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Summary

> This above all: to thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man.
>
> Shakespeare

In a long book with many equations, it is easy to become mired in details and hence miss the big picture. This chapter is a summary of the book's main points.

- Game theory is an indispensable tool in modeling human behavior. Behavioral disciplines that reject or peripheralize game theory are theoretically handicapped.
- The traditional equilibrium concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium, is implemented by rational actors only if they share beliefs as to how the game will be played.
- The rational actor model includes no principles entailing the communality of beliefs across individuals. For this reason, the complex Nash equilibria that arise in modeling the coordination of behavior in groups do not emerge spontaneously from the interaction of rational agents. Rather, they require a higher-level correlating device, or choreographer.
- Hence, the Nash equilibrium is not the appropriate equilibrium concept for social theory.
- The correlated equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept for a set of rational individuals having common priors. The appropriate correlating devices may be broadly identified with social norms.
- Social systems are complex adaptive dynamical systems. Social norms are among the emergent properties of such systems. Social norms range from simple conventions (e.g., vocabulary and traffic signals) to complex products of gene-culture coevolution (e.g., territoriality and property rights). Complex norms may be taught, learned, and internalized, but individuals must be genetically predisposed to recognize and obey social norms.
- There is thus a social epistemology based on the specific character of the evolved human brain, as well as the operation of culturally

specific social institutions that effect the commonality of beliefs in humans.

- Even with a commonality of beliefs and a social norm choreographing a correlated equilibrium, self-regarding individuals do not have incentives to play correlated equilibria. Rather, humans are other-regarding: they are predisposed to obey social norms even when it is costly to do so. We term this a *normative predisposition*.
- The behavioral disciplines today have four incompatible models of human behavior. The behavioral sciences must develop a unified model of choice that eliminates these incompatibilities and that can be specialized in different ways to meet the heterogeneous needs of the various disciplines.
- *The Bounds of Reason* contributes to the task of unifying the behavioral sciences by showing that game theory needs a broader social theory to have explanatory power, and that social theory without game theory is seriously compromised.
- The bounds of reason are not forms of irrationality but rather forms of sociality.