

- In the answer to 2.15, Strategic Voting, it should say “player 3 should make a suboptimal choice at nodes v and w...” I fixed this.
- Drop 2.5f. It is not stated properly.
- For second half of solution 4.15, there is an easier proof. Let $\alpha_k = \alpha_1\alpha_2\alpha_3/a_k$, and let $\beta = \sqrt{\alpha_1\alpha_2\alpha_3}$. then $p_i = \beta/\alpha_i$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$. Thus any mixed strategy equilibrium is unique.
- 11th line from bottom on p.412, the subscript should be b instead of β , and the formula inside the parentheses should be $50 + 10\alpha - 50\beta$.
- There’s a misplaced formatclearpage around p. 448 in Klingon and Snark, the Master Klingon must charge a fixed fee for half the Snarks, not a price per rate of eating Snarks.
- A Reconnaissance Game (4.27) has lots of Nash equilibria, all of which involve $(0,0,1/4,3/4)$ for Player 2 (defender).
- The (c) part to the answer of 4.26 is the same as the (b) part, and should be dropped.
- In answer to Colonel Blotto, $p = 1/9$ should be $p = 1/18$ on page 419. Also, there are other Nash equilibria, so ”check that others do not exist” should be dropped.
- In 4.16, plus ones and minus ones should be interchanged in figure.
- In the answer to One-Card Two-Round Poker with Bluffing, it should read: There is a Nash equilibrium

$$\frac{8}{15}ss + \frac{2}{15}sf + \frac{1}{3}f,$$

$$\frac{1}{5}rrbb + \frac{2}{5}rrbf + \frac{2}{5}rrf,$$

with a payoff of $4/5$ to player 1. I already fixed this.

- In Orange-Throat, Blue-Throat, and Yellow-Striped Lizards, in the figure labels, interchange Yellow and Blue. I fixed this.
- 4.37 is correct, but I expanded the answer.

- 4.38 had errors in the answer, which I fixed.
- 4.39: change n-1 to subscript in two places. I fixed it.
- 5.6: In the proof, x and $1 - x$ should be interchanged. I fixed it.
- 11.7: Extra comma in expectation expression. I fixed it.
- 12.3: The expression for $\mu(p_1)$ in (c) is incorrect, though it is correct in the answer section. The sentence should read “Show that $\mu(p_1) = x\pi/(x\pi + 1 - \pi)$ where x is probability that a buyer for whom $b = b_h$ refuses price p_1 .” The inequality in (g) is wrong. It should read

$$b_h > \left(\frac{1 - \delta_s}{\pi} - (\delta_b - \delta_s) \right) \frac{b_l}{1 - \delta_b}.$$

I fixed this.

- 12.12: The inequalities at the end of the answer should be $\pi^* + \pi_{mh} < \pi_{mh} + \pi_{dh}$ and $(m + c_l - 2c_h)(m - c_l) < 4(m - c_h)^2/9$. Also “this inequality holds.” should read “this inequality fails.” I fixed it.