Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation from Victim and Perpetrator Perspective: How Ingroup Victimization and Ingroup Transgressions Shape People’s Willingness to Reconcile Through Demands for Retributive and Restorative Justice, and Support for Future Violence

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Abstract

Four experiments examined people’s responses to intergroup violence either committed or suffered by their own group. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Serbs who strongly glorified Serbia were more supportive of future violence against, and less willing to reconcile with, Bosniaks after reading about Serbian victimization by Bosniaks rather than Serbian transgressions against Bosniaks. Replicating these effects with Americans in context of American-Iranian tensions, Experiment 2 further showed that demands for retributive and restorative justice, respectively, explained why high glorifying victims reacted this way and low glorifying victims did not. Extending these findings to lower-power groups, and in line with the inertia effect found among such groups, Experiment 3 revealed that when being victim rather than transgressor, Iranians’ increased demands for retributive justice translated into decreased, not increased, support for future violence. Experiment 4 demonstrated that learning about post-conflict international criminal tribunals eliminated the reactions strongly glorifying victims otherwise showed.

Word count: 148

Keywords: intergroup violence, conflict resolution, reconciliation, justice, ingroup identification/glorification
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Humankind has come a long way in developing international norms, laws, and institutions that aim at peaceful conflict resolution. This goal is often hindered, however, by members of the conflict parties who are unwilling to resolve their grievances about perceived injustices and to reconcile with each other. While the pertinent literature frequently looks exclusively at victims (or, less frequently, exclusively at perpetrators), it is crucial to examine both groups simultaneously in order to understand when and how conflict resolution and reconciliation programs can be successful among both sides of a conflict. The main goal of the present research was thus to compare and integrate the perspectives of both victims and perpetrators by investigating the influences of their divergent group experiences (ingroup victimization vs. ingroup transgression) on people’s immediate responses (e.g., support for future violence, rather than cessation of violence) and long-term responses (e.g., openness to reconciliation) to intergroup conflict. Furthermore, we also explored the moderating role of ingroup glorification, and the mediating roles of retributive and restorative justice demands.

Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives of Intergroup Conflict

Although perpetrators and victims are rarely clear-cut categories in most large-scale conflicts, social psychological research has empirically investigated how people respond to wrongdoings committed (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998, 2006; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010) or suffered (e.g. Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) by the
ingroup. When confronted with wrongdoings committed by the ingroup, for example, people tend to use moral disengagement strategies (Bandura, 1999, 2002) such as denial (Cohen, 2013), dehumanization of victims (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner et al., 2010), or even moralization of ingroup-committed harms (Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, & Castano, 2011; Leidner & Castano, 2012). Moreover, adversarial parties in large-scale intergroup conflicts often compete over victimhood, claiming that the perpetrating ingroup is indeed victim, not perpetrator, because it has suffered more than the harmed outgroup (for reviews see Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). Clearly, rather than acknowledging wrongdoings and contributing to the restoration of peace and justice, people are quite apt to construct new narratives that allow them to explain, justify, and even legitimize immoral acts committed by their own groups.

From the victims’ perspective, conflict resolution and reconciliation with the adversary are equally, perhaps even more, difficult. Ingroup victimization experiences can easily evoke vengeful feelings toward the perpetrator group, motivating group-based revenge (Lickel, 2012). Literature on interpersonal violence also contends that people desire transgressors to suffer in proportion to the magnitude of their crimes while ignoring the likelihood of future offenses (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). At the intergroup level, such a desire for retribution among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, both of which commonly self-identify as victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been shown to originate from their dehumanization of the adversarial group (Leidner et al., 2013).

Taking an integrative perspective on victims’ and perpetrators’ perspectives of intergroup conflict, it seems ever more clear that successful conflict resolution and reconciliation require collective efforts from both conflict parties, and thus a thorough understanding thereof. Yet, very
little research has examined both sides of a conflict in tandem, with two noteworthy exceptions. First, research on the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) emphasizes the importance of addressing the differential needs of victims and perpetrators as a prerequisite for reconciliation. This work, however, did not directly compare victims’ responses to those of perpetrators; rather, it compared victims’ reactions to different messages delivered by the outgroup, and perpetrators’ reactions to different messages delivered by the outgroup. Second, a longitudinal study made direct comparisons between European and Chinese Canadians’ perceptions and expectations of the Canadian government’s apology for its past discrimination against Chinese immigrants (Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013). Complementing and extending this recent work, we conducted four experiments investigating victims’ and perpetrators’ support for cessation vs. future acts of violence and willingness to reconcile, as well as the psychological mechanisms underlying these responses to conflict.

**Victims’ and Perpetrators’ Support for Future Violence and Reconciliation**

Victims’ motivation for revenge and perpetrators’ tendency to disengage from their own transgressions both hinder peacebuilding processes, and might even lead to future violence (e.g. retaliation). Thus, it is unclear what hinders constructive conflict resolution and reconciliation in the aftermath of intergroup violence more: (vicarious) victim or perpetrator experiences. If people’s responses to their group’s suffering are indeed primarily driven by the motive for revenge (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Lickel, 2012), this motive should translate into support for violence against members of the perpetrator group. In contrast, people’s responses to their group’s transgressions are more likely driven by the motive to save the ingroup image through disengaging from, denying, or even moralizing their group’s transgressions. On the one
hand, the inclination to distance from or deny ingroup transgressions is unlikely to translate into support for future violence. On the other, active moralization of wrongdoings turns ingroup-committed harms into a moral mandate (Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), thus encouraging and even requiring future violence. Moralization of wrongdoings should be more likely to prevail in ongoing, extreme, but also ambiguous cases of intergroup violence that leave room for such reinterpretations. As our research here focuses on rather unambiguous past (rather than ongoing) violence such as massacres and systematic prisoner abuse, people should be more likely to adopt strategies that allow them to disengage from, rather than to moralize ingroup-committed transgressions. Thus, we predicted that (vicarious) victim experiences, as compared to (vicarious) perpetrator experiences, will evoke more support for future violence against the adversarial group.

The hypothesized effect on support for future violence should in turn lead to reduced openness to intergroup reconciliation. While conflict settlement and conflict resolution involve the cessation of violence between adversarial groups, reconciliation requires “a changed psychological orientation towards the other” (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005, p. 301) and “mutual acceptance of the other’s identity and humanity” (Kelman, 2008 p. 16). Differentiating reconciliation from conflict resolution, Kelman (2008) suggests that reconciliation should be viewed as a logical consequence of successful conflict resolution and an ultimate step in the process of peace-making. Following Staub’s and Kelman’s sequential view of conflict resolution and reconciliation, we consider support for future acts (rather than cessation) of violence a relatively immediate or short-term response to settle an ongoing conflict, which should lead to less willingness to reconcile as a long-term response with the (reduced) potential of creating lasting peace. Thus, we predicted that support for future violence will
mediate the predicted negative effect of ingroup victimization (as compared to ingroup transgressions) on willingness to reconcile.

