America and the Age of Genocide: Labeling a Third-Party Conflict “Genocide” Decreases Support for Intervention Among Ingroup-Glorifying Americans Because They Down-Regulate Guilt and Perceived Responsibility to Intervene

Bernhard Leidner

Abstract
Drawing on research on the collapse of compassion and group processes and interrelations, four experiments investigated how labeling a conflict “genocide” affects distant bystanders’ support for intervention. The genocide label (compared with no label or the label “not a genocide”) weakened Americans’ support for intervention in a crisis analogous to Darfur. Ingroup glorification moderated this effect such that the genocide label decreased support at high levels of glorification (Studies 1-3). Ingroup attachment, if anything, moderated such that the genocide label increased support at high levels of attachment (Studies 1 and 3). Importantly, the effects occurred even when controlling for conservatism (Studies 1 and 3), gender, religion, military affiliation, and level of education (Study 2). Decreases in anticipated guilt over possible nonintervention (Studies 1 and 3) among high glorifiers, and a subsequent decrease in perceived obligation to intervene (Study 3), mediated the effect of the genocide label on support for intervention.

Keywords
bystanders, intergroup conflict, genocide, language, collapse of compassion

Received April 12, 2015; revision accepted August 26, 2015

We should have learned from Rwanda that to stop genocide, Washington must first say the word.

—Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, members of the advocacy group Africa Action in The Nation, June 24, 2004

we concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility and that genocide may still be occurring.

—Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, September 9, 2004

Genocide has been the leading cause of preventable violent death in the 20th to 21st centuries, taking more lives than war (Blum, Stanton, Sagi, & Richter, 2007). In her book A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power (2002) has identified group-level bystander effects as key causes for the repeated failures to stop genocide (for a review, see Cormier et al., 2010). A particular mechanism underlying these group-level bystander effects is the so-called collapse of compassion (see also psychophysical or psychic numbing, Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Slovic, 2007). It describes the phenomenon that rather than increasing, emotions such as empathy or guilt often decrease with an increasing number of people in need (Cameron & Payne, 2011; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). Thus, the collapse of compassion has also been implicated in the lack of genocide intervention.

To combat the collapse of compassion, scholars, practitioners, and policy makers have been arguing to use the specific term “genocide” (as opposed to other terms such as “ethnic cleansing”) to stop “inaction in preventing current and future

1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

Corresponding Author:
Bernhard Leidner, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 135 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003, USA.
Email: bleidner@psych.umass.edu
genocide” and instead increase support for genocide intervention (Blum et al., 2007; see also Cormier et al., 2010; Power, 2002). Regardless, the term “genocide” has traditionally been used after the fact. Breaking with this tradition, in 2004, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell concluded from a report by the Coalition for International Justice that the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur constituted “genocide” (cf. Totten, 2006). For many, Powell’s statement was tied to the hope that attaching the label “genocide” to an ongoing humanitarian crisis would prompt intervention (cf. Straus, 2005). Yet, more than 10 years later, the genocide is still ongoing, as decisive intervention by the United States and others has not materialized.

Following the motivated emotion regulation account of the collapse of compassion (Cameron & Payne, 2011), I argue that the effect of the g-word on the collapse of compassion and support for bystander intervention depends on distant bystanders’ motivations in line with their identification with the (potentially intervening) ingroup. The g-word can indeed curb the collapse of compassion for some, and consequently increase support for intervention. In others, however, the g-word can unintentionally facilitate the collapse of compassion, and consequently decrease support for intervention. Testing these claims, this article advances research on the bystander effect, the collapse of compassion, helping behavior, as well as research on the effects of language on emotions, attitudes, and behavior.

Bystanders, Helping, and the Collapse of Compassion

As Latane and Darley (1970) demonstrated that the presence of bystanders inhibits helping behavior, many studies have replicated and extended this finding to various situations (e.g., Blair, Thompson, & Wunsch, 2005; Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2013; Hurley & Allen, 1974; Levine & Crowther, 2008; for a meta-analysis, see Fischer et al., 2011) and even to the imagined/distant rather than real/proximate presence of bystanders (e.g., Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002). The reasons for the inhibition of helping behavior through bystanders lie in audience inhibition, social influence, diffusion of responsibility, perceived lack of competence to provide help, and perceived likelihood that help would be ineffective or even harmful. Yet, the bystander effect is malleable and can even be eliminated (Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2013; Kerr, 1983; Kerr & Bruin, 1983; Shepperd, 1993), for example, by emotions such as anger, outrage, guilt, or empathic concern for others in need, which increase helping behavior even in situations where the presence of many people usually undermines helping (Batson, 1997, 1998; Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Batson et al., 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).

In the context of large social groups in need, however, distant bystanders often prevent themselves from experiencing help-inducing emotions (compared with the extent they would allow themselves to experience these emotions in situations with fewer people in need; cf. Staub, 1989a). Consequently, multiple individuals do not receive more, and sometimes receive even less, compassion (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Slovic, 2007) and help (e.g., Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) than one individual. Similarly, statistically described large numbers of people in need receive less compassion than one person in need (Small et al., 2007). In other words, bystanders’ affective sensitivity decreases with increasing numbers of people in need. Thus, the larger a crisis is in magnitude, the less help distant bystanders will provide. Sadly, this so-called collapse of compassion helps explain why humanity continuously fails to deliver its repeated promise of “never again.” Even more sadly, the collapse of compassion should also be quite resistant to the fix the g-word has been widely expected to provide.

Effects of the G-Word

A substantial body of research demonstrates the power of language for many phenomena and fields (for reviews, see Fiedler, 2008; Giles & Coupland, 1991; Pickering & Majid, 2007; Semin, 2008), ranging from self-regulation (Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005), stereotyping (Maass, 1999), implicit prejudice (Nicolas & Skinner, 2012), and aggression (DeWall & Bushman, 2009) to politics (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Rubini & Sigall, 2002) and the law (Schmid & Fiedler, 1998). With respect to genocide, language has been identified as a powerful facilitator of genocide (e.g., Donohue, 2012), for instance, by assigning dehumanizing labels to target groups (“cockroach”). Conversely, some opined that the label “genocide” and analogies to past genocides (e.g., the Holocaust) have been used by politicians, policy makers, and pundits to sway the public’s support for intervention in contemporary conflicts (e.g., post-Srebrenica Bosnia, Kosovo; Steinweis, 2005). At the same time, however, evidence for the power of language in mounting support to stop genocide has only been anecdotal. Thus, it is important to empirically test the potential of the g-word to inhibit and/or facilitate the collapse of compassion, and therefore increase and/or decrease support for bystander intervention.

The reason why the g-word should curb the collapse of compassion and therefore increase support for bystander intervention in some, but facilitate the collapse of compassion and therefore decrease support for bystander intervention in others, lies in the mechanism underlying the collapse of compassion. Some theories posit that the collapse of compassion occurs because groups and individuals are cognitively represented in different ways, and hence, groups do not elicit emotions to the same extent that individuals do (Hamilton, Sherman, & Maddox, 1999; Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Sherman, Beike, & Ryalls, 1999; Slovic, 2007). Recent evidence suggests, however, that the collapse of compassion occurs because people make motivated attempts to regulate
their emotions (Cameron & Payne, 2011). In other words, people (down-)regulate their otherwise help-inducing emotions under certain motivational conditions. Generally, the motivation is to avoid material or psychological costs to the self: if helping is not costly, people will reduce their arousal by helping; if it is costly, however, they will reduce their arousal through rationalization strategies, or avoid arousal in the first place (see also L. L. Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994).

