

The Uncanny Jew: A Brief History of an Image*

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In 1838, the left wing Hegelian thinker, Karl Gutzkow, dramatically presented the image of the Jew and Judaism as it was shaped by the "Jewish Question," that is, by the question of whether or not Jews should be politically emancipated and admitted as citizens to the modern nation-state. In this instance, the question was raised in Germany by Gutzkow in the following terms:

Ahasverus [the eternal, wandering Jew] is the tragic consequence of Jewish hopes. There is embodied so painfully in this individual just that which the Jews wish collectively for themselves. There is in Judaism despair because though they would gladly die, they cannot. Certainly, the stubborn clinging to life by the Jews is a tragedy among their misfortunes. A messianic hope, which cannot be relinquished by even the most enlightened and purified Jews, tethers them to a bleak existence. . . .

For Judaism has never had the urge to self-destruction [*Selbstvernichtung*]. It has always been greedy to preserve and maintain itself for a triumphant future. Ahasverus' tragic fate is not his violent and unsuccessful search for death, but rather his exhausted dusk-watch, his outliving of himself, his obsolescence. Time itself always remains young: new peoples arise, new heroes, new empires. Only Ahasverus stays on, a living corpse, a dead man who has not yet died.¹

This image of the Jewish people as a "living corpse" is a representation that haunts the very formulation and raising of the Jewish Question, not only--but especially--in Germany. Can the Jews as a people, as a nation, as a race, and/or as a religion be incorporated into the German nation-state? As indicated by the phrases that describe the Jews as an "Ahasverus..., a dead man who has not yet died," Gutzkow represents the tragedy of the Jews as the prolongation and obsolescence of their existence, not as their "search for death." While a given thinker--such as Gutzkow, Hegel, or Schopenhauer--may support the civil emancipation of Jews, the consequences of the image or trope of embodied living-death for

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the political status of the Jews goes well beyond and, even, dialectically negates such emancipation. Any "solution" to the Jewish question, therefore, must not prolong their separate existence. They must be incorporated into the nation-state without remainder.

In this essay, I will trace out some crucial moments in the modern history of this image and its consequences. These moments will be taken not only from the writings of non-Jews but from those of Jews reconfiguring and responding to this image. My overall interest in paying close attention to these images of Jews is not simply to collect and categorize them for speculation, however disturbing and fascinating they may be. Rather, I am interested in a kind of cultural, political, and social history of this image because, as I have suggested elsewhere, images, metaphors, and tropes have consequences.² The representation of Jews as Uncanny may have been shaped in and through the "logic" of the Jewish Question, but that image has a history which that question both inaugurated and could not contain. We must pay attention not only to the "logic" of arguments, of questions and answers, but to the figural terms that shape and imaginatively locate and make possible this very logic.

In order to approach the implication within the Jewish Question of the image of the Jew as Uncanny--that is, as occupying an indistinguishable and undecidable borderline between life and death--I will first rehearse this question in its German and French settings. I do so in order to demonstrate how its very cultural and political "logic" was both produced by the representation of Jews as uncanny others and how the contradictions of this logic further exacerbated the negative character of this image, producing ever more pernicious framings and "solutions" to the Jewish question.

The contradictions of Jewish emancipation are very clearly and compactly set forth by Alain Finkielkraut in his book, *The Imaginary Jew*.³ I will quote selections from this text so as to frame my treatment of the history of the image of the "Uncanny Jew" in terms of these contradictions. Finkielkraut describes how, in response to their emancipation in France--and as the "Acts of the Israelitish Deputies" attests--"everything in [Jewish] law that might mark them as strangers to the human community was cast aside."⁴ "[T]hey acquitted their debt by de-jewifying themselves; the law, *their* law demanded they become mimics, for the advent of emancipation had placed them in France's debt."⁵

But what of the transgressors? The visible Jews, those who stood out? Who spoke French with a bad accent? Who were nostalgic for the ghetto and rejected integration? And the incorrigibles who persisted in acting as if a Jewish nation might still exist? By unilaterally violating the rules of emancipation, they encouraged anti-Jewish sentiment and placed the safety of their coreligionists at risk; traitors twice over, they were inadequate as citizens of France and as Jews. For the Israelites, acting Jewish *in public* could only be seen as a kind of dangerous sabotage. . . . The man of the past must be rooted out relentlessly: it's a question of life and death. The hunt demands a continual state of alert, for not to pursue him in others is an indirect admission that he still lives within ourselves. . . . The same pattern holds for the Israelite: his regeneration and recovery cannot be regarded as finished until he devotes himself to an undying hatred of traditional Jews. . . . Judeophobia among the assimilated was all the more passionate; their social status was at stake, living as they did

under the constant threat of being identified as Jews. . . . The only good Jew was an invisible Jew. The other, the visible Jew, was an obscene creature, indecent; morality as well as personal hygiene demanded that such an exhibitionist be shunned.⁶

But, ironically, it was precisely this effacement and hiddenness of Jewishness that was most threatening for emancipated European Jewish communities. Again, as Finkelkraut suggests,

Assimilation cannot be reduced to a *fiasco* pure and simple; it should perhaps be thought of as something more ironic, more diabolical yet: as a dreadful *misunderstanding*. Genocide [in WWII] was not imposed on the Jews *in spite of* their effort to assimilate, but *in response* to this very attempt. The more they hid their Jewishness, the more terrifying they became to others. As Jewish appearances gave less and less hint of ethnic background, the evils charged to Jews by anti-Semitic opinion grew worse and worse. Could these men of the Enlightenment ever have imagined that their increasing resemblance to the gentiles would arouse a hatred that ran so deep? . . . For the myth of Jewish omnipotence to take hold, the people of Zion first had to pass unnoticed, merge with the general populace. It took a Jew without qualities to fit the part of spy or conspirator. . . . Assimilation thus became a strange kind of trial in which the defendants completely misunderstood the indictment their judges had prepared. Assimilated Jews thought they were being charged with excessively Jewish behavior, when it was their will to integration that was really the crime: the wary would only weaken their case in the very way they secured their defense. A kind of relentless mechanism had been set in place, turning every protestation of innocence into yet more evidence of guilt.⁷

This pernicious logic is characteristic of the Jewish Question in Germany as well. As Paul Laurence Rose has importantly emphasized, "For nineteenth-century Germans, so unsure of their own 'Germanness,' the Jewish Question was ultimately the German Question. It was, in effect, another way of asking 'What is German': and receiving the satisfying answer-- 'whatever is not Jewish.'"⁸ The success of the Jew in mimicking the German further threatened the German's ability to define himself as, precisely, not a Jew, ironically making 'jewification' (in a logic of 'contagion') both more pervasive and threatening because invisible, unlocatable and, thus, uncontainable.