Not all people are equally likely, however, to endorse these generally predicted attitudes toward future violence and reconciliation simply due to their ingroup’s role (perpetrator or victim) in an intergroup conflict. Based on social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), we propose that the effects of membership in perpetrator or victim groups on people’s support for future violence and reconciliation depends on the quality and quantity of their psychological investment in that group.

**The Moderating Role of Ingroup Glorification**

Substantial research on social identification has demonstrated that people are more motivated to hold a positive view of their group to the extent that they identify with that group (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). As a consequence, when confronted with negative aspects of the ingroup, such as ingroup-committed transgressions, individuals who strongly identify with their group are less likely to accept the negative portrayal of their group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Recent research on social identification advocates a multidimensional view of group identification, for instance distinguishing between ingroup attachment and glorification (Roccas et al., 2006). Whereas attachment refers to one’s subjective identification with the ingroup, glorification refers to beliefs in the superiority of the ingroup over outgroups and emphasizes loyalty and deference to ingroup norms and authorities. Research revealed that glorification is negatively related to collective guilt for ingroup-committed transgressions, whereas attachment is positively related to collective guilt for ingroup-committed transgressions (Roccas et al., 2006). Similarly, when the ingroup (rather than
an outgroup) was responsible for intergroup violence, glorification but not attachment predicted dehumanization of outgroup victims and decreased demands for justice (Leidner et al., 2010), as well as a shift from violence-condemning harm and fairness morals to violence-legitimizing loyalty and authority morals (Leidner & Castano, 2012).

In line with past research, we argue that ingroup glorification should moderate the effects of ingroup victimization vs. transgression on people’s support for future violence and reconciliation. Among victims, higher levels of ingroup glorification should incur stronger motivation for revenge, whereas among perpetrators higher levels of glorification should incur stronger motivation to distance from the group’s wrongdoings in an effort to save its moral image. Consequently, high glorifiers should be more supportive of future violence and more resistant to reconciliation when the ingroup is seen as the victim rather than the perpetrator. Low glorifiers, on the other hand, are unlikely to respond differently to past intergroup violence depending on whether the ingroup is the victim or perpetrator. According to Roccas (personal communication, February 22, 2012; Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010), low glorifiers tend to attach high importance to values of universalism that emphasize understanding and acceptance for all human beings, including outgroups. Thus, low glorifiers might be even more critical, rather than lenient, when their ingroup is the perpetrator rather than the victim. The hypothesized model is depicted in Figure 1, partially tested in Study 1 and 3, and fully tested in Study 2 and 4.

Study 1

Study 1 tested the hypothesis that people support future violence against the outgroup and reconciliation to different degrees, depending on their ingroup’s experience in a conflict (victimization vs. transgression) and the extent with which they glorify their ingroup. We
conducted an experiment in the context of the conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks, allowing us to benefit from the rigor of the experimental method and the high external validity of field research. While acts of violence committed by Serbs were much more frequent than acts of violence committed by Bosniaks in the Bosnian War, there was violence and even massacres on both sides. Within this context, we investigated how Serbs reacted if they learned that their group members either committed or suffered mass ethnic violence against/from Bosniaks.

**Method**

**Participants.**

The sample consisted of 288 Serb adults, most of whom had personal experiences with the Bosnian War. Twenty participants did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation materials, as indicated by their summaries of this material and incorrect answers to questions about the ethnic identity of perpetrators and victims in this material\(^1\), and were excluded. This data exclusion was necessary as the reliability of our findings relied heavily on participants’ attention to the manipulation materials. Thus, we retained 268 participants for data analyses (66% women; age \(M = 31, SD = 13.81\)).

**Procedure.**

After consenting to take part in a study on attitudes and beliefs about the relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, participants were randomly assigned to read a newspaper article depicting a military operation, led either by Serbs or Bosniaks, in a town in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia, respectively. During the operation, over 3,000 civilians were killed and thousands more were injured. Dozens of villages were destroyed, leaving homes

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\(^1\) See Supplementary Materials for the results of manipulation checks.
destroyed and families broken. In the ingroup victimization condition, participants read about Bosniaks committing war crimes against Serb civilians, whereas in the ingroup transgression condition, participants read about Serbs committing war crimes against Bosniak civilians. The news articles were identical across conditions except for the ethnicities of the perpetrators and the victims, and the locations of the massacres. After the reading task, participants completed several manipulation check questions, indicating the ethnicities of the perpetrators and victims of the war crimes described in the article. To ensure that participants read the articles carefully and processed them more deeply, they then summarized the news article in their own words. Afterwards, they filled out the following dependent measures in the order described below. All items were measured on 6-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree). At the end of the study participants reported their demographic information and were fully debriefed.

**Materials.**

*Support for Future Violence.* Five statements measured the extent to which Serbian participants supported future violence against Bosniaks (e.g., “I want Serbia to take violent measures against Bosniaks.”)

*Willingness to Reconcile.* Adapted from Shnabel et al. (2009) and Wenzel and Okimoto (2010), eight items measured Serbian participants’ willingness to reconcile (e.g., “Serbia should try to do its part to promote reconciliation with Bosnia.”).

*Ingroup Attachment and Glorification* were measured with eight statements each, tapping the importance of Serbia to participants’ identity and their commitment to Serbia (e.g., “Being Serbian is an important part of my identity.”) and participants’ belief in the superiority of Serbia over other countries and their deference to Serb authorities (e.g., “Serbia is better than other nations in all respects.”), respectively (cf. Roccas et al., 2006).
Results

**Ingroup Attachment and Glorification.** The distribution of glorification ($\alpha = .87, M = 2.22, SD = .99$) was substantially positively skewed, necessitating a logarithmic transformation (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, pp. 86-87 for a discussion on data transformation), and the use of the so transformed variable in subsequent analyses. Neither attachment ($\alpha = .93, M = 4.16, SD = 1.32), F(1, 266) = 0.33, p = .565, \eta^2 = .001$, nor (untransformed or transformed) glorification, $F(1, 266) = 1.12, p = .291, \eta^2 = .004$, were affected by condition, thus allowing thus allowing us to use them, together with condition, as continuous independent variables (IVs) in subsequent general linear models (GLMs) carried out in SAS 9.3. To this end, attachment and glorification were centered (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To capture glorification’s conceptual distinctness from attachment despite the overlap of both variables’ measures (Roccas et al., 2006), the following analyses used glorification as a moderator while controlling for attachment as a covariate.

