

Buying off the Revolution: Evidence from the Colombian National Peasant Movement, 1957-1985 *

María del Pilar López-Uribe †

London School of Economics

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Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between a democratic reform and redistribution during periods of revolutionary threats. Far from causing an increase in broad redistribution (e.g. social spending), I show that the state organization of a social movement that extends the political rights of the threatening group can be used to identify rebel leaders and provide private goods to them, in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters. I study the context of the organization by the state of the most important social movement in Colombian history -the National Peasant Movement (ANUC)- during the decades of a threat of Communist revolution (1957-1985), when the government gave ANUC direct political participation at the local level in the executive branch and economic support. Using three newly digitized data sets of Colombian municipalities, I find that this reform did not lead to higher broad redistribution towards the peasantry but it led to an increase in targeted redistribution in terms of public jobs and lands. In particular, by matching the names of the peasant leaders to the beneficiaries of the land reform, evidence suggests that peasant leaders disproportionately benefited from land reform, especially in municipalities where the communist threat was higher. Finally, I find suggestive evidence that buying off the rebel leaders was an effective counter-revolutionary strategy as it led to less revolutionary activities after the support to ANUC was terminated (1972-1985).

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†Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Email: m.d.lopez-uribe@lse.ac.uk.

1 Introduction

Governments often face threats to the status quo from groups of the society that are politically and economically excluded. One response to the threat is the implementation of democratic reforms that increase the political participation of the threatening group. Most prominently, scholars have studied reforms such as extension of the franchise, and introduction of elections, as means to reduce revolutionary threats, and have concentrated on their effect on broad redistribution, assuming that once they take place, the original status quo will be permanently secured. However, even after implementing reforms that extend *de jure* decision power, governments may still face a threat from uprisings. In this scenario, elites need to provide *de facto* power, through giving the excluded group a direct voice in the policy making process.

If democratization is defined as a process that extends the political participation of underrepresented groups, one of its form that has received little attention in the literature, is a state-sponsored participatory reform, namely the organization of a social movement by the state.¹ This democratic reform empowers the threatening group by giving them direct political representation in the executive branch of government and it is a mechanism that gives *de facto* power after the franchise is extended.

Moreover, the organization of a social movement also helps governments to identify who are the leaders, the people elites should be worried about. Large scale social movements have a vertical structure that allow their own members to select the representatives that participate in the policy making process.

This paper studies the effect of this democratic reform on both, broad and targeted redistribution and their effectiveness in averting social unrest. I find that elites use this form of democratization not as a device to increase broad redistribution -which is expected when elites do not know who is the threat- but as a mechanism to identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off, in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters.

Specifically, this paper draws on the experience of the organization of the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- within the context of the threat of a Communist revolution in Latin America during 1957-1985. The Colombian government organized this movement in 1967, a time when peasants could already vote and run for public

¹In this paper, a social movement is defined as a process of mobilization that stretch across space and time, linking persons, and groups identified with particular claims and values (Escobar 1995).

office. Through a direct alliance between peasantry and the national state that lasted until 1972, the central government gave the peasants direct political participation in the local executive branch (a seat in local committees) and economic support (resources to organize and train peasants leaders). ANUC had a vertical organization where the peasant members elected their own and permanent leaders, who would represent them with the local and regional authorities.

In this context, a democratic reform is the extension of the political representation of a group which is dissatisfied with the status quo -peasantry- and it is measured as a municipal peasant association affiliated to ANUC obtaining legal entitlement during the years that the government supported the movement (1967-1972). Getting legal entitlement is a *de facto* devolution of power from landlords to peasants, that allows the peasantry to participate directly in the local policy making process: ANUC peasant leaders meet local authorities regularly to discuss investment projects, revise budgets and activities of their agencies and to coordinate future activities.

Crucially for my empirical strategy, obtaining legal entitlement is a two-stage process and includes an element of voluntary organization. First, an association has to get legal status (recognition) for which its members have to organize themselves and convene a local assembly. Then, it obtains legal entitlement (empowerment) by sending some documents to the Ministry of Agriculture in Bogota, which grants the new legal recognition in a process that takes, on average, between 9 to 11 months.

I use a difference in difference strategy that takes advantage of the variation in the timing of democratization, and solve the potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the association by restricting the main specification to a sample that compares only municipalities that obtained legal entitlement with the compliers, those that only managed to obtain legal status due to the end of the alliance in 1972. To test the main theoretical predictions of the link between threat of revolution, democratization, and redistribution, I use a newly digitized and hand-coded municipal dataset which includes detailed information about local public expenditure and revenues, ANUC and public land allocations from 1957 to 1975.

My empirical analysis yields four key findings. First, a democratic reform that empowered the peasants did not lead to higher redistribution from the landowners towards the peasantry. Results suggest deterioration in the broad redistributive policies such as social expenditure (primary education and basic health) as well as land tax revenues, due to an heightened tax evasion.

Second, the empowerment of the peasants led to higher targeted redistribution. In places where the democratic reform took place, there is an increase in bureaucratic expenditure and in the number of public lands given to peasants. I provide evidence showing that the change in bureaucratic expenditure was driven by an increase in the number of employees in the section of public administration, in line with previous qualitative findings (Bagley 1989, Escobar 1988, Archer 1990). By matching the names of approximately 2,500 peasant leaders and the names of over 10,000 peasants that received public lands during 1967-1972, the analysis also reveals that peasant leaders benefited disproportionately from the land reform.² These private goods -public jobs and lands- represent more than just a temporary change in income and they are political (contacts) and economic (collateral) assets that can be used in the future (Lehman, 1971).

Third, targeted redistribution and co-optation occurred more intensively in municipalities which experienced more violence in the previous years or where the communist support was stronger. In contrast, wealth, collective action capacity and inequality do not seem to affect the results. This finding supports the hypothesis that the mechanism behind the increase in the targeted redistribution was the potential threat of a revolution.

Assuming that targeted redistribution is an informal contract between the leaders and the state in exchange for demobilizing their followers (Lehman 1971), I test whether municipalities where peasant leaders were co-opted through public land allocations experienced less violence following the end of the alliance. I merge all data about public disorder activities in Colombia between 1972 and 1995, which includes the number of land invasions, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC- guerrilla rebel activities and peasant protests at municipal level. I find a negative correlation between co-optation of the peasant leaders and public disorder, which is consistent with the idea that the strategy was successful at buying off the revolution.

The study of mechanisms that increase participation is rapidly expanding as democratic reforms are seen as key drivers of redistribution and development. This paper contributes to this existing literature by studying the effect of another democratic reform, namely the organization of a social movement by the state, and how this type of representation can affect redistribution. This type of democratic reform differs from the

²Albertus (2013, 2015) suggests similar findings in the case of Velasco dictatorship in Peru during 1968-1980, where the land was redistributed to "middle-class" peasants instead of landless peasants because they had the greatest potential to organize against the regime.

one studied in the existing literature as it gives *de facto* decision power to peasants and goes beyond the traditional *de jure* decision power, universal suffrage. This paper also adds to the growing literature on democratization and redistribution during a threat of revolution, as it shows that the organization of a social movement by the state is a mechanism which allows the local associations to select their leaders and at the same time allows governments to identify the potential rebel leaders and buy them off. The paper exploits a unique dataset that allows to identifying simultaneously the leaders of the threatening group and the beneficiaries of the land reform. The results also complement the literature as they quantify the effect of democratization on both types of redistribution, broad and targeted. Finally, the threat of a Communist revolution and the end of the alliance between government and peasants provides a unique context to study the effectiveness of this strategy as a mechanism to avoid revolution.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review. Section 3 describes the institutional framework of Colombia and the National peasant movement during the period of study 1957-1985. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework. Section 5 discusses the econometric specifications of the relationship between democratization and redistribution during periods of a threat of revolution. Section 6 presents the mechanisms. Section 7 presents the econometric specifications and results of the relationship between democratization, co-optation and threat of revolution. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on democratization and redistribution during periods of a threat of a revolution. A prolific body of work has explored the different strategies that governments can implement when there is a threat to the status quo from a group that are politically and economically excluded. One strategy to deal with the threat is to rely on repression for survival, becoming dependent on the police force or military and using a large share of resources on keeping this control. In addition to the notorious consequences of displacement and mortality, the use of repression as a long-term strategy could facilitate that this force turned against governments. Moreover, this strategy may undermine the ability of the government, which is populated by the repressed members, to function (Haber, 2006).

Another commonly studied response by the elite is the implementation of democratic

reforms, with franchise extension and the introduction of election the most commonly used and studied type of reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006; Tilly, 1995; Weyland, 2010; Przeworski, 2009; Chaney 2013; Aidt and Jensen, 2014; Aidt and Franck, 2015; Aidt and Leon, 2015). These works have suggested that these forms of democratization will lead to an increase in broad redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and public good provision (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Peltzman 1980) and have assumed that once they take place, the original status quo will be permanently secured.

However, franchise extension is only one step forward in the process of democratization. In many democracies real power is rarely vested in formal political institutions and even when peasants, workers and urban poor enjoy political rights such as voting, they lack access to effective and informal channels of influence (Eckstein 2001).

There is another democratic mechanism that governments can use to restrain threats to the status quo and that has received little attention in the literature: the organization of a social movement by the state. Social movements are a democratizing mechanism because, through collective action, generate new channels of influence and people that have been traditionally excluded have now a united voice that allow them to participate directly in the policy making process (Meyer, 1994; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly 1978; Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg 1996; Campbell et al, 2010; Eckstein 2001; Escobar 1998). In Latin American history, social movements have served as vehicles for the achievements of more political and economic benefits (Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg, 1996).

Although the literature about social movements and their empowerment role is extensive, this work is the first attempt to study the organization of a social movement by the state in the context of a threat of revolution. Moreover, the idea proposed in this paper about the organization of social movements as a mechanism to identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off, in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters has not been previously explored in the quantitative political economy literature.

This paper is also related to the empirical literature that studies the effect of democratization on redistribution, regardless of the revolutionary threats. A prolific body of work suggests that introduction of election and franchise extension increase broad redistribution and public good provision (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lindert 1994; Peltzman, 1980; Husted and Kenny 1997; Vernby 2013; Martinez-Bravo et al 2014; Kroth et al 2016). For example, in Britain, France and Germany democratic reforms during the 19th and 20th century coincided with important educational reforms and progressivity

of the tax system (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Flora 1983). In a similar spirit, Corvalan et al (2017) show that the right to run has a greater effect on redistribution than the right to vote.

The role of democratic reforms as mechanisms to identify the leaders in authoritarian regimes and co-opted them has been discussed extensively. Elections have often been used as a mechanism to identify opposition leaders in authoritarian regimes whereas parliament provide them with some policy influence (Boix and Svobik, 2007; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schiler 2010). Once the opposition leaders³ are identified, they are co-opted and the status quo is secured as it was the case in Russia (Reuter and Robertson 2014), Argentina during the dictatorships in the 1970s-1980s (Rock, 1987) and Mexico during the Porfiriato (Haber, Razo and Maurer, 2003).⁴

Finally, the type of democratic reform I study is closest to quotas and reservation seats for underrepresented groups. Pande (2003) provides evidence that reservation for minority groups in India -underrepresented castes and tribes- can enhance groups' influence in the policy making process and that legislators belonging to these groups have used this influence to increase targeted redistribution. Similarly, in the case of gender quotas in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that the reservation of a council seat for women led to more investment in infrastructure that is directly relevant to women's needs. Despite the importance of this issue, very little is known about the causal effect of quotas or reservation seats on redistribution in the context of a threat of revolution.

3 Historical Background

The beginning of a revolutionary socialist state in Cuba in 1959 exerted a great stimulus on the aspirations of the peasants in Latin America and it was perceived by the governments in the region, including the United States, as a threat to the status quo (U.S Senate 1966, 1967; Archila 2001, Hobsbawm 2001; Hirschman 1963; Reyes 1987;

³Opposition leaders can be politicians as in the Russian case or senior entrepreneurs as in Argentina and Mexico.

⁴More recently, Nicolas Maduro's government in Venezuela has clearly identified the military as a potential threatening group and has promoted more than 2000 military to general positions -US has more than double military force and only 900 generals- and has allowed them to run the oil-state enterprise or to be in charge of different Ministries as a strategy to avoid an uprising of the military forces.

Gilhodes 1988; Bagley and Botero 1994).

In particular, Colombia was seen as one of the countries with a *castroite insurgency problem* in the region (C.I.A 1961, 1967)⁵ due to the spontaneous mobilization of peasants during the civil war "La Violencia" between 1948 and 1958⁶. In terms of the political structure, Colombia was under the "National Front" coalition (1958-1974), in which the two main political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative parties, agreed to alternate power for a period of four presidential terms. However, other parties such as the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL), National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) and the Communist party actively participated in local and regional elections.

To respond to the threat, Latin American governments, pressured by the US government and the Alliance for Progress, focused on implementing important agrarian reforms and rural development programs. One of the responses of the political urban elite was the implementation of democratic reforms that expand the political opportunities to peasants. Table 1 indicates that during the 1960s this policy was implemented in other countries of the region such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The empowerment was materialized in the organization and support of social movements in the name of general national goals that transcended political party interests (Perez, 2010).

In Colombia, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, supported by the urban elite⁷, founded in May 1967 the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968)⁸, considered the most important movement in the country's history (Gilhodes, 1988)⁹. ANUC had some features that distinguished it from any other rural movement in the country.¹⁰ First, it had national scope. Two years after its creation it had of-

⁵Other countries that were considered to have a future prospect of insurgency were Guatemala, Nicaragua and Bolivia.