This contradiction at the heart of the Jewish question represents the two poles between which Jewish identity was stretched in the dialectics of modernity brought on by the enlightenment and emancipation and their aftermath. Alas, this mimicry did not ultimately empower the subject but, as I have noted, rather, made the Jew who would be emancipated in the modern nation-state even more threatening and threatened.⁹ This no-win situation, I suggest, finds its figural condition and expression in the images and metaphors that shape the "Jewish Question." Indeed, the very problematics of Jewish visibility and invisibility were made visible through the imagistic lens by which the Jew was perceived and represented in the religious, philosophical, political, psychological, and aesthetic discourses of French and German modernity in particular. This figural "lens" is, as I have already suggested, that of the "Jewish Uncanny," that is, the representation of the Jew, Jewishness, and Judaism as Uncanny.

The Jewish Uncanny represents the Jew(s) as spectral, disembodied spirits lacking a national home and, thus, as unwelcome guests or aliens wandering into and within other peoples' homes, disrupting and haunting them, making them "Unheimliche," unhomey. Moses Hess wrote of the Jews, as "a soul without a body, wandering like a ghost through the centuries."¹⁰ The image of the already dead, but uncannily still present, Jews was a very prevalent one in discourses from Hegel and Heine to Gans (and other members of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*) and Pinsker. In some versions, the solution to the Jewish Question emphasized the invisibility and, indeed, the disappearance of the Jews, as is the case with Gutzkow, with whose quote I began this essay. Gutzkow writes further in these terms as follows:

The Jews wander and find only shelter among you. . . . [Yet] they have been long amongst us and strive to merge with us. Thus must now be exactly fulfilled the word of Christ that the Jews would wander in error for eternity and they should remain scattered over the whole earth. Pious Christians would fear that emancipation might deny this prophecy of Christ in an outrageous way. But in fact emancipation would for the first time directly split the Jews apart from one another, who until now have simply been scattered, and would fulfill the curse that was foreseen by Christ, namely that the Jews should cease for all eternity to be a people.¹¹

Arthur Schopenhauer likewise sought the disappearance of the Jews. He suggested that the solution to the Jewish Question was conversion to Christianity and intermarriage. Note the pronounced resonances with the first quote from Gutzkow with which I opened this essay:

Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew, is nothing but the personification of the whole Jewish race... This pettifogging little nation, this John Lackland among the nations, is to be found all over the globe, nowhere at home and nowhere strangers. . . . It asserts its Jewish nationality with unprecedented stubbornness. . . [but] lives parasitically on other nations. . . To bring an end in the gentlest manner to the tragicomedy, the best way is for marriages. . . between Jews and gentiles. . . Then, in the course of a hundred years, there will be only a very few Jews left, and soon the ghost will be exorcized. Ahasverus will be buried, and the chosen people will not know where their abode was. This desirable result, however, will be frustrated if the emancipation of the Jews is carried to the point of obtaining political rights...¹²

While he opposed giving political rights to Jews, Schopenhauer did support the granting of civil rights to German Jews. One must be careful, however, not to assume that use of the same images of Jews necessitates identical positions on the Jewish Question. Ahasverus, the myth and representation of the Eternal or Wandering Jew, is a shared trope in both Gutzkow's and Schopenhauer's writings and their political stances are very close as well. But others who use this trope, as I will presently demonstrate, reverse its meaning and its political consequences. Even the negative connotations of Ahasverus, which came to the fore in a series of early 17th-century chapbooks, were not uniformly--although they were most often--adopted.¹³

The "positive" Christian reading of Ahasverus is that he is a sign of Christian faith in the second coming, at which point the Eternal Jew will finally find rest in his embracing of Jesus as Christ and his conversion to Christianity. Ahasverus, thus, is to be preserved as a part of, and a crucial witness to, the truth of Christianity. In its "negative" reading, Ahasverus becomes only the unloving and egoistic Jew who rejected Christ and was, therefore, cursed to wander ceaselessly and to find no rest, which was a sign of the Jew's depravity and anti-sociality. This "negative" Ahasverus is decidedly outside of the bounds of Christianity, the religion of love. Eliminating Ahasverus becomes, in this version, part of the triumph and fulfillment of this love.¹⁴ The significance of the myth and image of Ahasverus, I suggest, is not only that it was in these writings negatively inflected, but that it was a way of representing the *Unheimlichkeit* of the Jews as an ancient problem, as a problem of the Jews' essential character, be that essence understood to derive from their national, religious, racial, or psychological character. The living death embodied by the Jews in the figure of Ahasverus--especially when messianic redemption (as in the first Gutzkow quote) or Salvation in the second coming is no longer considered part of his myth--is fully negative. Unredeemed "living death" is, potentially, a threat to others in a way that such Uncanniness, a witness to ultimate redemption or salvation, is not. And, further, it is important to note that in all of the instances of Ahasverus cited in the context of the Jewish Question, it is specifically and always the male Jew's spectral "*Unheimlichkeit*" that is put to rest--for Schopenhauer through intermarriage, conversion and assimilation, but not through political emancipation.¹⁵

For other thinkers, the solution to the Jewish Question was precisely to heighten their profile as Jews in their own nation-state. Proposing a radically different position on emancipation than either Gutzkow or Schopenhauer, the Zionist, Leo Pinsker, employed a remarkably similar figure to describe the condition of the Jews:

