

Lecture 5

I wish, in this and part of the next lecture, to discuss Kripke's puzzle about belief. Kripke states two main versions of the puzzle - one concerning the bilingual Pierre and his beliefs about London the other concerning the monolingual Peter and his beliefs about Paderewski. I shall focus on the second of the two versions since it brings into sharper relief the issues I wish to discuss, but my remarks should also apply to the first version.

I hope, in the end, to provide a solution to the puzzle. Indeed, I shall argue that it cannot be solved without making essential appeal to relationist ideas. But prior to the consideration of any particular solution or any particular approach, I shall argue that the puzzle is more difficult and far-reaching than has been commonly recognized. I shall first show that the statement of the puzzle can be strengthened to avoid many of the objections that have been raised against it and I shall then show that the puzzling predicament can be broadened so as to include a wide array of different situations. Even if it may be clear how the puzzle is to be solved for some of these situations, it may not be clear how it is to be solved for the others or how the various solutions are to be related.

The puzzles, for Kripke, were meant to serve a larger dialectical purpose. Referentialism, to which Kripke adheres, appears to imply Substitutivity, i.e., the substitutivity, *salve veritate*, of coreferential names. But Substitutivity appears to have certain counter-intuitive consequences in its application to belief reports; and so this suggests that Referentialism should be rejected. Kripke points out that it is only Substitutivity in conjunction with certain other assumptions that has these counter-intuitive consequences and that these other assumptions are capable on their own of leading to similar counter-intuitive consequences. This suggests that it is not Substitutivity that 'is to blame' and that it therefore makes no mark against Referentialism that it implies Substitutivity.

I wish to draw a different moral from the puzzles. Our proposed solution will not enable us to hang on to Substitutivity in its full generality. However, we are not thereby obliged to give up Referentialism. For just as it is only Substitutivity in conjunction with certain additional assumptions that has counter-intuitive consequences, so it is only

Referentialism in conjunction with certain additional assumptions - and Intrinsicism, in particular - that implies Substitutivity. Thus by giving up some of these other assumptions, we may reject Substitutivity and yet still hang on to Referentialism.

Kripke's puzzle concerning Peter/Paderewski goes as follows. Peter overhears conversations concerning the great Polish pianist and politician Paderewski and comes to the view that they concern two individuals, one a pianist and the other a politician. Since he believes that all pianists are musical, he has a belief which he would express in the words 'Paderewski is musical'; and it would therefore appear to be true to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical. Since Peter believes that all politicians are not musical, he has a belief which he would express in the words 'Paderewski is not musical'; and it would therefore appear to be true to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical. But surely Peter does not both believe that Paderewski is musical and that Paderewski is not musical. Indeed, Peter may be the leading logician of the land, who would never let an explicit contradiction escape his attention. This, then, is the puzzle.

Kripke formulates his puzzles in terms of the *truth* of various belief reports. But many philosophers have wanted to distinguish the *truth* of a report, which is a semantic matter, from its *correctness*, which is a pragmatic matter. Thus they have wanted to maintain that it may be true to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical and true to say that Paderewski is not musical and yet, because of various pragmatic implications, it may be incorrect or misleading to make these reports. There is no need to engage such philosophers for we can pose the puzzle in terms of the *correctness* of the various belief-reports, rather than their *truth*, and leave on one side the question of whether there might be a divergence between the two. Thus what we must now maintain, in posing the puzzle, is that it is correct to report Peter as believing that Paderewski is musical and also correct to report Peter as believing that Paderewski is not musical and yet not correct to report him as believing both.

To my mind, the most critical point in establishing that there is a genuine puzzle is to show that there is an unequivocal reading of the belief reports under which they are all correct. For it might be allowed that there is a reading of the belief reports in which it is correct to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical and also correct to say that Peter

believes that Paderewski is not musical; and it might also be allowed that there is a reading of the belief report in which it is not correct to say both that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical and that Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical; but it may be denied that there is a single reading under which the individual belief reports are correct and the composite belief report is not correct.

Kripke attempts to secure an unequivocal reading by insisting that the belief reports should be understood as *de dicto* throughout (pp. 105-6). What we are reporting is that Peter believes that: Paderewski is (or is not) musical. Thus the name must occur within the scope of the belief operator. I doubt that considerations of scope might serve to distinguish the reading that Kripke has in mind; and it is especially odd for the referentialist to think that they might. For names are ‘scopeless’, and so it is not even clear how considerations of scope could serve to distinguish any one reading from any other.

