

RUNNING HEAD: RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

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The Role of Retributive Justice and the Use of International Criminal Tribunals in Post-conflict
Reconciliation

Abstract

Four experiments examined people's responses to intergroup violence either committed or suffered by their own group. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Serbs who strongly glorified Serbia were more supportive of future violence against, and less willing to reconcile with, Bosniaks after reading about Serbian victimization by Bosniaks rather than Serbian transgressions against Bosniaks. Replicating these effects with Americans in context of American-Iranian tensions, Experiment 2 further showed that demands for retributive justice explained why high glorifiers showed asymmetrical reactions to ingroup victimization vs. perpetration. Again in the Serb and American context, respectively, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that post-conflict international criminal tribunals can help satisfy victim group members' desire for retributive justice, and thereby reduce their support for future violence and increase their willingness to reconcile with the perpetrator group. The role of retributive justice and the use of international criminal justice in intergroup conflict (reduction) are discussed.

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The Role of Retributive Justice and the Use of International Criminal Tribunals in Post-conflict Reconciliation

Humanity has come a long way in developing international norms, laws, and institutions that aim at peaceful conflict resolution. This goal is often hindered, however, by members of conflict parties who are hesitant to resolve their own group's grievances and to reconcile with the adversary. The psychological dimensions of intergroup relations, such as people's identification with relevant social groups (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hornsey, 2008) as well as their subjective perceptions of justice (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000), are key to a more comprehensive understanding of why people are open or resistant to reconciliation. Equally important are the complex dynamics between the perpetrator and victim groups of a conflict, with their often diametrically opposed views and demands (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013). The present research thus aimed to compare and integrate the perspectives of both victims and perpetrators by examining how divergent group experiences (ingroup victimization vs. transgression) influence people's support for future violence and willingness to reconcile in the aftermath of an intergroup conflict. Furthermore, we also explored the role of ingroup identification and justice demands in attitudes toward future violence and reconciliation. Lastly, we examined the use of international criminal justice as an intervention to overcome barriers to peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives of Intergroup Conflict

Although perpetrators and victims are rarely clear-cut categories in most large-scale conflicts, social psychological research has distinguished people's responses to wrongdoings *committed* by their own group (e.g., Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010) from responses to wrongdoings *suffered* by

their own group (e.g., Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013). When confronted with wrongdoings committed by the ingroup, for example, people tend to use moral disengagement strategies (Bandura, 1999, 2002) such as denial (Cohen, 2013), dehumanization of victims (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), or even moralization of outgroup-directed violence (Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, & Castano, 2011; Leidner & Castano, 2012). These strategies, in turn, have been shown to explain why members of perpetrator groups have less interest in pursuing justice than members of third parties (Leidner et al., 2010). Clearly, rather than contributing to the restoration of peace and justice, people are quite apt to construct new narratives that allow them to explain, justify, and even legitimize immoral acts committed by their own groups (for a review see Leidner, Tropp, & Lickel, 2013).

From the victims' perspective, conflict resolution and reconciliation with the adversary are equally difficult, perhaps even more so. Ingroup victimization experiences can easily evoke vengeful feelings toward the perpetrator group, motivating vicarious – and sometimes group-based – retribution (Lickel, 2012). Literature on interpersonal violence also contends that people desire transgressors to be punished in proportion to the magnitude of their crimes (“just deserts”), even when the likelihood of future offenses is low (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). At the intergroup level, such a desire for retribution (in the form of outgroup punishment) among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, both of whom commonly self-identify as victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been shown to originate from their dehumanization of their respective adversarial group (Leidner et al., 2013a). The existing literature thus suggests that victims of both interpersonal and intergroup offenses strongly desire retribution, especially for offenses large in scale or high in magnitude, and especially in the form of criminal justice.

Taking an integrative perspective on victims' and perpetrators' perspectives of intergroup conflict, it seems ever more clear that successful conflict resolution and reconciliation require a thorough understanding of both conflicting parties. Yet, very little research has examined both sides of a conflict in tandem, with two noteworthy exceptions. First, research on the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008, 2015; Shnabel et al., 2009), which theorizes that whereas perpetrators have the need to be accepted and restore their moral image, victims have the need to be empowered and restore their agency. The model emphasizes the importance of addressing the differential needs of victims and perpetrators as a prerequisite for reconciliation. This work, however, did not directly compare victims' responses to those of perpetrators; rather, it compared victims' reactions to different messages delivered by the perpetrator group, and perpetrators' reactions to different messages delivered by the victim group. Second, a longitudinal study directly compared European and Chinese Canadians' perceptions and expectations of the Canadian government's apology for its past discrimination against Chinese immigrants (Wohl et al., 2013). However, little empirical research to date has specifically examined victim and perpetrator groups' attitudes toward justice, which have been shown to be critical for both conflicting parties' acceptance of conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation processes (Leidner et al., 2013a). The main goal of the present research was therefore to provide further insights into the complex dynamics between perpetrator and victim groups by investigating the influences of perpetrator and victim experiences on people's support for future violence and reconciliation, and how demands for justice explain these reactions.

Justice in Post-conflict Reconciliation

Retributive vs. restorative justice. In the context of crime and violence, recent scholarship on justice distinguishes between retributive and restorative justice (e.g., Wenzel,

Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2012; for an extension of these concepts to intergroup conflict see Leidner et al., 2010, 2013a). Whereas retributive justice is mainly concerned with unilateral punishment of transgressors (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008), restorative justice focuses on restoring the relationship between perpetrators and victims, for instance through symbolic (e.g., apologies) and material (e.g., financial reparations) compensation, or reaffirmation of shared norms and values (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989, 2002; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2010). As discussed earlier, victims tend to have a strong desire for retribution, whereas perpetrators tend to morally disengage from past wrongdoings. These divergent reactions of victims and perpetrators to intergroup violence might therefore also manifest in asymmetrical justice demands. Demands for retributive justice, we argue, are likely to be stronger among members of the victim than the perpetrator group, especially among members who are motivated to defend and protect their group. Demands for restorative justice, on the other hand, are less likely to differ between members of victim and perpetrator group – even highly defensive ones – due to a focus on bilateral dialogue rather than unilateral punishment.

Justice and peace. Perceptions of justice can have important implications for the emergence, continuation, and resolution of conflict (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; Leidner et al., 2013a). In fact, one of the greatest challenges facing post-conflict reconstruction is the tension between the delivery of retributive justice and the pursuit of peace. In some cases, attempts to establish peace have followed strategies that forgo retributive justice (e.g., by granting perpetrators immunity or amnesty), based on the assumption that insisting on justice could hinder the peace process by alienating members of perpetrator groups and/or obstructing healing and forgiveness among members of victim groups (e.g., Cobban, 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000;

Karremans & Van Lange, 2005). In other cases, attempts to establish peace have followed strategies that incorporate the pursuit of justice (e.g., in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), based on the assumption that retributive justice will facilitate the peace process by addressing past atrocities, meeting victims' needs, and holding perpetrators accountable (Bass, 2000; Méndez, 1997; Olsen, Payne, Reiter, 2010; Sikkink & Walling, 2007; Teitel, 1999). Despite the growing interest in the role of justice in post-conflict peacebuilding processes, relevant discourse suffers from a lack of rigorous empirical research that can help quantify the relationship between justice and peace (for a review see Leidner & Li, 2015). In the current research, we aimed to experimentally test and reconcile some of the competing arguments on both sides of the debate. We argue that victim group members' particularly strong desire for retributive justice may hinder peacebuilding processes and even translate into support for future violence. At the same time, however, justice mechanisms such as criminal tribunals may help satisfy this particularly strong desire for retributive justice among victim group members and thereby increase their support for peace.