The world saw in this people [the Jews] the uncanny [*Unheimliche*] form of one of the dead walking among the living. The ghostlike apparition of a living corpse, of a people without unity or organization, without land or other bonds of unity, no longer alive, and yet walking among the living--this spectral form without precedence in history, unlike anything that preceded or followed it, could but strangely affect the imagination of the nations. And if the fear of ghosts is something inborn, and has a certain justification in the psychic life of mankind, why be surprised at the effect produced by this dead but still living nation? . . . A fear of the Jewish ghost has passed down the generations and the centuries. First a breeder of prejudice, later in conjunction with other forces . . . it culminated in Judeophobia. . . . Judeophobia is a variety of demonopathy with the distinction that it is not peculiar to particular races but is common to the whole of mankind, and that this ghost is not disembodied like other ghosts but partakes of flesh and blood, must endure pain inflicted by the fearful mob who imagines itself endangered. . . . It is this fear of ghosts, the mother of Judeophobia, that has evoked this abstract, I might say Platonic hatred, thanks to which the whole Jewish nation is wont to be held responsible for the real or supposed misdeeds of its individual members, and to be libeled in so many ways, to be buffeted about so shamefully.¹⁶

In employing the figure of the "Unheimliche" Jew, the medical doctor Pinsker diagnosed him as in a pathological, but curable, condition as a result of the incurable pathology of European "Judeophobia." Writing just prior to the turn of the century, the Russian Pinsker penned a manifesto in German, calling for the auto-emancipation of the Jews, in the wake of the failure of their emancipation and increasing anti-semitism in Europe. The building of a national home would, finally, put an end to their spectral, haunting diasporic status. Pinsker concludes his argument as follows:

The Jews are not a living nation; they are everywhere aliens; therefore they are despised. The civil and political emancipation of the Jews is not sufficient to raise them in the estimation of the peoples.

The proper, the only solution, is in the creation of a Jewish nationality, of a people living upon its own soil, the auto-emancipation of the Jews; their return to the ranks of the nations by the acquisition of a Jewish homeland.

. . . . That we may not be compelled to wander from one exile to another, we must have an extensive, productive land of refuge, a center which is our own.

. . . .The international Jewish question must have a national solution.¹⁷

Ahad Ha 'Am, writing in 1902, about 20 years after Pinsker, drew out some of the implications of Pinsker's views in ways that seem prescient. They echo the contradictions of assimilation found in the writings of Finkelkraut and Rose. Ahad Ha' Am asks:

Assimilate with the nations? If real assimilation be meant--the assimilation that reaches to the very soul and ends in annihilation--that is a kind of death which does not come of itself, and we do not wish to bring it on by our own efforts. But the surface assimilation which is the panacea advocated by a certain section of Jews can only make matters worse for us. Pinsker himself does not draw this conclusion in so many words; but it is a necessary consequence of the idea just mentioned. For, seeing that the source of anti-Semitism lies in our lack of a concrete national existence, which would compel the other nations to recognize in us a nation equal to themselves in status, it follows plainly that the more we assimilate--the more we imitate our surroundings and whittle away our national distinctiveness--the less concrete and the more spiritual will our national existence become; and the more, therefore, will the ghost-fear which begets anti-Semitism grow in intensity. . . . It is. . . fundamental to Pinsker's view that national equality is unattainable so long as we lack the concrete attributes of nationality. A nation which is a nation only in the spiritual sense is a monstrosity which the other nations cannot possibly regard as their compeer; it follows that they cannot recognize its title to demand the same rights as those enjoyed by the real nations.¹⁸

By either being "completely incorporate[d] into [the fabric of Europe],"¹⁹ which Eduard Gans--a proponent of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*--calls for, or by resurrecting or regenerating the body of the Jews by planting its seed again within its home soil, as Moses Hess proposes, the Jewish Question would be resolved. Hess, who is often considered the first modern Zionist, elicits the regeneration of the Jews in their national homeland by way of two very striking images. In the first image, "the soldiers of civilization, the French, are gradually sweeping away the dominance of the barbarians; and with their strong Herculean

arms will roll off the tombstones from the graves of the supposedly dead peoples and the nations will reawaken once more."²⁰ In the other image, Hess declared that

The Jewish nation still preserves the fruitful seed of life, which, like the grains of corn found in the graves of Egyptian mummies, though buried for thousands of years, have never lost their power of productivity. The moment the rigid form in which it is enclosed is shattered, the seed, placed in the fertile soil of the present environment and given air and light, will strike root and prosper.²¹

For Hess, this rigid form or husk that needs to be broken is the classical Jewish Reformists' assimilationist desire to become German and, thereby, invisible as Jews. He was concerned as well with the rigidity of the Orthodox. But whereas he thought the rigid husk around the reformists had to be broken from the outside in the final, great cultural calamity in which they would disappear, the Orthodox husk had to be preserved to protect the nationalist seed within until such time as they could one again sow their land and return to life from the grave.

The grains of corn in Hess's second image, buried in Egyptian graves for thousands of years, like the seed that is again planted within its home soil in Hesse's first image, "have never lost their power of productivity." Egyptian mummies and graves signify absolute death and stasis. They also signified, for Hegel, entombment and belief in immortality. Hegel thought the Jews lacking in belief in immortality and, thus, as failing to undertake--and as incapable of understanding the significance of--mummification. Thus, in locating the Jewish "grains of corn" in the graves of Egyptian mummies--but not as the mummies themselves--Hess makes his thought more compatible with that of Hegel, whose thought Hess admired. Jews may have sojourned in Egypt but, for both Hess and Hegel, they are not Egyptian. For Heinrich Heine, however, Jews are (sometimes) figured as embalmed: "Oh, those Egyptians--their handiwork defies time, their pyramids still stand immovable; their mummies are indestructible as ever. And just as indestructible is the mummy-nation that wanders over the face of the earth, wrapped in its age-old scroll of the law; a petrified piece of world-history--a specter, which for a livelihood trafficks in bills of exchange and old clothes."²² The "emphasis on the Egyptian origins of Judaism [in the late 18th and early 19th centuries] suggested to many that the uncanny persistence of the Jewish corpse after the death of Judaism might be attributable to a process of mummification."²³ But Heine (and in this he is more like Hess) also employs more positive images of the uncanniness of Jews and Judaism: "The Jews are a ghost who keeps guard over a treasure which was once entrusted to him. Thus sat this murdered people, this ghost-people, in its dark ghetto, and guarded there its Hebrew Bible."²⁴ In both images, the Jews are closely connected to their texts: the "age-old scroll of the law" which is connected to death and mummification and the "Hebrew Bible," which it guards as a treasure with its life. This is a typical *Wissenschaft des Judentums* view as well of the respective value of these texts.