**Support for Future Violence.** Participants’ support for future violence ($\alpha = .90, M = 1.18, SD = .62$) was submitted as a dependent variable (DV) to the moderated regression analysis specified above. The main effect of condition was significant, $F(1, 263) = 8.98, p = .003, \eta^2 = .03$, indicating that while participants on average opposed future violence against Bosniaks, ingroup-victimization increased support for future violence ($M = 1.29$) as compared to ingroup transgressions ($M = 1.06$). Importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and glorification (see Figure 2), $F(1, 263) = 24.4, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08 (LCI = .03, UCI = .15)$. Simple effects indicated that Serbs who

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2 The findings remained mostly unchanged when using the untransformed variable, with the exception that the interaction effect of condition and glorification on restorative justice became marginally ($p = .078$) rather than fully significant.
strongly glorified Serbia (i.e., 1 SD above the mean) reported significantly more support for future violence when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 1.58$) rather than the perpetrator of intergroup violence ($M = 1.03$), $t(263) = -5.59, p < .001$. Low glorifiers (i.e., 1 SD below the mean) did not significantly differ in their support for future violence; if anything, they showed the opposite tendency as compared to high glorifiers, $t(263) = 1.42, p = .153$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 263) = 9.39, p = .002, \eta^2 = .03$, indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence regardless of ingroup role, $\beta = .14$. The main effect of attachment was not significant, $F(1, 263) = .90, p = .344, \eta^2 = .003$.

Because support for future violence exhibited a strong floor effect, we dichotomized the originally interval-scaled support for future violence variable by assigning a score of 0 for original scores of 1 and a score of 1 for original scores greater than 1. We then submitted the resulting dichotomous variable to a logistic regression analysis. Consistent with the GLM above, this analysis yielded a significant association between ingroup role and whether or not participants supported future violence, moderated by glorification, $\chi^2(1) = 6.03, p = .014$.

**Willingness to Reconcile.** The analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .94, M = 4.80, SD = 1.24$) as DV again yielded the expected two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 3), $F(1, 263) = 3.87, p = .050, \eta^2 = .01$ ($LCI = .00, UCI = .05$). Follow-up analyses confirmed our hypothesis that ingroup victimization, compared to ingroup transgression, decreased willingness to reconcile only among Serbs who strongly glorified Serbia, $t(263) = 2.40, p = .017$. High glorifiers reported significantly lower levels of willingness to reconcile when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 4.13$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 4.59$). Low glorifiers did not differ significantly in their willingness to reconcile; if anything, again, they showed the opposite tendency as compared to high ingroup glorifiers, $t(263) = -.39, p = .700$. 
The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 263) = 24.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$, indicating that glorification was negatively related to willingness to reconcile ($\beta = -.45$). No other effects reached significance, $Fs(1, 263) < 2.09, ps > .145, \eta^2 s < .008$.

**Mediation analysis.** To test whether support for future violence mediated the effect of ingroup role by glorification on willingness to reconcile, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals. Ingroup role was introduced as the IV, support for future violence as the mediator, glorification as a moderator, willingness to reconcile as the DV, and attachment as covariate (Hayes, 2012, model 8). In line with our mediational hypothesis, there was a significant indirect effect of ingroup role on willingness to reconcile through support for future violence when glorification was high ($boot coefficient = .29, LCI = .07, UCI = .55$). When glorification was low, this effect had the opposite direction ($boot coefficient = -.07, LCI = -.16, UCI = -.02$).³

**Post-hoc power analysis.** A post-hoc power analysis using the G*Power program (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) revealed that on the basis of the average effect size for the two-way interactions between glorification and condition ($\eta_{avg}^2 = .02$), and a sample size of 268, the power to detect these interaction effects was 0.63. Despite the relatively low power, we obtained significant interaction effects with the a priori hypothesized patterns.

**Discussion**

Study 1 demonstrated that people who strongly (but not weakly) glorify their ingroup are more supportive of future violence against the outgroup and less open to reconciliation when

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³ Throughout all studies, we also tested several alternative models using both mediation and path analyses. See Supplementary Materials for results of the alternative models.
their ingroup suffered, rather than committed, intergroup violence. The mediational analysis further revealed that support for future violence mediated the effect of ingroup victimization, as compared to ingroup transgression, on reconciliation among both high and low ingroup glorifiers. This result supports our contention that support for future violence is a more immediate response to intergroup violence, which then affects willingness to reconcile in the long term.

It is also important to note that participants on average endorsed support for future violence to a very low degree, and with little variability. We believe that this floor effect occurred due to the fact that participants in our study were likely aware that Serbia is seen as the perpetrator in the overall conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks by most third parties (e.g., European Union, U.S.). As a result, they may have been particularly unwilling to express support for future violence against Bosniaks. Yet, given the floor effect and the limited variability, it is remarkable that we still obtained significant results in the hypothesized direction. If this is true, these effects should, if anything, become even more pronounced in contexts that do not suffer from this problem (e.g. in Study 2).

**Study 2**

Study 2 had two goals. First, replicating the effects found in Study 1 in a different context: the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. Second, testing our hypothesis that the effects found in Study 1 emerged from high glorifying victims’ stronger revenge motivation, and low glorifying victims’ stronger repair motivation. To this end, we tested two potential mediating factors: demands for retributive and restorative justice. Whereas retributive justice is mainly concerned with unilateral punishment of transgressors (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Carlsmit
& Darley, 2008), restorative justice is mainly concerned with restoring the relationship between perpetrators and victims, for instance through symbolic (e.g., apologies) and material (e.g., financial reparations) compensation, or reaffirmation of shared norms and values (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2008, 2010).

Past research has demonstrated that endorsement of retributive justice (e.g., punishment) is primarily driven by victims’ motive to pay back harm doers of interpersonal crimes for their misdeeds (Carlsmith et al., 2002), and that people who glorify their group tend to show a weaker demand for retributive justice when perpetrators of intergroup violence belong to their own rather than another group (Leidner et al., 2010). If high glorifiers are driven primarily by retribution when their group has been victimized, they should demand more retributive justice (but not restorative justice) in the face of ingroup victimization rather than ingroup transgressions. If low glorifiers are driven primarily by ingroup-critical attitudes (Leidner & Castano, 2012) and the motive to repair the broken bond with the outgroup, after ingroup victimization they should signal their willingness to reconcile by demanding less justice (e.g. less punishment of outgroup perpetrators and less compensation for ingroup victims), whereas after ingroup transgressions they should signal their willingness to reconcile by demanding more justice. Retributive and restorative justice demands so affected should then drive the previously observed effects on support for future violence. Retributive justice demands should drive high glorifiers’ increased support for future violence and decreased willingness to reconcile when their group suffered rather than perpetrated violence, whereas restorative justice demands should drive low glorifiers’ lack of such an increase and decrease, respectively.

Method
Participants. We recruited 191 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which provided a more heterogeneous sample in comparison to college undergraduate samples (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Our screening of the data quality resulted in the exclusion of 19 participants for not paying sufficient attention to the manipulation material (as indicated by their incorrect answers to questions about the identity of perpetrators and victims in the news report); three participants for raising suspicions about the credibility of the news report; five participants for not taking the study seriously (as indicated by their written summaries of the news report and the little time they spent on reading it); four participants for having close Iranian family members or friends; and two multivariate outliers (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The percentage of the sample (17%) excluded from data analysis was similar to the average benchmarks for online studies (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013). Most importantly, of the 33 participants who were not retained for subsequent data analyses, half were in the perpetrator and the other half in the victim condition; therefore, the manipulation did not cause more participants in one than in the other condition to be excluded. The data from the remaining 158 participants was used in subsequent data analyses (69% women; age $M = 33$, $SD = 11.12$).