⁶According to Hobsbawm (1963) this mobilization was greater than anywhere else in the Latin American history, with the exception of Mexico.

⁷At this time, the political national elite that controlled the central government had started to separate from the local/regional rural elite due to differences in their economic interests.

⁸To found ANUC, the president skipped the traditional process through the congress and signed directly the decree of foundation (Ocampo, 2014).

⁹Its national protests achieved important press coverage and gathered more than 500.000 people in 155 cities ("El Tiempo", June 3 1968).

¹⁰The other important rural association at the time was the National Federation of Coffee growers (FEDECAFE). However, this organization did not compete directly with ANUC. Its goals and demands from the government were different. FEDECAFE's main demands were subsidies, reduction of export tariffs, improvement of mechanisms of commercialization and access to credit.

fices in almost 50% of the municipalities and had approximately a million members. Second, it claimed to be politically independent and its members came from different political ideologies (Zamosc, 2006; Escobar 1982). Third, members were heterogeneous. Small landowners, tenants, sharecroppers, settlers and agricultural workers were part of it (Zamosc, 2006; Bagley and Botero, 1994). The goals of the movement were the improvement of the living and labor conditions of the peasantry and the implementation of an structural agrarian reform that redistribute land to the peasants (Zamosc, 2006). The government stipulated that only members of the movement would be potential beneficiaries of the agrarian policies, making compulsory to show a membership card when a service was requested or a benefit was received¹¹.

ANUC had a vertical organization. It had a national committee that participated in the meetings with the central government, regional associations that took part in the different state assemblies and municipal associations which elected five representatives to participate in the local committees. Each municipality was in charge of organizing its own association and of getting its legal recognition. The legal process had two stages: first, the association had to obtain legal status and then the legal entitlement was granted. To get legal status, members had to convene a local assembly with a 10% minimum quorum of the registered members and to agree on the statutes of the association. This assembly also required the presence of a delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture who had to sign the act of foundation. His presence relied on the budget that the ministry had to organize the movement¹². In total, 75 delegates had to travel around the country to attend these assemblies (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968). After an association got legal status it had to send some documents (constitutive act of the assembly, electoral results of the board of directors of the associations and a copy of the statutes) directly to the Ministry of Agriculture in Bogota who was in charge of granting the legal entitlement. The time to get legal entitlement once an association had obtained legal status varied between nine and eleven months.

Once an association got legal entitlement, its leaders were able to directly participate in the policy making process in their municipalities. Officials of the local entities met with peasants representatives to revise budgets and activities of their agencies and to coordinate future activities. With this representation, it was ensured that the local offi-

¹¹To become a member, a peasant has to show evidence of being a rural worker: laborer, sharecropper, settler or small land owner.

¹²The financial support comes mainly from the Alliance for Progress and from international organizations such as the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).

cials fulfilled their tasks taking into account the needs of the peasants and ensured that local entities had to study the how, when and where to provide public goods (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968)¹³.

The alliance between the state and ANUC lasted until 1972 when the government signed a new pact or agrarian counter-reform, known as the Chicoral agreement, which protected large properties and landowners. With the end of the alliance, the economic and political support of the state finished, some associations lost their legal entitlement and repression against the peasants started.¹⁴

As a result of internal divisions and the lack of mechanisms to get new economic resources, in October 1972 the movement split into two. A first group -"linea Sincelejo"- had a radical position, declared itself independent of the government and kept the revolutionary ideology of transforming the economic structure in the countryside by abolishing all type of capitalist structure. Some of ANUC members also joined the rural guerrilla group FARC that emerged in 1964 after the civil war -La Violencia- and some others founded the indigenous peasant group known as Quintin Lame (CQL) in 1974¹⁵. A second group -"linea Armenia"- supported the reforms proposed by the government and insisted upon peaceful and legal solutions through the dialogue with the authorities (Rudqvist, 1983). These two lines continue over time and although ANUC is still active, it has lost its strength and its influence in the national matters (Zamosc, 2006).

ANUC was a form of democratic reform that empowered the peasants and can be thought as a substitute for repression. Several factors can explain why the Colombian government preferred not to employ a violent strategy. First, it was costly compared to the other strategy -the organization of the peasant movement-. Bagley and Botero (1994) estimate that the cost of organizing ANUC was less than a dollar per member. Second, between 1948 and 1958, the country had experienced the longest and most crude bipartisan civil war in the countryside, "La Violencia", that left around 200.000 deaths.

¹³Other benefits that the associations received once they obtained legal entitlement were training to their leaders and access to credit quotas, revolving funds and marketing and technical assistance.

¹⁴In the region, military governments took power in Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1976. In these countries, militaries removed presidents they saw as moving dangerously to the left and to counter guerrilla movements that threatened to topple the governments. In these three cases, the immediate threat to national security was translated as "communism or fidelismo" (Wright, 1991).

¹⁵The Quintin Lame group received military training from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party and was formed after the killing of indigenous leaders in the state of Cauca by the repressive forces of the state and landowners (Penaranda, 2015).

When the war ended the state had a large deficit and lost part of the monopoly over violence in the rural areas. Third, international organizations encouraged governments to take control of the rural areas using peaceful means and conditioned their credit and economic resources to its achievement.

4 Conceptual Framework

Threats arise in response to grievances or unfulfilled needs that groups experience in a shared way (McAdam, 1982) and materialize when they develop a shared consciousness and collective identities (Taylor and Whittier, 1992, Johnson 1999) or with the presence of political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

The triumph of peasant revolutions in neighboring countries can exert a great stimulus on peasant aspirations, provide new political opportunities and exacerbates peasant grievances over poverty and landholding inequality, transforming the peasantry into a threat. Revolutionary events abroad also represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elites and may be a trigger of reforms to reduce grievances (Aidt and Jensen, 2014).

Grievance accounts of peasant support for revolutionary ideas -such as the communist ideology- and guerrilla movements suggest that fulfilling their grievances should reduce peasants' support for rebels. Hence, the state can address peasants' grievances by implementing reforms that meet peasant's demands and, it can potentially "buy" peasants away from supporting revolutionary ideas and turning them into a force that supports the status quo (Huntington 1968; Paige 1975).

One response to address the grievances is to implement democratic reforms that gives *de facto* power to underrepresented groups. Elections and franchise extension are only the first step moving forward in the process of democratization. These reforms are intended to improve the welfare of the excluded group and in turn prevent social unrest when employed as commitments to future broad redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). However, revolutionary threats may still occur after franchise extension. In democracies, where regular elections are already taking place and all citizens have been enfranchised, the representation of some groups remains limited. When there is a threat to the status quo in this context, governments have to repress the threat, implement other democratic reforms to empower the dissatisfied group or carry out redistributive

policies directly.¹⁶

One reform aimed at preventing revolution is the organization of social movements by the state, which is a state-sponsored participatory reform that generates new channels of influence by giving underrepresented groups political participation in the executive branch of the government.

The participation of the threatening group in the policy-making process is also a way to control it, as it was the case of the Latin American labor movements during the 1920s (Collier and Collier, 2012). Participation channels the threat toward administrative functions and resembles the impression that its demands are being addressed and as a result, they no longer need to be at the forefront of its activities (Murphree et al 1996).

What are the possible consequences of the organization of a social movement by the state? One possibility is that increased participation by the peasantry leads to greater broad redistribution in the form of land tax revenues and higher public goods provision. In particular, when the excluded group is the peasantry, its discontent is primarily distributive, not ideational (Finkel et al, 2015), so its empowerment will lead to demand more redistribution from the elite (landlords) to the excluded group (peasants). This broad redistribution will decrease grievances and the perceptions of inequality, by taking resources from the landowners and invest them in improving the living conditions of the rural population. By redistributing to the threatening group, it helps to appease the grievances and hence to reduce peasants' attempt to revolt.

However, larger-scale reforms that lead to higher broad redistribution are politically and economically costly. They require important economic resources and have the potential to harm elite interests.¹⁷ Because they are politically difficult to implement¹⁸, the effectiveness of the government's broad redistributive policies intended to undercut revolutionary threats and guerrilla expansion is limited, as it was the Colombian case during the 1980s and 1990s (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012). Large-scale reforms are also

¹⁶For example, during Velasco dictatorship in Peru between 1968-1980, the regime targeted directly the largest and most influential landowners for expropriation, redistributing to peasant workers (Albertus, 2013, 2015).

¹⁷This is not the case in nondemocratic regimes where the interest is precisely to destroy the power of economic elites and to diminish their influence, as it was the case of Peru during the 1970s.

¹⁸In Colombia, powerful landowners blocked extensive land reforms and successfully lobbied for INCORA to focus its efforts at those projects least disturbing to the existing land tenure (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012).

the strategy that governments tend to use when they have uncertainty about who can revolt or who are the leaders. For this reason, looking only at the effect of a participatory reform on broad redistribution as a way to avoid revolution is incomplete.

Governments have another, potentially effective, strategy: use the organization of the peasant movement to identify the leaders of the group. Social movements are a device to identify the leaders since they have a vertical structure and through an internal process they select their representatives. Once identified, the leaders can be bought off with particularistic benefits such as patronage jobs or public lands in exchange for demobilizing their followers.¹⁹

Whether the demobilization occurs as a result of an implicit contract between leaders and elites or because leaders have now a vested interest in the status quo due to an increase in "ownership" and "identification" leads to similar outcomes.²⁰ Demobilization and the appeasement of a threat to the status quo occur when leaders with significant power over their followers are co-opted by the state. Elites have incentives to use the organization of the social movement as a tool of political control and the co-optation of leaders strengthens the state's control over the threatening group while reducing the bargaining power of the rest of the movement's members. When leaders become part of the status quo, members face higher costs to organize against the government and overcoming the collective action problem is harder due to the loss of trust.²¹ Leaders can exploit their power over the members to encourage demobilization and any attempt to revolt. Hence, the co-optation of leaders will be negative correlated with violent activities against the status quo.²²

In terms of the role of the leaders, they will serve as a link between the state and the movement's members. Followers are grateful to leaders for speaking and acting on

¹⁹This strategic policy is similar to the political economy theory proposed by Biais and Perotti (2002) in which a government implements a Machiavellian privatization that allocates a significant share ownership to a targeted section of the population, leading to a shift in the political preferences that ensures reelection. Similarly, the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012) also suggests that the elites will use private goods to buy off the "essentials", those whose support guarantee the permanence of the status quo.

²⁰This increase in identification can occur even when these policies do not imply substantial changes or outcomes are not very satisfactory to the group goals.

²¹For example, Mattingly (2016) shows how the inclusion of lineage leaders in village political institutions in China weakens villagers' land rights and is used by the elite to elicit compliance from villagers for land expropriation policies.

²²Future work might study whether co-opting the leaders is an effective long-term strategy.

their behalf, even though leaders can potentially become part of the political elites.²³ Followers willingly cede agency to their leaders, for example due to their apathy or lack of competence in comparison to their skilled leaders (Michels 1962).²⁴

If this is the case, the empowerment of peasants will redistribute private goods which are political and economic assets for the peasant leaders.²⁵ Receiving private goods will also help the leaders to keep the vertical structure of the movement by consolidating their economic and/or political power and help them to differentiate from the rest of the members. The advantages of this strategy are its political and economic costs as it requires less economic resources (near zero in terms of the public budget) whereas it protects the elite interests.

By extending the political rights of the threatening group, governments also need to manage the balancing act of increase representation of this group without threatening the stability of the status quo. When governments decide to empower these groups they cannot risk their own power. In the case of social movements organized by the state, governments control their economic resources and their participation gives them a voice but not a vote over policy decisions, limiting their access to the state budget.

This framework relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes that leaders have sufficient control over their followers in order to avoid revolution if they decide it. Leader's power is particularly strong in large-scale social movements as they need to have a considerable influence on their followers in order to keep the movement cohesive (Hobsbawm 1993; McCarthy and Zald 1977).²⁶ Second, it assumes that leaders value more private goods than public goods.

I apply this framework to the Colombian case during the 1960s when there was a threat of a Communist revolution. The threatening group -the peasantry- was empowered by the state in order to avoid it being captured by the communists and rebel

²³Michels's (1962) theory of political leadership suggests that in large-scale movements, leaders inevitable become oligarchical as they are motivated to preserve their own power and positions and are more concerned with organizational maintenance than the original goals of the movement.

²⁴Marx and Engels (1968) and Lenin (1975) also shared the view that only intellectuals should be the leaders of revolutionary movements because they are able to understand the meaning of revolutionary struggle.

²⁵Public jobs are seeing as political assets that facilitate building contacts, political capital and networks that give political gains. In particular, public jobs in administrative sections allow employees to become familiar with both legal and administrative complexities of the State (Lehman, 1971).

²⁶As Morris and Staggenborg (2012) suggest leaders help to create or undermine political and economic realities that influence the trajectories and outcomes of social movements.

against the status quo. The empowerment occurred through the voluntary organization of a peasant association that gave the peasants direct participation in the policy making process. Their representatives in the local state organizations were the peasant leaders, who were elected by each municipal association. The strategy of the government in order to avoid a potential unrest was to give the peasant leaders economic -lands- and/or political -public jobs- assets and in exchange, these leaders had to demobilize their followers and avoid potential revolts.

5 Democratization and Redistribution

The objective of the empirical exercise is to estimate the effect of peasant empowerment during the period 1967-1972 on two types of redistribution, broad and targeted. I employ a difference in difference regression with municipality and year fixed effects and state specific-time trends in a panel data of 1088 Colombian municipalities between 1957 and 1975. I use obtaining legal entitlement as a proxy for peasant empowerment and exploit the variation in the timing of obtaining it.