The image of the wandering, "Eternal Jew" is made to intersect even more fully with that of the uncanny, ghostly Jew in some of Hess's other writings. Resonating with tropes common in those writings of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, as I have already indicated, and informed by Hegel, in these passages Hess suggests the different directions taken later in the divergent writings of Pinsker and Franz Rosenzweig, both of which, however, are also marked by the association of Jewishness and *unheimlichkeit*.

Eventually, the Jews carried their fermentation into humanity at large. They have been criticized for the fact that most of them, during Christ's lifetime, thought only about the re-establishment of their tiny state and did not rise to the sublimity of the great ideas of Christ... It should, however, not surprise us that the people could not conceive the sublime idea--after all, in our own time, most people do not yet understand this idea. Do not look down in distaste at the "Eternal Jew." Do not forget that your own hopes for the Second Coming of your own Savior met with the same fate as the one that befell the Jewish messianic beliefs. It is true that once the Jews gave up their idea of the future, and rejected Christ, they became like a lifeless mummy. Since then the Israelites have been afflicted with the curse of lack of change [*Stabilität*]; ghostlike, they have wandered over a world inspired by God, unable to die or to be revived alike. The rejuvenating element of Judaism, the messianic belief, has been extinguished and their quest for redemption, after they had been mistaken in the nature of true salvation, became a barren abstraction.

But did not the same happen to the Christians as far as their belief in the triumph of Christ is concerned? This hope had inspired the Middle Ages. But after Christ proved victorious on earth, the Christians pushed their victory from earth to heaven, as they were unable to understand the new age. The rejuvenating idea of the Christian Church was also extinguished: the hope for eternity and for the Resurrection of the Lord occupied in Judaism--as an appendage which is dispensable, which can be subsumed or pushed indefinitely into the future.²⁵

Although both Judaism and the Jews are regarded by the Christian West as static and unchanging after and because of their rejection of Jesus as the Christ, the Jews are actually the source of movement and change. As Schlomo Avineri explains,

As Judaism formed the transition between the Oriental and the Occidental, Judaism possessed within itself an element of movement; it is characterized by a permanent unhappiness about the world as it is, as dissatisfaction with existing conditions, a perennial quest for a better world, an eternal dream of looking for new horizons. This is Jewish messianism as understood by Hess. Against the traditional Christian view, which saw post-Biblical Judaism as a fossilized code of static laws and frozen regulations, Hess sees Judaism as a constant element of ferment, as movement, as the dialectical moment in history.²⁶

Indeed, Judaism--in a trope that will be repeated in later Jewish thought, most notably, that of Hermann Cohen--is the source of fermentation in the West:

The Jews had therefore to become the thorn in the side of Occidental humanity. Just as the Orient needed a Chinese Wall, so as not to be disturbed in its static existence, so the Jews are

the element of fermentation in Western humanity and have been destined, from earliest times, to force upon it the element of movement and change.²⁷

A number of questions arise from these formulations and associations of the Jews and change. Most notably, how does this association transform Hess' understanding of Hegel's dialectic? Guided by the world-historical Spirit [*Geist*], what has Hess's revised view of messianism--both Jewish and Christian--to do with this transformed view of dialectic? If for Hegel the Jews were an anachronism and associated with a certain stasis--a people living in the present whose historical contribution, however, had already been made and whose epoch was decidedly past--how does Hess' association of the Jews with fermentation change Hegel's system? Is Hess turning it inside out by reassociating the Jews with the messianic dimension--perhaps, even the very medium of the movement--of history itself?

While the above quoted texts are from Hess's The European Triarchy, by the time he writes Rome and Jerusalem, Hess has not only turned Hegel's system inside out, he has reversed its movement in a kind of "messianic" return to the Jewish state. Hess's Jewish nationalism both extends Hegel's support of Jewish emancipation and turns it on its head, locating it now not in a European nation, but in the Holy land itself. The Jews are emancipated there not as individuals alone, but as Jews, as a nation. The Jewish "quest for redemption" brings them back most properly not to an other-worldly faith, but to a return to the rebirth of the Jewish nation in their ancient land. It is this that will rejuvenate them from their ghostlike lack of change. Hess's imaging of this Jewish condition in his The European Triarchy is worth considering again, now more closely:

Do not look down in distate at the "Eternal Jew." . . . It is true that once the Jews gave up their idea of the future, and rejected Christ, they became like a lifeless mummy. Since then the Israelites have been afflicted with the curse of lack of change [*Stabilität*]; ghostlike, they have wandered over the world inspired by God, unable to die or to be revived alike. The rejuvenating element of Judaism, the messianic belief, has been extinguished and their quest for redemption, after they had been mistaken in the nature of true salvation, became a barren abstraction.²⁸

Here, Hess seems to accept the uncanny, ghostlike and "lifeless mummy" character of the Jews since they "gave up their idea of the future." In this, as I have noted, he seems to repeat some of the tropes of Jewish stasis that both Christianity and the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement associated with post-biblical--especially, rabbinic and medieval--Judaism. In particular, as I have shown, the image of Jewish mumification resonates with that of Heine and, in its association of Egypt and stasis, with Hegel. The inability either to die or be revived aptly describes their location in Hegel's (and others') view of the Jews as both anomaly and anachronism. The Jews, since they rejected Christ, were cursed, as in the legend of the Eternal or wandering Jew. Here this legend is explicitly further elaborated in terms of their ghostliness.

However, the context of these remarks is framed first by the exhortation to his Christian readership not to "look down in distate at the 'Eternal Jew.'" Why? Because, according to Hess, "the same thing happen[ed] to the Christians as far as their belief in the triumph of Chirst is concerned." Hess claims that just as in Judaism "the messianic belief. . . became a barren abstraction," so in Christianity, "the hope for eternity and for the Ressurrection of the Lord. . . [came to be treated] as an appendage which is dispensible, which can be subsumed or pushed indefinitely into the future."

The remarks which frame the close of this paragraph, however, point beyond not only this paragraph and its argument, but even beyond this text to that of Rome and Jerusalem.²⁹ There, the frame is widened or reframed, now as a redemptive return to the national homeland and away from salvation as a "barren abstraction." This "return to history" is the ferment of the Jews. It is, as Avineri suggests, "the dialectical moment in history." Pinsker later takes a similar position in his, "Auto-emancipation." And while--like Hegel and unlike Hess, Rozensweig affirms the eternal, stasis-like character of the Jew--Rozensweig also works with the image of the Jew as wandering, ghostlike, and eternal, and emphasizes the Jewish temporal relation to the messianic as always pointing toward redemption. In this later characteristic, Rozensweig's position is like that of Hess' reversal of Hegel on the Jew's contribution to messianism as precisely not past.