There is, however, another sense in which a belief report may be said to be *de dicto*. For we may take it to be *de dicto* in the sense that for a belief report to be correct it should be faithful to how the believer would express his beliefs; there should be an appropriate match between the embedded clause that the reporter would use in reporting the belief and the sentence or ‘dictum’ that the believer would use in expressing his belief. Of course, talk of ‘fidelity’ or ‘match’ is somewhat vague but it does seem plausible that the report that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical *is* faithful to how Peter would express his belief and similarly for the report that Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical. And it is also plausible that the report that Peter believes both that Paderewski is musical and that Paderewski is not musical is *not* faithful to how Peter would express his beliefs - for we use a pair of sentences we know to be contradictory in reporting his beliefs and yet Peter would not use a pair of sentences he knew to be contradictory in expressing his beliefs.

But despite the great plausibility of these claims, they might still be doubted. It might, in the first place, be pointed out that Peter’s use of the name is ‘fractured’, as it were, and that this prevents us from faithfully reporting his individual beliefs by means of an unfractured name. And it might, in the second place, be argued that the attribution of contradictory beliefs *is* faithful to how Peter would express his beliefs, since he would be

willing to express them in the words ‘Paderewski is musical’ and ‘Paderewski is not musical’, with an appropriate shift in the use of ‘Paderewski’.

Although the matter calls for a very thorough discussion, let me say a little about each issue. The second issue is often posed in the following terms: can we correctly attribute a pair of contradictory de dicto beliefs to a rational person? But this is not really what is at stake. After all, the leading logician of the land may be Graham Priest and, arguably, he is rational and could correctly be said to have contradictory de dicto beliefs. The formulation in terms of contradictory beliefs may also cloud the issue. For suppose that one cannot, in fact, correctly attribute a pair of de dicto beliefs to a rational person. There will then be a natural tendency to interpret any such attribution in a way in which it could be true, i.e. as non de dicto; and it will therefore be somewhat hard in this case to hold on to the de dicto interpretation.

What is really at issue is a question of coordination. In reporting Peter’s beliefs, my use of the name ‘Paderewski’ is coordinated; I take myself to be making the very same use of the name ‘Paderewski’ from one belief report to the other. However, Peter would not be willing to express his beliefs in a correspondingly coordinated fashion; he would not be willing to assert ‘Paderewski is musical’ and ‘Paderewski’ with what he took to be the same use of the name ‘Paderewski’. The critical question therefore is whether faithful reporting requires a match in coordination between reporter and believer: if the reporter’s use of various names is coordinated in the report of the beliefs, then should the corresponding use of the names be correspondingly coordinated in the believer’s expression of the beliefs? The case of contradictory beliefs raises this issue in a particular acute form, since it might then be thought to be impossible for rational believer to coordinate the expression of his beliefs in the same manner as the reporter coordinates the report of his beliefs. But the question also arises in less extreme cases. Suppose, for example, that Peter draws no inferences from his beliefs about Paderewski. He believes that the one Paderewski is a pianist; he believes of what he takes to be the other Paderewski that he is a politician; and that is it. We can then still raise the question of whether we could faithfully report him as believing both that Paderewski is a pianist and that Paderewski is a politician.

In considering this question, we should of course agree that there is a reading in which the report is correct. The question is whether there is a reading in which it is not correct. And here it seems clear to me that there is. Indeed, there appear to be contexts which *require* the coordinative reading. Suppose I wish to explain why Peter believes that Paderewski is musical. Then my explanation might go as follows: he believes that Paderewski is a pianist; he also believes that all pianists are musical; and from these two beliefs he then inferred that Paderewski is musical. Now this explanation involves two belief reports: it is agreed that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical; and it is asserted, by way of explanation, that Peter believes that Paderewski is a pianist. But suppose that the correctness of these belief reports did not require that Peter's beliefs be correspondingly coordinated, i.e. it did not require that he have the same 'take' on Paderewski in his belief that Paderewski is a pianist and his belief that Paderewski is musical. The explanation would then fail to be plausible, since there would then be no reason to suppose that he would be led from a belief concerning what he took to be one individual to a belief concerning what he took to be another individual.

