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**A Cooperative Species:  
Human Reciprocity and its Evolution**

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To...



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## Preface

What follows is the result of our sustained interaction concerning human cooperation and its evolution over the past decade and a half with Chris Boehm, Robert Boyd, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk, Marcus Feldman, Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter, Peter Hammerstein, Joe Henrich, Hillard Kaplan, Richard McElreath, Ugo Pagano, Peter Richerson, Eric Alden Smith, and Polly Weissner, among others. Robert Boyd, Robert Rowthorn, Hillard Kaplan, and Marc Feldman read the entire manuscript and their suggestions improved it immeasurably. For their contributions to the development of our ideas, and critiques of earlier versions of the material to follow, we would also like to thank Michael Alvard, Kenneth Arrow, Katherine Baird, Roland Bénabou, Carl Bergstrom, V. Bhaskar, Ken Binmore, Rebecca Bliege Bird, Jeffrey Carpenter, L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, Jung-Kyoo Choi, Timothy Clutton-Brock, Leda Cosmides, Vincent Crawford, George Cowan, Ross Cressman, Martin Daly, Lee Alan Dugatkin, Steven Durlauf, Alexander Field, Steven Frank, Drew Fudenberg, John Geanakoplos, Edward Glaeser, Alan Grafen, Avner Greif, Henry Harpending, Marc Hauser, Kristin Hawkes, Jack Hirshleifer, Guy Hoelzer, Keith Huntley, Sung-Ha Hwang, Ichiro Obara, Alex Kacelnik, Michael Lachmann, David Laibson, Olof Leimar, Rob Letzler, Michael Macy, Paul Malherbe, Jane Mansbridge, Charles Manski, Erick Maskin, Suresh Naidu, Martin Nowak, Corinna Noelke, Ichiro Obara, John Pepper, Aimee Plourde, Paul Romer, Alan Rogers, Robert Rowthorn, Larry Samuelson, Karl Schrag, Paul Seabright, Rajiv Sethi, Carlos Rodriguez Sickert, Steven Siller, E. Somanathan, Richard Sosis, Eors Szathmary, Leigh Tesfatsion, Giorgio Topa, Robert Trivers, Peyton Young, Martin Weitzman, Jon Wilkins, David Sloan Wilson, Margo Wilson, and Elisabeth Wood.

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*of Theoretical Biology* 206 (2000):169–179; “The Coevolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions”, *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 223 (2003):135–147 (with Jung-kyoo Choi and Astrid Hopfensitz); “The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations,” *Theoretical Population Biology* 65 (2004):17–28. [Permissions to be requested]

We have presented technical material in verbal as well as mathematical form wherever possible, and avoided mathematical formulations entirely where that is possible without sacrificing clarity. The final chapter includes brief description of several techniques that we employ throughout the book. When a technical term is first used, it is defined. Further uses of technical terms refer back to the definition, or to an explanation in the final chapter, using the symbol § followed by chapter number (if not in the current chapter) and section number. More complete statements of some of the technical aspects of our models and simulations are found in the works just cited. Readers interested in the overall argument of the book may wish to read chapters 1, 2, and 11. Sections 3.3 to 3.10, on the experimental evidence concerning social preferences, and sections 5.3 to 5.5, on economic models of cooperation based on repeated game theory, may be skipped without losing the main themes of the book.

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