Retributive justice, future violence, and reconciliation. Past research in the context of protracted conflict has shown that demands for retributive justice among self-identifying victims predicted support for political violence, whereas demands for restorative justice predicted support for peace deals (Leidner et al., 2013a). Thus, we predicted that (vicarious) victim experiences, as compared to (vicarious) perpetrator experiences, would evoke more support for future violence against the adversarial group as well as resistance to reconciliation, and that these differences in support for future violence and reconciliation would be mainly driven by victims' stronger demand for retributive (but not restorative) justice. Although victims' strong demands for retributive justice may have negative implications for the peace process, such demands are

legitimate and should not be ignored. It seems reasonable to suggest that if victims' need for retributive justice were properly fulfilled – for instance, through a tribunal – they would be less likely to seek future acts of violence, and be more willing to reconcile. The *implementation* of retributive justice could therefore facilitate rather than impede peace processes, at least from the perspective of victim groups.

It should be noted that although demand for retributive justice involves a strong just deserts motive (Carlsmith et al., 2002), support for future violence should not be viewed as a proxy for such motive. The just deserts motive refers specifically to the belief that punishment of perpetrators should be proportionate to the harm. The present research does not examine this motive or other psychological processes (e.g., dehumanization, need for empowerment) that may underlie demand for retributive justice; rather, it explores the downstream implications of victim and perpetrator groups' divergent justice demands for the resolution or continuation of conflict.

Taken together, we predicted that in the aftermath of intergroup violence, demands for retributive (but not restorative) justice would be stronger among members of victim rather than perpetrator groups. Such a difference in justice demands should then have important implications for the conflict parties' attitudes toward future violence and reconciliation. Specifically, victims' (as compared to perpetrators') stronger demand for retributive (but not restorative) justice should predict more support for future violence and less willingness to reconcile. Not all people are equally likely, however, to endorse these generally predicted reactions to conflict simply due to their ingroup's victim or perpetrator role in the conflict. We therefore further propose that the effects of the ingroup's role on people's responses to past intergroup violence depend on the extent to which they are motivated to defend and protect the ingroup.

The Moderating Role of Ingroup Glorification

Substantial research on social identification has demonstrated that people are motivated to defend their own group to the extent that they identify with that group (e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). Recent research on social identification advocates a multidimensional view of identification, for instance distinguishing between ingroup attachment and glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Whereas attachment refers to one's perceived importance of and commitment to the ingroup, glorification refers to beliefs in the superiority of the ingroup over outgroups and emphasizes loyalty and deference to ingroup norms and authorities. Research has revealed that glorification, but not attachment, has rather detrimental implications for intergroup relations. For instance, glorification is associated with denial of collective guilt and responsibility for ingroup wrongdoings (Bilali, 2013; Roccas et al., 2006), dehumanization of outgroup victims and decreased demands for justice (Leidner et al., 2010), a shift from endorsing violence-condemning towards violence-legitimizing moral principles (Leidner & Castano, 2012), as well as increased support for violence against previously uninvolved countries after being reminded of one's country's past interstate wars (Li, Leidner, Euh, & Choi, 2016). The extant research, however, has exclusively focused on the role of glorification in perpetrators' or, less so, third parties' (Leidner, 2015) responses to wrongdoings. To our knowledge, no effort has been made to examine whether victim groups' responses to their own suffering also depend on levels of glorification.

Based on the past research, we argue that ingroup glorification should moderate the effects of ingroup victimization vs. transgression on people's justice demands, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile. Whereas among perpetrators, higher levels of glorification incur stronger motivation to distance from the group's wrongdoings in order to maintain a

positive view of their group and themselves (Bilali, 2013; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006), we predicted that among victims, higher levels of ingroup glorification should incur stronger motivation for retribution. Consequently, strongly glorifying victims should demand more retributive justice than strongly glorifying perpetrators. This greater demand for retributive justice, as hypothesized above, should then lead to more support for future violence and less willingness to reconcile among strongly glorifying victims, compared to strongly glorifying perpetrators. Weakly glorifying group members, on the other hand, are unlikely to respond differently to past intergroup violence depending on the ingroup's victim or perpetrator role in the conflict. If anything, weakly glorifying perpetrators might be particularly critical of, rather than lenient toward, ingroup-committed violence (e.g., Bilali, 2013; Leidner & Castano, 2012). In response to ingroup's suffering, they might even be willing to forgo formal justice in order to make peace. The hypothesized full model is depicted in Figure 1. It is important to note that unlike the majority of past research, which focused on comparing high and low glorifying members of the same group, we compared a) members of different groups (i.e., victims and perpetrators) at high levels of glorification, and, b) members of different groups (i.e., victims and perpetrators) at low levels of glorification.

By examining the role of retributive justice in conflict resolution and reconciliation, this research contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it directly compares victim and perpetrator group members' attitudes toward future violence, reconciliation, and the underlying role of justice. Second, it attempts to uncover the intricate link between justice and peace, and demonstrate that justice can both hinder and facilitate peace. Finally, it examines the moderating role of glorification in victims' responses to conflict, complementing the previous research on glorification, which has only focused on perpetrators or third parties in intergroup conflicts.

Overview

Across two different intergroup contexts (Serbia-Bosnia, U.S.-Iran), we examined how experiences of ingroup victimization vs. transgression shape group members' support for future violence and willingness to reconcile (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, we explored the moderating role of ingroup glorification (Studies 1 and 2) and the mediating role of retributive justice (Study 2). Studies 3 and 4 tested whether satisfying victims' justice demands can promote peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Study 1

Study 1 tested the hypothesis that people support future violence against the outgroup and reconciliation to different degrees, depending on their ingroup's experience in a conflict (victimization vs. transgression) and the extent to which they glorify their ingroup. We conducted an experiment in the context of the conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks, allowing us to capitalize on both the rigor of the experimental method and the high external validity of field research. While acts of violence committed by Serbs were much more frequent than acts of violence committed by Bosniaks in the Bosnian War, there was violence and even massacres on both sides of the conflict (Zwierzchowski & Tabeau, 2010). Within this context, we investigated how Serbs reacted when they learned that their group members either committed or suffered mass ethnic violence against/from Bosniaks.

Method

Participants.

Participants were recruited through convenience sampling in Belgrade, Serbia. The study was conducted in paper-and-pencil format. Approximately 100 students from the University of Belgrade served as recruiters and did not fill out the survey themselves. Each student distributed

the survey to five respondents using his or her own social networks and received \$15 in compensation. The students made deliberate efforts to recruit an approximate equal number of male and female participants from a diverse range of ages in each experimental condition. Students were also instructed to try their best to recruit people with different political beliefs, for instance through approaching organizations with different political ideologies. The final sample consisted of 288 Serb adults, most of whom had personal experiences with the Bosnian War. Twenty participants did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation materials, as indicated by their summaries of this material and incorrect answers to questions about the ethnic identity of perpetrators and victims in this material,¹ and were excluded from the subsequent data analyses. This data exclusion was necessary as the reliability of our findings relied heavily on participants' attention to the manipulation materials. Thus, we retained 268 participants for data analyses ($N_{victim} = 139$, $N_{perpetrator} = 129$; 66% women; age $M = 31$, $SD = 13.81$).

Procedure.