This is just one example. But a similar point applies to any form of intentional explanation in which there is a coordinated use of name. If the coordination in the use of the names were not indicative of a corresponding coordination in the agent's attitudes, then the explanation would most likely fail of its purpose. Thus the coordinative reading is not merely one among many; it is essential to one of the most central aspects of belief attribution.

Of course, even if it is agreed that one cannot faithfully report Peter as having each of two contradictory beliefs, it might still be thought that Peter's fractured use of the name prevents us from faithfully reporting one or other of his two beliefs; it might be thought, in other words, that no reading which requires coordination could be tolerant of fractures. But, on this point, I am inclined to agree with Kripke; in reporting on beliefs that Peter would express with what he takes to be one use of the name, the existence of what he takes to be another use of the name is irrelevant; it is an external factor whose presence or absence has no bearing on the correctness of the reports. What happens on the one doxastic stage is, as it were, irrelevant to how we should report on what happens on the other. But let me also note that the contrary view would be devastating for any reasonable view of the role of names in

intentional explanation. For even if Peter's use of the name 'Paderewski' is fractured, we would still surely wish to make use of our unfractured name in explanation of his behavior and attitudes. We will want to explain, for example, how he might believe that Paderewski is musical on the basis of his belief that Paderewski is a pianist. But under the proposed view this would be impossible, since the coordination required for the purposes of the explanation would be incompatible with a tolerance towards fractures.

I have so far focused on Kripke's original puzzle and have suggested various ways in which its formulation might be strengthened. I now wish to consider some related puzzles which will make it even more difficult to see how the original puzzle is to be solved. For these puzzles are all somehow related and yet it is hard to see how a solution to one might extend to another or how a unified solution to all the puzzles might be obtained.

There is, in the first place, a variant of Kripke's puzzle which does not even require the use of names. Imagine that there is a double agent who works for 'us' and for 'them'. They realize that she works for us (under the designation '009') and they also realize that she works for them (under the designation 'Blonde') but they do not know that she works for both us and them. It would then appear correct to say that Blonde is an agent of whom they realize that she works for us but of whom they do not realize both that she works for us and that she works for them. Again, one can agree that there is a reading of this report in which it is not correct. My only point is that there is a reading - indeed, what would appear to be the most natural reading - in which the report *is* correct. But by considerations of symmetry, it should also be correct to say, under the very same reading, that Blonde is an agent of whom they realize that she works for them but of whom they do not realize both that she works for them and that she works for us. But the two reports are logically inconsistent; and so how can they both be correct?

These claims involve the name 'Blonde', but it occurs outside of the belief operator and so may be replaced by a quantifier. Thus we may say that there is a female agent of whom they realize that she works for us but of whom they do not realize both that she works for us and that she works for them; and similarly for the other case. These two claims are

then logically inconsistent with the claim that there is only one female agent; and yet surely they are not.

There is also a variant of Kripke's puzzle that makes no appeal to belief reports or to any other form of attitudinal report. Suppose that I regard Peter as a reliable source of information and wish to reproduce what he asserts with the intention of conveying that information to others. How I reproduce what he asserts is therefore guided by the principle that the reliability of the information should be preserved; and so, in reproducing what he says, I should not go beyond what he himself would be willing to assent to.

Let us call reproduction of this sort *faithful*. It is through faithful reproduction that reliable information may be transmitted from one person to another. Thus if one person is reliably informed of a certain fact, he may convey it to another; that other person may then faithfully reproduce what he says, thereby conveying it to another person; and so on. The person at the end of the chain will then be reliably informed of the fact as long as the informants along the way can be trusted.

Suppose now that Peter reliably informs me that Paderewski is a pianist. He asserts 'Paderewski is a pianist' (having the pianist in mind, of course). Then surely I may faithfully reproduce what he says in the words 'Paderewski is a pianist'; and someone who believed what I said would thereby have been reliably informed that Paderewski was a pianist. Suppose next that Peter reliably informs me that Paderewski is a politician. He asserts 'Paderewski is a politician' (having the politician in mind). Then surely I may faithfully reproduce what he says in the words 'Paderewski is a politician'; and someone who believed what I said would thereby have been reliably informed that Paderewski was a politician.

But wait! You have been reliably informed that Paderewski is a pianist. You have also been reliably informed that Paderewski is a politician. And so surely from this you may infer that Paderewski is both a pianist and a politician. But how can this be since it goes beyond Peter himself believes. If you were to convey this information back to Peter, he would dissent from it; and so how can he have been its source?