Based on the motivated emotion regulation account, the collapse of compassion should depend on the extent to which people’s motivations are relevant to the situational context. Supporting this account, Cameron and Payne (2011) showed that the collapse of compassion only occurred when bystanders expected that they must help; without this expectation, people’s compassion did not collapse, and they helped eight victims more than one. Similarly, only people skilled at emotion regulation had their compassion collapse, whereas others did not. Importantly, rather than decreasing initially strong emotions, people preemptively regulated their emotions such that they prevented their emotions from becoming intense to begin with. Similarly, Levine and Crowther (2008) found that when a social category is salient and bystanders and victims share social category membership, group size encourages helping, whereas when one or both of these conditions are not met, group size inhibits helping (see also Klar, Shori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013; Vollhardt, 2013). In essence, then, the collapse of compassion only occurs when people are motivated to regulate their emotions to “stifle moral impulse in the service of self-interest” (Cameron & Payne, 2011, p. 13).

**Emotion Regulation in Response to the G-Word Depends on Ingroup Identification**

In the context of distant bystanders’ responses to humanitarian crises and the g-word, ingroup identification should be an important moderator of people’s motivations and hence their reactions to the g-word. It is well known that ingroup identification is associated with ingroup favoritism (Stroebe, Lodewijkx, & Spears, 2005), avoidance of costly moral obligations (Bandura, 1999; Bersoff, 1999; Tsang, 2002), reduced sensitivity to social justice (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010), and fundamentally different values (Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010). People who strongly identify with their ingroup are largely motivated by values of conservation, stability, and security, whereas people who do not are largely motivated by values of universalism, welfare of humanity, and peace (Roccas et al., 2010). Moreover, high identifiers attribute less value to outgroup than to ingroup lives, and care less for outgroup suffering when there is nothing to gain for the ingroup (Pratto & Glasford, 2008).

Yet, unlike intervention in nongenocidal conflicts, intervention in genocidal conflicts is usually motivated by preservation of moral norms and values, rather than self/group interest (Choi, 2013). Unlike nongenocidal conflicts, genocidal conflicts are usually internal conflicts, with genocidal regimes directing their violence inward rather than outward. Consequently, genocidal conflicts tend not to threaten distant bystanders’ ingroup lives, their ingroup’s security or stability. In fact, usually the only threat to distant bystander groups emerges when they do intervene in the genocide. Thus, strongly (but not weakly) identifying bystanders perceive intervention in genocidal conflicts, more so than intervention in nongenocidal conflicts, as particularly costly and risky to the ingroup (e.g., its security). As such, intervention in genocidal conflicts is more closely aligned with the values of low identifiers than with those of high identifiers. Intervention in nongenocidal conflicts, however, is in line with the values of both low and high identifiers. Therefore, low identifiers should be motivated to support intervention regardless of whether or not a conflict is considered a genocide, or, if anything, to support intervention more when the conflict is genocidal rather than nongenocidal. High identifiers, however, should be less motivated to support intervention when the conflict is genocidal rather than nongenocidal. In other words, the g-word should decrease the motivation to support intervention among high but not low identifiers. Furthermore, as high identifiers are primarily concerned about costs and benefits to the ingroup and not just any group, the g-word should decrease high identifiers’ motivation to support intervention by the ingroup in particular, though not necessarily the motivation to support intervention by other groups.

Yet, although not intervening avoids costs to distant bystanders’ ingroup, it threatens to incur psychological costs, for example, in the form of aversive self-conscious emotions such as guilt (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010a, 2010b) or image shame (Gausel & Leach, 2011). These psychological costs and their anticipation (see also Ahn, Kim, & Aggarwal, 2014) hinder high identifiers in reaching their motivated reduction in support for intervention. In this way, high identifiers have the conundrum that their motivation to prevent what they perceive as costs to the ingroup is in conflict with their motivation to be free from aversive experiences for the self. Yet, people are equipped to psychologically rid themselves from negative self-sanctions (Bandura, 1999, 2002). One way to do so should be the preemptive down-regulation of emotions such as guilt, which often induces helping motivations and behavior (Lindsey, 2005; Shorr & McClelland, 1998), and therefore in this situation interfere with the motivated goal of not helping. Thus, when a conflict is labeled genocide, not only might high identifiers rationalize morally questionable omissions of help after the fact, but they might strategically prepare for it by numbing themselves to goal-interfering emotions beforehand. Doing so provides a solution to the dilemma of two conflicting motivations that high identifiers face, allowing them to act in accordance with the motivation to prevent costs to the ingroup without incurring other psychological costs for the self. For low identifiers,
however, whose values are in line with genocide intervention, the g-word should not increase their motivation to prevent help-inducing emotions, and consequently not decrease support for intervention. In essence, then, the g-word should motivate both high and low identifiers to further their own agenda set forth by their values and ensuing motivations. Whereas low identifiers should be able to do so in a straightforward fashion, high identifiers should be able to do so only by first reducing aversive emotions such as guilt.

As passive and active bystanders have dramatically different self-concepts (Monroe, 2008; Monroe & Epperson, 1994; Staub, 1989a, 2002), the moderating effects of social identification hypothesized above should depend not only on the quantity (high/low) but also on the quality of identification. According to Roccas and colleagues (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008), social identification consists of attachment to and glorification of the ingroup. The pernicious effects past research has found among high identifiers are mostly driven by ingroup glorification, referring to beliefs in ingroup superiority over other groups and deference to ingroup norms and authorities (see also Staub, 1985, 2002), whereas the prosocial effects past research has sometimes found among high identifiers are mostly driven by attachment, referring to commitment to and importance of the ingroup. Glorification leads to defensive disengagement from ingroup wrongdoings, which threaten the inflated self and group image glorifiers hold, triggering, for instance, exonerating cognitions (Roccas et al., 2006), explicit dehumanization of victims and minimization of their emotions (Leidner et al., 2010), shifts from violence-prohibiting harm and fairness morals toward violence-allowing loyalty and authority morals (Leidner & Castano, 2012), and denial of ingroup responsibility (Bilali, 2013). Attachment, however, leads to critical engagement with ingroup wrongdoings, reducing exonerating cognitions (Roccas et al., 2006), reinforcing violence-prohibiting harm and fairness morals (Leidner & Castano, 2012), and increasing acknowledgment of wrongdoing (Bilali, 2013). Importantly, glorification predicts reduced guilt for ingroup wrongdoing, whereas attachment predicts increased guilt for ingroup wrongdoing (Roccas et al., 2006).

Although research on glorification and attachment to date has focused on ingroup–outgroup conflicts, these concepts should also be important in the context of the present research (i.e., ingroup helping in outgroup–outgroup conflicts). The possibility of not helping should lead to a threat to distant bystanders’ self and group image, as omission of help is morally questionable (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010a, 2010b). The strong norm of helping, which has even led to international law’s Responsibility to Protect (outgroups from crimes such as genocide), should if anything increase this threat. For strongly glorifying bystanders, this threat should trigger defensive disengagement, motivating an increased collapse of compassion and consequently a decrease in support for intervention. For strongly attached bystanders, however, the threat should lead to critical engagement, curbing the collapse of compassion and consequently, if anything, increasing support for intervention. In sum, the negative effects of the g-word hypothesized above should be mostly driven by ingroup glorification, whereas any positive effects should be mostly driven by ingroup attachment. Under this lens, past findings that bystanders who engage in collective helping efforts tend to be strongly identified with their own group (e.g., Klar et al., 2013) and explicitly cite strong national identification as the main reason for why they did not remain passive (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) likely reflect ingroup attachment, not glorification, and are thus in line with this more nuanced moderation hypothesis. Furthermore, Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura, and Hopthrow’s (2010) finding that distant bystanders’ victim blaming leads to less donation behavior in cases of disasters is also in line with my hypothesis that people do at times disengage from helping situations, even when their ingroup has not been involved in creating the situation.

It is also important to note that the hypothesized moderating effects should be independent from political ideology, a variable known to be strongly associated with ingroup identification and especially glorification. As evidenced by bipartisan participation in grassroots movements such as “Save Darfur” and other, including political, efforts to stop genocide, liberals and conservatives seem to be equally likely to support genocide intervention. Thus, it is important to account for political ideology and its overlap with ingroup attachment and glorification when investigating the proposed moderating effects.