After consenting to take part in a study on attitudes and beliefs about the relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, participants were randomly assigned to read a news article depicting a military operation, led either by Serbs or Bosniaks, in the village of Visegrad (a Bosniak-majority town) or the village of Bratunac (a Serb-majority town) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively. During the operation, over 3,000 civilians were killed and thousands more were injured. In the ingroup victimization condition, participants read about Bosniaks committing war crimes against Serb civilians, whereas in the ingroup transgression condition, participants read about Serbs committing war crimes against Bosniak civilians. The news articles were identical across conditions except for the ethnicities of the perpetrators and

¹ See Supplementary Materials for the results of manipulation checks.

the victims, and the locations of the massacres. As both sides of the conflict suffered significant numbers of casualties during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (minimum numbers of 57,992 Bosniak Muslims and 19,398 Serbs were killed or disappeared; Zwierchowski & Tabeau, 2010), both news articles offered realistic accounts of the conflict. Moreover, no participant raised suspicion about the credibility of the article in their subsequent summaries. After the reading task, participants completed several manipulation check questions, indicating the ethnicities of the perpetrators and victims of the war crimes described in the article. To ensure that participants read and processed the information presented in the articles carefully, they then summarized the news article in their own words. Afterwards, they filled out the following dependent measures in the order described below. All items were measured on 6-point Likert scales (1=*strongly disagree*; 6=*strongly agree*). At the end of the study, participants reported their demographic information and were fully debriefed.

Materials.

Support for future violence. Five statements measured the extent to which Serbian participants supported future violence against Bosniaks (e.g., “*I want Serbia to take violent measures against Bosniaks.*”).

Willingness to reconcile. Adapted from Shnabel et al. (2009) and Wenzel and Okimoto (2010), eight items measured Serbian participants’ willingness to reconcile (e.g., “*Serbia should try to do its part to promote reconciliation with Bosnia.*”).

Ingroup attachment and glorification. Attachment was measured with eight items, tapping the perceived importance of Serbia to participants’ identity and their commitment to Serbia (e.g., “*Being Serbian is an important part of my identity.*”). Glorification was measured with eight items, tapping participants’ belief in the superiority of Serbia over other countries and

their deference to Serb authorities (e.g., “*Serbia is better than other nations in all respects;*” “*It is disloyal for Serbs to criticize Serbia.*”). All items were adapted to the Serbian context from Roccas et al.’s (2006) national identification scales.

Results

Ingroup attachment and glorification. The distribution of glorification ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 2.22$, $SD = .99$) was substantially positively skewed, necessitating a logarithmic transformation (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, pp. 86-87, for a discussion on data transformation), and the use of the transformed variable in subsequent analyses.² The decision to transform non-normally distributed variables was made a priori, before collecting or analyzing the data, and which transformation to apply (e.g., log, square-root) depended on the direction and degree of skewness. Neither attachment ($\alpha = .93$, $M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.32$), $F(1, 266) = 0.33$, $p = .565$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, nor (untransformed or transformed) glorification, $F(1, 266) = 1.12$, $p = .291$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, were affected by condition, thus allowing us to use them, together with condition, as continuous independent variables (IVs) in subsequent general linear models (GLMs) carried out in SAS 9.4. To this end, attachment and glorification were centered (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To capture glorification’s conceptual distinctness from attachment despite the overlap of both variables’ measures, the following analyses used glorification as a moderator while controlling for attachment as a covariate.³

² The findings remained mostly unchanged when using the raw, untransformed variable, with the exception that the interaction effect of condition and glorification on willingness to reconcile became marginally ($p = .078$) rather than fully significant.

³ We also analyzed the data with glorification as the moderator while controlling for both attachment and the interaction between attachment and condition. The results remained mostly unchanged with the exception that the interaction between condition and glorification on reconciliation became marginally significant. The same analyses also did not change the results reported in the following three studies, except for Study 2 where the interactions between glorification and condition became non-significant; the interactions between attachment and condition were not significant either.

Support for future violence. Participants' support for future violence ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 1.18$, $SD = .62$) was submitted as a dependent variable (DV) to the GLM specified above. The main effect of condition was significant, $F(1, 263) = 8.98$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, indicating that while participants on average opposed future violence against Bosniaks, ingroup victimization increased support for future violence ($M = 1.29$, $SD = .79$) as compared to ingroup transgression ($M = 1.06$, $SE = .31$). Importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and glorification (see Figure 2), $F(1, 263) = 24.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$ ($LCI = .03$, $UCI = .15$). Simple effects indicated that Serbs who strongly glorified Serbia (1 SD above the mean) reported significantly more support for future violence when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 1.58$, $SE = .07$) rather than the perpetrator of intergroup violence ($M = 1.03$, $SE = .08$), $t(263) = -5.59$, $p < .001$. Low glorifiers (1 SD below the mean), in contrast, did not significantly differ in their support for future violence, $t(263) = 1.42$, $p = .153$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 263) = 9.39$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence regardless of ingroup role, $\beta = .23$. The main effect of attachment was not significant, $F(1, 263) = .90$, $p = .344$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$.

Because support for future violence exhibited a strong floor effect, we also dichotomized the originally interval-scaled variable by assigning a score of 0 for original scores of 1 and a score of 1 for any original scores greater than 1. We then submitted the resulting dichotomous variable to a logistic regression analysis. Consistent with the GLM above, this analysis yielded a significant association between ingroup role and whether or not participants supported future violence, moderated by glorification, $\chi^2(1) = 6.03$, $p = .014$.

Willingness to reconcile.⁴ The analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .94$, $M = 4.80$, $SD = 1.24$) as DV again yielded the expected two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 3), $F(1, 263) = 3.87$, $p = .050$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ ($LCI = .00$, $UCI = .05$). Consistent with our hypothesis, high glorifiers reported significantly lower levels of willingness to reconcile when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 4.13$, $SE = .14$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 4.59$, $SE = .16$), $t(263) = 2.40$, $p = .017$. Low glorifiers, in contrast, did not differ significantly in their willingness to reconcile, $t(263) = -.39$, $p = .700$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 263) = 24.45$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$, indicating that glorification was negatively related to willingness to reconcile ($\beta = -.37$). No other effects reached significance, $F_s(1, 263) < 2.09$, $p_s > .145$, $\eta_p^2s < .01$.

Discussion

Study 1 demonstrated that people who strongly (but not weakly) glorify their ingroup were more supportive of future violence against the outgroup and less open to reconciliation when their ingroup suffered, rather than committed, intergroup violence. It is also important to note that participants on average endorsed support for future violence to a very low degree, and with little variability. We believe that this floor effect occurred because the Serb participants in our study were likely aware that most third parties (e.g., European Union, the U.S.) see Serbia as the main perpetrator in the overall conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks. As a result, they may have been particularly unwilling to express support for future violence against Bosniaks.

Study 2

⁴ Willingness to reconcile was negatively correlated with support for future violence, $r = -.40$, $p < .001$.

The goals of Study 2 were twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the effects found in Study 1 in a different context: the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.⁵ Second, we tested our hypothesis that the effects found in Study 1 emerged from strongly glorifying victims' greater demands for retributive justice. To this end, we examined demands for retributive justice as a mediating factor. We also measured demands for restorative justice in an effort to empirically disentangle these two types of justice and demonstrate the unique role of retributive justice in driving the effects. Specifically, we predicted that only demands for retributive justice, but not restorative justice, would explain high glorifiers' increased support for future violence after being reminded of ingroup victimization as compared to ingroup transgression.

Method

Participants. We recruited 191 American participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which provided a more heterogeneous sample in comparison to college undergraduate samples (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Our screening of data quality resulted in an exclusion of 19 participants for not paying sufficient attention to the manipulation material (as indicated by their incorrect answers to questions about the identity of perpetrators and victims in the news report); three participants for raising suspicions about the credibility of the news report; five participants for not taking the study seriously (as indicated by their written summaries of the news report and the little time they spent on reading it); four participants for having close Iranian family members or friends; and two multivariate outliers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The percentage of the sample (17%) excluded from data analysis was similar to the average benchmarks for online studies (Chandler, Mueller, &

⁵ This research was conducted between 2012 and 2014, before Iran, the U.S. and five other countries reached an agreement about Iran's nuclear program in 2015. At the time of data collection, the U.S. was still in conflict with Iran over its nuclear program.