These are but a very few examples of the image and trope of the "Jewish Uncanny." The Jews are here represented as always already dead but, somehow, and problematically, still apparently present (Schopenhauer) or as apparently dead and buried, but actually awaiting regeneration, resurrection, rebirth, or redemption (Hess or Pinsker). But either way, what appears to be the case is not. The Jew is on the border between life and death, life in death, death in life. But which one is it? Embedded in this image is this very ambiguity and undecidability.

It is as this border-state, this spectral and ghost-like condition, that I think the trope of the "Jewish Uncanny" is both repressed and returns in Sigmund Freud's writings, especially in his 1919 essay, "*das Unheimliche*"³⁰ ("The Uncanny"). This may seem an odd suggestion to make as Freud does not explicitly mention Jews as Uncanny in this essay. He even repeatedly states that the Uncanny itself does not have as much to do with uncertainty as to whether something is living or dead, as much as it has to do--in Freud's description of Frederich Schelling's terms--with that which "ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light."³¹ Freud draws the reader's attention toward the figure of the Sandman, in E. T. A Hoffman's tale of that name, and to the Oedipus complex and away from the figure of Olympia, the automaton, and his seeming confusion of her with a living young woman. While there are connections drawn between castration and circumcision in Freud's corpus that trouble the association of the Uncanny and the Jew,³² this phallic reading takes account only of the Oedipal themes of Freud's "*das Unheimliche*." I agree with some interpreters that we, the readers, have had "sand thrown in our eyes"³³ and that the exclusively Oedipal interpretation fails to contain the many different examples which

proliferate throughout Freud's essay.³⁴ These and other interpreters³⁵ demonstrate as well that "das Unheimliche" is an uncannily hybrid and heterological text, close interpretations of which unravel Freud's attempt to master the Uncanny in terms of the Oedipal complex. Instead of the predominance of the paternal, I suggest it is the maternal that haunts Freud's essay and that it is the death instinct--rather than the more restricted Oedipal economy--that dominates "das Unheimliche."³⁶ I can only here indicate--because of limitations of space--that it is these two factors, the maternal and the death instinct, which condition the relation of the Uncanny and Jewishness in Freud's essay.

While, as I have already noted, Freud explicitly directs our attention away from the question of intellectual uncertainty and from the uncanniness of the borderline living/dead, I think that it is precisely this trope of Jewishness that Freud is both displacing and attempting to reenvision. Writing during WWI, Freud attempts to embed the Jew (and Jewishness) within a universalized male subject, making the *Unheimliche* (the Uncanny) that which is always already in--and originating from--the *Heim*, the family, the familiar. Ameliorating (or exorcizing) the Jewish problem by reading the uncanniness of the Jew into the very structures of the unconscious within everyman, the Uncanny may thereby be seen as generated by the German *Heim* itself (as both family and nation-state) and not by a stranger, an Ahasverus wandering into and within the *Heim* from the outside. Especially after WWI, *unheimliche* others might thereby be reincorporated into the [national] *Heim*, the *Heimat*. Specifically, the Jew as the Uncanny other, the haunting ghost, might be put to rest by universalizing the site and origins of the *Unheimlich* within (and not as split off from, or as outside of) the *Heim*.

Freud's use of the trope of the Uncanny, thus, offers a third response to the "Jewish Question"--not Schopenhauer's conversion and intermarriage of Jews as a way of accomplishing their disappearance nor Pinsker's or Hess's Zionism in which the Jews become ever more visible by either emancipating themselves or by awaiting national redemption at the hands of Europe, and France in particular. Freud turns the trope of the Uncanny from the Jew to everyman, returning the spectre to its familial origin in the mother's body, her "womb," the first home. The Uncanny is, thereby, displaced from the Jewish male and grafted onto the body of woman, especially as mother. The primary anxiety which produces this sense of "unheimlichkeit" is located in this way not in racial terms, but explicitly in sexual difference. If, as has been argued,³⁷ the Jew's body was in the *fin-de-siecle* negatively feminized and, thereby, made other than everyman, this feminine difference was in "das Unheimliche" displaced and reinscribed onto women's bodies. In this way, Freud reinstated the male Jews' masculinity, making him capable of the *Bildung* and *Sittlichkeit* necessary for full emancipation. And if, as I have suggested, Freud is performing such a covert reincorporation of the Jew within the (national) home, he would hardly flag such a performance. Again, I cannot here more fully make this case, but part of its persuasiveness depends on reading Freud's essay in the context of previous images of the Uncanny Jew as

well as those in works of his contemporaries, such as Franz Rosenzweig, which were written as well (even if only in part) during WWI.

The Uncanny, the *Unheimliche*, has consistently been associated with the feminine, with passivity and lack. For Pinsker, it is "the fear of ghosts" that is "the mother of Judeophobia."³⁸ And, of course, Freud treats the Uncanny as a form of homesickness or nostalgia, of the desire to "return home" to the mother's womb. Both Freud and, especially, Pinsker found the Uncanny unsettling and each in his own way sought to put the Unheimlichkeit of the Jews to rest. Pinsker sought to create a national home for the Jewish people which had "no fatherland of its own, though many motherlands; no center of focus or gravity, no government of its own, no official representation."³⁹ The Jew, he goes on to say, "homes everywhere, but [is] nowhere at home. . . . [N]ot only is he not a native in his own home country, but he is also not a foreigner; he is, in very truth, the stranger *par excellence*. He is regarded as neither friend nor foe but an alien, of whom the only thing known is that he has no home."⁴⁰ For Pinsker, once the ghost is put to rest in the founding of a national Jewish home, the Uncanny disappears. "Home" (*Heim*) and the "Uncanny" (*Unheimliche*) are opposing terms.