Overview of the Studies

Three experiments tested the hypotheses explicated above. If a relative lack of support for bystander intervention occurs through an increase in the collapse of compassion among high glorifiers, they should prevent themselves from feeling guilt or responsibility, which usually induce helping behavior but incur psychological costs due to their aversive nature (cf. Cameron & Payne, 2011). Preventing or reducing the experience of guilt for not helping should then allow them to lower their support for intervention. Thus, following others (e.g., Ahn et al., 2014; Cameron & Payne, 2011), the collapse of compassion was operationalized through guilt for possible nonintervention (Studies 1 and 3). To test the hypothesis that high glorifiers’ support for bystander intervention was driven by self-/ingroup interest rather than humanitarian values, Studies 1 and 3 also tested the effect of the g-word on support for intervention by the ingroup and other groups separately. If high glorifiers are driven by ingroup interest, the g-word should only decrease their support for ingroup (but not outgroup) intervention. Study 2 further focused on the relationship of ingroup glorification and support for intervention, and how it changes from nongenocidal to genocidal conflicts. If high glorifiers’ support for intervention is driven
by self-/ingroup interest, glorification should positively predict support for intervention in nongenocidal conflicts, but not (or negatively) in genocidal conflicts. Study 3 also tested the role that perceived moral/legal obligation to intervene plays in support for intervention in humanitarian crises. While some argue that it might offset the collapse of compassion, I expected it to also be eroded by the collapse of compassion, rendering it another element of the mechanism that underlies the negative effect of the g-word on support for intervention among high glorifiers.

### Study 1

Study 1 had several goals: first, to test whether the g-word would indeed decrease support for (genocide) intervention, and whether such an effect would occur only for those who are strongly glorifying their group; second, to examine the mechanism underlying this effect, focusing on anticipated/forecasted guilt for possible nonintervention as a proxy for collapsed compassion; and third, testing the hypothesis that the decrease in support for intervention was driven by ingroup interest. Study 1 examined whether this decrease depended on the provider of the intervention (ingroup vs. outgroups). To account for the overlap between glorification on one hand and attachment and conservatism on the other, Study 1 also assessed people’s attachment and conservatism.

### Method

**Participants.** To avoid external validity problems of college samples—a shortcoming particularly important in conflict research (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011; Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, & Darley, 2012; Lilie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007)—the experiment was conducted online with a noncollege adult sample of 319, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Twelve participants not born in the United States, 6 who spent significantly more time reading the manipulation material than others (indicating that they were interrupted during the study), 7 who misunderstood or did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation material (as indicated by incorrect answers to questions checking core facts of the manipulation material), and 17 multivariate outliers (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) were excluded from subsequent analyses, leaving 277 participants (135 males, 142 females, M age = 36.54, SD = 12.67) for analysis. The percentage of participants excluded from subsequent analyses did not differ between conditions and was similar to other online research (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014).

**Procedure.** The experiment was conducted online. Participants were engaged in a situation of large-scale intergroup helping in a way that distant bystanders usually get engaged in such situations: through media exposure (see Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). Thus, they read about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur as it had actually been reported in the New York Times. A newspaper article described that “government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement” against “black Africans.” Casualty, injury, and refugee numbers from the original New York Times article remained unchanged, and so did the ethnic(ized) nature of the conflict, portrayed to be between Arabs and Black Africans (see the appendix for full materials). Only two elements were adapted from the original article: (a) the conclusion as to whether or not the crisis constituted genocide, to manipulate the “genocide label,” and (b) the parties in the conflict were said to be the Burundi (rather than Sudanese) government and militia forces versus Burundi (rather than Darfuri) minority groups who took up arms, to avoid participants’ possible familiarity with Darfur due to large grassroots movements and media attention up to 2007. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, reading that the conflict was said to constitute genocide (genocide condition), said not to constitute genocide (no-genocide condition), or —intended as a baseline, given that in many situations it is unclear whether a conflict constitutes genocide or not—said to be ambiguous as to whether or not it may constitute genocide (maybe-genocide condition). In all conditions, the same conflict, violence, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were described. A pretest of the manipulation provided strong evidence for its effectiveness, in that it only affected the understanding of the conflict in terms of whether or not it constituted genocide, but not in terms of violence in general (e.g., war crimes, crimes against humanity; see Supplemental Materials). After the manipulation, participants answered a few questions to ensure that they had paid sufficient attention to the reading materials. Then, the following measures were administered, all on visual analog scales from 1 to 9 unless indicated otherwise. The items within each scale were presented in randomized order. At the end of the study, participants were probed about suspicions and their knowledge of Burundi; no participant suspected that the information in the news article was false.

**Guilt (M = 4.91, SD = 2.30, a = .96).** Three items assessed the extent to which participants anticipated to experience guilt if their country were not to intervene in the conflict in Burundi, on a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (e.g., “Although I would not be personally responsible, as an American, I would feel guilty if my country does not intervene in the conflict in Burundi,” “As an American, it makes me feel guilty when I think about the possibility of my country not helping the Burundians who suffer”).

**Willingness to help (M = 5.67, SD = 1.64, a = .81).** Five items measured personal and U.S. government help for Burundian civilians on a scale from no, absolutely not to yes, absolutely (e.g., “Would you be willing to personally help Burundian...
civilians in need through donations for humanitarian aid?”; “Would you be willing to personally help Burundian civilians by writing pleas for help to United States politicians?”; “Would you support sending United States troops to aid the victims in Burundi?”; “Would you support using United States government money to aid the victims in Burundi?”).

Support for intervention. Eight items assessed support for intervention from four different bystander groups. Two items were asked for the ingroup and three different outgroups (“I believe that [NATO/the European Union/the United Nations/ the United States] should intervene in Burundi”; “I believe that [NATO/the European Union/the United Nations/the United States] has more power than anyone else to send help and volunteers to those affected in Burundi”). The four item pairs were presented in random order, and the two pairs for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) loaded on the same factor (M = 6.26, SD = 1.58, α = .74), whereas ingroup/the United States (M = 4.99, SD = 1.95, α = .66) and EU (M = 5.38, SD = 1.71, α = .61) loaded on separate factors of their own.

Ingroup attachment and glorification. Two eight-item scales by Roccas et al. (2006) were adapted to American identity (as in Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner et al., 2010) to assess attachment to (M = 6.20, SD = 1.89, α = .94) and glorification of (M = 4.64, SD = 1.58, α = .86) the United States.

Conservatism (M = 4.11, SD = 2.10, α = .93). Four items measured conservatism on a scale from liberal/left to conservative/right: “In general, I am . . .”; “Regarding economic issues (e.g., taxation, public spending), I am . . .”; “Regarding social issues (e.g., gay rights, multiculturalism), I am . . .”; and “Regarding U.S. foreign relations (i.e., relations of the United States with other countries in the world), I am . . .”

Following others (e.g., Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010; Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2006; Leidner et al., 2010), the intended moderators and covariates were administered at the end rather than the beginning of the study to avoid making participants suspicious of the study goal.