During the years that the peasant movement had the support of the state, 552 municipalities got empowerment (legal entitlement and legal status) and 92 only got recognition (legal status). 444 municipalities did not get any type of legal recognition. Table 2 shows yearly the number of municipalities that obtained legal entitlement and legal status and its variation over time and Figure 2 presents the spatial distribution of the municipalities that got legal entitlement and legal status only.

To test the effect of the participation of peasants in the policy-making process on broad redistribution I use information on land tax revenues, central transfers and social expenditure. Land tax revenues are a good proxy of broad redistribution since relate three actors: landowners who pay the taxes, local governments who collect them and peasants who are the potential beneficiaries. Land tax revenues were the main component of a municipality's revenues but the enforcement of their collection was very low. Local social expenditure includes the spending of projects in primary public schools and health centers reported by a municipality and central transfers are additional revenues for specific projects related to health, education and infrastructure that municipalities received from the central government.

To test the effect on targeted redistribution I collected data on bureaucratic expenditure, number of public employees and hectares of public lands given to peasants. This

type of expenditure redistributes resources to selected people by giving them private goods such as jobs and lands. Bureaucratic expenditure includes all the spending in the general direction of a municipality. This refers to the spending in general administration and executive power such as majors, local assemblies and local administrative directions. This spending is a good proxy of targeted redistribution because it includes the budget spent in public jobs that are potential political assets and job positions that facilitate building contacts and clientelistic relations.

The second proxy of targeted redistribution is the number of hectares of public lands allocated to peasants. Land is considered the most valuable asset for a peasant. Although agrarian reforms are aimed at benefiting most of the rural population, the policy is selective and usually ends up assisting only a small fraction of the peasants²⁷. Theoretically, all the agricultural workers could be potential beneficiaries of the agrarian reform. In practice, less than 5% of the peasants received public lands during these years²⁸. Because of selectivity in targeted redistribution, some members have disproportionately benefited from this type of redistribution.

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the different variables used in the specifications.²⁹ The treatment are those 552 municipalities that obtained legal entitlement. In the case of the full sample the control group is all the municipalities that did not get this legal recognition and in the case of the restricted sample the control group is the 92 municipalities that obtained legal status but did not get legal entitlement.

5.1 Identification Strategy

My main specification uses a restricted sample of 644 municipalities to solve for a potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the association. In this sample, I compare only municipalities that got both legal entitlement and legal status

²⁷Law 135 of 1961 provides to peasants two different mechanisms to receive public lands. First, through the regular process of public land allocations in which the peasants have to demonstrate that they have worked on at least 2/3 parts of the land they are claiming. Second, through colonization in which public lands are allocated free of charge to "poor rural workers or low income families". The decision relies on the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA) which is a public national institution with administrative autonomy.

²⁸Rural population during these decades was around 14 million and overall the agrarian reform implemented since 1961 gave out around 300.000 plots of lands to peasants

²⁹Table B.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for both treatment and control groups during the pre-treatment years (1957-1966).

(treatment) with municipalities that only got legal status (control) during the years that the government supported the organization of the peasant movement (1967-1972). Given that the average time to get legal entitlement after obtaining legal status was between 9 and 11 months, the control group includes municipalities that were pending to obtain the legal entitlement when the alliance between government and peasants ended in October 1972 and hence only obtained legal status. The self-selection problem is solved in the restricted sample because all the municipalities in it follow the requirement of voluntary organization and they only differ in the legal entitlement requirement which was a process that depends on the Ministry of Agriculture.

I also include other controls in the main specification. First, I control for potential income shocks that municipalities may experience every year. This captures changes in yearly municipalities' income depending on their suitability to produce some crops. This variable is the average of the land suitability of the main four crops (coffee, sugar, tobacco, banana) weighted by the national average price of each crop in 1957 COP. Second, I include other variables that might affect the timing of getting legal entitlement. These variables are population in 1964 and the number of tractors in 1960 interacted with a linear time trend t to allow their impact to vary over time.

The following difference in difference model is estimated:

$$y_{i,j,t} = \alpha_i + \delta_j t + \beta_1 D(peas_asso)_{i,j,t} + \beta_2 x_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 (X_{i1960/4} * t) + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

where $y_{i,j,t}$ is measured as the log of both broad -land tax revenues, central transfers and social expenditure- and targeted -bureaucratic expenditure and public lands granted to peasants- redistributive variables in municipality i , state j in year t ; $x_{i,j,t}$ is the income shock; $X_{d1960/4}$ is a vector of baseline demographic and economic variables (population and tractors) obtained in 1964 and 1960, t is a linear trend and $\alpha_i, \delta_j t$ and λ_t are municipality, state specific-time trend and year fixed effects respectively. The inclusion of municipality fixed effects in the main specification controls for any selection into treatment that is due to municipality time-invariant factors. Year fixed effects capture the influence of aggregate shocks and state specific-time trend control for the economic and institutional differences across states in Colombia during 1957-1975. The variable $D(peas_asso)_{i,j,t}$ takes value 1 from the year t that a municipality i in state j gets legal entitlement until 1972 and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at municipality level to allow for within-municipality correlations.

The coefficient β_1 is the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of legal enti-

tlement of the municipal peasant association on the outcome variables during the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). Interpreting β_1 as the causal effect of obtaining legal entitlement does not require to assume that the legal entitlement timing within municipalities was random. Instead, it requires the weaker assumption that conditional on the baseline controls, obtaining legal entitlement is not correlated with time-varying municipality characteristics that affect broad and targeted redistributive variables through channels other than the peasant movement. The second assumption that the identification strategy relies on is the standard parallel trends in the absence of the shock to peasant organizations.

5.2 Results

I test the hypothesis that averages of both broad and targeted redistributive variables in municipalities that got full empowerment and those that got just legal status (partial empowerment) were different during the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). Table 4 presents the effects of legal entitlement on broad redistribution and Table 6 presents the estimations on targeted redistribution. All estimations include municipality and year fixed effects. Columns 1, 4 and 7 in both tables include state specific-time trend, columns 2, 5 and 8 include state fixed effect and municipality specific-time trend and as a comparison columns 3, 6 and 9 present results for the full sample.

5.2.1 Broad Redistribution

Columns 1-3 in Table 4 report the results of obtaining legal entitlement on land tax revenues, columns 4-6 on central transfers and columns 7-9 on social expenditure.

Results indicate that obtaining legal entitlement did not lead to higher broad redistribution towards the peasantry. This implies a change in policy variables when a peasant association only got recognition compared to when it got full empowerment³⁰. The magnitude for the coefficient on land tax revenues is about 0.114 relative to the sample mean 12.0, which implies a 12%³¹ decrease in land tax revenues once an association got legal entitlement. The decrease in land tax revenues seems to be offset by an increase in transfers from the central government of around 10% but this coefficient is

³⁰The size of the coefficients is larger when the full sample is used.

³¹Because the dependent variable is in log, this result is obtained from $\exp(0.114) - 1 = 0.12$.

not significant³². The magnitude of the coefficient of social expenditure is 0.19 relative to the sample mean 10.4, which implies a decrease of 21% in municipalities that got legal entitlement with respect to those that only obtained legal status and is significant at 5%.

The negative and significant estimates for the legal entitlement dummy are robust when I use the alternative specification -municipality time-trend-, while the coefficient on central transfers remains insignificant. The magnitude of the coefficients is larger when I use the full sample and include as a control group not only municipalities that just got legal status but also municipalities that did not get any type of recognition. Moreover, the coefficient on central transfers becomes considerably larger and statistically significant.

In order to have a better understanding of the results, I explore different explanations behind the reduction in land tax revenues. The main payers of land taxes, given the exemptions to small plots of lands, were the landowners. There are four plausible explanations for the reduction in land tax revenues: i) cadastral updates, ii) changes in the tax rate, iii) changes in the statutory tax base or iv) changes in the effective tax base (tax evasion).

There was not cadastral update³³ or evidence of a tax rate change during this period.³⁴ To study changes in the statutory tax base I collect cadastral information between 1957 and 1972 at municipal level -number and value of taxable rural properties-. Table 5 tests whether obtaining legal entitlement between 1967-1972 have an effect on the number of rural taxable plots and their land values. Results suggest that in municipalities where

³²Although results are not significant, Table B.8 in the Appendix B also indicates that indirect tax revenues, such as local taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, increased during the same period and could have helped to offset the reduction in land tax revenues.

³³The official newspaper *Diario Oficial* indicates that the only cadastral update that took place during the period 1957-1975 was during the the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla in 1957-1958 (Decree 2317 and 2615, 1953).

³⁴Since the government of Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) land was subject to taxation through two different and fixed taxes: the main municipality revenue, the real estate land (land tax) of 4 x 1000 and a state tax, patrimony (net worth) tax of 1.35 x 1000 to 15 x 1000 in taxable property in excess of one million. Exemptions in both cases were applied to subsistence properties and communal lands (Pecaut 2006, Gonzalez and Calderon, 2002 and Hirschman, 1963). During the second government of President Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) a new tax bill that proposed a "territorial tax" and increased the cultivation requirements and the penalties for non-compliances was not approved by the Congress (Hirschman, 1963).

peasants were empowered, both the number of taxable plots and their cadastral value increased with coefficients significant at 1%. Consequently, the decrease in tax revenues can only be due to a decrease in the effective tax base, which is related to higher tax evasion by the main taxpayers, the landlords.

Theoretically, this result is also consistent with the idea that social movements also create, expand and amplify the political or economic opportunities for the opponents, which in this context were the rural elites (Tarrow, 1994). Landowners could have benefited from the organization of the peasant movement through a lower enforcement in the land tax collection in exchange for not interfering in the campaign to organize the movement and for recognizing the participation of the peasants in the policy making process.

5.2.2 Targeted Redistribution

Table 6 test the effect of obtaining legal entitlement on the targeted redistributive variables: bureaucratic expenditure and public lands allocated to peasants. These variables redistribute resources to the peasantry, but instead of benefiting the group as a whole they aim at favoring a selected group within the peasantry.

Column 1 indicates that obtaining legal entitlement will increase bureaucratic expenditure by 0.26 relative to the mean. This expenditure is around 30% higher for municipalities that got legal entitlement than for those that only got legal status. This expenditure includes all the spending in the general administration of a municipality. While the relevance of bureaucratic jobs is the potential access to political networks, peasant leaders could also get jobs in other sectors such as education, health or judicial system, but these would give them less political gains. If public jobs are seeing as political assets that facilitate building contacts and clientelistic relations, general direction job positions in the municipality executive power are the closest ones to achieve this objective.

To link the increase in bureaucratic expenditure with public jobs I collected information about the number of municipal employees in the different administrative sections. This data is only aggregated at state level for the period 1957-1972, so in this case I regress the percentage of municipalities in the state that got legal entitlement out of the total that got either entitlement or legal status on the number of municipal public employees.

Results in Table 7 show that the total number of municipal public employees increases in those states that have a higher share of municipalities that got legal entitlement. This increase is due to a substantial expansion in the number of jobs in the general administration section. An increase of 1 percentage point in this share is associated with an increase of 59% in the number of employees in general administration. Other sections such as education, health, judicial system or tax collection did not experience a significant increase in the number of employees.

The second channel of targeted redistribution, public lands granted to peasants, is measured as the total number of hectares (in thousands and log) allocated to peasants at municipal level.³⁵ Column 4 in Table 6 indicates that obtaining legal entitlement increases the number of hectares allocated to the peasants by 0.014 relative to the mean 0.02. This represents an increase of 1.5%. This change is small compared to the coefficients found in the other policy variables, indicating that the empowerment of peasants had a limited effect on implementation of the agrarian reform.

In order to establish who received public lands in the municipalities with legal entitlement during the years the government supported the movement, I match the list of names of the five municipal peasant leaders that attended the second national assembly of ANUC in 1971³⁶ in Bogota to the names of approximate 10.000 peasants that were listed as beneficiaries of public lands and were daily reported in the newspaper *Diario Oficial* between 1967 and 1972.

This exercise allows me to identify whether the peasant leaders were the main beneficiaries of the agrarian reform. Table 8 shows the number of municipalities that allocated lands to peasants, that obtained legal entitlement and that had peasant leaders that received public lands. Out of 1088 municipalities, 462 implemented an agrarian reform (=42%) during the years 1967-1972.. Out of these 462 municipalities, 63% (295) of them had a peasant association that got legal entitlement. Finally, 210 of the 295 had at least

³⁵I use the average measure of a Family Agriculture Unit (UAF) as the threshold. A UAF is defined as the number of hectares that a family of four needs to subsist for a month. This number varies depending on the soil conditions and type of crops produced but Tobon (1972) calculated that plots of land that are 20 hectares or larger can give a family an annual income of 8800 COP. I use this number to define the lands given to the peasantry and aggregated all allocations below this number to calculate the total number of hectares given to peasants yearly.

³⁶Although I only observe the name of the five peasant leaders once (1971), I had access to the list of peasant leaders in two states -Huila and Meta- in the following year. Only two leaders in the municipalities of Tarqui and Gigante were dropped of the lists and replaced by a new leader.

one peasant leader that received land during the years 1967-1972. This represents 71% of the total municipalities that got both agrarian reform and peasant association. Overall, 20% of the peasant leaders received land in this period. Based on the Ministry of Agriculture estimates of the number of members of ANUC (approximately one million members) and on INCORA reports on the number of public lands allocations (10.000 plots of lands in the empowered municipalities), only 1% of the members were beneficiaries of the state policy during the years that the peasants participated in the policy making process.

Moreover, I compare the average size of a plot of land with the average size of the land given to the peasant leaders and find that the land given to the leaders is twice greater than the average size of the land granted to peasants: 10.82 against 5.33 has respectively. In terms of the distribution, Figure 5 shows that more than 50% of the public lands given to peasants were smaller than 5 has, regardless of the characteristics of the peasant association.

