A Cooperative Species:
Human Reciprocity and its Evolution
To....
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Preface

What follows is the result of our sustained interaction concerning human cooperation and its evolution over the past decade and a half with Chris Boehm, Robert Boyd, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk, Marcus Feldman, Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter, Peter Hammerstein, Joe Henrich, Hillard Kaplan, Richard McElreath, Ugo Pagano, Peter Richerson, Eric Alden Smith, and Polly Wiessner, among others. Robert Boyd, Robert Rowthorn, and Marc Feldman read the entire manuscript and their suggestions improved it immeasurably. For their contributions to the development of our ideas, and critiques of earlier versions of the material to follow, we would also like to thank Michael Alvard, Margaret Alexander, Kenneth Arrow, Katherine Baird, Roland Bénabou, Carl Bergstrom, Bruce Bertram, V. Bhaskar, Ken Binmore, Rebecca Bliege Bird, Jeffrey Carpenter, L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, Wayne Cote, Jung-Kyoo Choi, Timothy Clutton-Brock, Leda Cosmides, George Cowan, Vincent Crawford, Ross Cressman, Martin Daly, Lee Alan Dugatkin, Steven Durlauf, Emma Einhorn, Alexander Field, Steven Frank, Drew Fudenberg, John Geanakoplos, Daniel Gintis, Edward Glaeser, Alan Grafen, Avner Greif, Henry Harpening, Marc Hauser, Kristin Hawkes, Kim Hill, Jack Hirshleifer, Guy Hoelzer, Kristin Howard, Keith Huntley, Sung-Ha Hwang, Alex Kacelnik, Kenneth Kennedy, Michael Lachmann, David Laibson, Patricia Lambert, Kevin Langergraber, Steven LeBlanc, Olof Leimar, Rob Letzler, Amara Levy-Moore, Iren Levina, Carlos Liard, Bridget Longridge, Michael Macy, Paul Malherbe, Jane Mansbridge, Charles Manski, Erick Maskin, John Mitani, Suresh Naidu, Martin Nowak, Corinna Noelke, Ichiro Obara, John Pepper, Aimee Plourde, Carolyn Resnicke, Paul Romer, Alan Rogers, Robert Rowthorn, Larry Samuelson, Karl Schrag, Paul Seabright, Rajiv Sethi, Carlos Rodriguez Sickert, Steven Siller, E. Somanathan, Richard Sosis, Eors Szathmary, Timothy Taylor, Leigh Tesfatsion, Giorgio Topa, Robert Trivers, Alina Vereshchagina, Linda Vigilant, Peyton Young, Martin Weitzman, Jon Wilkins, David Sloan Wilson, Margo Wilson, Elisabeth Wood, and Richard Wrangham.

We have presented technical material in verbal as well as mathematical form wherever possible, and avoided mathematical formulations entirely where that is possible without sacrificing clarity. The appendices include brief description of several techniques that we employ throughout the book. When a technical term is first used, it is defined. Further uses of technical terms refer back to the definition, or to an explanation in the Appendices, using the symbol § followed by chapter number (if not in the current chapter) and section number. More complete statements of some of the technical aspects of our models and simulations are found in the works just cited. Readers interested in the overall argument of the book may wish to read chapters 1, 2, and 13. Sections §5.3 to §5.12, on the experimental evidence concerning social preferences, and sections §4.2 to §4.5, on economic models of cooperation based on repeated game theory, may be skipped without losing the main themes of the book.

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