Results

To test the moderation hypothesis, I conducted moderated regression analyses with condition, attachment and glorification (standardized, not affected themselves by condition; see Supplemental Materials; Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) as independent variables (IVs), all their interaction terms, and conservatism (not affected itself by condition; see Supplemental Materials) as covariate. Although there were no main effects of condition, to be exhaustive I reported means for each experimental condition in Table 1 and correlations between dependent variables in Table 2.

| Table 1. Means (Standard Deviations) by Condition (Study 1). |
|------------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                  | No genocide | Maybe genocide | Genocide |
| Guilt            | 5.08 (2.23)  | 5.16 (2.10)  | 4.89 (2.26) |
| Support for ingroup intervention | 5.16 (1.82)  | 5.15 (2.00)  | 4.94 (1.79) |
| Support for outgroup intervention (NATO/UN) | 6.21 (1.53)  | 6.49 (1.38)  | 6.08 (1.62) |
| Support for outgroup intervention (EU) | 5.32 (1.63)  | 5.63 (1.65)  | 5.24 (1.49) |
| Willingness to help | 5.92 (1.35)  | 5.82 (1.63)  | 5.54 (1.62) |

Note. NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UN = United Nations.

| Table 2. Correlations Among Dependent Variables (Study 1). |
|------------------|---------------------|
|                  | Support for outgroup intervention (NATO/UN) | Support for outgroup intervention (EU) | Willingness to help |
| Guilt            | .15                 | .09                  | .61                   | .60                   |
| Support for ingroup intervention | .010               | .13                  | <.001                 | <.001                 |
| Support for outgroup intervention (NATO/UN) | .45               | .22                  | <.001                 | <.001                 |
| Support for outgroup intervention (EU) | .25               | .19                  | <.001                 | .002                  |
| Willingness to help | .65               | <.001                 |                       |                       |

Note. NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UN = United Nations. The first value in each cell are correlation coefficients (r), the second value in each cell are significance values (p).

Guilt. The moderated regression on guilt yielded a significant main effect of conservatism, F(1, 264) = 16.79, p = .000, η² = .06, and a significant three-way interaction of condition, attachment, and glorification, F(2, 264) = 7.21, p = .000, η² = .05. When glorification was high (and attachment as well; 1 SD above the mean), the genocide label decreased guilt (M_no-genocide = 6.01; M_genocide = 4.90), t(264) = −2.50, p = .010. When attachment was high (and glorification low), however, the genocide label and the possibility of genocide both somewhat increased guilt (M_no-genocide = 3.98; M_genocide = 5.63; M_maybe-genocide = 5.73), t(264) > −1.68, ps < .100. No other comparisons or effects reached significance.

Support for ingroup intervention. The three-way interaction of condition, attachment, and glorification was significant, F(2, 264) = 6.00, p = .003, η² = .04. The genocide label decreased support marginally significantly at high levels of
glorification (and attachment; \( M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 5.85, M_{\text{genocide}} = 4.99 \)), \( t(264) = -1.83, p = .068 \). It led to a marginal increase in support, however, when attachment was high (and glorification low; \( M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 4.26, M_{\text{genocide}} = 5.29 \)), \( t(264) = 1.84, p = .065 \). No other comparisons or effects reached significance.

**Support for outgroup intervention.** With respect to intervention from outside the United States, there were no significant interaction effects with condition on support for NATO/UN or EU intervention, \( F(2, 264) < 2.30, ps > .100 \). The only significant effects were the significant main effect of conservatism on support for NATO/UN intervention, \( F(1, 264) = 4.91, p = .028, \eta^2 = .02, \beta = -.23 \); the marginally significant main effect of attachment on support for NATO/UN intervention, \( F(1, 264) = 2.73, p = .100, \eta^2 = .01, \beta = .22 \); the marginally significant interaction of attachment by glorification on support for NATO/UN intervention, \( F(1, 264) = 3.80, p = .052, \eta^2 = .01 \); the significant main effect of conservatism on support for EU intervention, \( F(1, 264) = 12.50, p = .001, \eta^2 = .05, \beta = -.38 \); and the marginally significant main effect of glorification on support for EU intervention, \( F(1, 264) = 3.83, p = .052, \eta^2 = .01, \beta = .28 \).

**Willingness to help.** The main effects of attachment (\( \beta = .24 \)) and conservatism (\( \beta = -.23 \)) were marginally significant, \( F(1, 264) > 3.30, ps < .070, \eta^2s = .01 \), and so was the interaction of attachment by glorification, \( F(1, 264) = 2.94, p = .088, \eta^2 = .01 \). Again, a significant three-way interaction of condition, attachment, and glorification emerged, \( F(2, 264) = 3.94, p = .021, \eta^2 = .03 \). The genocide label and the possibility of genocide both led to a marginally significant decrease in willingness to help (\( M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 6.36, M_{\text{genocide}} = 5.62, M_{\text{maybe-genocide}} = 5.70 \)) at high levels of glorification (and attachment), \( t(264) < -1.80, ps = .080 \). People who were weakly attached to and weakly glorifying of the United States were slightly less willing to help when faced with genocide (\( M = 5.40 \)) as opposed to nongenocide (\( M = 5.82 \)), \( t(264) = -1.88, p = .060 \), whereas the same was not true for people high on either attachment or glorification while low on the other. No other effects reached significance.

**Mediational analyses.** To test the mediating role of guilt, I conducted moderated mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (CIs), using condition as IV, guilt as a mediator, glorification and attachment as moderators, conservatism as covariate, and support for U.S. intervention and willingness to help as dependent variables (DVIs), respectively. In line with my mediational hypothesis, guilt mediated the effect of condition on both support for U.S. intervention and willingness to help when attachment and glorification were both high (but not in any other combination of the two)—as indicated by significant indirect effects (for support for U.S. intervention: boot coefficient = -.60, CI = [-1.40, -.025]; for willingness to help: boot coefficient = -.64, CI = [-1.46, -.027]). Alternative models (MacCallum, Wegener, Unchino, & Fabrigar, 1993) reflecting the rival hypothesis that the effect of condition on guilt when attachment and glorification are both high is mediated by support for U.S. intervention or willingness to help were not supported by the corresponding moderated mediation analysis, as in this analysis the indirect effects did not reach significance.

**Discussion**

Study 1 provided support for the hypothesis that the g-word affects public support for intervention and willingness to help. Generally consistent with the moderation hypothesis, those strongly glorifying and strongly attached to their ingroup showed weaker support for intervention when faced with genocide (rather than nongenocide), whereas those who were strongly attached to and weakly glorifying their ingroup showed stronger support for intervention when faced with genocide (rather than nongenocide). Importantly, these effects on support for intervention only occurred for intervention by participants’ ingroup, but not for intervention by other groups (e.g., EU, NATO, UN). The reason for the decrease in support for U.S. intervention lay in a decrease in guilt over possible nonintervention at high levels of glorification (and attachment). Yet, a change in guilt did not seem to be the reason for the increase in support for intervention when attachment was high and glorification low.

Admittedly, these findings were less straightforward than anticipated, as the expected two-way interaction of g-word by glorification actually also depended on the level of attachment. Yet, overall these findings do support the hypothesis that the g-word affects public support for ingroup intervention differently, depending on people’s attachment to and glorification of the ingroup, and even when controlling for conservatism. As predicted, the presence of (high) glorification was critical for support for intervention to decrease, and the presence of (high) attachment was critical for support for intervention to increase. Yet, neither the presence of glorification nor that of attachment alone led to the emergence of their respective effects. In sum, both high glorification and high attachment were necessary but not sufficient for their respective effects to emerge.

Examining the patterns of the three-way interactions (see Figures 1-3), it was apparent that the decrease in support for ingroup intervention, help, and guilt among those strongly glorifying and attached to their ingroup was not driven by lower scores in the genocide condition, but by higher scores in the no-genocide condition. For strongly attached but weakly glorifying ingroup members, however, the increase in support for intervention, help, and guilt was driven by higher scores in the genocide condition, not by lower scores in the no-genocide condition. This pattern was in line with my hypothesis that high glorifiers are generally (when a conflict does not constitute genocide) more supportive of intervention and help, but for self-serving reasons or ulterior motives (e.g., national interest). Yet, when a conflict does constitute genocide and intervention is usually driven more...
clearly by humanitarian reasons (Choi, 2013), high glorifiers became less supportive of intervention (cf. Wolff, 2006)—at least those who were also strongly attached to the ingroup. The increase in support for intervention in genocide among strongly attached but weakly glorifying people, however, may indeed have been motivated by more humanitarian motives. This explanation was further supported by the finding that high glorifiers (who were also strongly attached) decreased their support for intervention only with respect to U.S. intervention, but not with respect to intervention by other groups. Moreover, it was in line with the values held by people who are strongly rather than weakly glorifying their ingroup (cf. Roccas et al., 2010).

