

Errata for Game Theory Evolving, Second Edition

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In Section 3.3 I give evidence of the general principle that in market-like interactions with competition on one or both sides of the market, subjects act the same whether or not they have self- or other-regarding preferences, and supply equals demand at a market-clearing price. I did not say why this is the case. Joel Sobel, in a recent paper entitled "Do Markets Make People Selfish?" (Feb. 2007) develops an elegant analytical model explaining why. He assumes agents have other- as well as self-regarding preferences, but "an agent would prefer to make a trade that increases his monetary payoff rather than let some else make the same transaction." The justification of this assumption is that by refraining from being altruistic, in a competitive situation, an agent is not helping his trading partner, but rather simply allowing another agent to reap the benefits of trade a market prices.

On p. 50, the values of P and R should be reversed.

On p. 94, I recall a visit to Harvard by Daniel Ellsberg in which he described an interesting Nixon "disinformation campaign." Allan Dafoe has found the proper reference to this campaign: Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969" *International Security* 27,4 Spring 2003: 150–183.

In Figure 6.5, p. 132, the payoff "4" on the third-from-the-left terminal node should be "-4".

The entry for OG vs. GG on p. 237 should be (1/2,1). Thanks to Simon Halliday for finding this.

In the Acknowledgements, p. 373, the correct name is Mike Mesterton-Gibbons.