The timing of co-optation is also consistent with the hypothesis that the government organized the peasant movement to identify the leaders and buy them off. Only 22% of the leaders received their land before their association was organized, whereas 78% received it after the movement was organized, their leaders were elected and the association obtained legal status.³⁷ Overall, these results suggest that municipalities that got legal entitlement experienced on average higher targeted redistribution, with peasant leaders disproportionately benefiting from it.

Results are still robust to different specifications. First, when I allow heterogeneity in the trends of the outcome variables across municipalities by including municipalities specific-time trends (results presented in Tables 4 and 6). Second, when I use the full sample the magnitude of the coefficients on both variables is smaller but still statistically significant at 1%.

I also report additional robustness checks to address other potential concerns about the estimates for both types of redistribution.³⁸ Table B.11 uses just the sample of

³⁷12% of the peasant leaders received land during the months between obtaining legal status and legal entitlement and 66% obtained land after the legal entitlement was granted.

³⁸I also run a seemingly unrelated regression where I allow errors associated with the dependent variables to be correlated across different equations. Results are still robust for three of the dependent variables (land tax revenues, central transfers and bureaucratic expenditure) and are presented in the Appendix B, Table B.14. A jointly significant test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on legal entitlement are jointly zero in the four simultaneous equations.

municipalities that got legal status during 1971 (95) using as a treatment group those that obtained legal entitlement either in 1971 or 1972 (33 municipalities) and as a control municipalities that only managed to get legal status in 1971 due to end of the alliance between the movement and the government (62 municipalities). Although results are not significant due to the low power of the sample, all the signs are consistent with the results presented in Tables 4 and 6.

Table B.13 includes indicator variables for 1 and 2 years before and after getting legal entitlement. The coefficients on the legal entitlement leads are close to zero, showing little evidence of an anticipatory response within a municipality about to obtaining legal entitlement. In the year that an association gets legal entitlement the change in land tax revenues, social expenditure and bureaucratic expenditure is around 25%, after which the change is much smaller. Although for this specification the estimates of the public land allocations are not significant, the size of the coefficients increases substantially the year that an association gets legal entitlement compared to the previous and following years.

5.3 Validation of assumptions

One of the main assumptions in a difference in difference framework is the parallel path: the trends for treated and non-treated municipalities would be the same in the absence of treatment (Lechner, 2010). To validate this assumption I run two exercises.

I run the main specification for the pre-treatment period (1957-1966) and regress the outcome variables against an indicator of whether the municipality received treatment or not.³⁹ Results are presented in Table B.2 for the restricted and full sample and suggest that neither the broad nor the targeted redistributive variables in municipalities that received the treatment differ from those that did not receive it.⁴⁰ These results are also shown in Figure 3 which presents the pre-trends of the five outcome variables for the

³⁹These regressions include year fixed effect, state fixed effect and geographical and economic controls. This shows whether there is any difference in broad and targeted redistribution between municipalities that got legal entitlement and those that only got legal status before the foundation of the peasant movement.

⁴⁰When the specification includes region instead of state fixed effect, the effect on transfers is significant and positive, indicating that differences on the central transfers between municipalities that got legal entitlement and the control group in pre-treatment years are mainly driven by state characteristics.

two groups (legal status only and legal entitlement)⁴¹.

I also estimate a placebo experiment only using the pre-treatment period (1957-1966) of the data and moving the legal entitlement years from 1969-1972 to 1960-1963 and results are reported in Table B.3. The coefficients for the restricted sample are all close to zero, and none of them are significant, indicating that outcomes variables in municipalities that later obtained legal entitlement were not already on a similar trend before 1967.⁴²

The second assumption is that the timing of obtaining legal entitlement in Colombian municipalities depends on pre-determined variables that are accounted for in the main specification. I estimate the following specification to check this assumption:

$$D(\text{peas_asso})_{i,j} = \beta_1 X_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

where $D(\text{peas_asso})_i$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an association got legal entitlement during the period 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise and $X_{i,t}$ is a vector of different time variant and invariant variables.⁴³

Table B.4 presents the results of an OLS and probit estimation for both full and restricted sample. As expected, more variables are correlated with legal entitlement in the full than in the restricted sample. In both samples, the difference between getting legal entitlement or getting partial or not treatment depends mainly on geographical variables, which is expected given that one requirement to get full legal recognition was to send paperwork to Bogota for approval. Experience in organizing (historical peasant leagues) and the support to communist parties is also correlated with obtaining legal entitlement, but only in the full sample.

⁴¹The figures indicate an important reduction in revenues and expenditure in 1963. The significant reduction in the dependent variables in this year is the result of an increase in inflation of around 400% between 1962 and 1963 (6.3% in 1962, 33.6% in 1963 and 8.8% in 1964). The large change in inflation was the result of two different policies: a decree that increased the minimum wage issued at the beginning of 1963 and a drastic devaluation of the Colombian peso implemented by the Central Bank due to a currency shortage because of low coffee prices, the main export.

⁴²In the case of the full sample, the coefficients of land tax revenues and public land allocations are significant, but in the case of the land tax revenues is the opposite to the one observed once the municipalities received the treatment.

⁴³This vector includes variables such as rainfall, altitude, temperature, area, distance to capital, population, peasant leagues (1945), "La Violencia", land reform (1930-1960) and for the year 1960 data on roads, railroads, irrigated lands (has), coffee lands (plots), banana lands (plots), literacy (%), tenants (%), number of tractors, number of workers, share of votes of radical left-wing parties in presidential elections in 1946 and share of votes of the winner in presidential elections in 1966.

As an additional validation, Table B.5 shows the results of an ordered response model⁴⁴ to explain differences in the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. Results indicate that municipality characteristics such as temperature and experience in organizing are correlated with the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. The marginal effects indicate that having one more peasant league during the 1920s -which is a proxy of collective action capacity-, relative to the mean 0.76, increases the probability of obtaining legal entitlement during the first year (1970) by 0.08 percentage points. In addition, places less urbanized but with higher average wage are also correlated with a higher probability of obtaining legal entitlement earlier.

These variables are controlled in the main specification by the municipality-fixed effect. Other time-varying economic and political variables such as literacy rate, political competition, land tenure distribution, infrastructure, and lands for coffee or banana production are not correlated with receiving the treatment.

6 Heterogenous Effects

Results in Tables 4- 8 suggest that the empowerment of the peasants, measured by a peasant association obtaining legal entitlement, led to a decrease in broad redistribution but an increase in targeted redistribution. In this section, I try to deepen potential mechanisms through which empowerment can affect broad and targeted redistribution. While it is infeasible to study all possible channels, existing literature provides some guidance on the mechanisms that are especially important.

6.1 Threat of a Communist Revolution

I start providing some empirical evidence supporting the plausibility of a threat of a communist revolution as a central channel through which democratization have an effect on redistribution.

Before the Cuban revolution, the communist ideology was asleep in Colombia and did not have a real chance to translate into a serious and credible speech that could get into power. The events in Cuba inspired the peasants to try to break the deadlock of landless,

⁴⁴In this model the dependent variable takes value 3 if a municipality gets legal entitlement during the first year (1970), 2 if it is in 1971, 1 if it is in 1972 and 0 otherwise (full sample) or if it gets just legal status (restricted sample).

political exclusion and low public good provision, threatening the political elite with the loss of their traditional political power based on exclusion (Wright, 1991).⁴⁵

The influence of the Cuban revolution was higher in places characterized by a historical "revolutionary spirit" where the leftist and revolutionary ideas were deeply embedded in the society (Hobswam, 1973). Municipalities with a stronger support to the communist party and ideologies were more vulnerable and sensitive to the Cuban situation and hence, more willing to protest and rebel for a potential change in the status quo.

I use the political support to radical left-wing parties (communist, socialists, maoists and radical liberals) as a first proxy of the threat of revolution. In order to avoid potential reverse causality with the outcome variables, I exploit the persistence in the communist support over time and its variation across municipalities by using the share of votes that the radical left wing parties obtained during the presidential elections in 1946, when all radical lefty parties jointly supported one candidate.⁴⁶ The second proxy of a threat of revolution is the exposure to the civil war "La Violencia" during the years 1948-1958. During the war, conservative guerrillas started to go after the liberals and communist peasants, who also had access to weapons and military armament. The civil war took place in municipalities where peasants were highly influenced by either the radical wing of the liberal party or the communists, which were also the target of the Conservative army (Trejos, 2011).⁴⁷

Both of these proxies are transformed into binary variables to facilitate the interpretation of results and are included in the main specification as an interacted variable with the legal entitlement dummy.⁴⁸ Panel A in Table 9 presents the results for the first

⁴⁵In Colombia, the influence of Cuba was manifested in the radicalization of left-wing parties such as the communist party and the liberal revolutionary movement (MRL), which started to pursue a change "*a la cubana*" (Romero and Castro, 1978) and were fed on the legacy of the past civil wars.

⁴⁶Table B.15 suggests a strong correlation between the share of votes of the communist party in departmental assemblies elections in 1966 -one year before the movement was founded- and previous elections. The correlation is around 0.4 with the previous presidential election in 1962 and is smaller but still statistically significant at 1% when I compare it with the elections in 1966.

⁴⁷To respond to this persecution, the communist party organized "self-defense" groups in areas of their influence, that later were known as "independent republics", due to the lack of state presence (Medina, 1980). The "self-defense" communist peasants groups founded the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia -FARC- in 1964.

⁴⁸The communist support in 1946 that takes value 1 if the percentage that the communist parties obtained in the presidential elections in 1946 is above the median and 0 otherwise and the exposure to civil war takes value 1 if a municipality experienced any violent event during "La Violencia" and 0 otherwise.

proxy of threat -communist support- and Panel B in the same table for the second proxy -exposure to civil war. I test whether broad and targeted redistribution are affected by variation in the threat of a revolution. In panel A of Table 9, column 1 and 3 indicate that broad redistribution is smaller in places where the peasants are empowered and the threat of an uprising is stronger. However, just the coefficient of the interaction variable in the case of land tax revenues is statistically significant. Column 4 also indicates that targeted redistribution, measured as bureaucratic expenditure, increases significantly in municipalities empowered and with high support to the communist, compared to the national average.

Similarly, panel B in Table 9 suggests that broad redistribution in municipalities where the peasants are empowered falls significantly more if they have been exposed to the civil war during the previous decade (1948-1958). The interaction term in panel B in column 1 and 3 implies a decrease of around 25% in land tax revenues and social expenditure in municipalities that get legal entitlement and also are exposed to La Violencia. The positive and statistically significant coefficients in column 4 and 5 capture the intensification of the effect of the democratic reform on targeted redistribution in municipalities that participate in the civil war during the 1950s.

In addition, I run a standard OLS regression using two measures of peasant leaders co-optation (number and land share) as dependent variables on different geographical, economic, social, historical and political variables. Table 10 suggests that co-optation of the peasant leaders is significantly and positively correlated with previous exposure to violence and with revolutionary threats. Graphically, Figure 6 shows a positive correlation between the share of land given to peasant leaders and the communist support. Other geographical, economic and social variables are not correlated with leaders co-optation.

An interesting result in Table 10 is that leaders co-optation is not correlated with political competition, measured as the share of votes of the winner candidate in the presidential elections in 1966. This result suggests that land allocations to peasant leaders are not rewards in exchange of mobilizing political support and votes.

6.2 Alternative mechanisms

While I have argued that the threat of a revolution is an important mechanism linking democratization to broad and targeted redistribution, an alternative hypothesis is that

experience at organizing facilitates the process of voluntary democratization and due to higher levels of collective action capacity, governments will have more incentives to co-opt the leaders and capture these groups⁴⁹.

I define collective action capacity as the ability of organizations to independently recruit and mobilize members and use two proxies to measure it.⁵⁰ The first one is the number of peasant leagues that obtained legal entitlement between 1918 and 1947⁵¹. The second one is a measure of colonial collective organizations: the presence of slave palenques or indigenous resguardos between 1500 and 1851.⁵² Both of these measures reflect previous experience and history at organizing since they require high levels of coordination, networking and strong ties among their members and within communities.

Table 11 explores this hypothesis and columns 4 and 5 examine the effect of democratization and collective action capacity on targeted redistribution. None of the coefficients of the interaction variable are statistically significant. However, the coefficients on *legal entitlement* is positive and statistically significant for both measures and their size is very similar to the baseline coefficients.⁵³ These results suggest that targeted redistribu-

⁴⁹ Seabright (2000) has explained how cooperation may be self-reinforcing or habit-forming in South India. Bardhan (2000) studies 48 irrigation communities in South India and shows more cooperative behavior in communities where the water-user's organization has existed for more than 20 years. Shin (1994) demonstrates how prior collective actions contributed to the Korean peasant uprisings of 1946 by developing a political and national consciousness. In a recent paper, Finkel, Gehlbach and Kofanov (2017) show that the persistence in repertoires of collective action are potential determinants of the peasant organization and disturbances that Russia experienced between March and October in 1917. On the same lines, Golden (1988), Hammond (2009), Jenkins and Perrow (1977) and Gurr (1968) show how previous social movements or past struggles facilitates the development of a consciousness that result in subsequent collective actions.

⁵⁰ They are measured before 1948, when the civil war "La Violencia" started.

⁵¹ Although the law that allowed workers and peasants to organized was issued in 1931 (Law 83), the first peasant organizations were founded at the end of the 1920s in areas of agricultural exports such as Santa Marta (United Fruit Company), Viota (coffee plantations), Puerto Berrio (league of settlers from Antioquia) and in some indigenous areas of Cauca (Sanchez, 1977).