Study 2

Study 2 had multiple goals. First, to further address the tentative conclusion of Study 1, that ingroup glorification was positively related to intervention in genocidal conflicts, but not or even negatively related to intervention in nongenocidal conflicts. Second, to replicate and consolidate the moderating effects found in Study 1, even when controlling for gender, level of education, religion, and close ties to ingroup military personnel—all of which have been shown to be associated with foreign policy attitudes and thus may have been confounded with findings in Study 1. Finally, it addressed the limitation of Study 1 that some participants, despite having understood the news reports they read (as established by the manipulation checks in the pretest, see Supplemental Materials), may not have agreed with the assessment in the news report as to whether or not the conflict constitutes genocide, and that such disagreement may even have varied by condition (e.g., more disagreement in the no-genocide than in the genocide condition).

Method

Participants. The experiment was conducted online with a sample of 214 people recruited through MTurk. Six participants not born in the United States, 4 who spent significantly more time reading the manipulation material than other participants (indicating that they were interrupted during the study), and 19 who misunderstood or did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation material (as indicated by incorrect answers to questions checking core facts of the manipulation material) were excluded from subsequent analyses, leaving 185 participants (82 males, 103 females, \( M_{\text{age}} = 34.91, SD = 12.78 \)) for subsequent analyses. Again, the number of excluded participants did not significantly differ between conditions, and I retained an almost identical number of participants in each condition (92 and 93, respectively).

Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 1, with a few small adjustments. Because the differences in Study 1 were strongest between the “genocide” and the “no-genocide” conditions, the “maybe-genocide” condition falling in between,
Study 2 used only the former two conditions. The measures for support for ingroup intervention ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 2.12$, $\alpha = .64$), ingroup attachment ($M = 6.17$, $SD = 2.02$, $\alpha = .95$), and ingroup glorification ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.52$, $\alpha = .85$) were identical to Study 1. Before filling these out, participants responded to an item measuring their agreement with the labeling of the

Figure 2. Support for ingroup intervention as a function of ingroup attachment and glorification (Study 1).

Figure 3. Willingness to use personal or ingroup resources to help as a function of ingroup attachment and glorification (Study 1).
conflict according to the news report they read (“In my overall opinion, the conclusion of the U.S. commission was correct”; $M = 5.85, SD = 2.70$). At the end of the study, participants indicated their gender, level of education, religion, and whether or not they themselves or close family members served in the U.S. Army.

**Results**

I conducted a moderated regression analysis with manipulation as categorical IV, attachment and glorification (standardized, not affected themselves by condition; see Supplemental Materials) as continuous IVs, and all interaction terms. In addition, I entered gender, level of education, religion, and close ties to U.S. military personnel as dichotomous covariates. Furthermore, to test whether the effects found in Study 1 held when taking into account people’s (dis-)agreement with the news report, I added agreement as an additional covariate. Because agreement was itself affected by condition (see Supplemental Materials), it was also necessary to add the two-way interaction of condition by agreement to the model (cf. Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004). Even when controlling for all these variables, this analysis yielded a (marginally) significant interaction of condition by glorification, $F(1, 159) = 3.00, p = .083, \eta^2 = .02$. Corroborating the assumption that glorification is positively related to support for intervention for nongenocidal conflicts but not for genocidal conflicts, the slope of glorification was significant in the no-genocide condition, $\beta = .83, t = 2.99, p = .003$, but nonsignificant in the genocide condition, $\beta = .15, t = 0.52, p = .606$. Similar to Study 1, the genocide label decreased support for ingroup intervention at high levels of glorification ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 5.94; M_{\text{genocide}} = 4.79$), $t = -1.95, p = .053$, whereas it did not do so at low levels of glorification ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 4.49; M_{\text{genocide}} = 4.30$), $t = 0.33, p = .739$. This result essentially replicated the moderating effect of Study 1, with the exception that here it held for all high glorifiers, regardless of their level of attachment (see Figure 4). In other words, here glorification was both necessary and sufficient for the negative effect of the genocide label to emerge. When running the same analysis without the four demographic covariates, the three-way interaction of Study 1 was replicated with marginal significance, $F(1, 159) = 3.34, p = .069$.

Further (marginally) significant effects were the main effect of glorification, $F(1, 159) = 6.02, p = .015, \eta^2 = .04, \beta = .49$; the main effect of attachment, $F(1, 159) = 3.04, p = .083, \eta^2 = .02, \beta = .22$; the two-way interaction of manipulation by attachment, $F(1, 159) = 4.18, p = .043, \eta^2 = .03$; and the two-way interaction of manipulation by agreement with the United States’s conclusion of whether or not the conflict constituted genocide, $F(1, 159) = 5.90, p = .016, \eta^2 = .04$. Participants with low attachment reported significantly weaker support for intervention when the conflict was labeled genocide ($M = 3.79$) rather than not ($M = 5.22$), $t = -2.14, p = .034$, whereas participants with high attachment did not differ in their support between conditions ($M_s = 5.45$ and 5.09 for genocide and no-genocide, respectively), $t = 0.65, p = .517$. Participants who disagreed with (not) labeling the conflict genocide (1 $SD$ below the mean) reported significantly
weaker support for intervention in the genocide condition (M = 3.94) than in the no-genocide condition (M = 5.58), t = −2.27, p = .025, whereas participants who agreed with (not) labeling the conflict genocide (1 SD above the mean) did not significantly differ in their support for intervention between conditions (Ms = 5.25 and 4.79 for genocide and no-genocide condition, respectively), t = 0.92, p = .357. All other effects did not reach significance, Fs < 2.75, ps > .100, η2s < .04. The main effect of condition was not significant (Mno-genocide = 5.25, SDno-genocide = 2.10; Mgenocide = 5.17, SDbgenocide = 2.11).

Discussion

Study 2 again confirmed that the g-word affects support for intervention. Specifically, it decreased it among those who strongly glorified the ingroup by eliminating the usually positive relationship between glorification and support for conflict intervention. This finding again supports the hypothesis that for high glorifiers, conflict intervention is driven by self-/ingroup interest (e.g., gains for the ingroup from intervening in a conflict; cf. Roccas et al., 2010)—an interest that genocidal conflicts usually do not satisfy. These effects even held when controlling for gender, religion, education, and military affiliation. Remarkably, the interaction between manipulation and glorification rendered the effects of these covariates nonsignificant, indicating that it is this interaction that explains any of these covariates’ effects we might otherwise observe. While the two-way interaction found in Study 2 did not perfectly replicate the three-way interaction found in Study 1, when dropping the covariates from the analysis, rendering the analysis identical to that in Study 1, the three-way interaction found in Study 1 did replicate with marginal significance in Study 2. Furthermore, the two-way interaction found in Study 2 directly supported my hypothesis, without needing further qualification by attachment. Interestingly, the effects among high glorifiers also held for those who strongly agreed with their ingroup’s assessment that a given conflict constitutes genocide. In other words, even when people strongly agree with the assessment that a conflict constitutes genocide, they may decrease their support to stop it—if they strongly glorify the ingroup. Although this is to be expected given the “self-interest hypothesis,” it renders the use of the g-word to combat the collapse of compassion even more problematic.

Study 3

Study 3 aimed yet again to reproduce the general effect of collapsing compassion and decreased support among high glorifiers, while also testing the role that perceived moral/legal obligation to intervene plays. As briefly mentioned earlier, some argue that moral/legal obligation to intervene should counteract the collapse of compassion and lack of intervention. Yet, I hypothesized that the psychological perception of moral/legal obligation to intervene should also be undermined by the collapse of compassion, and therefore be part and parcel of the mechanism underlying high glorifiers’ lack of support for intervention, rather than an antidote for this mechanism.