Procedure.

Participants followed a similar procedure as in Study 1. First, participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious, but allegedly real, New York Times article depicting three cases of prisoner abuse in an underground prison at the Afghan-Iranian border. In the ingroup victimization condition, participants read about Iranian soldiers captured and tortured American civilians, whereas in the ingroup transgression condition participants read about American soldiers captured and tortured Iranian civilians. The reported acts of abuse included sleep deprivation, severe beatings, suffocation, and humiliating acts. In one of the three cases,
mistreatment and torture eventually led to the death of the prisoner. The news articles were identical across conditions except for the names and nationalities of perpetrators and victims. After the reading task, participants completed manipulation check questions and summarized the news article in their own words. Then they filled out the following dependent measures in the order outlined below. All items were measured on 9-point analog visual scales (1=strongly disagree; 9=strongly agree).

**Materials.**

*Demands for Retributive and Restorative Justice.* Adapted from Leidner et al. (2013), retributive justice was measured by five items tapping the notion of unilateral punishment as a way to restore justice (e.g., “To restore justice, the U.S./Iran needs to be punished for American/Iranian soldiers’ actions described in the news report.”), whereas restorative justice was measured by five items tapping apologetic behavior and reaffirmation of shared values as a way to restore justice (e.g., “To restore justice, the U.S. and Iran need to agree on rules of a peaceful world.”).

*Support for Future Violence.* Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with four statements proposing the use of violence as a means of conflict resolution (e.g., “The U.S. should send military forces to Iran to settle the dispute.”).

*Willingness to Reconcile, Ingroup Attachment and Glorification* were measured using the same items as in Study 1, adapted to the U.S.-Iran context.

**Results**
**Ingroup Attachment and Glorification.** The distribution of glorification ($\alpha = .90, M = 4.70, SD = 1.65$) was mildly positively skewed, therefore necessitating a square root transformation and the use of the transformed variable in subsequent analyses.\(^4\)

**Retributive Justice.** Retributive justice ($\alpha = .88, M = 6.23, SD = 1.69$) was submitted as a DV to a moderated regression analysis. As predicted, the analysis yielded a significant two-way interaction between ingroup role and glorification (see Figure 4), $F(1, 153) = 12.35, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .07$ ($LCI = .01, UCI = .16$). Simple effects revealed that participants who strongly glorified their ingroup demanded significantly more retributive justice when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 6.87$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 5.79$), $t(153) = -2.91, p = .004$. On the contrary, participants who weakly glorified their ingroup exhibited the opposite pattern, demanding significantly less retributive justice when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 5.78$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 6.52$), $t(153) = 2.03, p = .044$. No other effects reached significance, $F$s($1, 153$) $< .42$, $ps > .516$, $\eta^2$s $< .01$.

**Restorative Justice.** The moderated regression analysis with restorative justice as DV ($\alpha = .75, M = 7.00, SD = 1.25$) yielded the expected two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 5), $F(1, 153) = 6.44, p = .012$, $\eta^2 = .04$ ($LCI = .00, UCI = .11$). Simple effects revealed that low glorifiers demanded significantly less restorative justice when their ingroup was the victim ($M = 6.90$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 7.65$), $t(153) = 2.79, p = .006$. Whether the ingroup was the victim or perpetrator did not have significant effects on high glorifiers’ demands for restorative justice; if anything, high glorifiers showed the opposite tendency compared to low glorifiers, $t(153) = -0.80, p = .425$. The main effect of glorification

\(^4\) The results remained unchanged when using the untransformed glorification variable.
approached significance, \( F(1, 153) = 3.76, p = .055, \eta^2 = .02 \), indicating that glorification was somewhat negatively associated with demands for restorative justice regardless of ingroup role, \( \beta = -.28 \). A significant main effect of attachment also emerged, \( F(1, 153) = 7.63, p = .006, \eta^2 = .05 \), indicating that attachment was positively associated with restorative justice, \( \beta = .37 \). There was no significant main effect of condition, \( F(1, 153) = 1.91, p = .169, \eta^2 = .01 \).

**Support for Future Violence.** Support for future violence (\( \alpha = .87, M = 3.81, SD = 1.85 \)) was significantly affected by a two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 6), \( F(1, 153) = 6.23, p = .014, \eta^2 = .04 \) (\( LCI = .00, UCI = .11 \)). High glorifiers reported significantly more support for future violence when their ingroup was the victim (\( M = 5.31 \)) rather than the perpetrator (\( M = 4.26 \)), \( t(153) = -2.86, p = .005 \). Low glorifiers’ support for future violence did not depend on ingroup role; if anything, they showed the opposite tendency compared to high glorifiers, \( t(153) = .64, p = .523 \). The main effect of glorification was also significant, \( F(1, 153) = 24.17, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14 \), indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence regardless of condition, \( \beta = .95 \). No other effects reached significance, \( Fs(1, 153) < 2.51, ps > .115, \eta^2 < .02 \).

**Willingness to Reconcile.** The analysis with willingness to reconcile (\( \alpha = .90, M = 6.73, SD = 1.34 \)) as DV yielded the expected two-way interaction of ingroup role by glorification (see Figure 7), \( F(1, 153) = 8.11, p = .005, \eta^2 = .05 \) (\( LCI = .00, UCI = .13 \)). High glorifiers were significantly less willing to reconcile when their ingroup was the victim (\( M = 5.53 \)) rather than the perpetrator (\( M = 6.34 \)), \( t(153) = 3.03, p = .003 \). Low glorifiers’ willingness to reconcile did not depend on ingroup role; if anything, again, they showed the opposite tendency compared to high glorifiers, \( t(153) = -.82, p = .411 \). The main effect of glorification was also significant, \( F(1,
153) = 26.62, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .15$, indicating that glorification was negatively related to willingness to reconcile, $\beta = -.74$. There was also a significant main effect of attachment, $F(1, 153) = 7.76, p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .05$, indicating that attachment was positively related to willingness to reconcile, $\beta = .38$. The main effect of ingroup role did not reach significance, $F(1, 153) = 2.82, p = .095$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

**Mediation analyses.** To test the multi-step mediation model of the effect of ingroup role by glorification on willingness to reconcile through (a) retributive and restorative justice demands, and (b) support for future violence, we conducted two moderated mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (one analysis for each of the two “steps” of our model), and a path model testing the whole model at once. In the first mediation analysis, ingroup role was introduced as the IV, retributive and restorative justice demands as mediators, glorification as a moderator, and support for future violence as DV, with attachment as covariate (Hayes, 2012, model 8). In line with our mediational hypothesis, there were significant indirect effects of ingroup role on support for future violence: one through retributive justice demands when glorification was high ($boot\ coefficient = -.19$, $LCI = -.603$, $UCI = -.007$) but not when it was low, and another through restorative justice demands when glorification was low ($boot\ coefficient = -.21$, $LCI = -.571$, $UCI = -.032$) but not when it was high. In the second mediation analysis, ingroup role was introduced as the IV, support for future violence as a mediator, glorification as a moderator, and willingness to reconcile as DV. The indirect effect of ingroup role on willingness to reconcile through support for future violence was significant when glorification was high ($boot\ coefficient = .35$, $LCI = .060$, $UCI = .749$) but not when it was low.

