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Education

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Expected Spring 2008
(Major fields: Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics)

M.A. in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2005
(Major fields: Microeconomics, Game Theory)

B.A. in Economics, Federal University of Parana, Parana, Brazil, 2003

Primary Fields

- Behavioral Economics
- Experimental Economics
- Game Theory
- Microeconomics
- Labor Economics

Dissertation

Title: 'Essays on Behavioral Economics'

Committee: Peter Skott (co-chair), Jeffrey Carpenter (co-chair), Peter Matthews, Michael Ash, and John Spraggon

- Experimental study investigating how different types of bosses affect efficiency in team production
- Theoretical model analyzing how an unproductive boss creates efficiency in team production when workers suffer from inequality aversion
- Reassessment of the psychological insights made by John Maynard Keynes through the evidence from Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Working Papers

The Role of the Boss in Team Production: An Experimental Investigation; Job market Paper; Chapter in Doctoral Thesis

Team Production, Residual Claimancy, and Inequality Aversion; Chapter in Doctoral Thesis, Submitted to the *Journal of Socio-Economics*

The Behavioral Economics of Keynes (co-authored); Chapter in Doctoral Thesis, Submitted to the *Journal of Socio-Economics*

Monetary Incentives, Selection Bias, and Intrinsic Motivation in Laboratory Experiments: A Methodological Investigation (co-authored)

Markets with Non-Enforceable Prices in a Weightless Economy: The Case of Radiohead (co-authored)

Research Interests

- Behavioral Theory of the Firm: how social preferences influence the efficiency of different forms of organizing the firm
- Behavioral Economics of Inequality: experimental analysis on the impact of inequality in the degree of social preferences
- Motivation Crowding-Out: how extrinsic incentives undermine intrinsic motivation
- Psychological Game Theory and Social Norms: modeling and experimentally testing pluralistic ignorance using beliefs, intentions, and emotions
- The Weightless Economy and Intellectual Property Rights: advantages, disadvantages, and applicability of markets with non-enforceable prices
- History of Economic Thought: revisiting the psychological insights made by prominent economists of the past by comparing them with the most recent findings of behavioral and experimental economics

Teaching Experience

Teaching Associate (main instructor) in the Department of Economics at University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2007

Courses

Game Theory (Fall 2007), Behavioral Economics (Spring 2007)

Teaching Assistant in the Department of Economics at University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2004-2006

Courses

Intermediate Microeconomics (Fall 2006, Fall 2005), Introduction to Microeconomics (Spring 2006, Spring 2005, Fall 2004)

Teaching Assistant in the Department of Economics at Federal University of Parana, Brazil

Courses

Intermediate Microeconomics (Fall 2001)

Teaching Interests

Behavioral Economics/Experimental Economics

- Individual Decision-Making
- Behavioral Game Theory
- Experimental Methods

Game Theory

- Classical Game Theory
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Psychological Game Theory

Microeconomics

- Walrasian Microeconomics
- Post-Walrasian Microeconomics: Institutional, Evolutionary, and Behavioral

Awards

National Science Foundation Sub-award under the Supervision of Jeffrey Carpenter, 2007

Economics Department Undergraduate Scholarship, Federal University of Parana, Brazil, 2001

Reviewer and Referee Assignments

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Workshops and Conferences

Economic Theory Workshop, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, November 2007

Paper presented: The Role of the Boss in Team Production: An Experimental Investigation

Umass-New School Graduate Workshop, New School for Social Research, November 2007

Paper presented: The Role of the Boss in Team Production: An Experimental Investigation

Analytical Political Economy Workshop, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, November 2007

Paper presented: Team Production, Residual Claimancy, and Inequality Aversion

13th Visiting Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics, George Mason University, July 2007

Participant

2nd International Conference of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE), University of Utah, Salt Lake City, June 2007

Paper presented: Behavioral Economics and The Economics of Keynes

Analytical Political Economy Workshop, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, March 2007

Paper presented: Incorporating Inequality Aversion into a Model of Team Production

Umass-New School Graduate Workshop, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, December 2006

Paper presented: The Behavioral Economics of Keynes

Undergraduate Economics Club Seminar, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, November 2006

Paper presented: An Introduction to Behavioral Economics

Summer School in Post-Keynesian, Institutional, and Feminist Economics, University of Missouri, Kansas City, June 2006

Participant

Institute for Humane Studies Graduate Workshop on Institutions and Human Nature, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, June 2005

Participant

References

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Dissertation Summary:**Essays on Behavioral Economics**

My dissertation consists of three major essays on behavioral economics. The first two investigate how important the role of a boss is to solve the collective action problem in team production. In order to do that, different methodologies are employed: one essay is a theoretical model of team production when workers suffer from inequality aversion. The second is an experimental study on team production that compares the levels of contribution to a group project when workers face different types of bosses. And the third and last essay does a critical interpretation of John Maynard Keynes's psychological insights by comparing them with the recent evidence collected in the fields of behavioral and experimental economics. A brief description of each essay is as follows:

Team Production, Residual Claimancy, and Inequality Aversion

This essay develops a model in which workers have social preferences in the form of inequality aversion towards the boss. The workers face a "rent extractor" boss who selects in advance the fraction of total output that she wants to receive from them. It finds that the presence of this unproductive boss solves the free-rider problem in team production if: 1. workers take into account their subjective costs of effort when assessing inequality; and 2. workers are sufficiently averse towards positive inequality. It shows that under these conditions the boss will have a preference for being very generous; then, workers provide a high level of effort to offset their material advantage until welfare is at the same level as the boss' profits.

The Role of the Boss in Team Production: An Experimental Investigation

This essay reports the results of a laboratory experiment that analyzed the role of a boss under a team production environment through the use of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. The boss had to select in advance the fraction of total contributions she wanted to receive from workers. After observing this decision, subjects in the role of workers had to decide how much to contribute to a group project. The experiment analyzed treatments with an unproductive boss, a productive boss, and no boss. In addition, it also investigated how the possibility of punishment by either a boss or a co-worker affects overall contributions. The main findings are: 1. The endogenous creation of heterogeneous marginal benefits when a productive boss is present generates the highest levels of contribution when punishment is not allowed; 2. The collective action problem is solved completely with contributions when a productive boss divides output equally; 3. When an unproductive boss is very generous, workers reciprocate by contributing the same or more to the group project than when the boss is absent, even though workers receive a lower marginal benefit with the presence of the boss. This effect is stronger when the boss depends less on the output of workers; 4. Workers are more likely to increase contributions when they have been punished by a productive boss rather than by an unproductive boss or a co-worker; and 5. "Partial Mutual Monitoring" also solves the collective action problem in small groups.

The Behavioral Economics of Keynes

This essay evaluates some of the economic theories developed by Keynes in the light of recent research in behavioral and experimental economics. It seeks in Keynes's own works the hints and suggestions about what a realistic approach to behavior under uncertainty might be. It claims that Keynes was deeply conscious about the necessity to incorporate realistic behavioral assumptions in macroeconomic models that deal with judgment under uncertainty. It is found that his research program is broadly compatible with and finds support in most of the latest findings of behavioral and experimental economics, even though his inferences were largely based on "subjective impressions" rather than rigorous scientific studies; many of the ideas set forth by Keynes in his economic works, especially in the *The General Theory*, have a defensible behavioral foundation, and fit broadly the actual behavior of economic agents in the real world. As a consequence, the essay argues that any economic theory claiming to follow Keynes's thought can benefit from this interaction.