Method

Participants. The experiment was conducted online with a sample of 253 people recruited through MTurk. Eighteen participants not born in the United States, 4 who spent significantly more time reading the manipulation material than other participants (indicating that they were interrupted during the study), 39 who misunderstood or did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation material (as indicated by incorrect answers to questions checking core facts of the manipulation material), and 6 multivariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) were excluded from subsequent analyses, leaving 190 participants (77 males, 113 females, M age = 38.38, SD = 13.47) for subsequent analyses. Again, the number of excluded participants did not significantly differ between conditions, and I retained fairly equal numbers of participants in each (98 and 92, respectively).

Procedure. The design was similar to Study 2, with only the no-genocide and the genocide conditions. The measures for support for intervention (M = 5.72, SD = 2.40, α = .65), willingness to help (M = 6.04, SD = 1.73, α = .82), guilt (M = 5.18, SD = 2.49, α = .97), ingroup attachment (M = 6.26, SD = 1.96, α = .95), and ingroup glorification (M = 4.71, SD = 1.65, α = .89) were identical to Study 2. One additional, five-item measure assessed participants’ perception of the extent to which their ingroup was obligated to intervene in conflicts it was not involved in itself (e.g., “The U.S. has a legal obligation to intervene in humanitarian crises in other countries.” “The U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene in humanitarian crises in other countries.” M = 4.31, SD = 1.54, α = .79). The demographics included the same measure of conservatism as in Study 1 as well as the additional demographic questions in Study 2.

Results

Although there were no main effects of condition, to be exhaustive, I reported means for each experimental condition in Table 3 and correlations between dependent variables in Table 4.

Support for ingroup intervention. Using condition as categorical IV, ingroup attachment and ingroup glorification (standardized, not affected themselves by condition; see Supplemental Materials) as continuous IVs, and conservatism (not affected itself by condition; see Supplemental Materials) as covariate in a general linear model (GLM), both the two-way interaction of condition by glorification,
Willingness to help. The interactions of condition by glorification, F(1, 181) = 6.00, p = .015, η² = .03, and condition by glorification and attachment, F(1, 181) = 10.48, p = .001, η² = .05, were significant. Unpacking the two-way interaction, the genocide label significantly decreased willingness to help at high levels of glorification (M_no-genocide = 6.26, M_genocide = 5.13), t(181) = 2.27, p = .025, whereas it tended to increase willingness to help at low levels of glorification (M_no-genocide = 5.78, M_genocide = 6.31), t(181) = −1.38, p = .170 (see Figure 7). The three-way interaction further revealed that the genocide label (somewhat) increased willingness to help when attachment was high regardless of the level of glorification (M_no-genocide = 5.83, M_genocide = 6.99, at low levels of glorification; M_no-genocide = 5.87, M_genocide = 6.79, at high levels of glorification), ts(181) = −1.85 and −2.39, respectively, ps = .066 and .018, respectively. When glorification was high but attachment low, however, the genocide label decreased willingness to help (M_no-genocide = 6.66, M_genocide = 3.44), t(181) = 3.57, p = .001. When glorification and attachment were both low, the label had no effect (M_no-genocide = 5.72, M_genocide = 5.61), t(181) = 0.33, p = .740 (see Figure 8). The condition by attachment interaction was also significant, F(1, 181) = 15.30, p < .001, η² = .08. The genocide label increased willingness to help at high levels of attachment (M_no-genocide = 5.85, M_genocide = 6.90), t(181) = −2.66, p = .008, whereas it decreased willingness to help at low levels of attachment (M_no-genocide = 6.14, M_genocide = 4.63), t(181) = 3.17, p = .002. The main effects of attachment, F(1, 181) = 8.33, p = .004, η² = .04, β = .51, and conservatism, F(1, 181) = 16.81, p < .001, η² = .09, β = −.56, were both significant. All other effects were not, Fs(1, 181) < 1.50, ps > .200.

Guilt. The three-way interaction of condition by attachment and glorification trended toward significance, F(1, 181) = 2.11, p = .148, η² = .01. The genocide label (marginally) significantly increased guilt when attachment was high regardless of the level of glorification (M_no-genocide = 4.70, M_genocide = 6.47, at low levels of glorification; M_no-genocide = 5.45, M_genocide = 6.83, at high levels of glorification), ts(181) = −1.96 and −2.49, respectively, ps = .051 and .014, respectively. When glorification was high but attachment low, however, the genocide label decreased guilt (M_no-genocide = 5.70, M_genocide = 3.11), t(181) = 1.99, p = .048. When glorification and attachment were both low, the label had no effect (M_no-genocide = 4.32, M_genocide = 3.97), t(181) = 0.70, p = .484 (see Figure 9). The condition by attachment interaction was significant, F(1, 181) = 9.32, p = .003, η² = .05. The genocide label increased guilt at high levels of attachment (M_no-genocide = 5.04, M_genocide = 6.63), t(181) = −2.81, p = .006, whereas it decreased guilt at low levels of attachment (M_no-genocide = 4.94, M_genocide = 3.58), t(181) = 1.97, p = .053. The main effects of attachment, F(1, 181) = 9.90, p = .002, η² = .05, β = .79, and conservatism, F(1, 181) = 13.86, p < .001, η² = .07, β = −.74, were significant. All other effects were not, Fs(1, 181) < 1.80, ps > .180.

Perceived moral/legal obligation. The interactions of condition by glorification, F(1, 181) = 4.97, p = .027, η² = .03, and condition by glorification and attachment, F(1, 181) = 6.47, p = .012, η² = .03, were significant. Unpacking the two-way interaction,
the genocide label decreased perceived moral/legal obligation at high levels of glorification ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 4.88, M_{\text{genocide}} = 3.91), t(181) = 2.16, p = .032$, but not at low levels of glorification ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 3.68, M_{\text{genocide}} = 4.07), t(181) = -1.14, p = .258$ (see Figure 10). The three-way interaction revealed that this decrease at high levels of glorification only occurred when attachment was low ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 5.14, M_{\text{genocide}} = 2.75), t(181) = 2.92, p = .004$; all other simple effects were not significant (see Figure 11). The interaction of condition by attachment was also significant, $F(1, 181) = 8.09, p = .005, \eta^2 = .04$. The
genocide label decreased perceived moral/legal obligation at low levels of attachment ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 4.47$, $M_{\text{genocide}} = 3.40$), $t(181) = 2.48$, $p = .014$, whereas it somewhat increased perceived moral/legal perception at high levels of attachment ($M_{\text{no-genocide}} = 3.97$, $M_{\text{genocide}} = 4.58$), $t(181) = -1.71$, $p = .089$. The main effect of glorification trended toward significance,
$F(1, 181) = 2.59, p = .110, \eta^2 = .01, \beta = .26,$ and was qualified by an interaction with attachment, $F(1, 181) = 5.75, p = .018, \eta^2 = .03,$ such that glorification predicted perceived moral/legal obligation significantly positively at high levels of attachment, $t(181) = 3.04, p = .003,$ but not at low levels of attachment, $t(181) = 0.07, p = .945.$ The main effect of conservatism was also significant, $F(1, 181) = 10.45, p = .002, \eta^2 = .05, \beta = -.40,$ whereas the other effects were not, $Fs(1, 181) < 1.60, ps > .200.$

**Figure 9.** Guilt over possible ingroup nonintervention as a function of ingroup attachment and glorification (Study 3).