To test all steps of our mediation model simultaneously, we conducted a path analysis with ingroup role, glorification, and their two-way interaction as exogenous variables,
controlling for attachment as another exogenous variable, and retributive and restorative justice
demands, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile as endogenous variables.
Mirroring our GLMs above, we modeled the main effects of ingroup role and glorification as
well as their interaction on both retributive and restorative justice demands as the “step 1
mediators,” both of which in turn affected support for future violence as the “step 2 mediator,”
which ultimately affected willingness to reconcile as the DV. In addition to affecting support for
future violence indirectly through demands for retributive and restorative justice, the three
exogenous variables also affected support for future violence (but not reconciliation) directly.
The statistical model is depicted with standardized path coefficients in Figure 8. This model
presented a reasonably good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 21.46, p = .006, CFI = .96, NFI = .93, SRMSR
= .04$.

**Post-hoc power analysis.** A post-hoc power analysis revealed that on the basis of the
average effect size for the two-way interactions between glorification and condition ($\eta_{avg}^2 = .05$),
and a sample size of 158, the statistical power to detect these interaction effects was high: 0.82.

**Discussion**

Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 in a different conflict context. In addition to the
conceptual replication, Study 2 also revealed significant interaction effects of ingroup role by
glorification on demands for retributive and restorative justice. As expected, high glorifiers
demanded more retributive, but not more restorative, justice when their ingroup was the victim
rather than the perpetrator of intergroup violence, indicating a distinctly retributive motive to
address their victim experiences. Low glorifiers, on the other hand, demanded less retributive
and less restorative justice when their ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator of
intergroup violence, indicating that they may be willing to lower their demands for justice in order to reconcile with the outgroup. It should be noted that both groups on average supported, rather than opposed, retributive and restorative justice as indicated by their relatively high means. Thus, the reduced justice demands among low glorifying victims should not be interpreted as a lack of concern for justice, but rather, an increased willingness to compromise on their generally substantial demands for justice.

Furthermore, our mediational analyses rendered support for the hypothesis that the effects of ingroup role on support for future violence are driven by demands for retributive and restorative justice. High glorifiers supported future violence more strongly when their ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator as a result of their increased demands for retributive justice. Low glorifying victims, on the other hand, did not support future violence more strongly, as a result of their decreased demands for restorative justice.

**Study 3**

Study 1 and Study 2 addressed the Serb perspective in the Bosnian War and the American perspective in the Iran-U.S. conflict, but not the perspectives of Bosniaks or Iranians, respectively. Due to the power asymmetry between the two groups in each respective conflict, members of lower-power groups (i.e. Bosniaks and Iranians) might react differently from those of the higher-power groups (i.e. Serbs and Americans). It is possible that victimization by a more powerful outgroup implies further diminution of ingroup power, thus increasing perceived difficulty and likelihood of successful retaliatory violence against the more powerful outgroup. Consequently, members of lower-power groups might be less likely to support future violence after being victimized by, as compared to having victimized, a higher-power outgroup. Research
on humiliation experienced by lower-power groups in intergroup conflict supports this hypothesis. Despite high levels of outrage that often accompany feelings of humiliation, humiliation has been demonstrated to produce an “inertia effect” (i.e., a tendency toward inaction and suppression of an otherwise desired violent reaction), as it is also characterized by perceived powerlessness (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Leidner, Sheikh, & Ginges, 2012). To examine the perspective of a lower-power group, Study 3 investigated Iranians’ reactions to the same intergroup violence between the U.S. and Iran as in Study 2. Due to the logistic difficulty involved in the participant recruitment process and data collection, we were unable to obtain a large enough sample of Iranians to conduct meaningful moderation analyses. Thus, we did not examine the moderating effects of glorification or attachment in Study 3. As our previous effects occurred mostly among high glorifiers, we thus made a concerted effort to recruit Iranians who supported the Iranian regime and then investigate main effects of condition in that sample.

**Methods**

**Participants.** We recruited 69 Iranian adults (43 men; age $M = 30.44$, $SD = 7.74$). As mentioned earlier, we decided to maximize the number of strongly glorifying participants in our sample. To this end, we targeted participants primarily based on political views, which have been known to correlate with glorification. Of the 69 participants so recruited, all were native Farsi speakers born in Iran, 64 were Muslim, and 23 had been drafted to the army (Iran has a yearly, mandatory military draft). The average number of years of education was 16.97 (equivalent to an average of a college degree; $SD = 2.98$; range = 10-26). When asked about political views in general, participants scored an average of 3.30 ($SD = 1.61$) on a 6-point scale (1 = *extremely liberal*; 6 = *extremely conservative*), suggesting no bias toward liberal political beliefs in the sample.
**Procedure and materials.** Participants followed the same procedure as in Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to either the ingroup victimization or the ingroup transgression condition. In the former, participants read about the same cases of prisoner abuse committed by American soldiers against Iranian civilians as in Study 2. In the latter, participants read about the same cases of prisoner abuse committed by Iranian soldiers against American civilians as in Study 2. The news reports were identical to the ones used in Study 2. Participants completed the same dependent measures as in Study 2. All items were measured on 6-point Likert scales.

**Results**

**Retributive and Restorative Justice.** According to an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), the items focusing on apology and financial reparations loaded onto the same factor as the retributive justice items; only the two items concerning value reaffirmation loaded on a separate factor. This factor pattern suggested that in this Iranian sample, apology and reparations were construed as punitive. Following these EFA results, we submitted retributive justice (including apology and reparations, $\alpha = .92, M = 4.56, SD = 1.49$) as well as restorative justice (value reaffirmation, $\alpha = .74, M = 4.77, SD = 1.32$) to a GLM with ingroup role as the IV. Ingroup role had a significant effect on retributive justice, $F(1, 62) = 24.26, p < .001, \eta^2 = .28$ ($LCI = .11, UCI = .44$), such that participants in the victim condition demanded significantly more retributive justice ($M = 5.37$) than participants in the perpetrator condition ($M = 3.80$). There was no significant effect on restorative justice, $F(1, 60) = 0.12, p = .734, \eta^2 = .00$.