This is not the case for Freud. He puts to rest the Ahasverus myth, in which the Jew wanders into the homes of others from the outside, by locating the origin of the Unheimlich within the home itself. Even the very term "*Unheimlich*" is understood by Freud to derive from its apparent opposite, that is, *Heimlich*. As he says, "Thus, *heimlich* is a word the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich*. *Unheimlich* is in some way or other a sub-species of *heimlich*."⁴¹ That which is secret, *geheim*, and is considered part of the privacy of the home, the *heimlich*, develops as "something hidden and dangerous" into the uncanny, the *un-heimlich*. Freud interprets "Schelling's definitions of the uncanny as something that ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light"⁴² as related to the repression of the familiar, of that which originates from within the home, the feminine, the *heimliche*. Freud, unlike Pinsker, does not eliminate the Uncanny, but relocates it, as I have explained, displacing it from the Jewish male to the woman's body, from Ahasverus to the hearth. In this way, the Uncanny becomes a feature of the experience of every man, including the Jew who, thus, becomes an Everyman and is incorporated into the nation-state, the *heim* or *heimat*.

For Rosenzweig, as for Pinsker and Freud, the Uncanny is associated with the feminine, passivity, and lack. And yet, Rosenzweig differs significantly from them in his treatment of the Uncanniness of the Jews. Unlike both of these thinkers, Rosenzweig emphasizes the *Unheimlichkeit* of the Jews. As a Holy people, they are Uncanny to the nations. This Uncanniness is part of their very witness. The Jewish Question, for Rosenzweig, is formed and answered very differently than for Pinsker. The Jews, according to Rosenzweig, are not a people like other peoples. Jewish roots are genealogical, within the

"blood," not within the soil. The Jews are not a land-oriented people. Even the Holy land is not theirs, but God's, the Holy One. He writes,

To the eternal people, home never is home in the sense of land, as it is to the peoples of the world who plough the land and live and thrive on it, until they have all but forgotten that being a people means something besides being rooted in a land. The eternal people has not been permitted to while away time in any home. It never loses the untrammled freedom of a wanderer. . . . And so even when it has a home, this people, in recurrent contrast to all other peoples on earth, is not allowed full possession of that home. It is only 'a stranger and a sojourner.' . . . The holiness of the land removed it from the people's spontaneous reach while it could still reach out for it. This holiness increases the longing for what is lost, to infinity, and so the people can never be entirely at home in any other land.⁴³

And that land is not theirs, but God's. Not a Zionist like Pinsker or Ahad Ha-Am, Rosenzweig sees the Jews as an eternal people precisely because of their uncanniness, living "beyond [the] external life" of the nations,

barred from [its] own soil and [its] own language. . . . The eternal people buys its eternity at the cost of its temporal life. . . . For this people, the moment petrifies and stands between unincreased past and immovable future. . . . While the myth of peoples changes incessantly. . . here the myth becomes eternal and is not subject to change. . . . And so. . . we see. . . in the relation to its own history, what we saw before in its relation to language and land, that this people is denied a life in time for the sake of life in eternity. It cannot experience the history of the nations creatively and fully. Its position is always somewhere between the temporal and the holy, always separated from the one by the other. And so, in the final analysis, it is not alive in the sense the nations are alive: in a national life manifest on this earth, in a national territory, solidly based and staked out on the soil. It is alive only in that which guarantees it will endure beyond time, in that which pledges it everlastingness, in drawing its own eternity from the sources of the blood.⁴⁴

As these quotations from the Star of Redemption demonstrate, Rosenzweig incorporates the *Unheimlichkeit* of the Jews into his view of their role and purpose. As the eternal people, the Jews are God's portion. It is this, and not the Christian explanation of the punishment of the Ahasverus--the Wandering or Eternal Jew--for rejecting Christ, that accounts for their Uncanniness. What is viewed by the nations as central--especially the possession of their own land, everyday language, and national history--is not valued in the same way for Jews. From the perspective of eternity the lives of the nations appear vain and transient. The real home of the Jews is in the Holy, in eternity. All other homes, even that of the holy land, are not fully their own and their inhabiting of these lands can only be partial. And as with the land, so too with language. As Rosenzweig says, "The holiness of the holy language which the Jew employs only for prayer does not permit his life to put out roots into the soil of a language of its own. So far as his language is concerned, the Jew feels always he is in a foreign land, and knows that the home of his language is in the region of the holy language, a region everyday speech can never invade."⁴⁵

Neither Pinsker nor Freud would be satisfied with this revaluation of the Jewish Uncanny. For Rosenzweig preserves just that separateness and otherness of the Jews that they would have erased, the one by normalizing the people as a nation with its own land (Pinsker) and the other by dissolving the racially marked difference of the Jews in terms of a more primary and constitutive notion of sexual difference (Freud). And Rosenzweig does so by interpreting home and heimlichkeit in terms of the Holy and eternity, thereby making the Jews inescapably and purposely Unheimlich. In this way, he appears to confirm antisemitic views of Jews as negatively uncanny, as defined by lack, as not having a national land, language and history. At the same time, Rosenzweig affirms a different sense of the *Unheimlichkeit* of the Jews, transvaluing it in terms of the difference between the value of the order of temporality and that of the eternal. One understanding of the Uncanny is, at it were, the uncanny mirror image of the other.

How does one decide between them? Which image casts the light from which the other gains its reflection, or are both reflections of equal status and truth? Are the Jews a petrified or an eternal people? In a way, Rosenzweig might claim that the Jews are both petrified and eternal, but that only the Jews can understand, through the witness of their lives, their own eternity. There is an impassable chasm between the view of non-Jews and of Jews on this matter. This is why the Jews suffer in history, even in the modern nation-state, as they fulfill their witness of pointing to the not-yet character of redemption. Antisemitism would, thus, seem unavoidable. In the messianic time will antisemitism's negative Uncanny be finally understood in light of the Holy and the eternity of the Jews? Or will Jews, having fulfilled their mission, disappear? What are we to make of this complementarity between Jewishness, Judaism, and its supplement or Uncanny double, antisemitism? Pinsker seems to have thought that, at least before the making of a national home for the Jews, these two would necessarily coexist. "In this way have Judaism and anti-Semitism passed for centuries through history as inseparable companions. Like the Jewish people, the real wandering Jew, anti-Semitism, too seems as if it would never die. He must be blind indeed who will assert that the Jews are not *the chosen people*, the people chosen for universal hatred."⁴⁶