⁵² Slave palenques were free-black agricultural communities and defensive centers that sought self-sufficiency and were founded by escaped slaves. Indigenous resguardos were territorial units that comprised communal lands administrated by native authorities. They are measured as dummy variables that take value 1 if there was either a palenque or an indigenous resguardo in the municipality between 1500 and 1851, year in which slavery was abolished and indigenous resguardos were dissolved.

⁵³ This result is also suggested in Table 10 where the history at organizing (peasant leagues 1918-1945) is negative correlated with the number of peasant leaders co-opted.

tion was not higher in places where the collective action capacity was stronger. On the contrary, results indicate that municipalities with no history at organizing were easier to co-opt.

The relative wealth or agricultural development of a municipality can be an alternative mechanism that affects the intensity of the effect of democratization on broad and targeted redistribution. Poor municipalities have lower living conditions and hence higher economic grievances, which give them more incentives to organize and rebel. If this is the case, threat would be higher in poorer municipalities and the government would try to co-opt the leader in those places. Table 12 explores this hypothesis using as a measure of wealth and agricultural development the daily wage in 1968 and the number of tractors in 1960.⁵⁴ None of the interaction variable coefficients in Panel A in Table 12 are statistically significant. In the case of tractors in Panel B, the interaction term on column 4 is not significant and the coefficient on legal entitlement is larger than the baseline coefficient. The coefficient estimate -0.019 on the (*legal_entitlement* x *tractors*) interaction in column 5 captures the elimination of the effect of legal entitlement on public land allocations in municipalities with higher agricultural development. Table 12 suggest that wealth or agricultural development were not mechanisms driving the effect of democratization on broad and targeted redistribution.

Table 13 presents results of heterogeneous effects using variation in inequality in the rural areas. I measure inequality as the share of no owners (settlers, sharecroppers, tenants, agricultural workers) working on rural areas in terms of the number of properties and of area cultivated.⁵⁵ In the case of broad redistribution, none of the coefficients are significant for both type of measures (Panel A -number of properties or Panel B-area). In the case of targeted redistribution, the coefficients estimates of 0.362 and 0.019 on legal entitlement in column 4 and 5 of Panel A imply that the effect of legal entitlement on targeted redistribution is 35% higher in municipalities with lower percentage of no owners relative to the baseline results. However, the coefficient estimates on (*legal_entitlement* x *%_no_owners*) of -0.128 and -0.017 reduce the bias when municipalities with higher percentage of no owners are taken into account. These results indicate that inequality in

⁵⁴For means of comparison, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the log of the daily wage in 1968 or the number of tractors in 1960 are above the median and 0 otherwise. For the specification that uses the interaction with the number of tractors as one of the explanatory variables, I drop the variable that is interacting tractors with a time trend in the original specification.

⁵⁵I transform these two variables as binary indicators equal to 1 if they are above the median and 0 otherwise.

land tenure is not a factor that explains the differences in the effect of legal entitlement on redistribution.

7 Democratization, Co-optation and Threat of Revolution

A Colombian liberal politician recognized that with the foundation of ANUC "*the goal of the state was not to organize a peasant revolution but to avoid one*" (Perez, 2010). I then explore whether the results on targeted redistribution reported in Tables 6-8 are consistent with a government strategy to avoid violent activities by using a data set that contains economic, social and political information about 1088 municipalities from 1972 to 1995. I test whether the strategy of the government -once the leaders are identified to co-opt them- was effective at reducing violent activities after 1972, when the alliance between the government and the peasant movement ended.

With this cross-section data set, I study the relationship between legal entitlement, co-optation of peasant leaders and revolutionary activities. I work with a restricted sample of 520 municipalities that includes only municipalities that got legal entitlement to compare within this universe the municipalities where leaders were or not co-opted.⁵⁶

After matching the names of peasant leaders with the names of peasants that received land, I calculate three measures of co-optation. First, a dummy variable that indicates whether the municipality experienced co-optation of their leaders or not. Second, the number of municipal peasant leaders -of the 5 delegates that attended the II ANUC national assembly in 1971- that received a public land between 1967 and 1972. Finally, the share of land that peasants leaders received during the same years relative to the total land that was granted to the municipality.

I use three different proxies for revolutionary activities. First, the number of land invasions after the alliance between government and ANUC ended (1972-1978). When the relationship between the government and the peasants officially ended in 1972, a section of ANUC announced the direct opposition to the government and a wave of land invasions started across the country.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Results when using the full sample and the restricted sample that includes only municipalities that got legal entitlement or just legal status are presented in the Appendix B, Table B.18 and Table B.19.

⁵⁷Figure 7 shows the number of land invasions during the 1970s: while there were not more than 30

Second, FARC rebel actions during the years 1974-1985, which include the number of threats to civilians, attacks, assaults and extortions. When the alliance ended in 1972, a faction of ANUC decided to continue the fight and joined the newborn rural guerrilla group FARC, whose aspirations were aligned with ANUC goals: improvement of the living conditions of the peasants and the implementation of an agrarian reform that transforms the economic structure of the rural areas (Molano, 2015).⁵⁸

Finally, I use the number of peasant protests over the period 1974-1995. These protests reflect more spontaneous associations either organized by ANUC or by other sectors of the peasantry, and aim at bringing government attention to rural areas⁵⁹.

I run a standard OLS and a negative binomial estimation⁶⁰ to test whether co-opting the peasant leaders during the years that the government supported the movement (1967-1972) is correlated with the increase in revolutionary activities that is observed after the alliance between government and ANUC ended (1972-1995) in the municipalities that obtained legal entitlement. The following equation is estimated:

$$\text{threat}_{i,j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{cooptation}_{i,j} + X'_{i,j} \beta + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

where $\text{threat}_{i,j}$ is any of the three measures of public disorder -number of land invasions (1972-1978), number of FARC rebel actions (1974-1985) or number of rural protests (1975-1995)- in municipality i in state j and the variable $\text{cooptation}_{i,j}$ is any of the three measures of co-optation stated previously. $X'_{i,j}$ contains a vector of time invariant geographic characteristics and other controls.⁶¹

in 1971, this number exceeded 600 in 1972. These invasions were initiated and supported by ANUC and were the result of the unfulfilled government promises (Escobar, 1972).

⁵⁸FARC was considered the military wing of the communist party and its influence is reflected by the fact that Manuel Marulanda Velez, main leader of the guerrilla group, was a leader of this party before the foundation of FARC.

⁵⁹The main causes of rural protest during these years were access to land and public good provision. Since the 1990s the human rights motive was also part of the protests.

⁶⁰Due to the characteristics of the dependent variables (nonnegative count values reflecting the number of occurrences of an event in a fixed period of time) OLS models are not the best method because they usually violate two of their main assumptions: conditional normality and homoscedasticity. Both of these problems are solved with the negative binomial model which is flexible in the error structure and assumes a Poisson distribution of errors.

⁶¹This vector includes variables such as land tenancy (1960), population (1964), left-wing parties support (1946), dummy of "La Violencia", historical peasant leagues (1931-1947), land reform (1967-1972) and land conflicts (1878-1964) and α_j is a state fixed effect.

Table 14 shows the results of the ordinary least squares estimates⁶². The dependent variables are specified in the headers of the columns. Columns 1-3 look at the number of land invasion between 1972 and 1978, column 4-6 look at the number of FARC rebel activities between 1974 and 1985 and column 7-9 look at the number of peasant protests over the period 1974-1995.

Overall, this table shows a strong negative correlation between the co-optation of peasant leaders through public land allocations and the posterior violent activities that the country experienced (1972-1995). As it is expected, results are stronger in the case of land invasions since they were greatly linked to the peasant movement and its members. Most of the land invasions were called under ANUC name and the movement publicly supported them (Escobar, 1982).

The results in the second row of the table indicate that a peasant leader co-opted reduces the number of rebel activities, on average, by 1 event. All of these results are statistically significant at 1% level. The third row shows that an increase in the number of peasant leaders that received private benefits leads to, on average, a 0.3 decrease in the number of rebel activities. These results are statistically significant at 1% level for land invasions and peasant protests and at 5% level for FARC rebel activities. The fourth row indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of land that peasants' leaders received is correlated with a 2.5 to 3 decrease in the number of rebel activities. This coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level for land invasions and FARC rebel activities but it is not significant in the case of peasant protests.

Table 15 and 16 show the estimates of the negative binomial model and its incidence rate ratios respectively. Municipalities where the peasant leaders were co-opted are expected to have a rate 0.6 times lower for land invasions and FARC rebel activities. The coefficient when the explanatory variable is the number of peasant leaders co-opted indicates that if a municipality were to increase its number of peasant leaders co-opted by one, its rate for land invasions and FARC activities would be expected to decrease by a factor 0.7 and 0.8 respectively. These coefficients have the expected sign in the case of peasant protests but are not statistically significant. Similarly, if a municipality increases

⁶²I also run the equation

$$\text{threat}_{i,j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D(\text{peas_asso})_{i,j} + \gamma_2 \text{cooptation}_{i,j} + X'_{i,j} \beta + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

to test whether obtaining legal entitlement or not is also correlated with violent activities. In this case, I use the sample of municipalities that obtained either legal entitlement or just legal status

the share of land given to its leaders by 1%, its rate for land invasions would be expected to decrease by 0.03, while holding all other variables in the model constant. The results of both the standard OLS estimation and negative binomial indicate a negative correlation between co-optation of the peasant leaders and revolutionary activities, suggesting that the co-optation strategy was, to some extent, effective.

Results in Table B.16 in the Appendix B show the relative importance of the extensive margin over the intense margin: the largest and significant difference is when three or four peasant leaders are co-opted. This is consistent with the idea that members in a large-scale movement do not follow a charismatic leader but a cohesive group of leaders. When the majority of the leaders are co-opted and use their influence to demobilize their followers, it is harder for their members to oppose and replace them.

In addition, I also find a positive correlation between municipalities that got legal entitlement but were not co-opted and land invasions. Although the sign of this correlation holds for the negative binomial estimation, this result is not significant. This result suggests that municipalities that were organized and empowered but did not benefit from targeted redistribution are correlated with higher public disorder afterwards.

This empirical result must be interpreted cautiously, as elites strategically selected where to co-opt the leaders. However, if elites co-opted them when the threat of a revolution was higher, then it is arguable that the estimates are likely to be downward biased (in absolute values).

8 Concluding remarks

In this paper I estimate the effect of a type of democratic reform -organization and political participation of a peasant movement- on broad and targeted redistribution in Colombian municipalities during the years of a potential threat of a Communist revolution (1957-1985).

In the Colombian case during the 1960s when there was a threat of a Communist revolution, the threatening group -the peasantry- was empowered by the state in order to avoid it being captured by the Communist and rebel against the status quo. The empowerment occurred through the voluntary organization of a peasant association that gave the peasants direct participation in the policy making process. Their representatives in the state organizations were the peasant leaders, who were locally elected by each

municipal association. The strategy of the government in order to avoid the Communist revolution was to provide the peasant leaders with economic -lands- or political -public jobs- assets.

I show that in municipalities where the peasants were empowered -an association getting legal entitlement- broad redistributive variables decrease during the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972), while simultaneously targeted redistribution increases. I provide evidence on the drivers of the increase in targeted redistribution: more public jobs in municipalities empowered and more public lands for the peasant leaders. I also provide suggestive evidence of the negative correlation between the co-optation of the peasant leaders and the public disorders events that Colombia experienced during the 1970s and 1980s.

This paper studies the effect of democratization on a particular type of redistribution -targeted-, transcending the idea that democratization only is correlated with broad redistribution. These results also confirm previous findings in the autocracy case regarding the strategies of the government to co-opt potential opposite groups such as the provision of rent-seeking positions in the legislatures. But the evidence goes further, as they provide direct evidence of the private goods received -lands- and how this is linked to revolutionary activities. Finally, this paper explores a particular democratic mechanism that extends the political rights in democracies beyond the *de jure* decision power, such as universal suffrage.

The findings of this paper, insofar as they provide evidence on the effects of democratic reforms on targeted redistribution and the effectiveness of this strategy during times of a threat of revolution, have important implications for theories of conflict, democratization and redistribution. If governments recognize that to avoid public disorder, targeted redistribution to well-connected social movements leaders can be more successful than reforms aimed at increasing broad redistribution, particularistic benefits to the leaders become more likely despite increases in inequality with the threatening group.

Future research must try to explore the effect of other type of democratic reforms such as quotas in the legislative branch as a mechanism to prevent unrest. In the case of Colombia, more research needs to be done related to the effectiveness at increasing public good provision in terms of the different repertoires -land invasions or new political parties- that were used once the peasant movement lost the state support. Moreover, there is a research gap in the study of the new clientelistic relationships that arise with the emergence of peasant leaders as political actors and their different implications on

public good provision and state capacity in the medium and long term.

Table 1: Franchise extension, Peasant movements, Land reforms and Guerrilla movements.

	Communist Party foundation	Franchise extension	Land reform I	Peasant Movement foundation	Land reform II	Guerrilla movements
Argentina	1918	1916				1970(ERP)
Ecuador	1925	1924		1968	1965-1975	
Peru	1928	1931		1960	1964-1968	1964(APRA)
Brazil	1922	1932		1960	1962-1964	
Chile	1922	1934		1967	1962-1967	
Colombia	1930	1936	1936	1967	1961-1971	1964 (FARC/ELN)
Venezuela	1931	1945	1945-1948	1959	1958-1968	1963(FALN)
Costa Rica	1931	1949		1969	1961	
Bolivia	1950	1952	1953	1952	1953	
Uruguay	1920	1927				
Mexico	1919	1947	1934			
Panama	1930	1941		1961	1962	
El Salvador	1930	1950		1961		
Nicaragua	1967	1955			1979	1961(FSLN)
Guatemala	1922	1946		1950	1952-1954	1962(FAR)
Dominican Republic	1939	1942		1962	1962	
Cuba	1925	1940				

Chile: Confederacion Triunfo.