**Support for future violence.** One item (“Iran should impose military sanctions against the U.S. as a conflict resolution strategy.”) was removed before creating a composite score due
to an item-total correlation of .19. On the resulting DV ($\alpha = .67, M = 1.20, SD = 0.40$), there was a significant effect of ingroup role, $F(1, 58) = 6.16, p = .016, \eta^2 = .10 \ (LCI = .00, UCI = .25)$. Consistent with the “inertia effect” hypothesis regarding lower-power groups, and unlike the members of the higher-power groups in Study 1 and 2, participants in the victim condition opposed future violence significantly more ($M = 1.05$) than participants in the perpetrator condition ($M = 1.30$). Because the mean of support for future violence exhibited a strong floor effect, we also performed a non-parametric t-test using the Wilcoxon signed-rank method. Consistent with our GLM above, support for future violence was significantly lower in the victim than in the perpetrator condition, $Ws = 652.00, z = -2.08, p = .042, r = -.27$.

**Willingness to reconcile.** There was no significant effect of ingroup role on willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .92, M = 4.30, SD = 1.53$), $F(1, 63) = 0.45, p = .506, \eta^2 = .01$.

**Post-hoc power analysis.** A post-hoc power analysis revealed more than adequate power of 0.98 for the comparison between the ingroup-victim and ingroup-perpetrator condition.

**Discussion**

The results indicated that Iranians were more supportive of retributive (but not restorative) justice when their ingroup was portrayed as the victim rather than the perpetrator, mirroring high glorifying Americans’ reactions in Study 2. Similar to Serbs in Study 1, Iranians on average reported very low levels of support for future violence with little variability. Despite this floor effect, we obtained results that are in line with the “inertia effect” Ginges and Atran (2008) found for Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel. That is, Iranians’ increased demands for retributive justice when their ingroup was the victim rather than the perpetrator did not translate into increased support for future violence. On the contrary, support for future violence was weaker,
not stronger, when the ingroup was the victim than the perpetrator, suggesting that the desire for retribution is offset by the ingroup’s relatively lower power and therefore does not give way to support for retaliatory violence.

**Study 4**

Findings from Study 1-3 collectively suggested that conflict intervention programs could benefit from satisfying the retributive justice demands of strongly glorifying members of victim groups, which may subsequently decrease their desire for future violence and overcome their resistance to reconciliation. The international discourse on the aftermath of large-scale intergroup conflict has increasingly recognized the importance of holding perpetrators of mass violence accountable through formal legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court (ICC; e.g. Teitel, 2003). The main goal of Study 4 was therefore to investigate whether learning that an international criminal tribunal addressed past intergroup violence can fulfill the need for retributive justice among strongly glorifying members of higher-power victim groups, and thereby eliminate the otherwise observed increase in support for future violence or opposition to reconciliation. Simultaneously, we also tested the often-made argument by critics of international justice that prosecution of past crimes can impede reconciliation because it provokes members of the perpetrator group (Coban, 2006; Colson, 2000). This test is equally important, as elimination of obstacles to reconciliation among victims will only lead to sustainable peace if it does not simultaneously create other obstacles among perpetrators.

**Methods**

**Participants.** The sample consisted of 412 Americans recruited from MTurk. After excluding one participant who was not a native English speaker, nine participants who indicated
having close ties with Iran, 36 participants who did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation material, two participants who raised suspicions about the credibility of the news report, 28 participants who were significant reading time outliers or spent less than 30 seconds, and 12 multivariate outliers, 324 participants were retained for data analyses (55% women; age $M = 34.58$, $SD = 12.56$). The 88 participants who were not retained for subsequent data analyses were evenly distributed across the study’s four conditions.

**Procedure and materials.** As in Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious *New York Times* article that was almost identical to the ones used in Study 2 and 3 except that the prisoner abuse was described as a systematic and widespread practice, in order to render prosecution of perpetrators by an international criminal tribunal a plausible and realistic approach to addressing the atrocities. We employed a 2 (ingroup role: victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (justice mechanism: tribunal vs. control) experimental design. The manipulation of ingroup role was the same as in previous studies – half of the participants read about American transgressions against Iranians and half read about American victimization by Iranians. Whereas participants in the control conditions were not given any further information on how the atrocities were addressed (i.e. identical to the previous study designs), participants in the tribunal conditions were given additional information on a decision made by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute the perpetrators by an international criminal tribunal. After reading the news article, participants completed the same dependent measures as in Study 2 with an additional measure of support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies. Three items measured support for diplomatic approach to conflict resolution (e.g., “The U.S. should actively seek diplomatic dialogue with Iran to discuss possible solutions to the conflict”). All items were measured on 9-point Likert scales.
Results

**Attachment and Glorification.** As in Study 2, the distribution of glorification ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 4.46$, $SD = 1.55$) was mildly positively skewed, thus again necessitating a square root transformation. The distribution of attachment ($\alpha = .95$, $M = 6.48$, $SD = 1.80$) was mildly negatively skewed, necessitating a reversed square root transformation.

**Retributive Justice.** The analysis yielded a significant main effect of justice mechanism on demands for retributive justice, $F(1, 315) = 9.57$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Participants in the tribunal conditions ($M = 5.31$) reported significantly less demands for retributive justice as compared to those in the control conditions ($M = 5.83$). There was also a significant two-way interaction between ingroup role and glorification, $F(1, 315) = 61.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$. Analyses of simple effects revealed the exact same pattern as in previous studies: high glorifiers demanded significantly more retributive justice when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 6.34$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 4.63$), $t(315) = 6.47$, $p < .001$, whereas low glorifiers demanded significantly less retributive justice when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 5.00$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 6.38$), $t(315) = -4.78$, $p < .001$. The hypothesized three-way interaction of ingroup role and justice mechanism by glorification trended toward significance, $F(1, 315) = 1.88$, $p = .172$, $\eta^2 = .01$ ($LCI = .00$, $UCI = .03$). Important to our hypothesis, reading about the tribunal significantly reduced strongly glorifying victims’ demands for retribution ($M = 5.80$) compared to not reading about any justice mechanism ($M = 6.88$), $t(315) = -2.88$, $p = .004$. For strongly glorifying perpetrators, holding ingroup members accountable through a tribunal did not

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5 To directly replicate the findings of previous studies, we also analyzed data with only participants in the two control conditions, excluding those in the tribunal conditions. We also merged data from Study 2 and the control conditions in Study 4. The results converged with the previous findings. See Supplementary Materials.
significantly alter their demands for retributive justice, \( t(315) = 1.29, p = .199 \). Low glorifiers, in contrast, demanded more retributive justice when the ingroup was the perpetrator rather than the victim in both control and tribunal conditions, \( ts(315) > 2.95, ps < .004 \). Unlike for high glorifiers, the implementation of a tribunal did not significantly affect low glorifiers’ demands for retributive justice when the ingroup was the victim (\( M_{\text{tribunal}} = 4.92, M_{\text{control}} = 5.09 \)), \( t(315) = -.44, p = .661 \), and it tended to decrease their demands for retributive justice when the ingroup was the perpetrator (\( M_{\text{tribunal}} = 6.04, M_{\text{control}} = 6.71 \)), \( t(315) = 1.58, p = .115 \). No other effects reached significance, \( Fs(1, 315) < .84, ps > .380, \eta^2 < .01 \).

