Amazing DPs

We argue contra Grimshaw (1979) that there are no such semantic objects as concealed exclamations (henceforth CEs). Instead, all DPs appearing in intensional argument positions of cognitive or emotive factives (henceforth C-DPs) make the same contribution, but the embedding predicates differ in semantic contribution as well as pragmatic requirements.

Data and Previous Literature: Elliott (1971) points out that DPs introduced by emotive factive predicates (cf. (1)) have exclamative interpretations. Grimshaw (1979) establishes a parallelism between DPs that are introduced by predicates that also take interrogative clauses (Concealed Questions CQs, (2)) and DPs that are introduced by predicates that also take exclamative clauses (cf. (2b)); she argues that just like interrogatives and exclamatives are different semantic objects, so are CEs and CQs.

(1) It’s amazing the big car he bought.
(2) a. John asked the height of the building / what height the building was.
   b. John couldn’t believe the height of the building / what a height the building was.

The follow-up of her argument is that predicates which may embed both wh-interrogatives and wh-exclamatives introduce DPs that may be interpreted as either CQs or CEs:

(3) John found out the height of the building. AMBIGUOUS

At least two observations seem to support the idea that CQ-DPs have to be treated differently from CE-DPs: (i) modification by an adjective that indicates high degree (e.g. incredible) as in (4) disambiguates in favor of the CE-reading. (ii) not all DPs possible as CQs can be embedded under emotive predicates like it’s amazing (cf. (5)).

(4) John found out the incredible height of the building. ONLY CE
(5) {I know/*It’s amazing} the best carburetor on the market.

Portner & Zanuttini (2005) argue for a distinction between CEs (e.g. (2b)) and nominal exclamatives (NEs, e.g. (1)). NEs include a relative clause and, unlike CEs, can stand alone in matrix contexts:

(6) a. The car he bought!
   b. #The size of the building!

They concentrate exclusively on NEs as in (1), and derive the clausal meaning from the relative clause. They propose that these DPs have the same semantic and pragmatic properties as wh-exclamatives, namely they denote sets of true propositions the computation of which involves domain widening (cf. Zanuttini & Portner 2003).

But crucially, the relative clause is neither necessary (cf. (7a)) nor sufficient (cf. (7b)) for the licensing of stand-alone exclamative DPs. Instead, the contrast (6b)/(7a) suggests that information structure plays a central role to be studied in more detail.

(7) a. The size of this building!
   b. #The city that is the capital of California!

We consider this decisive evidence against a split into CEs and NEs, and thus against an analysis that hinges on relative clauses.

A uniform analysis for C-DPs: We argue for a uniform treatment of DPs in intensional argument positions of cognitive and emotive factive predicates: the DP plays a double role in that it expresses a (singleton) property and at the same time picks out its extension in the actual world (cf. Frana 2006 for CQs). The differences in interpretation and restrictions on what are
possible C-DPs fall out from the semantic and pragmatic properties of the different embedding predicates as well as pragmatic properties of the corresponding conversational moves. The latter also constrain the possibilities of DPs used as stand alone exclamatives.

First, w.r.t. (3), we assume that there is only one C-DP-embedding find out, which asserts an event of discovery that enables the subject to correctly identify the actual height of the building and presumes that he had not been able to do so before (CQ as in Schwager 2007). Now, if it is common knowledge that the speaker him/herself knows the height of the building and considers it high, the proposition expressed is perceived to have an exclamative flavour, which, in that scenario, is also available for the overtly interrogative counterpart. incredible in (4) makes this exclamative component explicit. Given the inherent uniqueness of an object’s height, the adjective cannot be interpreted restrictively, and thus conveys expressive meaning (cf. Potts 2005, Morzycki t.a.).

Second, we propose a semantics for emotive factives that draws on Sharvit (2002). amazingC-DP as appearing with the expletive (to be ensured by a syntactic stipulation) is the (se,t)-variant of attributive ⟨e,t⟩-amazing. The C-DP embedded under amazingC-DP denotes an individual concept. The predicate is interpreted with respect to a contextually salient set of properties X, and expresses the proposition that at all worlds compatible with the speaker’s expectations (= EXP(w)) a different subset of X holds of the referent picked out by the DP there as compared to the subset of X true in the actual world of the actual referent of the DP.

(8) \[\text{[amazing}_{C-DP}\text{]}^{c,w} = \lambda x_{se}. \forall w' \in \text{EXP}(\text{speaker}(c))(w) \left[ \{ P \in X_c | P(w)(x(w)) \} \neq \{ P \in X_c | P(w')(x(w')) \} \right] \]

The salient set of properties depends to a large extent on the embedded DP. The felicity of a particular DP depends on how easily it makes salient a set of properties that affect its value. E.g., for abstract objects like degrees of height, the salient set comes from its possible values \(X = \{ \lambda w \lambda d. d = 10m, \lambda w \lambda d. d = 11m, \ldots \} \) (hence, \(x\) has a different value if different properties hold). In contrast to that, cities render salient sets of properties that do not challenge their identity. Hence, amazement that different such properties hold is expressed straightforwardly by ⟨e,t⟩-amazing, blocking (8). So, while there is no semantic selection restriction, the different pragmatic restrictions on C-DPs imposed by emotive or cognitive factives fall out from the different requirements imposed on the context. CQs require the availability of suitable identifiers (cf. Schwager 2007), whereas CES require salience of a suitable set of properties.

**Conclusion:** DPs achieving an exclamative flavour when introduced by predicates that can also embed wh-clauses still receive ordinary DP-interpreations (individual concepts). The exclamative meaning comes from the predicate. Different restrictions on what DPs are felicitous under cognitive and emotive factives derive from different context dependencies of these predicates. Apart from a desirable reduction of semantic objects denoted by DPs, the analysis may also imply interesting consequences for the study of the worrersponding wh-complements.