**Figure 10.** Perceived moral/legal obligation as a function of ingroup glorification (Study 3).
Mediation analyses. To test the mediating roles of guilt and perceived moral/legal obligation, I conducted moderated mediation analyses as in Study 1 (i.e., with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% CIs, using condition as IV, guilt and legal obligation as mediators, glorification and attachment as moderators, conservatism as a covariate, and support for U.S. intervention and
willingness to help as DVs, respectively). Both guilt and moral/legal obligation mediated the effect of condition on both support for U.S. intervention and willingness to help when glorification was high while attachment was low—as indicated by significant indirect effects (guilt: for support for U.S. intervention: boot coefficient = −.98, CI = [−2.35, −0.11]; for willingness to help: boot coefficient = −.66, CI = [−1.56, −0.03]; moral/legal obligation: for support for U.S. intervention: boot coefficient = −1.07, CI = [−2.53, −0.21]; for willingness to help: boot coefficient = −.82, CI = [−1.83, −0.20]). Alternative models reflecting the rival hypothesis that the effects of condition on guilt and moral/legal obligation when glorification is high while attachment is low are mediated by support for U.S. intervention or willingness to help were not supported by the corresponding moderated mediation analyses, as in these analyses the indirect effects did not reach significance.

Although both mediators worked, I had hypothesized that moral/legal obligation should be a consequence of collapsed compassion (here measured by guilt). Therefore, I also tested sequential mediation. As Hayes’s bootstrapped mediation macro does not provide for a test of moderated sequential mediation, I split the data set by condition and tested sequential mediation in each condition separately, with the interaction of glorification by attachment as the IV, guilt as Step 1 mediator, perceived moral/legal obligation as Step 2 mediator, support for ingroup intervention and willingness to help as DVs, respectively, and attachment, glorification, and conservatism as covariates (Hayes, 2013, Model 6). As predicted, this mediation was significant in the genocide condition (for support for ingroup intervention: boot coefficient = .06, CI = [0.003, 0.256]; for willingness to help; boot coefficient = .03, CI = [0.001, 0.138]), but not in the no-genocide condition (for support for ingroup intervention: boot coefficient = −.04, CI = [−0.218, 0.074]; for willingness to help: boot coefficient = −.04, CI = [−0.181, 0.060]).

Discussion

Study 3 again found a decrease in support for ingroup intervention and willingness to help at high levels of glorification (as per the two-way interaction of condition by glorification, as in Study 2, and the qualifying three-way interaction of condition by glorification and attachment, as in Study 1), and an increase at high levels of attachment. Although the effect on guilt only trended, its mediating role in the aforementioned decrease was replicated yet again. Furthermore, rather than mitigating the collapse of compassion, perceived moral/legal obligation was also eroded by it, turning into an accomplice in the decrease of support for ingroup intervention and willingness to help among high glorifiers.

Statistical Power and Meta-Analytical Results

A post hoc power analysis using the G*Power program (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) revealed that on the basis of the average effect size, the statistical power for the hypothesized interaction effects was 0.55 in Study 1, 0.66 in Study 2, and 0.67 in Study 3. Although the power in each study exceeded the average power of 0.35 in social-psychological studies (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Marszalek, Barber, Kohlhart, & Holmes, 2011), and was within range of the average power of 0.65 in studies published in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (PSPB), and Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JESP) (Fraleys & Vazire, 2014), it was below the recommended benchmark of 0.80 (Cohen, 1977). Furthermore, some results reached only marginal significance. For these reasons, I also combined comparable data from all studies, leading to a more than satisfactory power of 0.98, and allowing me to obtain more robust significance values and effect sizes for the hypothesized interaction of condition by glorification. As willingness to help, guilt, and perceived moral/legal obligation were not measured in all studies, I focused on the main DV of support for ingroup intervention. The predicted effect of condition by glorification was homogeneous across studies, \(Q(2) = .35, p = .841, f^2 = 0.00\) (cf. Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014). Most importantly, it was significant, \(F(1, 549) = 4.28, p = .039, \eta^2 = .01\), with the expected simple effects and slopes (see Figure 12). This interaction was not qualified by the three-way interaction. The main effects of glorification and attachment were significant as well. Thus, the meta-analytical results further, and more conclusively, supported my moderation hypothesis.

General Discussion

At the outset of this contribution, I raised several questions. Can the label “genocide” decrease distant bystanders’ support for intervention in a humanitarian crisis? If so, how, why, and for whom? The answer to the first question is quite clear. Yes, the genocide label can affect distant bystanders’ public support for intervention (Studies 1-3). The answer to the question of who is more complex: It decreased support especially among strongly glorifying ingroup members (Studies 1-3), whereas it tended to increase support among strongly attached ingroup members (Studies 1 and 3). Importantly, it did so even when controlling for conservatism (Studies 1 and 3), gender, religion, military affiliation, and level of education (Study 2). It even decreased support for those strongly glorifying ingroup members who wholeheartedly agreed with their government’s assessment that a conflict constituted genocide (Study 2). The answer to the question of how/why lies in an increase in the collapse of compassion, as evidenced by a decrease in guilt over possible nonintervention among strongly glorifying ingroup members (Studies 1 and 3), and a subsequent decrease in perceived moral/legal obligation to intervene (Study 3). While not all three studies found the predicted condition by glorification interaction, two of them did (Studies 1 and 3), and two found that this interaction further depended on the
level of attachment (Studies 2 and 3). Yet, given the high degree of social desirability and image concerns elicited by questions about genocide intervention, which worked against the detection of the predicted effects among high glorifiers, the degree of reproducibility of the effects is rather remarkable. Although it is not entirely clear when attachment counteracts the effects of glorification and when it does not (or even exacerbates them), it seems safe to say that high glorification is necessary, if not always sufficient, for the collapse of compassion to occur and result in a decrease in support for intervention. Without high glorification (i.e., low glorification), the g-word had, if anything, positive effects on support for intervention. Furthermore, results from the combined analysis across all studies confirmed the predicted two-way interaction of condition by glorification across studies.

Importantly, all studies engaged participants in a situation of intergroup helping in a highly ecological way: through media exposure (see Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). Furthermore, utilizing noncollege adult samples, this research avoided the external validity problems of college samples, a shortcoming particularly important in conflict research (see Ginges et al., 2011; Gromet et al., 2012; Lillic & Janoff-Bulman, 2007). In doing so, this research heeds the recent call for “more immersive or real situations” in social-psychological research (see Ginges et al., 2011; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2012) and stands in the long tradition of bystander research, which has been commended for its use of real emergencies and helping behavior. Although some effects reached only marginal significance and the exact interplay between glorification and attachment was less robust than expected, the basic pattern of the findings—that of a decrease in support of intervention among high glorifiers in some shape or form—was reproduced multiple times.

The focus on direct (as opposed to conceptual) replications (cf. Simons, 2014), by definition, leaves in doubt the generalizability of the effects. First and foremost, they may not occur outside the United States, or for crises with victims very similar to the distant bystanders. Yet, research on glorification and intergroup processes has found effects consistently across countries (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010). Thus, it is more likely than not that the effects of glorification observed here will generalize. Of course, this likelihood depends also on the meaning of the g-word in other countries. For example, it has been argued that countries with a history of (genocidal) victimization are more likely to intervene in genocide elsewhere. This and other arguments lead back to the relationship or similarity between victims and bystanders. Yet, the materials used in these studies were highly ecologically valid and prototypical of modern humanitarian crises—in fact identical to news reporting of the Darfur crisis—where victims and the most powerful bystanders are rather dissimilar. Therefore, although the findings may not generalize to some crises that could occur, they are generalizable to the majority of crises that do occur in modern times, and likely also to those bystander groups that are in the best position to intervene.

I believe the findings of the present contribution, although certainly disappointing for those who hoped the g-word would fix the recurring lack of genocide intervention, are very important and informative. A few points are especially noteworthy.