Paolacci, 2013). Most importantly, of the 33 participants who were not retained for subsequent data analyses, half were in the perpetrator and the other half in the victim condition; therefore, the manipulation did not cause more participants in one than the other condition to be excluded. The data from the remaining 158 participants was used in subsequent data analyses ($N_{victim} = 77$, $N_{perpetrator} = 81$; 69% women; age $M = 33$, $SD = 11.12$).

Procedure.

Participants followed a similar procedure as in Study 1. First, participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious, but allegedly real, New York Times article depicting three cases of prisoner abuse in a secret, underground prison at the Afghan-Iranian border. According to the article, a recent investigation by a justice committee focusing on the Middle East revealed the systematic abuses at the prison. In the ingroup victimization condition, participants read about Iranian soldiers capturing and torturing American civilians, whereas in the ingroup transgression condition participants read about American soldiers capturing and torturing Iranian civilians. The reported acts of abuse included sleep deprivation, severe beatings, suffocation, and humiliating acts. In one of the three cases, mistreatment and torture eventually led to the death of the prisoner. The articles also stressed that such interrogation techniques were the norm at the prison. The news articles were identical across conditions except for the names and nationalities of perpetrators and victims. After the reading task, participants completed manipulation check questions and summarized the news article in their own words. Then they filled out the following dependent measures in the order outlined below. All items were measured on 9-point visual analog scales (1=*strongly disagree*; 9=*strongly agree*).

Materials.

Demands for retributive and restorative justice. Adapted from Leidner et al. (2013a), retributive justice was measured by five items tapping the notion of unilateral punishment as a way to restore justice (e.g., “*To restore justice, the U.S./Iran needs to be punished for American/Iranian soldiers’ actions described in the news report;*” “*To fully reinstate justice, the Human Rights Court needs to prosecute the U.S./Iran for its role in the events described in the news report.*”), whereas restorative justice was measured by five items tapping apologetic behavior and reaffirmation of shared values as a way to restore justice (e.g., “*Without a sincere apology from the U.S./Iran for having acted wrongly, the injustice is not completely restored;*” “*To restore justice, the U.S. and Iran need to agree on rules of a peaceful world.*”).

Support for future violence. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with four statements proposing the use of violence as a means of conflict resolution (e.g., “*The U.S. should send military forces to Iran to settle the dispute.*”).

Willingness to reconcile, ingroup attachment and glorification were measured using the same items as in Study 1, adapted to the U.S.-Iran context.

Results

Correlations among all dependent variables, separate by condition, are reported in Table 1.

Ingroup attachment and glorification. The distribution of glorification ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.65$) was mildly positively skewed, therefore necessitating a square root transformation. Although the use of the transformed variable, compared to the use of the raw variable, did not change any of the results, we used the transformed variable in subsequent analyses in keeping with our a priori determined data analytical strategy. As in Study 1, neither attachment ($\alpha = .96$, $M = 6.44$, $SD = 2.07$), $F(1, 156) = 0.03$, $p = .874$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, nor

(untransformed or transformed) glorification, $F(1, 156) = .07, p = .794, \eta_p^2 < .01$, were affected by condition.

Retributive justice. Retributive justice ($\alpha = .88, M = 6.23, SD = 1.69$) was submitted as a DV to the same GLM as in Study 1. As predicted, the analysis yielded a significant two-way interaction between ingroup role and glorification (see Figure 4), $F(1, 153) = 12.35, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$ ($LCI = .01, UCI = .16$). Simple effects revealed that Americans who strongly glorified the U.S. demanded significantly more retributive justice when the U.S. was the victim ($M = 6.87, SE = .30$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 5.79, SE = .30, t(153) = -2.91, p = .004$). On the contrary, Americans who weakly glorified the U.S. exhibited the opposite pattern, demanding significantly less retributive justice when the U.S. was the victim ($M = 5.78, SE = .29$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 6.52, SE = .30, t(153) = 2.03, p = .044$). No other effects reached significance, $F_s(1, 153) < .42, p_s > .516, \eta_p^2s < .01$.

Restorative justice. The GLM with restorative justice as DV ($\alpha = .75, M = 7.00, SD = 1.25$) also yielded a two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 5), $F(1, 153) = 6.44, p = .012, \eta_p^2 = .04$ ($LCI = .00, UCI = .11$). Simple effects revealed that low glorifiers demanded significantly less restorative justice when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 6.90, SE = .21$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 7.65, SE = .22, t(153) = 2.79, p = .006$). Whether the ingroup was the victim or perpetrator did not have significant effects on high glorifiers' demands for restorative justice, $t(153) = -0.80, p = .425$. The main effect of glorification approached significance, $F(1, 153) = 3.76, p = .055, \eta_p^2 = .02$, indicating that glorification was somewhat negatively associated with demands for restorative justice regardless of ingroup role, $\beta = -.21$. A significant main effect of attachment also emerged, $F(1, 153) = 7.63, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .05$,

indicating that attachment was positively associated with restorative justice, $\beta = .37$. There was no significant main effect of condition, $F(1, 153) = 1.91, p = .169, \eta_p^2 = .01$.

Support for future violence. Support for future violence ($\alpha = .87, M = 3.81, SD = 1.85$) was significantly affected by a two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 6), $F(1, 153) = 6.23, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .04$ ($LCI = .00, UCI = .11$). High glorifiers reported significantly more support for future violence when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 5.31, SE = .30$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 4.26, SE = .29$), $t(153) = -2.86, p = .005$. In contrast, low glorifiers' support for future violence did not depend on ingroup role, $t(153) = .64, p = .523$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 153) = 24.17, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$, indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence regardless of condition, $\beta = .52$. No other effects reached significance, $F_s(1, 153) < 2.51, p_s > .115, \eta_p^2s < .02$.

Willingness to reconcile. The analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .90, M = 6.73, SD = 1.34$) as DV yielded the expected two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 7), $F(1, 153) = 8.11, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .05$ ($LCI = .00, UCI = .13$). High glorifiers were significantly less willing to reconcile when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 5.53, SE = .22$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 6.34, SE = .22$), $t(153) = 3.03, p = .003$. Again, low glorifiers' willingness to reconcile did not depend on ingroup role, $t(153) = -.82, p = .411$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 153) = 26.62, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$, indicating that glorification was negatively related to willingness to reconcile, $\beta = -.50$. There was also a significant main effect of attachment, $F(1, 153) = 7.76, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .05$, indicating that attachment was positively related to willingness to reconcile, $\beta = .25$. The main effect of ingroup role did not reach significance, $F(1, 153) = 2.82, p = .095, \eta_p^2 = .02$.

Path analysis. To test the proposed mediational model of the effects of ingroup role on support for future violence and reconciliation through retributive justice demands,⁶ we conducted a path analysis in which condition was dummy coded with the ingroup-perpetrator condition as the reference group. The dummy variable, glorification, and their two-way interaction were entered as exogenous variables, controlling for attachment as another exogenous variable. Demands for retributive and restorative justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile were entered as endogenous variables. To be consistent with our GLMs and their results, the path model included direct paths from the interaction between condition and glorification to all four endogenous variables, direct paths from retributive and restorative justice to support for future violence and willingness to reconcile, as well as direct paths from glorification to future violence and reconciliation. Because retributive and restorative justice are two closely related constructs, their error terms were correlated, and so were the error terms of future violence and reconciliation. The statistical model is depicted with standardized path coefficients in Figure 8.

