551 Metaphysics Eddon M 3:35-6:05
description forthcoming
584 Philosophy of Language Antony Tu 1:00-3:30
description forthcoming
586 Philosophy of Mathematics Klement MWF 12:20
description forthcoming
593M Philosophy of Mind Levine Th 1:00-3:30
An in-depth study of the philosophical issues surrounding mental representation and cognitive architecture through the work of Jerry Fodor.  Permission of instructor is required for undergraduates.
594T Autonomy Garcia TuTh 11:15
Autonomy is a key concept in moral and political philosophy.  This course offers an overview of autonomy from three different perspectives. First, we will look at the historical development of the idea (Rousseau/Kant). Second, we will discuss recent accounts of personal autonomy, especially ‘hierarchical’ analyses (Frankfurt/Dworkin) and their critics (Thalberg/Watson/Wolf/Bratman/Velleman) as well as philosophical accounts of the failure of personal autonomy in terms of addiction (Elster/Wallace).  Third, we will explore social and political autonomy, including worries about autonomy and the social constitution of selves (Meyers/Friedman), the relationship between autonomy and authenticity (Oshana/Taylor), and the relationship between liberal neutrality, perfectionism, and autonomy (Christman/Hurka/Raz).
595T Set Theory Hardegree TuTh 9:30
Elementary introduction to the theory of sets (specifically Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory). Sets, relations, functions, natural numbers, proof by induction, cardinal numbers. Comparison with other theories of plurality. Pre-requisite: Phil 310 (Intermediate Logic).
751 Epistemology Kornblith Tu 4:00-6:30
The Epistemology of Disagreement
We all hold a great many beliefs knowing full well that others disagree with us.   Often, this creates no special epistemological problems.  If you have evidence which others lack, or you have thought more carefully about some issue than your opponents, then the mere fact that others disagree with you may be unproblematic.  But we all hold many opinions knowing that there are others—epistemic peers who are just as well-informed as we, just as thoughtful, just as intellectually responsible and so on—who have views diametrically opposed to ours.  And this seems to create an epistemological problem: how should the views of our peers be taken into account in determining what it is reasonable to believe?  We will read work by Christensen, Elga, Feldman, Goldman, Kelly, Lackey, Sosa, van Inwagen, White and others.  A short paper and a seminar paper will be required.
782 Philosophy of Religion Baker/Matthews W 3:30-6:05

This graduate seminar will focus on Reason and Religious Belief.  We will consider such questions as these:  Can religious disagreements be reasonable? (Feldman; Baker)  Are any arguments for the existence of God sound? (Baker and Matthews)  Are religious beliefs precluded by “the ethics of belief”?  (Zamulinski; Peels)  Is theological foundationalism satisfactory?  (Plantinga) Is Fideism satisfactory? (James; Bishop)  We will also read Rawls’s undergraduate thesis, On My Religion, and discuss how Rawls’ religious views influenced his political philosophy.

Prerequisites:  Graduate standing in the Philosophy Department or permission of the instructors

791J Seminar – Occasionalism O’Neill Th 4:00-6:30
Occasional Causes and Occasionalism
Occasionalism is the view that (possibly barring free agents’ production of acts of will) no created thing can be an efficient cause; God alone has causal power and exercises this power.  Some commentators have argued that a number of views to which Descartes is committed lead to a form of (partial) occasionalism: bodies cannot be causes.  The cue ball’s translation of motion upon contact with another ball is not the cause of the latter’s motion; it is merely the “occasion” for God to cause the latter ball’s motion. We will try to determine if these commentators’ ascription of this type of occasionalism to Descartes is correct or not. The course will examine the concept of occasional cause as it is used by Descartes, as well as by some less well-known 17th-century figures, such as Mary Astell, J.B. van Helmont and Margaret Cavendish.  We will trace antecedents of the concept in the doctrines of the ancient Stoics and Galen, in Renaissance logic texts, and in the writings of Aquinas and Suárez.  We will contrast this concept of occasional cause with that of Malebranche, which has its antecedents in the medieval Christian and Islamic occasionalist natural philosophies.
794E Seminar – Ethics Graham Tu 7:00-9:30
description forthcoming