**Restorative Justice.** There was a significant main effect of ingroup role on demands for restorative justice, \( F(1, 315) = 6.42, p = .012, \eta^2 = .02 \), such that participants demanded significantly less restorative justice in response to ingroup victimization (\( M = 6.05 \)) as compared to ingroup transgressions (\( M = 6.51 \)). This main effect was further qualified by a two-way interaction between ingroup role and glorification, \( F(1, 315) = 32.17, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09 \). Consistent with the previous studies, low glorifiers demanded significantly less restorative justice when their ingroup was the victim (\( M = 5.56 \)) rather than the perpetrator (\( M = 7.28 \)), \( t(315) = -6.72, p < .001 \). On the contrary, high glorifiers demanded significantly more restorative justice when their ingroup was the victim (\( M = 6.48 \)) rather than the perpetrator (\( M = 5.86 \)), \( t(315) = 2.59, p = .010 \). The interaction between ingroup role and justice mechanism trended toward significance, \( F(1, 315) = 2.55, p = .112, \eta^2 = .01 \). In the control conditions, ingroup victimization (\( M = 6.40 \)) significantly decreased participants’ demands for restorative justice compared to ingroup transgression (\( M = 6.93 \)), \( t(315) = -2.91, p = .004 \). In contrast, ingroup role did not significantly affect demands for restorative justice for participants in the tribunal conditions, \( t(315) = -.67, p = .502 \). The main effect of attachment approached significance, \( F(1,
315) = 3.15, \( p = .077 \), \( \eta^2 = .01 \), indicating that attachment was somewhat positively correlated with support for reparations, \( \beta = .17 \). The main effect of glorification was also trending, \( F(1, 315) = 2.32, p = .129 \), \( \eta^2 = .01 \), indicating that glorification tended to be negatively associated with support for restorative justice, \( \beta = -.17 \). No other effects reached significance, \( Fs(1, 315) < .34, ps > .558 \), \( \eta^2 < .01 \).

**Violent and Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies.** We first conducted an EFA to determine whether support for violent and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies were indeed two distinct constructs as we had intended. The results indicated that items of violent and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies all loaded together on a single factor, with items of violent conflict resolution strategies loading positively and items of diplomatic conflict resolution strategies loading negatively on the same factor. We thus reverse coded the items of diplomatic conflict resolution strategies and created a composite score, *support for future violence*, combining both the violent and the reverse-coded diplomatic conflict resolution items. Analyses with this variable (\( \alpha = .80 \), \( M = 3.05 \), \( SD = 1.28 \)) as the DV revealed a significant interaction between ingroup role and justice mechanism, \( F(1, 315) = 7.09, p = .008 \), \( \eta^2 = .02 \). In the control conditions, ingroup victimization (\( M = 3.33 \)) significantly increased participants’ support for future violence, compared to ingroup transgressions (\( M = 2.91 \)), \( t(315) = 2.27, p = .024 \). In contrast, ingroup role did not significantly affect participants’ support for future violence in the tribunal conditions, \( t(315) = -1.49, p = .138 \). This two-way interaction was further qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction with glorification, \( F(1, 315) = 3.75, p = .054 \), \( \eta^2 = .01 (LCI = .00, UCI = .04) \). High glorifiers reported significantly more support for future violence when the ingroup was the victim (\( M = 4.03 \)) rather than the perpetrator (\( M = 3.37 \)) in the control conditions, \( t(315) = 2.88, p = .004 \). The opposite pattern was observed in the
tribunal conditions, such that high glorifiers reported marginally significantly less support for future violence when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 3.19$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 3.67$), $t(315) = 1.94, p = .053$. Important to our hypothesis, reading about the tribunal significantly reduced strongly glorifying victims’ support for future violence ($M = 4.03$) as compared to not reading about any justice mechanism ($M = 3.19$), $t(315) = -3.53, p < .001$. For strongly glorifying perpetrators, holding ingroup members accountable through a tribunal did not significantly alter their support for future violence, $t(315) = 1.26, p = .208$. Low glorifiers, in contrast, did not differ in their support for future violence depending on the experimental manipulations, $t(315) < .53, ps > .594$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 315) = 49.23, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .14$, indicating that glorification was positively related to support for future violence, $\beta = .56$. The main effect of attachment approached significance, $F(1, 315) = 2.99, p = .084$, $\eta^2 = .01$, indicating that attachment was somewhat negatively related to support for future violence, $\beta = -.14$. No other effects reached significance, $Fs(1, 315) < 1.68, ps > .196$, $\eta^2_s < .01$.

**Willingness to Reconcile.** The analysis with willingness to reconcile ($\alpha = .89, M = 6.12, SD = 1.34$) as DV yielded a significant main effect of ingroup role, $F(1, 315) = 5.40, p = .021$, $\eta^2 = .02$. Being victimized by Iran ($M = 5.94$) reduced American participants’ willingness to reconcile, compared to perpetrating violence against Iran ($M = 6.30$). As expected, this main effect was further qualified by a significant three-way interaction of ingroup role by justice mechanism and glorification, $F(1, 315) = 5.20, p = .023$, $\eta^2 = .02 (LCI = .00, UCI = .05)$. In the control conditions, high glorifiers reported significantly less willingness to reconcile when the ingroup was the victim ($M = 5.36$) rather than the perpetrator ($M = 6.23$), $t(315) = 3.24, p = .001$, whereas no such difference was observed in the tribunal conditions, $t(315) = -.47, p = .636$. 
Importantly, learning about the tribunal significantly enhanced strongly glorifying victims’ willingness to reconcile ($M = 5.99$), as compared to not reading about any justice mechanism ($M = 5.36$), $t(315) = 2.25$, $p = .025$. Information about the tribunal did not significantly alter strongly glorifying perpetrators’ willingness to reconcile, $t(315) = -1.39$, $p = .167$. Low glorifiers, in contrast, did not differ significantly in their willingness to reconcile depending on the experimental manipulations, $t(315) < 1.64$, $ps > .103$. The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 315) = 8.00$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .02$, indicating that glorification was negatively related to openness to reconciliation, $\beta = -.27$. No other effects reached significance, $Fs(1, 315) < 1.41$, $ps > .237$, $\eta^2s < .01$.

Post-hoc power analysis. A post-hoc power analysis revealed that the power to detect the three-way interactions between ingroup’s role and justice mechanism by glorification was 0.51.

Discussion

We demonstrated that learning about a tribunal holding perpetrators accountable reduced strongly glorifying victims’ demands for retributive justice, lowered their support for future violence, and increased their willingness to reconcile, as compared to strongly glorifying victims’ responses in the control conditions. While the omnibus test of the three-way interaction on retributive justice was only trending toward significance, the pattern of the simple effects was as predicted, and fully significant. At the same time, the information about putting ingroup perpetrators on trial did not significantly affect the responses of strongly glorifying members of the perpetrator group. These findings suggests that international criminal justice can help fulfill strongly glorifying victims’ need for retributive justice and thereby curb support for retaliatory
violence and facilitate reconciliation. The lack of evidence for the argument of critics of international criminal justice, that trials might intensify perpetrators’ support for violence and opposition to reconciliation, suggests that international criminal justice can help eliminate obstacles to conflict resolution and reconciliation on the victims’ side without creating new obstacles or backlash on the perpetrators’ side.