The model presented a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(10) = 18.22, p = .051, CFI = .97, SRMSR = .05, RMSEA = .07$. The interaction between condition and glorification significantly predicted both retributive ($\beta = .28, p < .001$) and restorative justice ($\beta = .20, p = .008$). Retributive justice, in turn, positively predicted support for future violence ($\beta = .18, p = .020$), whereas restorative justice negatively predicted future violence ($\beta = -.20, p = .006$) and positively predicted willingness to reconcile ($\beta = .40, p < .001$). The path from retributive justice to reconciliation did not reach significance; if anything, however, it was trending in the opposite direction as

⁶ We also tested an alternative model with restorative and retributive justice demands as well as future violence as parallel mediators, together explaining the effects of ingroup role on willingness to reconcile (moderated by glorification). However, the model fit was unacceptable, $\chi^2(12) = 83.54, p < .001, CFI = .76, SRMSR = .19, RMSEA = .12$. For both theoretical and statistical reasons, this model was therefore not tested further in the following studies.

restorative justice ($\beta = -.12, p = .111$). The interaction term also predicted future violence positively ($\beta = .17, p < .020$) and reconciliation negatively ($\beta = -.25, p < .001$). The path analysis also revealed marginally significant indirect effects of the interaction term on support for future violence through retributive justice, $\beta = .10, p = .052$, and in the opposite direction through restorative justice, $\beta = -.08, p = .060$. The interaction between condition and glorification also had a significant indirect effect on reconciliation through restorative justice, $\beta = .15, p = .019$. The indirect effect of the interaction term on reconciliation through retributive justice did not reach significance; again, however, if anything it was trending in the opposite direction as restorative justice, $\beta = -.06, p = .146$.

Discussion

Study 2 conceptually replicated the findings of Study 1 in a different conflict context. In addition, Study 2 also revealed significant interaction effects of ingroup role by glorification on demands for retributive and restorative justice. Importantly, the findings confirmed the hypothesis that high glorifiers have stronger demands for retributive justice when their ingroup is the victim rather than perpetrator of intergroup conflict. Low glorifiers, in contrast, reacted in a rather ingroup-critical, reconciliatory manner, demanding less justice when their ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator. Importantly, as expected, high glorifiers' changes in justice demands were specific to the retributive aspect of justice and did not extend to the restorative aspect, whereas low glorifiers' changes in justice demands entailed both retributive *and* restorative aspects of justice. It should also be noted that both groups on average supported, rather than opposed, both types of justice as indicated by their relatively high means. Thus, the reduced justice demands among low glorifying victims should not be interpreted as a lack of

concern for justice, but rather as an increased willingness to compromise on their generally substantial demands for justice in an effort to make peace.

We hypothesized that high glorifiers would be more supportive of future violence and less willing to reconcile when the ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator as a result of their increased demands for retributive, but not restorative, justice. The findings rendered partial support for this mediational hypothesis. The path analysis revealed that demands for retributive justice explained the effect of the interaction between ingroup role and glorification on support for future violence, but not willingness to reconcile. The indirect effect of the interaction term on future violence via retributive justice indicates that when the ingroup was the victim rather than perpetrator, high glorifiers were more supportive of future violence as a result of their stronger demands for retributive (but not restorative) justice. Although the indirect effect on reconciliation via retributive justice was not significant, it was trending in the predicted direction. Given that retributive justice was more closely related to support for future violence than reconciliation in the ingroup-victim condition (see Table 2), it is not surprising that retributive justice was a stronger mediator for future violence than reconciliation in this study.

The analyses also revealed a finding that we had not focused our predictions on, namely, the indirect effects of the interaction between ingroup role and glorification on future violence and reconciliation via restorative justice. Inspection of both GLMs and path analysis results suggests that the indirect effects via restorative justice were driven by low glorifiers, who reported less interest in both types of justice when the ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator and yet did not differ significantly on future violence or reconciliation. As the indirect effects of retributive and restorative justice on the two DVs operated in opposite directions, they cancelled each other out in predicting low glorifiers' responses to future violence and

reconciliation, which explains why they did not respond differently to both DVs (see also Hayes, 2009). In other words, low glorifying victims did *not* increase their support for future violence or decrease their willingness to reconcile *because* they *decreased* their demands for both retributive and restorative justice.

Study 3

Findings from Studies 1 and 2 collectively suggested that conflict intervention programs could benefit from satisfying the retributive justice demands of strongly glorifying members of victim groups, which may subsequently reduce their support for future violence and overcome their resistance to reconciliation. The international discourse on the aftermath of large-scale intergroup conflict has increasingly recognized the importance of holding perpetrators of mass violence accountable through formal legal mechanisms (e.g., Teitel, 2003). A recent example of such legal mechanisms is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a body of the United Nations established to prosecute crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars and to punish their perpetrators.

While only strongly glorifying individuals reacted aggressively to ingroup victimization, we expected that holding outgroup perpetrators accountable should have positive effects on all victim group members, both strongly and weakly glorifying ones. While such positive effects would be particularly important to reduce the barriers to peace among high glorifiers, as illuminated in Studies 1-2, we expected low glorifiers to welcome accountability of perpetrators as well. The main goal of Study 3 was therefore to investigate whether learning that an international criminal tribunal addressed past intergroup violence could meet the demand for retributive justice of members of victim groups in general, and thereby foster their reconciliatory attitudes.

Since the main findings of Studies 1-2 were driven by high glorifiers' past victim (not perpetrator) experiences, Study 3's investigation of the effects of a tribunal focused only on victims – the satisfaction of their need for retributive justice, and through that the removal of barriers to peace. Study 3 was conducted again in the context of the Bosnian War, with a sample of Serbs. Specifically, we compared Serbs' reactions to the information that the ICTY had prosecuted cases of Bosniaks accused of war crimes, with their reactions to the information that the international community had granted immunity (i.e., exemption from punishment) to Bosniaks accused of war crimes.

Method

Participants.

The sample consisted of 205 Serb adults. The recruitment procedure was similar to Study 1. After excluding 17 participants who did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation materials (as indicated by their summaries of this material and incorrect answers to questions about the article), 188 participants were retained for data analyses ($N_{impunity} = 93$, $N_{trial} = 95$; 49% women; age $M = 42$, $SD = 15.15$).

Procedure.

Participants first read a fictitious news article describing mass killings committed by the Bosniak soldiers against Serb civilians. The first half of the article was identical to the article used in the ingroup victimization condition in Study 1. After reading about the atrocities, participants in the trial condition continued to learn that the ICTY prosecuted and punished the Bosniak soldiers who were responsible for the war crimes described in the article. In the control condition, participants learned that these Bosniak soldiers received impunity, and were thus not prosecuted (or punished) for their crimes. In both conditions, participants were told that pursuing

criminal justice or granting impunity was an effort to promote peace and reconciliation between the war-torn countries in the former Yugoslavia. Following the reading task, participants completed manipulation check questions and summarized the news article in their own words. Afterwards, they filled out the following dependent measures in the order described below. All items were measured on 6-point Likert scales (1=*strongly disagree*; 6=*strongly agree*). As pursuing justice through a criminal tribunal is a form of retributive, rather than restorative, justice, and the former was the main focus of the present research, we only measured demands for retributive justice in this study. Furthermore, given the strong floor effect observed in Study 1 regarding Serbs' support for future violence against Bosniaks, we did not measure this variable in Study 3 but focused solely on willingness to reconcile.

Materials.

Demands for retributive justice were measured using the same scale as in Study 2, adapted to the Bosnian-Serbian context.

Willingness to reconcile, ingroup attachment and glorification were measured using the same scales as in Study 1. To be able to rigorously test the hypothesis that reading about the tribunal would reduce demands for retributive justice and increase willingness to reconcile among both high *and* low glorifiers, we again measured ingroup attachment and glorification. Thus, modeling the main effects of condition and glorification, as well as the interaction of condition by glorification, we expected to find either a significant main effect of condition *without* a significant interaction by glorification, or a significant interaction of condition by glorification where simple effects would be significant among *both* high and low glorifiers (possibly to different degrees).

