath of office as found in the U.S. Constitution, to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” was incorporated into all official oaths of office, including both the enlisted and commissioning oath still used to this day:^{xi}

<ext>Officer’s Commissioning: I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.^{xii}

<1/2 line #>

Enlisted: I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will

obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.^{xiii}

<txt>Evocative of the fifth-century just war maxims of Saint Augustine exhorting Roman soldiers to examine the moral foundation of their service and conduct, these oaths forced individuals entering military service to personally acknowledge the basis of the authority under which they entered into military service and the source of the legitimacy of their actions while in military service. As the oath requires allegiance to a particular constitution, the political and ideological premises of this constitution are distinct from other contemporary armies who pledged their allegiance to other arrangements of political authority. The formal basis of military allegiance in the United States, in contrast to the major European powers of the day, was also institutional rather merely national in an organic sense. However, the end of the Civil War did not result in a consensus regarding military professionalism and the nature of its historical development. Different interpretations and views on the institutional lessons of the Civil War and the efficacy of using foreign models of military professionalism, specifically that of Prussia, as a model for institutional reform divided those who would have the most influence over the establishment of future military doctrine in America.

The centrality of an individual affirmation of duty in the oaths of political allegiance resonates well with both Francis Lieber's General Order No. 100 and the traditional just war doctrines contained within it. This, however, conflicted with the general assumptions associated with that other notable Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz. American scholars and members of the American military profession have utilized Clausewitz and the Prussian military tradition to ground theories of military professionalism that contrast strikingly with the democratic and just war doctrine put forward by Lieber.

<h1>Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia

<txt>Although the popularity of Clausewitz among American military professionals is understandable, the thinker's historical reach is limited. Clausewitz did not have a direct individual impact on the development of the American profession during its most important period of development, that lying between the Civil War and World War II. Basing the impetus of military professionalism in America on Clausewitz, as distinct from the Prussian military reformers in general, is just bad history. It was not through Clausewitz but rather through the French writer Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, that Napoleonic strategy was conveyed to America. The reason for this was that Jomini's writings were clearer and more understandable

than Clausewitz's classic.^{xiv} Clausewitz's influence on the American military between the Civil War and the Second World War must be understood in conjunction with the nineteenth-century Prussian military in general; Clausewitz can at most be considered an usually uncited source for a view of military professionalism that has come to play an informal role in the development of American military professionalism until the time that the United States was defeated in Vietnam.

Such a view is at odds with the premier theoretical work on American military professionalism, Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State. Huntington argues that modern military professionalism was spawned in post-Napoleonic War Prussia and was epitomized by the theories of Clausewitz. Prior to this, according to Huntington, America could claim to possess only a proto-military.

¹ Two recent biographies of Carl von Clausewitz are Raymond Aron, Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

¹ All references to On War (Vom Kriege, 1832) are based on the edition and translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; reprint Everyman's Library, 1993).

¹ Major works of Clausewitz criticism published after World War I include B. H. Liddel Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson, 1932), and Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: Hase & Koehler, 1935).

⁴ The most substantial treatment of the influences of German idealist philosophy on Clausewitz is found in Aron's Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War, 223–232. Clausewitz's conception of "absolute war" has been described as a "Platonic ideal" outside any reference to German idealist philosophy. See Howard's Clausewitz, 49. While contemporary critics of Clausewitz stress his idealism in his characterization of "ideal" or "absolute" war, his contemporary apologists minimize it. See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), 16–21, for an example of the former and Bernard Brodie's introductory essay ("The Continuing Relevance of On War") to On War, 1976 (Vom Kriege, 1832), 52–53, for an example of the latter. Clausewitz is not alone among those considered to be political realists who have predilections toward German idealist philosophy. For the influence of Hegelian idealism on Hans Morgenthau, see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 106n.

¹ Clausewitz, On War, 84.

¹ Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 19–28.

¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), and Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

¹ For a discussion of how Clausewitz's direct influence on the American military profession intensified after the American defeat in Vietnam, see the editor's introduction to Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. Michael Howard (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 9.

¹ Clausewitz, On War, 99.

¹ General Order No. 100, art. 30.

¹ Edward M. Coffman, in his authoritative article on the subject, disputes the contention that the Constitution played a significant role in officers' decisions to fight for or against the United States and argues that the postwar allegiance oaths required by Congress were a significant development in both military professionalism and the American civil-military relationship. See Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution" Parameters, September 1987, 2–12. Even Samuel P. Huntington, who held that southern culture was more facilitating of military professionalism, noted: "On the one hand, the Southern officer's political allegiances drew him to the Confederacy; on the other, his professional responsibility drew him to the Union." See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 211–212.

¹ Cited in Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution," 5.

¹ Most officers have taken this oath as an enlisted soldier or a cadet prior to their commissioning.

¹ Russell F. Weigley noted in The American Way of War that Clausewitz's writings were, compared to Jomini's, "difficult, circumlocutory, often apparently self-contradictory." See The American Way of War: A History of United States Military and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 82, 211.

ⁱ Two recent biographies of Carl von Clausewitz are Raymond Aron, Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

ⁱⁱ All references to On War (Vom Kriege, 1832) are based on the edition and translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; reprint Everyman's Library, 1993).

ⁱⁱⁱ Major works of Clausewitz criticism published after World War I include B. H. Liddel Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson, 1932), and Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: Hase & Koehler, 1935).

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^v Clausewitz, On War, 84.

^{vi} Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 19–28.

^{vii} See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), and Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

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^{ix} Clausewitz, On War, 99.

^x General Order No. 100, art. 30.

^{xi} Edward M. Coffman, in his authoritative article on the subject, disputes the contention that the Constitution played a significant role in officers' decisions to fight for or against the United States and argues that the postwar allegiance oaths required by Congress were a significant development in both military professionalism and the American civil-military relationship. See Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution" Parameters, September 1987, 2–12. Even Samuel P. Huntington, who held that southern culture was more facilitating of military professionalism, noted: "On the one hand, the Southern officer's political allegiances drew him to

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^{xii} Cited in Coffman, “The Army Officer and the Constitution,” 5.

^{xiii} Most officers have taken this oath as an enlisted soldier or a cadet prior to their commissioning.

^{xiv} Russell F. Weigley noted in The American Way of War that Clausewitz’s writings were, compared to Jomini’s, “difficult, circumlocutory, often apparently self-contradictory.” See The American Way of War: A History of United States Military and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 82, 211.