Colombia: Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC).

Venezuela: National Peasant Federation.

Costa Rica: Federacion Nacional Unitaria de trabajadores agricolas y de campesinos.

Panama: 1 Liga campesina en Carrizal (congreso campesino).

Guatemala: National confederation of Guatemala.

Ecuador: Federacion Nacional de Organizacion Campesina (FENAC).

Peru: Rural workers federation of Peru (FENCAP).

Brazil: Parana peasant league and National Confederation of Agricultural workers.

El Salvador: Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN).

Table 2: Legal Status and Legal Entitlement

Municipal Peasant Associations		
Year	Legal Status	Legal Entitlement
1961	0	0
1962	0	0
1963	0	0
1964	0	0
1965	0	0
1966	0	0
1967	0	0
1968	48	0
1969	225	1
1970	246	408
1971	95	123
1972	30	20
1973	0	0
1974	0	0
1975	0	0
Total	644	552

Notes: The full sample includes 1088 municipalities and the data includes the years 1957-1975.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev
<i>A. Public Finance (in real terms and logs)</i>			
Total Revenue	16994	13.5	1.61
Land Tax revenue	16870	12.2	1.59
Sales Tax revenue	16868	10.7	1.93
Capital revenue	13428	11.0	2.24
Central Transfers	16486	11.2	1.88
Total Expenditure	16774	12.8	1.57
Social Expenditure	15697	10.3	2.01
Tax Collection Expenditure	16302	10.4	1.92
Bureaucratic Expenditure	16493	11.7	1.69
Economic Promotion Expenditure	10334	11.2	1.92
Debt	2582	11.2	2.19
<i>B. Peasant Municipal Associations</i>			
Legal Status (dummy)	1088	0.62	0.49
Legal Entitlement (dummy)	1088	0.54	0.42
<i>C. Public Land allocated to Peasants</i>			
Public Lands (Plots)	20596	5.16	25.34
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs)	20596	0.02	0.14
<i>D. Co-optation Variables</i>			
Peasant Leaders (dummy)	1094	0.20	0.40
Peasant Leaders	1094	0.55	1.27
Land Share- Peasant Leaders	1094	0.02	0.07
<i>E. Other Variables</i>			
Income Shocks	20520	9.16	9.02
Vote Share Leftist Parties (1946)	1085	0.30	0.30
Peasant Campaign Budget (in thousands, real terms)	19	30342	44365
Peasant Leagues (1914-1947)	1090	0.76	6.25
Union Members (1914-1947)	1090	152.4	1449.2
Peasant Union Members (1914-1947)	1090	13.75	78.5
Slaves Palenques (1650-1851, dummy)	1097	0.03	0.21
Indigenous Resguardos (1531-1851, dummy)	1097	0.18	0.38
Daily Wage (1968, log)	877	2.71	0.30
Tractors (1960)	871	18.33	93.88
No land owners (% , number, 1960)	808	0.27	0.17
No land owners (% , area, 1960)	807	0.15	0.14
<i>F. Threat of Revolution</i>			
La Violencia (dummy)	1047	0.18	0.38
Land Invasions (1971-1978)	1095	0.99	3.22
Rebel Activity (1974-1985)	1046	1.28	12.36
Peasant Protests (1974-1995)	1094	2.75	3.97

Table 4: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Broad redistribution 1957-1975 (in log).

	Land Tax Revenues			Central transfers			Social expenditure		
	Restricted Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)	Restricted Sample (4)	Restricted Sample (5)	Full Sample (6)	Restricted Sample (7)	Restricted Sample (8)	Full Sample (9)
<i>Dependent Variable Mean</i>	12.0	12.0	12.4	11.1	11.1	11.2	10.4	10.4	10.3
Legal Entitlement.	-0.136*** (0.054)	-0.233*** (0.036)	-0.241*** (0.047)	0.083 (0.093)	0.008 (0.063)	0.203* (0.062)	-0.151** (0.097)	-0.198* (0.116)	-0.196*** (0.059)
Income Shock	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.026*** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.014 (0.011)
Observations	11.368	11.368	17.866	11.074	11.074	16.467	10.738	10.738	15.598
Clusters	625	625	1080	621	621	924	616	616	909
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓			✓			✓	
Controls	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5: Legal Entitlement and land tax base, 1957-1972

	Rural		Rural and Urban	
	Number Taxable Plots (1)	Cadastral Value (2)	Number Taxable Plots (3)	Cadastral Value (4)
Legal Entitlement	0.172*** (0.031)	0.143*** (0.049)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.133*** (0.048)
Income shock	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Observations	6676	6676	6669	6669
Clusters	595	595	593	593
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: log of the number of taxable plots in both rural and urban areas and log of total payable tax in 1957 COP millions.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 6: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Targeted redistribution 1957-1975 (in log).

	Bureaucratic Expenditure			Public Land Allocations		
	Restricted Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)	Restricted Sample (4)	Restricted Sample (5)	Full Sample (6)
<i>Dependent Variable Mean</i>	11.4	11.4	11.7	0.04	0.04	0.02
Legal Entitlement	0.252*** (0.058)	0.376*** (0.067)	0.173*** (0.037)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.009* (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)
Income shock	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Observations	11.242	11.242	16.493	12.216	12.216	20.520
Clusters	620	620	918	644	644	1080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓			✓	
Controls	✓		✓	✓		✓

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1968-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 7: Legal Entitlement and the number of municipal employees, 1957-1972

	General Direction (1)	Judicial System (2)	Tax Collection (3)	Education and Health (4)	Total (5)
Municipalities	0.084*	-0.041*	-0.052**	-0.000	-0.018
Legal entitlement (%)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.072)	(0.032)
Observations	380	380	364	380	364
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32
State Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Dependent variable: number of employees in each section of the municipality (in logs). Explanatory variable: percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the municipalities with legal status. All regressions control for year and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 32 states for the years 1957-1972.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 8: Matching names of peasant leaders and peasant beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, 1957-1972 (1088 municipalities)

Allocated land to peasants	Association Legal Entitlement	Peasant leader beneficiaries	Number of Municipalities
x			462 (=42%)
x	x		295 (=63%)
x	x	x	210 (=71%)

Table 9: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution (restricted sample).

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114** (0.052)	0.096 (0.099)	-0.195** (0.095)	0.255*** (0.056)	0.014*** (0.005)
A: Communist Support (dummy around the median)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.073 (0.060)	-0.006 (0.102)	-0.130 (0.112)	0.135*** (0.067)	0.017*** (0.006)
Legal Entitlement * Communist	-0.075* (0.045)	0.123 (0.093)	-0.103 (0.085)	0.191** (0.054)	0.005 (0.006)
Income shock	0.004 (0.005)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: "La Violencia" (dummy)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.068 (0.050)	0.285*** (0.087)	-0.185*** (0.067)	0.240*** (0.059)	0.008* (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * "La Violencia"	-0.137*** (0.052)	-0.022 (0.101)	-0.271*** (0.061)	0.098* (0.058)	0.023** (0.010)
Income shock	0.005 (0.005)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	11.348	11.019	10.718	11.242	12.102
Clusters	622	616	613	620	637
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and the interaction of this variable with Communist support in 1946 or the exposure to the civil war "La Violencia". ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 10: Leaders co-opted

OLS		
Leaders Co-opted (1967-1972)		
	Number	Land Share
	(1)	(2)
<i>A. Geographical Variables</i>		
Rainfall (log)	-0.065 (0.169)	0.010 (0.012)
Altitude (log)	0.031 (0.083)	0.003 (0.006)
Temperature	0.026 (0.021)	0.000 (0.001)
Area(log)	0.351 (0.076)	-0.011* (0.006)
Distance to Capital	0.141* (0.084)	-0.000 (0.006)
<i>B. Economic and Social Variables</i>		
Population (1970) (in log)	-0.120 (0.116)	0.005 (0.008)
No owners Land (%1960)	0.504 (0.364)	-0.001 (0.026)
Tractors (1960)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Railroads (1960)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Daily Wage (log, 1968)	0.626*** (0.229)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>C. Historical and Political Variables</i>		
Peasant Leagues (1945)	-0.099* (0.060)	0.002 (0.004)
"La Violencia" (dummy)	0.791*** (0.164)	0.019* (0.011)
Left-wing support (% elections 1946)	0.547*** (0.214)	0.036** (0.015)
Land Conflicts (1878-1964)	0.099** (0.041)	0.003 (0.003)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	-0.312 (0.320)	-0.000 (0.023)
Observations	716	716
R-squared	0.221	0.056

Notes: The dependent variable is either the number of peasant leaders co-opted or the share of land these leaders received during 1967-1972. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960)" measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Peasant leagues" measures the number of legal peasant leagues between 1918-1945. The variable "Tractors" is the number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variable d_ "La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 11: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax	Central	Social	Bureaucratic	Public Land
	Revenues	Transfers	Expenditure	Expenditure	allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114** (0.052)	0.096 (0.099)	-0.195** (0.095)	0.255*** (0.056)	0.014*** (0.005)
A: Peasant Leagues (Number of peasant leagues legally recognized, 1918-1947)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.111* (0.059)	0.109 (0.101)	-0.186* (0.109)	0.238*** (0.061)	0.013*** (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Peasant Leagues	-0.043 (0.038)	-0.139** (0.071)	-0.162** (0.073)	0.062 (0.044)	0.002 (0.007)
Income shock	0.004 (0.005)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: Colonial Collective Organizations (Slave palenques and Indigenous Resguardos, 1550-1851)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.124* (0.058)	0.076 (0.102)	-0.237*** (0.068)	0.260*** (0.061)	0.011*** (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Colonial Collective Organization	-0.011 (0.048)	-0.062 (0.097)	-0.037 (0.055)	0.008 (0.052)	0.005 (0.007)
Income shock	0.004 (0.005)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.014* (0.008)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The variable *peasantleagues* is the number of peasant leagues that were legally recognized between 1918-1947. The variable *ColonialCollectiveOrganization* takes value 1 if the municipality had a slave palenque or an indigenous resguardo between 1550-1851 and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 12: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114** (0.052)	0.096 (0.099)	-0.195** (0.095)	0.255*** (0.056)	0.014*** (0.005)
A: Wages (dummy around the median, log, 1968)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.099* (0.059)	-0.024 (0.109)	-0.269*** (0.104)	0.222*** (0.064)	0.015*** (0.006)
Legal Entitlement *wages (1968)	-0.022 (0.044)	0.167* (0.095)	0.085 (0.086)	0.075 (0.054)	0.002 (0.008)
Income shock	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	11.110	10.834	10.452	10.880	11.361
Clusters	598	595	591	593	598
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: Tractors (dummy around the median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.096 (0.080)	0.073 (0.130)	-0.163 (0.135)	0.278*** (0.061)	0.030*** (0.004)
Legal Entitlement *Tractors	-0.014 (0.069)	0.020 (0.115)	0.011 (0.113)	0.013 (0.076)	-0.019** (0.008)
Income shock	0.006 (0.005)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	10.976	10.695	10.504	10.905	11.285
Clusters	593	590	591	593	594
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. Panel B only includes as a control Population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The dummy variable *wages* takes value 1 if the log daily wage in 1968 is above the median and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable *tractors* takes value 1 if the number of tractors in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 13: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues (1)	Central Transfers (2)	Social Expenditure (3)	Bureaucratic Expenditure (4)	Public Land allocations (5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114** (0.052)	0.096 (0.099)	-0.195** (0.095)	0.255*** (0.056)	0.014*** (0.005)
A: No owners (dummy number of properties around median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.040 (0.058)	0.000 (0.099)	-0.160 (0.114)	0.362*** (0.063)	0.019*** (0.006)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners	-0.063 (0.040)	0.085 (0.084)	-0.017 (0.087)	-0.128*** (0.052)	-0.017** (0.009)
Income shock	0.002 (0.004)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	10.390	10.165	10.041	10.355	10.449
Clusters	550	549	550	550	550
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: No owners (dummy area around median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.076 (0.055)	0.050 (0.101)	-0.174 (0.111)	0.299*** (0.061)	0.007 (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners	0.005 (0.040)	-0.011 (0.085)	0.009 (0.089)	-0.007 (0.051)	0.006 (0.007)
Income shock	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	10.390	10.165	10.041	10.335	10.449
Clusters	550	549	550	550	550
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). In panel A, the dummy variable *noowner* takes value 1 if the share of the total number of properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. In panel B, the dummy variable *noowner* takes value 1 if the share of the total area of properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 14: OLS-Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-2.824*** (0.758)			-1.910*** (0.673)			-0.367 (0.610)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-1.050*** (0.192)			-0.329* (0.175)			-0.099 (0.194)	
Share land peasant leaders			-2.959*** (0.935)			-3.845*** (1.214)			-2.399** (1.224)
Peasant Leagues (1931-1947)	-0.123 (0.079)	-0.169** (0.075)	-0.130* (0.079)	0.334* (0.200)	0.316 (0.204)	0.329 (0.207)	0.236*** (0.088)	-0.240** (0.099)	-0.236*** (0.087)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.395*** (0.136)	0.491*** (0.131)		-0.018 (0.139)	-0.134 (0.164)		-0.059 (0.122)	-0.064 (0.128)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	-0.026 (0.430)	0.076 (0.427)	-0.069 (0.436)	0.009 (0.624)	-0.014 (0.472)	-0.032 (0.477)	0.371 (0.616)	0.375 (0.620)	0.411 (0.622)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 15: Negative Binomial-Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-1.056*** (0.296)			-1.252*** (0.345)			-0.013 (0.148)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.630*** (0.110)			-0.233** (0.109)			-0.004 (0.041)	
Share land peasant leaders			-8.316*** (2.667)			-3.925 (2.648)			-0.618 (0.504)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.057* (0.032)	0.081*** (0.029)	0.046 (0.032)	0.075 (0.053)	0.035 (0.049)	0.067 (0.057)	0.058*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.019)	0.056*** (0.020)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.174*** (0.051)	0.251*** (0.056)		0.020 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.059)		-0.031 (0.027)	-0.031 (0.027)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	-0.379 (0.324)	-0.157 (0.330)	-0.288 (0.319)	0.195 (0.345)	0.126 (0.358)	0.025 (0.372)	0.134 (0.193)	0.134 (0.193)	0.156 (0.199)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 16: Negative Binomial-IRR -Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	0.347*** (-3.57)			0.285*** (-3.63)			0.986 (-0.09)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		0.532*** (-5.68)			0.791** (-2.14)			0.995 (-0.12)	
Share land peasant leaders			0.000*** (-3.12)			0.266 (-0.91)			0.019 (-1.48)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.944* (-1.76)	0.921*** (-2.72)	0.954 (-1.43)	1.078 (1.42)	1.036 (0.73)	1.069 (1.17)	1.073** (2.19)	0.942*** (-2.94)	0.945*** (-2.72)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	1.190*** (3.42)	1.285*** (4.47)		1.020 (0.35)	0.954 (-0.79)		0.969 (-1.14)	0.969 (-1.14)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	0.684 (-1.17)	0.854 (-0.48)	0.749 (-0.90)	1.215 (0.56)	1.134 (0.35)	1.025 (0.07)	0.143 (0.70)	1.143 (0.69)	1.169 (0.78)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Z-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure 1: Months between Legal Status and Legal Entitlement