Results

Ingroup attachment and glorification. Neither attachment ($\alpha = .93$, $M = 5.05$, $SD = 1.04$), $F(1, 186) = .18$, $p = .669$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, nor glorification ($\alpha = .93$, $M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.16$), $F(1, 186) = .03$, $p = .868$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, were affected by condition. As in previous studies, the following analyses used glorification as a moderator while controlling for attachment as a covariate.⁷

Retributive justice. As expected, the analysis with demands for retributive justice ($\alpha = .83$, $M = 4.45$, $SD = 1.41$) as the DV yielded a significant main effect of justice mechanism (tribunal vs. impunity), $F(1, 182) = 50.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$ ($LCI = .12$, $UCI = .31$). Reading about the tribunal ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 1.33$), as compared to impunity ($M = 5.05$, $SD = 1.22$), decreased participants' demands for retributive justice. This main effect was further qualified by a two-way interaction between condition and glorification, $F(1, 182) = 6.38$, $p = .012$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Simple effects analyses revealed that high glorifiers reduced demands for retributive justice after reading about the tribunal ($M = 4.32$, $SE = .17$) than impunity ($M = 5.12$, $SE = .19$), $t(182) = 3.43$, $p = .001$, and low glorifiers exhibited the same pattern but to an even greater degree ($M_{tribunal} = 3.32$, $M_{impunity} = 4.99$), $t(182) = 6.71$, $p < .001$. The main effects of glorification and attachment were both significant, $F_s(1, 182) > 4.76$, $p_s < .031$, $\eta_p^2_s > .02$, indicating that both glorification and attachment were positively related to demands for retributive justice ($\beta_s > .14$).

Willingness to reconcile.⁸ The analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.24$) as the DV also yielded the expected main effect of justice mechanism, $F(1, 183) = 8.01$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ ($LCI = .01$, $UCI = .11$). Compared to impunity ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.27$), reading about the tribunal ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 1.17$) significantly increased participants' willingness

⁷ All the main effects reported below remained significant when controlling for both attachment and the interaction between attachment and condition. The effects of justice mechanism also remained significant without using glorification as a moderator and attachment as a covariate (i.e., in a one-way ANOVA with condition as IV and no other IVs or covariates).

⁸ Willingness to reconcile was negatively correlated with demands for retributive justice, $r = -.38$, $p < .001$.

to reconcile with the Bosniaks. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 183) = 5.47, p = .020, \eta_p^2 = .03$, indicating that glorification was negatively associated with reconciliation, $\beta = -.21$. No other effects reached significance, $F_s(1, 183) < .44, p_s > .507, \eta_p^2s < .01$.

Mediation analysis. To test the mediational model of the effect of justice mechanism on willingness to reconcile through retributive justice demands, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals. We did not perform a path analysis in this study because the mediational model only had one outcome variable (i.e., willingness to reconcile) and could be directly tested in a moderated mediation analysis using PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes, 2012). The conditional indirect effects that PROCESS offers allow for a more straightforward interpretation of the mediating roles of retributive justice at high and low levels of glorification. In the analysis, justice mechanism (tribunal vs. impunity) was introduced as the IV, retributive justice demands as mediator, glorification as moderator, and willingness to reconcile as DV, with attachment as covariate (see Table 2 for all direct and indirect effects).

In line with our mediational hypothesis, there were significant indirect effects of justice mechanism on willingness to reconcile through retributive justice demands both when glorification was high (*boot coefficient* = .21, *LCI* = .060, *UCI* = .422) and when it was low (*boot coefficient* = .45, *LCI* = .220, *UCI* = .771). Moreover, the moderated mediation index was significant (*boot coefficient* = -.12, *LCI* = -.259, *UCI* = -.032), indicating that the indirect effect was stronger among low glorifiers than among high glorifiers. Learning about the tribunal therefore reduced the opposition to reconciliation among strongly glorifying victims observed in Studies 1 and 2 by reducing their desire for retribution. Additionally, trials had even stronger

positive effects on low glorifying victims, even though, according to Studies 1 and 2, they do not oppose intergroup reconciliation to begin with. Testing the same mediational model using path analysis also yielded a very good model fit, $\chi^2(3) = 4.83$, $p = .185$, $CFI = .99$, $SRMSR = .03$, $RMSEA = .06$.

Discussion

We demonstrated that learning about an international tribunal holding perpetrators accountable, compared to learning about impunity, reduced victim group members' demands for retributive justice, and thereby increased their willingness to reconcile. Importantly, these positive effects of addressing past violence through a tribunal were not restricted to high glorifiers of the victim group; rather, all members of the victim group exhibited more reconciliatory attitudes regardless of their levels of glorification. This study, however, had two limitations. First, while impunity is a commonly employed alternative to retributive judicial mechanisms, using impunity as a comparison raises the question of whether the observed effects were driven by the tribunal or the impunity condition. It is possible that reading about impunity, compared to the tribunal, increased victim group members' demands for retributive justice and reduced their willingness to reconcile. Second, we were unable to test the effect of tribunals on victims' support for future violence. To address these limitations, we conducted Study 4, again utilizing the context of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.

Study 4

The goals of Study 4 were threefold. We aimed to 1) conceptually replicate the findings in Study 3 in a different conflict context: the Iran-U.S. conflict; 2) offer a more stringent test of the effects of tribunals by comparing the tribunal condition to a baseline, rather than an impunity

condition; 3) examine the impact of international criminal justice on American participants' support for future violence against Iranians.

Methods

Participants. The sample consisted of 205 Americans recruited from MTurk. After excluding 15 participants who did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation material, one participant who raised suspicions about the credibility of the news report, and four participants who had close Iranian family members or friends, 185 participants were retained for data analyses ($N_{baseline} = 94$, $N_{trial} = 91$; 57% women; age $M = 33.40$, $SD = 12.33$).

Procedure and materials. Participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious *New York Times* article that was almost identical to the one used in the ingroup victimization condition in Study 2, except that the prisoner abuse was described as a systematic and widespread practice, in order to render prosecution of perpetrators by an international criminal tribunal a plausible and realistic approach to addressing the atrocities. After reading about American victimization by Iranians, participants in the tribunal condition were given additional information on a decision made by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute the perpetrators by an international criminal tribunal in an effort to maintain stability and peace in the region, whereas participants in the control condition were not given any further information on how (or if) the atrocities were addressed. After reading the news article, participants completed measures of demands for retributive justice, support for future violence (violent conflict resolution strategies), willingness to reconcile, as well as glorification and attachment. The measures were identical to the ones used in Study 2. To provide a more fine-grained measure of conflict resolution strategies, we added three items measuring participants' support for diplomatic (rather than only violent) conflict resolution strategies (e.g., "*The U.S. should actively seek diplomatic dialogue with Iran*

to discuss possible solutions to the conflict”). All items were measured on 9-point visual analog scales.

Results

Correlations among all dependent variables, separate by condition, are reported in Table 3.

Attachment and glorification. As expected, neither attachment ($\alpha = .94$, $M = 6.59$, $SD = 1.77$), $F(1, 183) = .00$, $p = .947$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, nor glorification ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.64$), $F(1, 183) = .56$, $p = .455$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, was affected by condition.⁹

Retributive justice. Replicating the results in Study 3, the analysis with demands for retributive justice ($\alpha = .91$, $M = 5.73$, $SD = 1.90$) as DV yielded a significant main effect of justice mechanism (tribunal vs. baseline), $F(1, 180) = 10.83$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$ ($LCI = .01$, $UCI = .12$). Compared to baseline ($M = 6.15$, $SD = 1.75$), reading about the tribunal ($M = 5.29$, $SD = 1.96$) decreased participants’ demands for retributive justice. The main effects of glorification and attachment were both significant, $F_s(1, 180) > 8.38$, $p_s < .005$, $\eta_p^2_s > .04$, indicating that both glorification and attachment were positively related to demands for retributive justice ($\beta_s > .23$). The interaction between mechanism and glorification did not reach significance, $F(1, 180) = .89$, $p = .347$, $\eta_p^2_s < .01$.