Since its formative development with the advent of the Jewish Question in the emancipation, to its so called, "Final Solution" in the terrible literalizing of this image in the manufacture in the Shoah of the "living-dead"[the *muselmanen*], the image of the Uncanny Jew has, as it were, had a kind of "afterlife." The trope of the Jewish Uncanny and images of Jews as uncanny are evident in explicitly post-Holocaust fiction and memoirs⁴⁷ as well as in contemporary novels about Jewish identity.⁴⁸ But it has perhaps been most prevalent and influential in its appearance in contemporary French critical theory, from the writings of Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Francois Lyotard to those of Jacques Derrida, Edmond Jabes and Emmanuel Levinas.⁴⁹ Most of these writers treat the figure of Jewish wandering, exile, and nomadism, a number of them doubling this figure with that of the writer. But what I want to focus on here, in moving toward the conclusion of this essay, is how Judaism, Jewishness, and anti-semitism are treated as intertwined topics in some of these texts. For

the questions I raised in relation to Rosenzweig's views of the Uncanniness of the Jews and Pinsker's pointing to Judaism and anti-Semitism as "inseparable companions" remain and must be further addressed, if not resolved.

In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot writes,

Antisemitism, in this sense, is in no way accidental; it gives a figure to the repulsion inspired by the Other, the uneasiness before what comes from afar and elsewhere: the need to kill the Other, that is, to submit to the all powerfulness of death what cannot be measured in terms of power. One could perhaps say that anti-Semitism has three characteristics: (1) it turns all the "positive" values of Judaism into negatives and, first of all, the primary affirmation of the distance that is "infinite," irreducible, impassible (even when it is passed over), with which Judaism confronts us; (2) it transforms into fault (into an ethically and socially condemnable reality) this being-negative to which it reduces the Jew; (3) it does not restrict itself to a theoretical judgment, but calls for the actual suppression of the Jews in order better to exercise against them the principle of denial with which it has invested their image. A denial so absolute, it is true, that it does not cease to reaffirm the relation with the infinite that being-Jewish implies. . . .The anti-Semite, at grips with the infinite, thus commits himself to a limitless movement of refusal. No, truly, excluding the Jews is not enough, exterminating them is not enough; they must also be struck from history, removed from the books through which they speak to us, just as the presence that inscribed speech is must finally be obliterated: the speech before and after every book and through which, from the farthest distance where all horizon is lacking, man has already turned toward man--in a word, destroy "autrui."⁵⁰

A number of questions haunt this text, only some of which I will raise in conclusion. Can the two questions of Judaism and antisemitism be separated or are they, as Blanchot suggests, rather one--not only political, but metaphysical--Jewish Question?

I observe. . . that anti-Semites, too, seek fundamentally only to avoid the metaphysical exigency that Judaism poses to each of us by way of Jewish existence, and that is in order better to suppress this question that they want to suppress all Jews. . . . To neglect this aspect of anti-Semitism is to renounce coming to grips with its gravity, to renounce finding it in one of its roots, and therefore to refuse to see what is at stake when, in the world, in whatever form it may take, anti-Semitism affirms and strengthens itself.⁵¹

Is this a "universal problem," or can Judaism and/or Jewishness separate itself from the metaphysics of Europe and its antisemitism? But is this not precisely the question at stake in all of this: the relation of Judaism, Jewishness, and the West? Can and must they be thought of separately or are they always together? What if we cannot separate these questions? Would, then, the discourse of antisemitism define Jewishness (in, for example, contemporary critical theory) the way for Jean-Paul Sartre the antisemite's gaze fixes and defines the Jew?⁵²

Whether these discourses in principle can be separated or not, many Jewish thinkers have taken up, turned, and transformed antisemitic images such as the Jewish Uncanny as part of their representation of Judaism and Jewishness. What are the responsibilities of these Jewish--and other non-Jewish--writers and what are the consequences of the images they employ? Some seem to treat these metaphors, images, and tropes with an, as it were,

unbearable lightness. How, then, to account for their gravity? Can the instability and volatility of these images--in this case, that of the "Jewish Uncanny"--be directed and contained? Or do the images have a power that rules and persists beyond and despite authorial intent? It seems clear, however, whatever the response to these questions, that once having been raised in these terms and images, the "Jewish Question" cannot be put to rest but continues to haunt our discourses of self, of other, of nation, of religion, of identity and identification.

Notes

¹Karl Gutzkow, "Plan for an Ahasverus," (August 1838) reprinted in his Vermischte Schriften (1842), pp.164-166, as translated by and cited in Paul Lawrence Rose, German Question/Jewish Question: Revolutionary Antisemitism from Kant to Wagner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 199.

²For a more extended discussion of the role of figures and tropes in argument and their consequences, see my "A Matter of Discipline: Reading for Gender in Jewish Philosophy," in Miriam Peskowitz and Laura Levitt, eds., Judaism Since Gender (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp., 158-173.

³Alain Finkielkraut, The Imaginary Jew (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). Originally published as Le Juif imaginaire (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), reprinted in Collection "Points," No. 149, 1983.

⁴Ibid., p. 62.

⁵Ibid., p. 63.

⁶Ibid., pp. 63-66.

⁷Ibid., pp. 69-70.

⁸Rose, German Question/ Jewish Question, p. 41.

⁹For a more extensive discussion of the politics of mimicry and the Jewish Question, see my "Ecriture judaïque: Where are the Jews in Western Discourse?" in Angelika Bammer, Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 182-201.

¹⁰Cited in Moses Hess, The Revival of Israel: Rome and Jerusalem, the Last Nationalist Question, trans. Meyer Waxman, "Introduction," Melvin I. Urofsky (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) p. vi. [Originally published in German in 1862. Translated into English by Meyer Waxman in 1918 and published under the title Rome and Jerusalem: A Study of Jewish Nationalism (New York: Bloch Pub. Co.), reprinted in 1943.]

¹¹Karl Gutzkow, Die Zeitgenossen (Stuttgart 1837), pp. 233-235, as translated in and cited by Rose, German Question/ Jewish Question, p. 193.

¹²Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford 1974), pp. 2:261-164.

¹³For a discussion of this turning point, see George K. Anderson, The Legend of the Wandering Jew (Hanover: Brown University Press, 1965, 1991), p. 51.

¹⁴On the Wandering Jew, see Galit Hasan-Roken and Alan Dundes, eds., The Wandering Jew: Essays in the Interpretation of a Christian Legend (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1986), George K. Anderson, and Rose.

