
Summary

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

Shakespeare

In a long book with many equations, it is easy to become mired in details and hence miss the big picture. This chapter is a summary of the book's main points.

- Game theory is an indispensable tool in modeling human behavior. Behavioral disciplines that reject or peripheralize game theory are theoretically handicapped.
- The coordination of behaviors in game theory—playing a Nash equilibrium—is based on the communality of knowledge and belief across individuals, in the form of common subjective priors.
- The rational actor model used in game theory includes no principles entailing the communality of knowledge and belief across individuals. Thus, the methodological individualism tacitly accepted by game theorists is incorrect.
- To find such principles, we must look to a social epistemology based on the specific character of the socially evolved human brain, as well as the operation of culturally specific social institutions that effect commonality of knowledge and belief.
- The complex Nash equilibria that arise in modeling cooperation in large groups do not emerge spontaneously from the interaction of rational agents. Rather, they require a choreographer, in the form of social norms.
- Even with a commonality of knowledge and belief, and a social norm choreographing a Nash equilibrium, self-regarding individuals do not have incentives to play Nash equilibria. Rather, humans are inclined to obey social norms, which we term a *normative predisposition*. Humans are genetically predisposed to behave prosocially, and explaining human cooperation is impossible without recognizing the specific forms of human prosociality.

- The correlated equilibrium, not the Nash equilibrium, is the appropriate equilibrium concept for modeling human strategic interaction, with social norms being the appropriate correlating devices (choreographers).
- The bounds of reason are not forms of unreason, but rather forms of intrinsic sociality.
- The behavioral disciplines today have incompatible models of human choice. A major task of the behavioral sciences today is developing a unified model of choice that eliminates these incompatibilities, and that can be specialized in different ways to meet the heterogeneous needs of the various behavioral disciplines. This book is an attempt to contribute to this endeavor, by showing that game theory needs a broader social theory to have explanatory power, and social theory without game theory is seriously compromised.