Again, just as with the Kripke's original puzzle, it is hard to know what to say. Surely we do not want to deny that Peter can be the source of reliable information about

Paderewski just because his use of the name is fractured. And surely we do not want to deny the legitimacy of drawing inferences from facts of which we have been reliably informed. And yet surely we want to avoid the consequence that the reliability of the information we acquire might thereby be undermined.

These variant puzzles have significant implications for our understanding of Kripke's original puzzle. On the face of it, his puzzle is about the use of names in belief contexts. But these variants suggest that the original puzzle has nothing essential to do either with names or with belief contexts and that forms of the puzzle could have arisen even if names had never been introduced into the language or if there had existed no linguistic means for describing our beliefs or intentional states. Most solutions to the puzzle take the form of proposing a semantics or pragmatics for the use of names in belief reports. But these solutions cannot be regarded as getting to the heart of the matter unless it is clear how they might extend to variants of the puzzle in which the use of names or the reporting of beliefs is not in question.

In addition to these variants of Kripke's puzzle which lie along the same dialectical axis, as it were, there is a new puzzle that raises some orthogonal considerations. Let me first give a formulation of the new puzzle in terms of reproduction, since it is somewhat simpler than the formulation in terms of reporting. Suppose that Peter asserts that Paderewski is a pianist (he is not yet confused between two Paderewski's). Then surely Sally can faithfully reproduce what Peter says, using those very words. But should there be any doubt over this, let us suppose that Sally derives her use of the name 'Paderewski' from Peter. This is then as clear a case as one could hope to have of faithful reproduction. Let us now suppose that Peter overhears Sally's reproduction of what he says but takes her to be referring to a different pianist by the name of 'Paderewski'. Then surely, if Peter derives a new use of the name 'Paderewski' from Sally, he can use those very words faithfully to reproduce what she says. Thus we have a faithful reproduction of a faithful reproduction of what Peter said; and this presumably should also be a faithful reproduction of what Peter said. But surely, when Peter subsequently says 'Paderewski is a pianist', he is not faithfully reproducing what he previously said. Indeed, this would appear to be a paradigm of unfaithful reproduction, since

he might not be willing to assent to the sentence ‘Paderewski [in its second use] is a pianist’ and so, in saying ‘Paderewski [in its second use] is a pianist’, he would be going beyond what he was originally willing to assent to.

The report-form of the puzzle goes as follows. Suppose that Peter believes that Paderewski is a pianist (again, he is not yet confused between two Paderewski’s) and expresses his belief in the words ‘Paderewski is a pianist’. Then surely Sally can faithfully report Peter as believing that Paderewski is a pianist. As before, we may suppose that Sally derives her use of the name ‘Paderewski’ from Peter. This is then as clear a case as one could hope to have of faithful reporting. For reasons that will become apparent, let us suppose that Sally does not refer to Peter by name but as ‘the man with the jug ears’ (an appellation that Peter does not recognize as applying to himself). Thus what she says is ‘the man with the jug ears believes that Paderewski is a pianist’. Peter overhears her and takes her to be referring to another pianist by the name of ‘Paderewski’. Then surely, as long as Peter derives his use of ‘Paderewski’ from Sally, he can use those very words faithfully to reproduce what Sally says. Peter therefore faithfully reproduces Sally’s faithful report of what Peter believes; and so, presumably, produces a faithful report himself of what he believes. But how can this be? For Peter would not express his earlier belief in the words ‘Paderewski [in its second use] is a pianist’; and so how could he faithfully report his belief in the words ‘I (the jug-eared man) believe that Paderewski [in its second use] is a pianist’?

The new and the old puzzle are somewhat different. The old puzzle concerns composition; compositions of faithful reports or reproductions appear to lead, despite our expectations, to unfaithful reports or reproductions. The new puzzle, on the other hand, concerns chaining; chainings of faithful reports or reproductions appear to lead, despite our expectations, to unfaithful reports or reproductions. The new puzzle, of course, needs to be considered in its own right; and I suspect that it may turn out in some ways out to be deeper in its implications than the original puzzle. But the new puzzle can also be seen to place additional demands on a solution to the old puzzle. For their counter-intuitive upshots are somewhat different; and so, even if we learn to live with one, it is not so clear how we should learn to live with the other. Yet surely we require a unified account of how the tensions

between the fractured use of names and the demands of faithful reporting or reproduction might be resolved.