Support for diplomatic and violent conflict resolution strategies. We first conducted an exploratory factor analysis to determine whether or not support for violent and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies were two distinct constructs. The results indicated that items of violent and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies all loaded together on a single factor, with

⁹ All the main effects reported below remained significant without using glorification as a moderator and attachment as a covariate.

items of violent conflict resolution strategies loading positively and items of diplomatic conflict resolution strategies loading negatively. We thus reverse coded the items of diplomatic conflict resolution strategies and created a composite score, *support for future violence* ($\alpha = .80$, $M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.37$), combining both the violent and the reverse-coded diplomatic conflict resolution items.

As expected, analyses with support for future violence as the DV revealed a significant main effect of justice mechanism, $F(1, 180) = 8.47$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$ ($LCI = .01$, $UCI = .10$). Compared to baseline ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.42$), reading about the tribunal ($M = 2.85$, $SD = 1.26$) decreased participants' support for future violence. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 180) = 22.45$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$, indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence ($\beta = .39$). No other effect reached significance, $F_s(1, 180) < .50$, $p_s > .480$, $\eta_p^2s < .01$.

Willingness to reconcile. Replicating Study 3, the analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .89$, $M = 5.94$, $SD = 1.46$) as DV again yielded the expected main effect of justice mechanism, $F(1, 180) = 5.59$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$ ($LCI = .00$, $UCI = .08$). Compared to baseline ($M = 5.68$, $SD = 1.53$), reading about the tribunal ($M = 6.20$, $SD = 1.34$) significantly increased participants' willingness to reconcile. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 180) = 5.78$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, indicating that glorification was negative related to willingness to reconcile ($\beta = -.22$). No other effect reached significance, $F_s(1, 180) < .32$, $p_s > .570$, $\eta_p^2s < .01$.

Mediation analyses. Since the mediational model had two outcome variables (support for future violence and reconciliation), as in Study 2 we conducted a path analysis to test the whole model at once. In the path analysis, condition was coded with the baseline condition as the

reference group. We entered justice mechanism (dummy coded), glorification, and their two-way interaction as exogenous variables, controlling for attachment as another exogenous variable, and retributive justice demands, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile as endogenous variables. Consistent with the GLMs, the path model included direct paths from justice mechanism and glorification to all three endogenous variables, as well as direct paths from demands for retributive justice to support for future violence and willingness to reconcile. As in Study 2, the error terms of future violence and reconciliation were correlated. The statistical model is depicted with standardized path coefficients in Figure 9.

The model presented an excellent fit to the data, $\chi^2(6) = 9.96, p = .126, CFI = .99, SRMSR = .03, RMSEA = .06$. Justice mechanism predicted demands for retributive justice negatively ($\beta = -.20, p = .001$). Demands for retributive justice again predicted support for future violence positively ($\beta = .33, p < .001$) and willingness to reconcile negatively ($\beta = -.39, p < .001$). Justice mechanism also had significant direct paths to future violence ($\beta = -.12, p = .049$), but not to reconciliation ($\beta = .09, p = .196$). Finally, glorification predicted both demands for retributive justice ($\beta = .42, p < .001$) and support for future violence positively ($\beta = .28, p < .001$), but not reconciliation ($\beta = -.08, p = .274$). Importantly, the indirect effect of justice mechanism on future violence via retributive justice was significant ($\beta = -.07, p = .008$). The indirect effect of justice mechanism on reconciliation via retributive justice was also significant, and in the opposite direction ($\beta = .08, p = .006$). In other words, participants' reduced demands for retributive justice after reading about a tribunal (as opposed to the baseline) explained their decreased support for future violence and increased openness to reconciliation.

Discussion

In the context of the Iran-U.S. conflict, we successfully replicated the main findings of Study 3, demonstrating that international criminal justice can help meet victims' demands for retributive justice and thereby facilitate reconciliation. Moreover, reading about the tribunal, compared to the baseline condition, also curbed victims' support for future violence. The inclusion of a true baseline strengthened our confidence in the use of international criminal justice as an effective conflict intervention. Our path analysis offered further evidence for the proposed model where a tribunal can help satisfy victim group members' demand for retributive justice, and this reduced justice demand can in turn lead to less support for future violence and more reconciliatory attitudes.

General Discussion

In four experiments with two different populations (Serbs and Americans) and two different intergroup contexts (Bosnian War and U.S.-Iran tensions), we investigated the effects of ingroup victimization, as compared to ingroup transgressions, on group members' responses to intergroup violence. By using a combination of real and pseudo-real conflict events involving participants as members of victim or perpetrator groups, we ensured the ecological validity of the current research (for a recent call for "more immersive or real situations," see Wenzel & Okimoto, 2012). Despite the vast differences between the two intergroup contexts, all four studies produced converging results, suggesting that the current findings might be generalizable to other conflict situations as well. Moreover, the use of media pieces in the experimental manipulations matches how most people commonly encounter intergroup violence (see Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007).

The findings show that among Serbs (Study 1) and Americans (Study 2) who strongly (but not weakly) glorified their country, ingroup victimization led to more support for future

violence and less willingness to reconcile, compared to ingroup transgressions. Moreover, the reason for the increased hostile attitudes toward the outgroup – mainly in terms of support for future violence – among strongly glorifying victims (as compared to strongly glorifying perpetrators) laid in their increased demands for retributive (but not restorative) justice (Study 2). Finally, Studies 3 and 4 together showed that by satisfying victims' demands for retributive justice, information about international criminal justice reduced their support for future violence and fostered willingness to reconcile.

Justice and Peace from Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives

The current research contributes to quantifying the link between justice and peace from the perspectives of both victim and perpetrator group. The relationships between justice and other peace-making processes (e.g., conflict settlement, conflict resolution, reconciliation) have been subject to debate for decades in the international discourse of peace and justice. Whereas some view justice and peace as complementary goals in post-conflict transformations, others believe that pursuing justice can impede peacemaking and even prolong conflict. This theoretical and empirical ambiguity about the link between justice and peace is amplified by the fact that there has been no experimental research rigorously testing the arguments of either side of the debate (for a review see Leidner & Li, 2015).

By specifying the roles of different types of justice (i.e., retributive and restorative justice), this research takes a first step to disentangle the mixed findings and opposing arguments from previous scholarship. Replicating past research (Leidner et al., 2013a), we showed that retributive justice demands had negative implications for support for peace among (strongly glorifying) victims of intergroup violence, whereas restorative justice demands did not. We also extended the existing literature by examining the dynamic interplay between victim and

perpetrator groups and the moderating role of glorification. Due to their divergent justice goals, strongly glorifying group members are less likely to reach or support peace agreements when their group has suffered rather than perpetrated violence against another group. While the current research provided evidence for the mediating role of retributive justice demands, we should be cautious about the causal relationships among justice demands, future violence, and reconciliation when interpreting the results, as these variables were all measured (rather than experimentally manipulated). It is possible, albeit not likely, that support for violent conflict resolution might have driven, or operated in parallel with, demands for punishing perpetrators. Although we cannot definitively rule out such alternatives with the current studies, it is safe to conclude that people's demands for justice indeed have important implications for the resolution or continuation of conflict in the aftermath of large-scale violence, and that the nature of these implications depends on the type of justice and individuals' group identity.

Complementing past research on how glorification influences people's reactions to their own groups' wrongdoings, our work suggests that high levels of glorification can also obstruct peaceful conflict resolution on the part of victim groups. This observed gap between strongly glorifying victims' and perpetrators' justice demands can be particularly problematic considering that leaders and decision makers on each side of a conflict are likely to strongly glorify the groups they represent (see also Castano, 2008 and Li et al., 2016a for similar arguments). The two intervention studies (i.e., Studies 3 and 4), however, showed that retributive justice does not always have a negative effect on peace; rather, it can facilitate peace if it is properly addressed through a tribunal.