¹⁵Because it is always the male Jew's Unheimlichkeit at stake in the Jewish Question, I have employed male pronouns to refer to the Jew, even when he is feminized, throughout this essay. I am not addressing the "Jewess Question" here. See Amy-Jill Levine, "A Jewess,

More and/or Less" and Jay Geller, "Circumcision and Jewish Women's Identity," in Miriam Peskowitz and Laura Levitt, eds., Judaism Since Gender, pp. 149-157 and pp. 174-187.

¹⁶Leo Pinsker, "Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to his People by a Russian Jew," in Robert Chazan and Marc Lee Raphael, eds., Modern Jewish History: A Source Reader (New York: Schocken Press, 1969), pp. 163-164.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁸Ahad Ha'Am, "Pinsker and Political Zionism" in Ahad Ha'Am: Essays, Letters, Memoirs, trans. Leon Simon (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1946), pp. 186-187.

¹⁹Eduard Gans, "A Society to Further Jewish Integration (1822)," in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 216. Gans was one of the seven founding members of the Society for the Culture and Science of the Jews, founded in 1819. He claimed that "To merge does not mean to perish [*aufgehen ist nicht untergehen*], . . . that everthing passes without perishing, and yet persists, although it has long been consigned to the past. That is why neither the Jews will perish nor Judaism dissolve; in the larger movement of the whole they will seem to have disappeared, and yet they will live on as the river lives in the ocean. . . : "There will be a time when no one in Europe will ask any longer, who is a Jew and who is a Christian?[Herder]," pp. 216-217.

²⁰Hess, The Revival of Israel, p. 76.

²¹Ibid., p. 77.

²²Heinrich Heine, "Travel Sketches: The City of Lucca," chapter 13, p. 601, as cited in Amy Newman, "The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel," Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXI/3, p. 466-467. Rose cites this passage, as found in his German Question/ Jewish Question, p. 161, as follows: "A mummified people [*Volksmumie*] that wanders the earth, wrapped up in its swathing of prescriptive letters, an obstinate piece of world history, a specter that bargains for its maintenance with bills of exchange and old hose." Rose also describes Ludwig Borne as having a view similar to that expressed by Heine: "Borne Indeed disliked very much what he saw as the narrow religiosity and tribalism of the Jews, what he called this dead 'Egyptian mummy.'" (Rose, p. 143; Ludwig Borne, *Aphorismen*, No. 164.)

²³Newman, p. 161.

²⁴Heinrich Heine, History of Religion and Philosophy, Introduction, p. vii, as cited in Rose, German Question/ Jewish Question, p. 165.

²⁵As quoted in Shlomo Avineri, Moses Hess: Prophet of Communism and Zionism (New York: New York University Press, 1985), pp. 71-2, from Moses Hess, Die Europäische Triarchie [The European Triarchy], pp. 130-131.

²⁶Ibid., p. 70.

²⁷As quoted in Avineri, p. 71, from Hess, The European Tirarchy, p. 130.

²⁸Ibid. p. 71. See footnote one above.

²⁹ See endnote 11 above.

³⁰ Sigmund Freud, "das Unheimliche," originally published in Imago, Vol. 5/6, 1919, pp. 297-324; English translation by Alix Strachey found in Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," Studies in Parapsychology (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1963, pp. 19-60.

³¹ Freud, "The Uncanny," p. 28.

³² Daniel Boyarin, "What Does a Jew Want?; or, The Political Meaning of the Phallus," Discourses 1996-1997 Fall-Winter, special issue on race and psychoanalysis, ed. Christopher Lane (forthcoming); Jay Geller, "A Paleontological View of Freud's Study of Religion: Unearthing the *Leitfossil* Circumcision," Modern Judaism 13 (1993), pp. 49-70; Sander Gilman, "The Construction of the Male Jew," Freud, Race, and Gender (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 49-92.

³³ Helene Cixous, "Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's *Das Unheimliche* (The 'uncanny')," New Literary History (Spring 1976), pp. 525-548; English translation of the French, originally published in Poétique 1972, pp. 199-216.

³⁴ Samuel Weber, "The Sideshow, or: Remarks on a Canny Moment," Modern Language Notes 1973, pp. 1102-1133.

³⁵ Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

³⁶ Sara Kofman, "The Double is/and the Devil: The Uncanniness of *The Sandman* (*Der Sandmann*)," Freud and Fiction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 121-162, first published as "Le Double e(s)t le diable," in Quatre romans analytiques (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1974), pp. 135-181.

³⁷ Sander Gilman, "The Jewish Psyche: Freud, Dora, and the Idea of the Hysteric," The Jew's Body (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 60-103; Jay Geller, "The Unmanning of the Wandering Jew," American Imago, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1992, pp. 227-262; Daniel Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997 forthcoming).

³⁸ Pinsker, p. 164.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁴¹ Freud, "The Uncanny," p. 30.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁴³ Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption trans. William W. Hallo (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 300. Der Stern der Erlösung was originally published in 1921.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 302-304.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴⁶Pinsker, p. 164.

⁴⁷D. M. Thomas, The White Hotel (New York: The Viking Press, 1981); W. G. Sebald, The Emigrants trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions Pub. Co., 1996), originally published as *Die Ausgewanderten* (Frankfurt: Eichborn Verlag, 1993).

⁴⁸Philip Roth, Operation Shylock: A Confession (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

⁴⁹For more on the figuration of Jews in contemporary French critical theory, especially that of Jean Francois Lyotard, see my "*Ecriture judaïque*." For a general discussion of the representation of Jews and Jewishness in French postmodern discourse, see Michael Weingrad, "Jews (in Theory): Representations of Judaism, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust in Postmodern French Thought," Judaism (Winter 1996, Vo. 45, no. 1), pp. 79-98.

⁵⁰Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 129-130; Originally published as *L'Entretien infini* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1969).

⁵¹Ibid., p. 447, footnote 4.

⁵²Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. George J. Becker, (New York: Grove Press, 1960). Originally published as *Reflexions sur la question juive* (Paris: Gallimard, 1954). See Susan Rubin Suleiman, "The Jew in Jean-Paul Sartre's *Reflexions sur la question juive*: An exercise in Historical Reading," in Linda Nochlin and Tamar Garb, eds., The Jew in the Text: Modernity and the Construction of Identity (London and New York: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1995), pp. 201-218.