I want now to present a solution of the various puzzles that have been posed. I begin with Kripke's original puzzle concerning Paderewski and then extend the solution outwards to the other puzzles.

What I would like to say, in response to Kripke's puzzle, is that the report that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical is correct, that the report that Peter believes Paderewski is also correct, but that the composite report consisting of the two individual reports taken together is not correct. Thus in a given context in which one is meant to provide a faithful report of what Peter believes, it would be correct to give either report but it would not be correct to give them both.

I believe that this response is very intuitive, but it raises enormous difficulties which must be resolved before it can be considered satisfactory. We should first note that the terms in which Kripke states the puzzle do not even allow this response to be presented as a solution. This is partly because he tends to operate in the material mode. Thus he asks us whether Peter believes that Paderewski is musical rather than whether it is correct to report Peter as believing that Paderewski is musical. And it is partly because he does not even have the notion of a composite report. We think of the puzzle as appearing to establish that the composite report is correct; and we reject this conclusion by granting that the individual reports are correct but rejecting the assumption that the composition of correct reports is a correct report. But since Kripke does not have the notion of a composite report, this assumption does not even figure in his statement of the puzzle.

How we should mold our response to Kripke's formulation of the puzzle is a delicate matter. Suppose he asks us: does Peter believe that Paderewski is musical?'. We say 'yes'. He then asks us: does Peter believe that Paderewski is not musical? Whether we say 'yes' or not depends upon whether we think of the two answers together as constituting two separate reports or as constituting a single composite report. If the former, we should say 'yes'; and if the latter we should say 'no' - or at least not say 'yes'. How we conceive of the answers

makes a difference to what we can infer. In the former case, we cannot infer the conjunction ‘Peter believes that Paderewski is musical and Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical’, since the conjunction requires that the two conjuncts be regarded as belong to a single report. In the latter case, we can infer the conjunction, though we are in no position to assert the conjuncts. It is as if there were invisible scope-markers in our discourse indicating when two or more belief statements should be taken to belong to the same report; and what we can legitimately say or infer depends upon where we take those scope-markers to be drawn.

It might be thought that our response is a form of contextualism. Some philosophers have supposed that each individual report might be correct in the appropriate context. Thus in a context in which the pianist is in question it would be correct to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical; and in a context in which the politician is in question it would be correct to say that Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical. Since the context in which each belief report is correct is not the same, it is therefore acceptable to make both belief reports, just as it is acceptable to say ‘now I am standing, now I am not standing’.

I am inclined to think this response is misguided, since the correctness of the belief reports need not depend upon their being associated with different conceptions of Paderewski. But, in any case, this is not our view. Our contexts are formal rather than substantive. A context does not contribute anything to the interpretation of the report that is made within the context; and if one asks ‘what makes for the difference in context of two belief reports?’, there is nothing informative one can say unless it is that they are *treated* as different. Contexts in our sense might be compared to suppositional contexts. Imagine that I suppose P and that I subsequently suppose Q. Am I then justified in inferring P & Q? That depends upon whether the suppositional contexts are the same or different, i.e. on whether one is making two separate suppositions or a single composite supposition. But if one asks ‘what makes the suppositional contexts different?’, there is nothing one can point to beyond the intention to treat them as different. Of course, one does not normally think of assertions as subject to compartmentalization in the same way as suppositions. Whether one can infer P & Q from the suppositions of P and of Q depends upon whether one thinks of these suppositions as belonging to the same suppositional context, while whether one can infer P &

Q from the assertions of P and Q is not normally taken to be sensitive to some form of assertional context. But if we are right, the two cases are more alike than one might have thought.

The fundamental question with which we must deal is: how is it possible for a composite belief report not to be correct even though the individual belief reports are correct and even though there is no substantive shift in context from the one belief report to the other? This question might appear to be especially pressing if correctness is identified with truth (an identification I am tempted to make). For how can the truth of two assertions, taken together, amount to anything more than the truth of each assertion? But it is also difficult to see how the correctness of two assertions in such a case might amount to anything more than the correctness of each assertion, even if correctness is not identified with truth.