International Criminal Justice as Conflict Intervention

Our intervention studies confirmed the theorized possibility that international justice mechanisms such as criminal tribunals can satisfy, at least to a certain extent, victims' demands for retributive justice, which can subsequently decrease support for future violence and facilitate reconciliation (see Leidner & Li, 2015). This research thus lends empirical support to tribunal advocates' arguments that ensuring accountability through formal retributive justice mechanisms can help bring about peace and reconciliation (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004). Importantly, the evidence presented in Studies 3 and 4 speaks against the argument that pursuing retributive justice may reduce victims' willingness to forgive and reconcile (e.g., Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Karremans & Van Lange, 2005).

The current findings are also in line with the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel et al., 2009). Although we did not directly measure participants' needs for acceptance and empowerment, it is plausible that perpetrator group members' openness to restorative justice partly stems from their need for acceptance, and victim group members' desire for retributive justice from their need for empowerment. Therefore, learning about a tribunal prosecuting outgroup perpetrators might also help restore victims' sense of power and agency, which can in turn increase their conciliatory attitudes. However, we also contend that the need for retributive justice should not be equated with the need for empowerment, because the former refers distinctively to the desire to punish perpetrators through institutional mechanisms. While other conflict resolution mechanisms such as acknowledgment of victimhood and self- and group-affirmation can be effective in empowering victims and increasing their conciliatory attitudes (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Hameiri & Nadler, 2017; Vollhardt, Mazur, & Lemahieu, 2014), they may be inadequate in realizing reconciliation in its full scope if victims' specific needs for justice are not properly addressed (Li, Rovenpor, & Leidner, 2016). In the aftermath of large-scale,

institutionalized violence, formal justice mechanisms signal structural transformations, as well as the reconfiguration of previously unequal or abusive power relations between victim and perpetrator groups (e.g., Li et al., 2016b). They can thus be a rather promising intervention in this context, as well as a facilitator of other conflict interventions.

Another note-worthy finding is that when the ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator, low glorifying victims did not significantly increase their support for future violence or decrease their willingness to reconcile, and decreased rather than increased their demands for both retributive and restorative justice. While this finding supports our hypothesis that low glorifying victims might be more compromising in terms of their justice demands in favor of repairing the broken bond with the outgroup, more research is needed to understand this finding better. It is safe to say, however, that low glorifying victims do not pose an obstacle to cessation of violence and reconciliation. Moreover, despite being relatively less concerned with justice in general, they too welcomed international justice mechanisms in the peace process when these were implemented. Thus, our findings suggest that international justice is beneficial for those who demand it strongly as well as those who demand it less strongly.

Limitations and Future Directions

Some limitations of this research should also be noted. First, our intervention studies exclusively focused on victim groups' reactions to tribunals. Given that perpetrator groups might be reluctant to support victims' pursuit of retributive justice, future research is warranted to examine perpetrators' reactions to tribunals and other punitive justice mechanisms. It is crucial to examine both victim and perpetrator groups simultaneously in order to understand when and how justice-oriented conflict resolution programs can be successful for both sides of a conflict. Second, the two intervention studies also did not address the role of restorative justice, which

often goes hand in hand with retributive justice in international justice mechanisms. Truth and reconciliation commissions, for example, might be particularly well-suited for addressing the need for restorative justice. Even tribunals, if set up in a way that encourages perpetrators and victims to engage with each other in a bilateral process, might also help fulfill the need for restorative justice (Leidner & Li, 2015). Thus, another fruitful future direction is to examine the use of restorative justice mechanisms in conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Finally, the current study only addressed Serb reactions to the Bosnian War and American reactions to the Iran-U.S. conflict, while neglecting the perspectives of Bosniaks and Iranians. Due to the power asymmetry between the U.S. and Iran, and between Serbs and Bosniaks during the Bosnian War, the two parties in conflict might differ conceivably in their perceptions of ingroup victimization and perpetration, interpretations and demands of justice, as well as the implications of justice for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Moreover, as Serbs were the primary perpetrator group during the Bosnian War, highlighting their victim experiences in an experimental setting may not be the same as highlighting Bosniak victim experiences among Bosniaks – the primary victim group in the Bosnian War. Despite the “objective” perpetrator status of Serbs, however, the majority of Serbs perceive themselves as having suffered the most during the conflict, compared to other ethnic groups including Bosniaks (Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 2005, 2009, 2011). As it is this psychological reality in the minds of people (rather than the “objective” reality based on third-party consensus) that shapes their justice demands, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile, our findings might well generalize to members of groups that see themselves as victims *and* are seen as such by third-party consensus. To test the generalizability of our findings and to facilitate a more

comprehensive understanding of conflicts and their resolution, however, future research should examine both sides of the same conflict in tandem.

Concluding Remarks

Four experiments demonstrated that ingroup's role as the perpetrator or the victim of intergroup transgressions can influence people's attitudes toward future violence against and reconciliation with the outgroup. Establishing the role of justice in these effects, the present research shows that while victims' demands for retributive justice can constitute an obstacle to reconciliation, their attitudes toward the perpetrator group are malleable and can be improved through tribunals that help meet their justice demands. These findings can thus inform legal and policy decision-making in transforming post-conflict societies, notably through international criminal justice.

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Tables

Measures	Ingroup-victim (N = 77)			Ingroup-perpetrator (N = 81)		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
1. Retributive justice						
2. Restorative justice	.47***			.35**		
3. Future violence	.46*	.17		-.17	-.42***	
4. Reconciliation	-.34**	.13	-.50***	.28*	.49***	-.64***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 1. Correlations among demand for retributive justice, restorative justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile by condition (ingroup-victim vs. perpetrator; Study 2).

	Willingness to reconcile Unstandardized Coefficient (LCI, UCI)	
	High glorifiers	Low glorifiers
Condition→Retributive justice (a)	-.82 (-1.307, -.332)	-.157* (-2.060, -1.084)
Retributive justice→Reconciliation (b)	-.30* (-.483, -.111)	-.30* (-.455, -.146)
Condition→Reconciliation (c)	.08 (-.403, .562)	.19 (-.341, .717)
Condition→Retributive justice→ Reconciliation (ab)	.21* (.060, .422)	.45* (.220, .771)

* indicates significant effects at 95% CI

Table 2. Direct and indirect effects of condition (justice mechanism) on willingness to reconcile through demand for retributive justice for high and low glorifiers (Study 3).

Measures	Baseline (N = 94)		Tribunal (N = 91)	
	1	2	1	2
1. Retributive justice				
2. Future violence	.50***		.40***	
3. Reconciliation	-.43***	-.68***	-.42***	.60***

*** $p < .001$

Table 3. Correlations among demand for retributive justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile by condition (baseline vs. tribunal; Study 4).


Figures

Figure 1. Conceptual model of the hypothesized effects of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) on support for future violence and willingness to reconcile through demands for retributive justice, moderated by ingroup glorification while controlling for attachment.



Figure 2. Support for future violence as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 1).




Figure 3. Willingness to reconcile as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 1).




Figure 4. Retributive justice as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).




Figure 5. Restorative justice as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).




Figure 6. Support for future violence as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).




Figure 7. Willingness to reconcile as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).




Figure 8. The direct and indirect joint effects of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and glorification on demands for retributive and restorative justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile, with ingroup attachment controlled for and the effects of ingroup role and glorification taken into account (Study 2). Paths displayed in black were central to our hypotheses; paths displayed in gray were not. Solid paths were significant; dashed paths were not.




Figure 9. The direct and indirect effects of justice mechanism (tribunal vs. baseline) on demands for retributive justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile, with glorification as the moderator and attachment and the interaction between mechanism and glorification controlled for (Study 4). Paths displayed in black were central to our hypotheses; paths displayed in gray were not. Solid paths were significant; dashed paths were not.