The Power of Words

Although disappointing, there is at least some good news here. First, the g-word can affect people. Although its effects seem to be negative on some people, there is also indication that they can be positive, for instance, for those who are strongly attached but do not glorify their country (Studies 1 and 3). Second, even the fact that its effects are negative on some people may contain some good news. It may be easier to reverse this effect into a positive one than to generate a positive effect out of nothing. Finally and similarly, the fact that the collapse of compassion, for instance, in terms of guilt, plays a role points to the possible remedy: prevent those who are motivated to decrease their guilt from doing so, so that then they may support intervention, even if only for their own emotional sake rather than altruistic care for the targets of genocide. This could be achieved by rendering the option of not helping more costly than the option of helping, even through language. Reflexive discourse strategies have been shown to elicit guilt and prosocial behavior in response to foreign policy crises, for instance, through pointing out to bystander countries how their inaction is at odds with their own self-image (Steele, 2007; see also Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, & Nichols, 2012). Such strategies may be particularly effective for high glorifiers (cf. van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013).

The Role of Attachment and Glorification

The finding that the effects of the genocide label are moderated by glorification and attachment is especially important, as their rather opposite effects could well cancel each other out in practice—although it appears that as predicted, the effects of glorification are larger and more consistent and persistent than those of attachment. Political decision makers and leaders are often strongly glorifying their ingroup, and/or have difficulty going against the will of their strongly glorifying constituents, and therefore may be more likely not to intervene when a conflict is labeled genocide, even though other constituents may advocate intervention more strongly when faced with genocide. To address this situation, it is crucial to understand why glorification plays such an important role in the effects of the g-word on support for intervention. The reason, as explained earlier, may lie in the value systems that ingroup members subscribe to. According to Roccas et al. (2010), one of the central values high glorifiers hold is that of security. Yet, the security perspective high glorifiers take (i.e., that genocide intervention is more risky than non-intervention) can possibly be used to the advantage of
that should be prosecuted by an international war crimes tribunal, a U.S. commission has said. The commission, charged with investigating the violence that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 1.8 million people, found that “most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians” and constitute genocide.

“In particular, the commission found that government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Burundi,” the commission said in its 176-page report. “These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.”

The conflict in Burundi began intensifying in 2003, when two minority groups took up arms against what they believed to be the Arab-dominated government’s discrimination against Black Africans.

The report also said Burundi’s government forces played a key role in the armed conflict, and that the National Security and Intelligence Service had a central role and “is responsible for the design, planning and implementation of policies associated with the conflict.”

The commission’s investigative team remained in Burundi for 4 months and found that the atrocities continued even as it met with Burundi officials.

The U.S. State Department has estimated that more than 70,000 people have died in Burundi, the result of the violence and malnutrition plaguing the area. Human rights groups say progovernment Arab militias have forced more than one million Black Africans from their homes and killed thousands.

The conflict has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people within Burundi, with another 200,000 fleeing to neighboring Tanzania, according to U.S. State Department figures.

The commission asserts genocide has been committed in Burundi and that the government of Burundi and the militias bear responsibility.

The United States has not yet announced its plans for handling the situation.

Maybe-genocide condition (diversions from the genocide condition in bold). The government of Burundi and militia forces acted together in committing widespread atrocities in Burundi that should be prosecuted by an international war crimes tribunal, but it is unclear whether or not the violent acts amount to genocide, a U.S. commission has said. The commission, charged with investigating the violence that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 1.8 million people, found that “most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians.”

“In particular, the commission found that government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual

Appendix

Manipulation Materials

Genocide condition. The government of Burundi and militia forces have acted together in committing genocide in Burundi

Alternatives to the G-Word

Of course, the question remains why the genocide label has seemingly been used successfully to increase support for intervention in cases such as post-Srebrenica Bosnia and Kosovo, despite my finding that it decreases support for intervention (among high glorifiers). This seeming discrepancy points to alternatives to the g-word, which may have co-occurred with the g-word in post-Srebrenica Bosnia and Kosovo. Maybe in these exemplary cases of genocide intervention, it was not the genocide label itself, but more visceral elements connected to it, such as media images and visceral analogies to the Holocaust, that caused the intervention (Strobel, 1997). At an even more fundamental level, maybe the unique nature of the term “genocide” should be abandoned. All the debates over the definition and use of the term genocide, triggered by and large by its assumed power to prompt action, may have mattered far less than people thought, because as shown by the Darfur case and the experimental evidence presented here, the term does not prompt action as easily as people think. As advocated by legal scholars, it may be worthwhile for (lay-)people to see other crimes that are in the same legal category as genocide (e.g., war crimes, crimes against humanity) as equally grave and action-worthy. Or, as suggested by Blum et al. (2007), intervention should be required even in response to a “potential genocide” rather than only in response to a “genocide beyond any doubt”—which may be a viable option, as the maybe-genocide condition did not erode support for intervention (Study 1). Although the finding that the g-word can discourage rather than encourage (some) people to support intervention may be hard to accept, it is crucial to adjust strategy when once-held beliefs turn out to be wrong. The hopes placed on the g-word should not necessarily be abandoned and can possibly even be salvaged (e.g., through guilt- or shame-inducing interventions). But it appears wise not to place our hopes on the g-word alone.
violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Burundi,” the commission said in its 176-page report. “These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.” Yet, the U.S. report could not conclude that genocide occurred.

The conflict in Burundi began intensifying in 2003, when two minority groups took up arms against what they believed to be the Arab-dominated government’s discrimination against Black Africans.

The report also said Burundi’s government forces played a key role in the armed conflict, and that the National Security and Intelligence Service had a central role and “is responsible for the design, planning and implementation of policies associated with the conflict.”

The commission’s investigative team remained in Burundi for 4 months and found that the atrocities continued even as it met with Burundi officials.

The U.S. State Department has estimated that more than 70,000 people have died in Burundi, the result of the violence and malnutrition plaguing the area. Human rights groups say progovernment Arab militias have forced more than one million Black Africans from their homes and killed thousands.

The conflict has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people within Burundi, with another 200,000 fleeing to neighboring Tanzania, according to U.S. State Department figures.

The commission asserts that the Burundian government has committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burundi, but did not conclude genocide occurred as well.

The United States has not yet announced its plans for handling the situation.

No-genocide condition (diversions from the genocide condition in bold). The government of Burundi and militia forces have acted together in committing widespread atrocities in Burundi that should be prosecuted by an international war crimes tribunal, but the violent acts do not amount to genocide, a U.S. commission has said. The commission, charged with investigating the violence that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 1.8 million people, found that “most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians,” but did not constitute genocide because there was no evidence of intent from the government to commit the crime of genocide.

“In particular, the commission found that government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Burundi,” the commission said in its 176-page report. “These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.” Even so, the commission concluded that the conflict did not seek to extinguish a race of people, as they found no evidence of genocidal intent by the government.

The conflict in Burundi began intensifying in 2003, when two minority groups took up arms against what they believed to be the Arab-dominated government’s discrimination against Black Africans.

The report also said Burundi’s government forces played a key role in the armed conflict, and that the National Security and Intelligence Service had a central role and “is responsible for the design, planning and implementation of policies associated with the conflict.”

The commission’s investigative team remained in Burundi for 4 months and found that the atrocities continued even as it met with Burundi officials.

The U.S. State Department has estimated that more than 70,000 people have died in Burundi, the result of the violence and malnutrition plaguing the area. Human rights groups say progovernment Arab militias have forced more than one million Black Africans from their homes and killed thousands.

The conflict has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people within Burundi, with another 200,000 fleeing to neighboring Tanzania, according to U.S. State Department figures.

However, the commission asserts that genocide has not been committed in Burundi, as the government of Burundi and the militias do not have a policy of genocide or genocidal intent.

The United States has not yet announced its plans for handling the situation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes
1. In all studies, results were virtually the same when controlling for participants’ basic demographics (e.g., country of birth, gender, age).
2. All results remain virtually the same when adding the same covariates as in Study 2 (i.e., age, gender, religion, level of education, ties to U.S. Armed Forces, conservatism) to the analytical models reported in Study 3.

Supplemental Material
The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb.sagepub.com/supplemental.

References