Now there is a relatively superficial answer to this question. For one can provide an account of when a belief report is correct which attempts to make evident how the above composition principle might fail. But there is also a deeper and more satisfactory answer, one that motivates the superficial answer and helps connect the various puzzles. It is this deeper answer, I believe, that requires an appeal to relational ideas.

The superficial answer is already implicit in our diagnosis of what was unacceptable about the attribution of contradictory beliefs. We suggested that what made the attribution unacceptable was the absence of a match in coordination; there was a coordination among the use of the names in the reports that was lacking in the believer's expression of his beliefs. Let us now see how this account might be generalized. Imagine that we make a composite report of Peter's beliefs. We say: Peter believes S1, he believes S2, ..., he believes Sn. Let us suppose that Peter would express the beliefs we are attempting to describe by means of the sentences T1, T2, ..., Tn. To keep matters simple, let us suppose that, except for the choice of names, Peter would use the same words in expressing his beliefs as we use in describing them and that the correctness of the report simply turns on there being an appropriate connection between the sequence of names M1, M2, ..., Mk that we use in describing his beliefs and the sequence of names N1, N2, ..., Nk that he uses in expressing them.

The question now is: what are the conditions under which the report will be correct?

Three answers suggest themselves. The first is that corresponding names should be coreferential. This amounts to treating the reports as *de re* and, of course, under this reading, Kripke's puzzle does not arise. The second answer is that the reporter's names should be coordinated in the same manner as the believer's names. Thus when the reporter takes two of his names M_i and M_j to be the same (or the same in use) the believer should take his corresponding names N_i and N_j to be the same (or the same in use). I call this the 'weakly faithful' reading. It does not require that the reporter and the believer use the same names. Suppose, for example, that Paderewski also goes under the name 'Henry' and that Peter has two beliefs concerning Paderewski which he would express in the words 'Henry is a pianist' and 'Henry is a politician'. Then it would be correct to report Peter as believing that Paderewski is a pianist and that Paderewski is a politician under the weakly faithful reading, since his beliefs are coordinated in the same manner as the report. However, it would not be correct to report Kripke's Peter as having these beliefs under this reading, even though he would be willing to express his beliefs in the words 'Paderewski is a pianist' and 'Paderewski is a politician', since the beliefs are not coordinated in the manner required by the report. The third answer is that not only should there be a match in the *intra*-personal use of the names, there should also be a match in the *inter*-personal use: where the reporter uses a given name M_i (or makes a given use of a name) the believer should use the same name N_i (or make the same use of the name). I call this the 'strongly faithful' reading. Under this reading, it would not be correct to report *our* Peter as believing that Paderewski is a pianist and that Paderewski is a politician, since he would not use the name 'Paderewski' in expressing his beliefs though it would be correct to report him as believing that Henry is a pianist and that Henry is a politician.

The weakly and strongly faithful readings appear to provide us with the means for seeing how the individual belief reports might be correct even though the composite report is not; for the correctness of the composite report requires a match in *intra*-personal coordination which is not required by the correctness of the individual reports. However, a problem remains. For we would like the correctness of a faithful belief report to turn on whether there is a match in meaning, or a relationship of synonymy, between the embedded

clauses S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n in the belief reports and the sentences T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n by which the believer might express his beliefs. In other words, there should be a relation of synonymy which is such that a belief report will be correct just in case the relation holds between the sentences S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n and the sentences T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n . We might call this the 'synonymy principle'. We should note that it does not commit one to any particular relation of synonymy; it merely says that for any given reading of a belief report, there should be some relation of synonymy, perhaps not all fine-grained, by which it might be understood. The problem now is to see how the faithful readings are compatible with the synonymy principle. For one naturally supposes that if there is a relation of synonymy holds between the pairs of sentences $(S_1, T_1), (S_2, T_2), \dots, (S_n, T_n)$, then that same relation of synonymy should hold between the sequences of sentences S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n and T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n . But the faithful readings require a notion of synonymy for which this is not so.

In the next lecture, I shall attempt to solve this problem and to extend the resulting solution to the other puzzles. I shall also take up the topic of Moore's Paradox of analysis. I have so far largely viewed relationism as a way of providing referentialist with some of the advantages of a standard Fregean position. What I think is remarkable about Moore's Paradox, once its implications are properly understood, is that it should force even the most thorough-going Fregean to adopt a form of relationism. Thus relationism is a view which should be embraced by Fregeans and referentialists alike.