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**The Bounds of Reason:  
Game Theory and the Unification  
of the Behavioral Sciences**



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**Herbert Gintis**

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This book is dedicated to Morris and Henrietta  
Malena, Gerson Gintis, and Flora and Melvin Greisler.  
We get along without you very well. Of course we do.

There is no sorrow so great that it  
does not find its background in joy.

Neils Bohr



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