**General Discussion**

In four experiments with three different populations in two vastly different intergroup contexts, we investigated the effects of ingroup victimization, as compared to ingroup transgressions, on people’s short-term and long-term responses in the aftermath of the violence. Among Serbs (Study 1) and Americans (Study 2 and 4) who strongly (but not weakly) glorified their country, ingroup victimization led to more support for future violence and less willingness to reconcile, compared to ingroup transgressions. The reason for the increased support for future violence and decreased willingness to reconcile among high glorifying victims (as compared to high glorifying perpetrators) lay in increased demands for retributive justice, whereas the reason for the lack of these effects among low glorifiers lay in decreased demands for restorative justice (Study 2). Illuminating another layer of complexity, Study 3 suggested a potential boundary condition for these effects. That is, despite increased demands for retributive justice, members of lower-power groups (here, Iranians in the Iran-U.S. conflict) responded with reduced support for future violence to ingroup victimization than transgression. Finally, Study 4 showed that by fulfilling strongly glorifying victims’ desire for retributive justice, information about international criminal justice reduced their support for future violence and fostered willingness to reconcile. Importantly, such information did not provoke negative responses from perpetrator group members.
Justice and Peace

Our findings have important implications for the peace-making process. The relationships between justice and other peace-making processes (e.g., conflict settlement, conflict resolution, reconciliation) have been subject to debate for decades in the international discourse of peace and justice. Whereas some view justice and peace as complementary goals in post-conflict transformations (e.g., Andrieu, 2009; Bass, 2000; Méndez, 1997; Teitel, 1999), others perceive the pursuit of justice as at odds with that of peace, arguing that insisting on justice hinders willingness to cease violence among perpetrators and encourages retaliatory acts among victims (e.g., Cobban, 2006; Goldsmith & Krasner, 2003). Amplifying this uncertainty about the link between justice and peace, there has been no experimental research rigorously testing the arguments of either side of the debate (see Leidner & Li, accepted). By specifying the roles of different types of justice (i.e., retributive and restorative justice), the current research takes a first step to disentangle the mixed findings and opposing arguments from previous scholarship.

Replicating past research (Leidner et al., 2013), among (strongly glorifying) victims of intergroup violence retributive justice demands have adverse effects on peace, especially when the ingroup has higher power than the outgroup, whereas restorative justice demands do not. We also extended the existing literature by examining the dynamic interplay between victim and perpetrator groups. Due to their divergent justice goals, strongly glorifying group members are less likely to reach or support peace agreements when their group has suffered rather than perpetrated violence against another group—especially considering that leaders and decision makers on each side are usually high glorifiers who have strong ties to the groups they represent.

Our experimental evidence also speaks to the malleability of people’s attitudes toward conflict resolution and reconciliation that has been argued for by Leidner and colleagues.
(Leidner, Tropp, & Lickel, 2013), and the possibility that establishing a tribunal can satisfy, at least to a certain extent, victims’ desire for retributive justice, which can subsequently decrease support for future violence and facilitate reconciliation. This research thus lends empirical support to tribunal advocates’ arguments that ensuring accountability through formal retributive justice mechanisms can help bring about peace and reconciliation (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004), without necessarily decreasing cooperation from the perpetrator group. Other interventions such as intergroup contact or self-affirmation have been implemented to increase outgroup-directed empathy, trust, and forgiveness among victims (e.g., Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008). While these findings may suggest that such interventions could also be used to decrease strongly glorifying victims’ yearning for retributive justice, they may be ineffective and even backfire if victims’ demands and needs are left unaddressed. Thus, international justice may be a better intervention in this context.

Another note-worthy finding is that low glorifying victims, unlike high glorifying victims, did not significantly increase their support for future violence or decrease their willingness to reconcile, and decreased rather than increased their demands for both retributive and restorative justice. While this finding supports our hypothesis that low glorifying victims might be more compromising in terms of their justice demands in favor of repairing the broken bond with the outgroup, more research is needed to understand this finding better. It is safe to say, however, that low glorifying victims do not pose an obstacle to cessation of violence and reconciliation. Moreover, despite being relatively less concerned with justice in general, they too might welcome international justice mechanisms in the peace process if they were implemented. Thus, international justice may be beneficial for those who demand it as well as those who do not.
Power and Intergroup Conflict

The present research finds that Iranians exhibited the opposite pattern regarding support for future violence compared to Americans and Serbs. Due to the power asymmetry between Iran and the U.S., we interpreted this result based on the notion that members of lower-power groups refrain from violent actions due to inertia (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Consistent with previous research, this inertia effect did not appear to lead to increased support for reconciliation. Although this interpretation is plausible, we cannot establish a causal link between perceived power and the observed differences in American and Iranian attitudes toward future violence. In addition to power status, the two countries differ in a variety of other important aspects such as religion, history, culture, and legal system, which could all potentially account for their citizens’ differential reactions to ingroup victimization and transgression. Therefore, research that experimentally manipulates power is warranted to further explore the power dynamics in intergroup conflict and its resolution.

Concluding Remarks

Four experiments demonstrated that whether the ingroup is the perpetrator or the victim in intergroup transgressions can influence people’s attitudes toward future violence against and reconciliation with members of the outgroup. Establishing the roles that demands for retributive and restorative justice play in these effects, this research lays the groundwork for future research that aims to promote compatible justice demands, support for non-violent conflict resolution and reconciliation between both sides of a conflict, and can inform legal and policy decision making in transforming post-conflict societies, for instance through international criminal justice.
Acknowledgement

Study 4 in this research has been supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BCS-1324097) to the second author.
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Figures

Figure 1. Conceptual model of the hypothesized effects of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) on willingness to reconcile through demands for retributive and restorative justice, and support for future violence, moderated by ingroup glorification while controlling for ingroup attachment.
Figure 2. Support for future violence as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 1).
Figure 3. Willingness to reconcile as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 1).
Figure 4. Retributive justice as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).
Figure 5. Restorative justice as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).
Figure 6. Support for future violence as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).
Figure 7. Willingness to reconcile as a function of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim) and ingroup glorification, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2).
Figure 8. The direct and indirect effects of ingroup role (perpetrator vs. victim), ingroup glorification, and their interaction on demands for retributive and restorative justice, support for future violence, and willingness to reconcile, with ingroup attachment controlled for (Study 2). Paths displayed in black were hypothesized. Paths displayed in gray were modeled to stay consistent with the general linear models, but neither crucial to our hypotheses nor part of our main findings. Solid paths were significant, and dashed paths were not. Standardized path coefficients are reported.