Figure 2: Municipalities with legal entitlement and legal status (only), 1967-1972




(a) Legal Entitlement

(b) Legal Status (only)

Figure 3: Pre-trends of broad and targeted redistribution, 1957-1966




(a) Land Tax Revenues




(b) Central Transfers



(c) Social Expenditure



(d) Bureaucratic Expenditure




(e) Public Land Allocations

Figure 4: Evolution of broad and targeted redistribution, 1963-1973



(a) Land Tax Revenues



(b) Central Transfers



(c) Social Expenditure




(d) Bureaucratic Expenditure




(e) Public Land Allocations


Figure 5: Distribution of Individual Public land allocations by area, 1967-1972



(a) Municipalities with Legal Entitlement



(b) Municipalities with Legal Status



(c) Municipalities without Legal Entitlement
or Status

Figure 6: Land share of peasant leaders and Communist support (1946)





Figure 7: Land Invasions 1971-1978



A Appendix A: Data

The analysis builds two new data sets from different primary and secondary sources. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables.

Local Government Expenditure and Revenues: This is the first dataset about local government expenditure and revenues built in Colombia that covers the years 1957-1975. Data was collected from official yearbooks at the Colombian National Archive and National Library for the entire period of study. The balance sheets have disaggregated information of all sources of revenue (by type of tax), transfers and expenditures. All nominal values of revenues and expenditures are transformed in real terms in 1957 Colombian pesos using the Consumer Price Index estimates of the Colombian Central Bank. Municipalities are the lowest level of administration in Colombia and are in charge of collecting particular taxes and revenues established by national laws (e.g. land and income tax) and of providing basic public goods (e.g. primary level education, tertiary roads and local health centers). Municipalities also receive transfers from the national government as an additional source of revenue but those revenues are attached to particular investment projects. Tax revenues count for around 60% of total municipal revenues and within this type of revenue, land tax revenues are around 70% of total tax revenues.

Legal Status and Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations: Data on the exact dates that the municipal peasant associations got legal status and legal entitlement comes from two sources: the archive of the Ministry of Agriculture and the archive of ANUC. I construct two different variables with this data. The variable *legal status* takes the value 1 the year that the peasant association gets legal status until 1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable *legal entitlement* takes the value 1 the year that the peasant association gets legal entitlement until 1972 and 0 otherwise. Associations can only get legal entitlement once they have obtained legal status, so there is no case that an association gets first legal entitlement and then legal status does not exist.

Public Lands allocated to Peasants: The data on public lands allocations come from the Colombian Institute for rural development -INCODER-. The dataset contains every plot of land that has been allocated at municipal level and its size during 1901-2013. During the years of interest (1957-1985), the dataset has more than 185.000 allocations. I collapsed this data by municipality and year and dropped all the allocations of size greater than 20 has (the used size to measure the agricultural unit for a family -UAF-).

I construct two variables with this dataset: the number of peasants that receive public lands (*public_land_num*) and the total number of hectares (in thousands) that peasants received of public lands (*public_lands_has*) by year and by municipality.

Peasant Leaders names: Data on peasant leaders was collected from the ANUC archive. The list of the delegates at municipal level that attended the II National Congress of ANUC in 1971 is collected from *Manual de la campana nacional de organizacion campesina* published in 1972.

Names of peasants that were granted lands: The list of the names of peasants that received public lands comes from the daily information published in *Diario Oficial* during 1967-1972. This dataset contains more than 10.000 names.

Cadastral values and Public Employees: Information on cadastral values is only reported from 1957 to 1972. Yearly data was collected from the yearbooks of public finance at the Colombian National Archive and the National Library. The yearly data contain information on the number of properties and the cadastral value for both urban and rural areas of each municipality. The official newspaper that reports all the national laws and decrees *Diario Oficial* was also revised during the period of study to verify any law change regarding tax rate, tax base or exemptions.

The number of public employees at municipal level is disaggregated by each sectors (general direction, judicial system, tax collection, education, health among others). This information is only available at state level for the years 1957-1972 and was obtained from the library at the Ministry of Finance "Jose Maria Castillo y Rada".

Income shocks: I use as a control the variable *income_shock*. This variable is the average of the land suitability of the main four crops (coffee, sugar, tobacco, banana) weighted by the national average price of each crop (in 1957 Colombian pesos). Data on land suitability was collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization -FAO- and on national average price comes from the annual bulletins published by Colombian National Statistical Agency -DANE-.

Communist Support: The communist support is measured as the vote share of all left wing parties during the presidential election in 1946. I collect information for the presidential elections in 1946 and 1966 and the departmental assemblies elections in 1962 and 1966. I test persistence in the communist support with the significance of the correlation of the vote share of the leftist parties in elections over time. This information comes from the National Electoral Agency and from yearbooks published by Colombian

Statistical Agency (DANE).

Historical Peasant leagues: Information on the history of Collective Action Activities comes from the first national census of unions in 1947. The census contains detailed information about the number of unions and rural unions and their members between 1918 and 1947. I collapsed this information at municipal level. I complement that information with the data provided about legal peasant organizations in the annual report of the Ministry of Labor in 1945.

I also construct a variable of peasant associations supported by the Communist Party but not legally recognized by the government from 1914 to 1939. The variable is a dummy that has value 1 if in that municipality there was a peasant association with these characteristics and 0 otherwise. The data about these associations comes from the Communist newspaper *Claridad: Semanario de la tarde* from 1936 to 1939.

Slave Palenques and Indigenous resguardos: I construct a dummy variable that indicates the presence of either a Slave Palenque or an Indigenous Resguardo in the municipality until 1851. That year, the government issued two laws: slavery abolition and Indigenous resguardo dissolution. Since 1851, all the slaves were declared free and the communal and protected communal indigenous lands were divided into their members. Once the law took place, some Palenques and resguardos continued to exist but the idea of community and independent organizations changed. I collected the data about Palenques and resguardos from different sources. Data on palenques came mainly from Friedemann (1993) and on Indigenous Resguardos from Gonzalez (1970), Friede (1976) and Herrera (1998).

Campaign to organize the National Peasant Movement: Data on the annual budget received by the Ministry of Agriculture to organize the national peasant movement is reported in the yearbooks of the national balance sheets published by *Contraloria General de la Nacion -CGN-*. The campaign was financed mainly by international organizations that transferred the money to the Ministry of Agriculture. All the campaign organization was centralized at the national level and an independent section within the Ministry was created just to work on the organization of the national peasant movement.

Land Invasions: Information about the number of land invasions that took place in each municipality between 1971-1978 is reported weekly in the peasant newspaper "La Via Campesina". In this newspaper they report all land invasions across the country independently of the size. I contrasted this numbers with the reports of land invasions

in one of the main newspapers of the country "El Tiempo" during the same period. "El Tiempo" underreported considerable the number of land invasions which means that taking the data from "La Via Campesina" is more reasonable.

FARC Rebel Activity: Information about rebel activity is collected from the data set of IEPRI-CEDE, and includes the number of violent events by FARC between 1974-1985. It includes the number of threats to civilians, attacks, assaults and extortions. I add up the number of events and give same weight to each of these events.

Peasant Protests: Information about peasant protests is collected from the CINEP data set which includes by event all the protests where peasants were involved between 1974 and 1995. I collapsed events at municipal-year level and give equal weight to all the protests.

B Appendix B: Empirical Appendix

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for treatment (legal entitlement) and control groups before treatment (1957-1966).

	Treatment		Control-Full sample		Control-Restricted sample	
	532 municipalities		556 municipalities		92 municipalities	
	Mean	Std.Dev	Mean	Std.Dev	Mean	Std.Dev
Land Tax revenues (logs)	12.4	1.31	12.0	1.59	12.1	1.46
Central Transfers (logs)	11.2	0.69	11.0	1.98	11.1	1.66
Social Expenditure (logs)	10.3	1.6	10.5	1.92	10.4	1.56
Bureaucratic Expenditure (logs)	11.7	1.31	11.6	1.69	11.3	1.36
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs)	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.08

Notes: All revenues and expenditure are in log. Variable on Public Land allocations are expressed in thousands of has and logs.

Table B.2: Pre-treatment: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution 1957-1966

	Broad Redistribution (in log)						Targeted Redistribution (in log)			
	Land Tax Revenues		Central Transfers		Social Expenditure		Bureaucratic Expenditure		Public Land Allocations	
	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.017 (0.146)	0.115 (0.109)	0.157 (0.165)	0.198 (0.092)	0.013 (0.166)	0.044 (0.049)	0.015 (0.167)	0.029 (0.022)	0.003 (0.007)	0.317 (0.194)
Income shock	-0.000 (0.002)	0.026*** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.005 (0.009)
Observations	5.347	8.151	5.293	8.643	5.122	7.994	5.280	8.185	5.560	10.800
Clusters	545	859	541	886	533	858	538	864	556	1080
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: All regressions control for year fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The full sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.3: Placebo test: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution 1957-1966

	Broad Redistribution (in log)						Targeted Redistribution (in log)			
	Land Tax Revenues		Central Transfers		Social Expenditure		Bureaucratic Expenditure		Public Land Allocations	
	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full	Restricted	Full
	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample	Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	0.020 (0.030)	0.094*** (0.024)	0.052 (0.056)	0.065 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.039)	0.001 (0.031)	0.025 (0.026)	0.028 (0.190)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)
Income shock	0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	5.854	8.658	5.811	8.643	5.507	8.006	5.707	8.322	6.430	10.800
Clusters	603	891	596	886	582	858	591	873	643	1.080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The legal entitlement years are shifted from 1969-1972 to 1960-1963. The full sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.4: Legal Entitlement (1967-1972)

	OLS		Probit	
	Full Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)	Restricted Sample (4)
<i>A. Geographical Variables</i>				
Rainfall (log)	-0.084* (0.048)	0.007 (0.036)	-0.268* (0.164)	0.057 (0.216)
Altitude (log)	-0.069*** (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.297*** (0.099)	-0.029 (0.096)
Temperature	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.034 (0.033)
Area(log)	0.005 (0.024)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.074)	0.070 (0.093)
Distance to Capital	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.086 (0.083)	-0.036 (0.110)
<i>B. Economic and Social Variables</i>				
Population (log, 1964)	0.135*** (0.035)	0.034 (0.026)	0.431*** (0.126)	0.207 (0.163)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
No owners Land (% ,1960)	-0.071 (0.104)	0.026 (0.092)	-0.284 (0.348)	0.135 (0.506)
Tenants (% ,1960)	0.059 (0.103)	0.065 (0.084)	0.262 (0.382)	0.352 (0.432)
Tractors (log, 1960)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.008)	0.097*** (0.039)	0.048 (0.051)
Workers (log, 1960)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.067)	-0.031 (0.078)
Daily Wage (1968)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.017 (0.014)	0.028 (0.023)
Coffee Lands (1960)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Banana Lands (1960)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Railroads (log, 1960)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.026 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.021)
Roads (log, 1960)	0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.022 (0.018)	0.016 (0.023)
Housing (log, 1960)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.130*** (0.038)	-0.077 (0.055)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Literacy rate(1964)	0.003 (0.022)	0.014 (0.088)	0.002 (0.016)	0.010 (0.078)
<i>C. Historical and Political Variables</i>				
Peasant Leagues (1945)	0.022 (0.019)	0.011 (0.012)	0.073 (0.067)	0.012 (0.090)
d_ "La Violencia"	0.050 (0.044)	0.068** (0.038)	0.182 (0.141)	0.478* (0.262)
Left-wing support (% , elections 1946)	0.219*** (0.057)	-0.061 (0.054)	0.701*** (0.182)	-0.321 (0.277)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	0.123 (0.092)	-0.013 (0.075)	0.340 (0.283)	-0.015 (0.421)
Observations	745	507	745	507
R-squared	0.172	0.037	0.165	0.062

Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960) measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is the share of tenants out of the total number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands" are the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of houses in a municipality. The variable d_ "La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.5: Legal Entitlement Timing (1967-1972)

	Ordered Response Model	
	Full Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)
<i>A. Geographical Variables</i>		
Rainfall (log)	-0.249* (0.149)	-0.060 (0.176)
Altitude (log)	-0.203*** (0.086)	-0.106 (0.099)
Temperature	-0.052*** (0.022)	-0.051* (0.027)
Area(log)	0.092 (0.062)	0.058 (0.072)
Distance to Capital	-0.061 (0.070)	-0.054 (0.087)
<i>B. Economic and Social Variables</i>		
Population (log, 1964)	0.322*** (0.097)	0.114 (0.126)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
No owners Land (%1960)	0.017 (0.298)	0.0156 (0.373)
Tenants (%1960)	0.454 (0.295)	0.407 (0.351)
Tractors (log, 1960)	0.074** (0.031)	0.019 (0.035)
Workers (log, 1960)	0.054 (0.058)	0.044 (0.070)
Daily Wage (log, 1968)	0.330* (0.195)	0.610** (0.247)
Coffee Lands (log,1960)	-0.004 (0.048)	-0.017 (0.058)
Banana Lands (log, 1960)	0.012 (0.051)	0.030 (0.057)
Railroads (log, 1960)	0.022 (0.013)	0.020 (0.016)
Roads (log, 1960)	0.012 (0.015)	0.013 (0.018)
Housing (log, 1960)	-0.135*** (0.028)	-0.110*** (0.033)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Literacy rate(1964)	0.002 (0.022)	0.010 (0.088)
<i>C. Historical and Political Variables</i>		
Peasant Leagues (1945)	0.325*** (0.126)	0.262* (0.142)
"La Violencia" (dummy)	0.129 (0.125)	0.206 (0.158)
Left-wing support (% elections 1946)	0.571*** (0.163)	0.265 (0.206)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	0.150 (0.092)	0.256 (0.322)
Observations	745	498
R-squared	0.105	0.049

Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitlement in 1970, 2 if it got it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitlement in 1970, 2 if it got it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960) measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is the share of tenants out of the total number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands" are the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of houses in a municipality. The variable d_ "La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.6: Restricted Sample-Without Controls: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.115* (0.059)	0.086 (0.105)	-0.270*** (0.107)	0.259*** (0.064)	0.011** (0.005)
Observations	11.368	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.235
Clusters	625	620	616	620	644
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.7: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution (Control group: Municipalities that got just legal status).

	Total Revenues (in log)	Total Expenditure (in log)
	(1)	(2)
Legal Entitlement	0.019 (0.031)	-0.078 (0.065)
Income shock	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Observations	11.445	10.995
Clusters	625	620
Municipality Fixed Effect	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓
Municip-time trend	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.8: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Indirect Tax Revenues 1957-1975 (in log).

Indirect Taxes Revenues			
	Restricted Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)
Legal Entitlement.	0.069 (0.075)	0.025 (0.092)	0.234*** (0.047)
Income Shock	0.032*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.007)
Observations	11.374	11.387	17.917
Clusters	625	625	1080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓	

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.9: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the land tax base, 1957-1972

	Rural		Rural and Urban	
	Number Taxable Plots (1)	Cadastral Value (2)	Number Taxable Plots (3)	Cadastral Value (4)
Legal Status	144.35 (151.981)	0.209*** (0.060)	-1105.8 (976.92)	0.162*** (0.056)
Legal Entitlement	35.76 (122.94)	0.149*** (0.053)	-1174.7 (790.6)	0.098** (0.050)
Observations	13792	13792	13792	13792
Clusters	862	862	862	862
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: number of taxable plots in rural and both rural and urban areas and Total payable tax in 1957 COP millions. The sample is a municipal-level panel of 862 municipalities for the years 1957-1973. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.10: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the number of municipal employees,
1957-1972

	General Direction	Judicial System	Tax Collection	Education and Health	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Municipalities	0.463**	-0.047	-0.025	-0.322	0.038
Legal entitlement (%)	(0.221)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.277)	(0.104)
Observations	364	364	364	364	364
Clusters	31	31	31	31	31
State Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Dependent variable: log of the number of employees in each section of the municipality. Explanatory variable: percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the total number of municipalities. All regressions control for year and state fixed effects.

Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 31 states for the years 1957-1972.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.11: 1971 Municipalities: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Institutional Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.001 (0.120)	0.338 (0.220)	-0.280 (0.198)	0.142 (0.161)	0.007 (0.014)
Income shock	-0.000 (0.011)	0.032 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.010 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.001)
Observations	1617	1595	1520	1621	1783
Clusters	92	91	91	90	96
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 95 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1971 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.12: Leads and Lags: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Institutional Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement leads and lags					
Legal Entitlement _{t-2}	0.048 (0.035)	0.130** (0.061)	-0.088 (0.060)	0.030 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t-1}	0.061** (0.026)	0.055 (0.044)	-0.070* (0.041)	0.030 (0.032)	0.000 (0.005)
Legal Entitlement _{t0}	-0.239*** (0.031)	0.031 (0.038)	-0.220*** (0.046)	0.311*** (0.043)	0.009 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t1}	0.038** (0.018)	0.027 (0.039)	-0.007 (0.071)	-0.038 (0.031)	0.006 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t+2}	0.055** (0.027)	0.018 (0.060)	0.239 (0.176)	-0.172** (0.076)	0.003 (0.006)
Income shock	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	10.132	9.956	9.575	10.006	10.930
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1088 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1967 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.13: Leads and Lags: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Institutional Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement leads and lags					
Legal Entitlement _{t-2}	0.048 (0.035)	0.130** (0.061)	-0.088 (0.060)	0.030 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t-1}	0.061** (0.026)	0.055 (0.044)	-0.070* (0.041)	0.030 (0.032)	0.000 (0.005)
Legal Entitlement _{t0}	-0.239*** (0.031)	0.031 (0.038)	-0.220*** (0.046)	0.311*** (0.043)	0.009 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t1}	0.038** (0.018)	0.027 (0.039)	-0.007 (0.071)	-0.038 (0.031)	0.006 (0.006)
Legal Entitlement _{t+2}	0.055** (0.027)	0.018 (0.060)	0.239 (0.176)	-0.172** (0.076)	0.003 (0.006)
Income shock	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	10.132	9.956	9.575	10.006	10.930
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1088 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1967 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.14: Restricted Sample-Seemingly Unrelated Regression: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal Entitlement	-0.088* (0.047)	0.193*** (0.064)	-0.051 (0.080)	0.226*** (0.047)
Observations	10.376	10.376	10.376	10.376
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Seemingly unrelated regressions allow error terms in the equations separately to be correlated. The regression perform the join test that the coefficients on the legal entitlement for the four regressions are equal to zero. Results indicate that, for the same municipalities, the hypothesis that the correlation of the residuals in the four redistributive variables is zero is rejected. All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state specific time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 if just got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.15: Correlation across municipalities of the share of votes of Communist
1946,1962,1966.

Share of votes left-wing parties	
	Departmental assembly elections 1966
Departmental assembly elections 1962	0.405***
Presidential elections 1946	0.236***

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.16: OLS-Extensive Margin- Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions (1)	FARC Rebel activity (2)	Peasant Protests (3)
1 peasant leader co-opted	-1.969*** (0.729)	-1.649** (0.738)	-0.401 (0.666)
2 peasant leaders co-opted	-3.114*** (0.883)	-2.446*** (0.789)	-0.285 (0.862)
3 peasant leaders co-opted	-4.996*** (0.968)	-2.156** (0.843)	0.052 (1.184)
4 peasant leaders co-opted	-4.745*** (0.937)	-2.023** (0.878)	-0.523 (0.852)
5 peasant leaders co-opted	-5.136*** (1.123)	-2.322** (1.069)	-0.711 (1.034)
Peasant Leagues (1931-1947)	-0.164** (0.074)	0.325 (0.210)	-0.236** (0.101)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.592*** (0.156)	0.006 (0.168)	-0.048 (0.140)
Left-wing parties support (1946)	0.079 (0.428)	-0.010 (0.471)	0.394 (0.623)
Observations	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The base group of the variable *peasant_leaders_coopted* is 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.17: OLS-Extensive Margin: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions (1)	FARC Rebel activity (2)	Peasant Protests (3)
Legal Entitlement	0.439 (0.438)	-0.721 (0.458)	0.761** (0.392)
1 peasant leader co-opted	-0.129 (0.543)	-1.011* (0.567)	-1.041* (0.580)
2 peasant leaders co-opted	-0.509 (0.679)	-1.928*** (0.707)	-0.878 (0.724)
3 peasant leaders co-opted	-2.041** (0.995)	-2.140** (1.037)	-0.793 (1.062)
4 peasant leaders co-opted	-1.732*** (0.472)	-1.777*** (0.494)	-1.153** (0.504)
5 peasant leaders co-opted	-1.432 (1.043)	-2.096** (1.086)	-1.373 (1.112)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	-0.094 (0.094)	0.668*** (0.169)	-0.172 (0.173)
Observations	591	590	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The base group of the variable *peasant_leaders_coopted* is 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.18: OLS-Sample of municipalities with legal entitlement and legal status: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.767*	0.810**	0.761**	0.387	0.694	0.608	0.141	0.069	-0.081
	(0.045)	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.438)	(0.494)	(0.350)	(0.464)	(0.471)	(0.466)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-1.066***			-1.625***			-1.062***		
	(0.359)			(0.372)			(0.381)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.291***			-0.418**			-0.272***	
		(0.074)			(0.137)			(0.114)	
Share land peasant leaders			-2.868***			-3.726***			-2.384
			(0.859)			(1.979)			(1.648)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	-0.081	-0.100	-0.051	0.688***	0.676***	0.731***	-0.172	-0.228	-0.200
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.19: OLS-Full Sample: The Effect of Peasant Empowerment and Co-optation between 1967-1972 on the potential threat of revolution between 1972-1985.

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.952*** (0.225)	1.317*** (0.217)	1.078*** (0.208)	1.215*** (0.238)	1.126*** (0.360)	0.964*** (0.350)	0.800*** (0.264)	0.653*** (0.264)	0.554** (0.254)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-0.931*** (0.274)			-1.42*** (0.288)			-0.768*** (0.316)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.377*** (0.081)			-0.346** (0.137)			-0.203** (0.096)	
Share land peasant leaders			-3.523*** (1.177)			-3.295* (1.979)			-2.455* (1.445)
Observations	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.002	1.002	1.002	987	961	961
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1971 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.20: Negative Binomial: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.227 (0.300)	0.327 (0.285)	0.120 (0.299)	0.018 (0.289)	0.025 (0.290)	0.066 (0.290)	0.197* (0.101)	0.182* (0.100)	0.163 (0.127)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-0.534*** (0.218)			-0.640*** (0.261)			-0.136 (0.107)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.385*** (0.076)			-0.145** (0.077)			-0.028 (0.031)	
Share land peasant leaders			-3.295*** (1.754)			-1.323 (1.461)			-0.305 (0.505)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.075 (0.079)	0.057 (0.078)	0.086 (0.080)	0.423*** (0.085)	0.427*** (0.085)	0.431*** (0.081)	0.095** (0.042)	0.096** (0.042)	0.099*** (0.041)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.21: Negative Binomial-IRR : Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	1.256 (0.76)	1.387 (1.15)	1.159 (0.50)	0.981 (0.06)	0.974 (0.09)	0.935 (0.23)	1.236* (1.66)	1.200* (1.75)	1.177 (1.28)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	0.586*** (-2.48)			0.526*** (-2.45)			0.845 (-1.58)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		0.683*** (-4.99)			0.864** (-1.86)			0.9718 (-0.91)	
Share land peasant leaders			0.035*** (-2.02)			0.266 (-0.91)			0.736 (-0.60)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	1.078 (0.085)	1.058 (0.082)	1.090 (0.087)	1.527*** (0.131)	1.533*** (0.130)	1.539*** (0.125)	1.073** (2.19)	1.101** (2.28)	1.104*** (2.36)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Z-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

C Appendix C: A short history of a previous Threat of Revolution in Latin America - 1920s-1930s

Latin American history provides a suggestive example consistent with the hypothesis that governments respond to threats of uprising by implementing democratic reforms. During the 1920s and 1930s, when the ideas of the Mexican and Russian revolution began to spread in the region, 12 countries experienced the foundation of their Communist party (see Table 1). In 1929, the first regional conference of the Communist Party was held in Buenos Aires and included delegates from all countries in the region but Chile, whose Party was suffering repression under Ibanez government. During these years regional and local peasant associations were founded, numerous peasants protests took place, and there was an intensification of land conflicts between landowners and settlers or sharecroppers in the region (Gilhodes, 1988; Sanchez, 1977; Vega 2004; Tovar 1975, Gaitan 1969).

Due to all these events, Latin American governments perceived a clear threat to their status quo, especially from the rural areas. The main containment mechanism used by the governments at that time was the extension of the suffrage (either universal male suffrage or female suffrage). As a result, this democratic reform was implemented in the following years after the foundation of the Communist party in eight countries in the region as Table 1 suggests⁶³.

⁶³Some of these countries also implemented extensive agrarian reforms to suppress the threat. This is consistent with Hirschman (1963), who suggests that the triumph of the rebels in the Mexican revolution explains why important land reforms were implemented in the following years.

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